Archdeacon Paley's View of the evidences of Christianity ...

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Book , V

ARCHDEACON PALEY'S

Part I

OP THE DIRECT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND WHEREIN IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EVIDENCE ALLEGED FOR OTHER MIRACLES 19

PROPOSITION I.

That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labors, dangers, and sufferings voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct 20

CHAP. V. — Observations on the preceding evidence 43

CHAP. VI— That the story, for which the first propagators of Christianity suffered, was miraculous 47

CHA.P. VII. — That it was, in the main, the story which we have

now proved, by indirect considerations 49

CHAP. VIII.— The same proved, from the authority of our historical

Scriptures 58

CHAP. IX.— -Of the authenticity of the historical Scriptures 67

CONTEXTS.

Sect. I.— Quotations of the historical Scriptures by ancient Christian writers 71

Sect. II. — Of the peculiar respect with which they were quoted 87

Sect. III.— The Scriptures were in very early times collected into a distinct volume 89

Sect. IV. — And distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect 92

Sect. V. — Were publicly read and expounded in the religious assemblies of the early Christians 93

Sect. VI.— Commentaries, &c. were anciently written upon the Scriptures 95

Sect. VII. — They were received by ancient Christians of different sects and persuasions 93

Sect. VIII.— The four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen Epistles of Saint Paul, the first Epistle of John, and the First of Peter, were received without doubt by those who doubted concerning the other books of our present canon 103

Sect. IX. — Our present Gospels were considered by the adversaries of Christianity, as containing the accounts upon which the religion was founded 106

Sect. X.— Formal catalogues of authentic Scriptures were published, in all which our present Gospels were included 109

Sect. XI.— The above propositions cannot be predicated of any of those books which are commonly called apocryphal books

of the New Testament 11

CHAP. X.— Recapitulation 11*

PROPOSITION II.

That there is not satisfactory evidence, that persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of those accounts 1 17

CHAP. I ib.

CHAP. II 129

PART n.

THE AUXILIARY EVII>EJfCES OF CHRISTIANITY*

CHAP. VIII. Conclusion . 255 B

A VIEW

OF

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

PREPARATORY CONSIDERATIONS.

I deem it unnecessary to prove, that mankind stood in need of a reveiation, because I have met with no serious person who thinks that, even under the Christian revelation, wc have too much light, or any degree of assurance, which is superfluous. I desire, moreover, that in judging of Christianity, it may be remembered, that the question lies between this religion and none : for if the Christian religion be not credible, no one, with whom we have to do, will support the pretensions of any other.

Suppose, then, the world we live in to have had a Creator ; suppose it to appear, from the predominant aim and tendency of the provisions and contrivances observable in the universe, that the Deity, when he formed it, consulted for the happiness of his sensitive creation ; suppose the disposition which dictated this counsel to continue ; suppose a part of the creation to have received faculties from their Maker, by which they are capable of rendering a moral obedience to his will, and of voluntarily pursuing any end for which he has designed them ; suppose the Creator to intend for these, his rational and accountable agents, a second state of existence, in w T hich their situation will be regulated by their behavior in the first state, by which supposition (and by no other) the objection to the divine government in not putting a difference between the good and the bad, and the id consistency of this confusion with the care and benevolence discoverable in the works of the Deity, is done away ; suppose it to be of the utmost importance to the subjects of this dispensation to know what is intended for them ; that is, suppose the knowledge of it to be highly conducive to the happiness of the species, a purpose which so many provisions of nature are calculated to promote ; suppose, nevertheless, almost the whole race, either by the imperfection of their faculties, the misfortune of their situation, or by the loss of some prior revelation, to want tins knowledge, and not to be likely without the aid of a new revelation to attain it: — under these circumstances, is it improbable that a revelation should be made ? is it incredible that God should interpose for such a purpose ? Suppose him to design for mankind a future state ; is it unlikely that he should acquaint him with it ?

Of the antecedent Credibility of Miracles.

Now in what way can a revelation be made but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive. Consequently in whatever degree it is probable, or not very improbable, that a revelation should be communicated to mankind at all ; in the same degree is it probable, or not very improbable, that miracles should be wrought Therefore when miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a revelation manifestly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things related, is no greater than the original improbability that such a revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it however to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to what extent, this argument is alleged. We do not assume he attributes of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, in or er to prove the reL-ity of miracles. The reality always mast be proved by evidence. We assert only that in miracles adduced in support of revelation, there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. And for the purpose of maintaining this assertion, we contend that the incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in attestation of a message from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that state, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable or improbable, of the two following propositions being true : namely, first, that a future state of existence should be destined by God for his human creation ; and, secondly, that being so destined, he should acquaint them with it. It is not necessary for our purpose, that these propositions be capable of proof, or even that by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable ; it is enough that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the divine power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no farther improbable than they are improbable), ought to be rejected at first sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence they be attested.

This is the prejudication we would resist. For to this length does a modern objection to miracles go, viz. that no human testimony can in any case render them credible. I think the reflection above tated, that if there be a revelation, there must be miracles, and hat under the circumstances in which the human species are placed, a revelation is not improbable, or not improbable in any great degree, to be a fair answer to the whole objection.

But since it is an objection which stands in the very threshold of our argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future reasoning upon the subject, it may be necessary, before we proceed farther, to examine the principle upon which it professes to be founded ; which principle is concisely this, That it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false.

Now there appears a small ambiguity in the term ' experience,' and in the phrases ' contrary to experience,' or ' contradicting experience,' which it may be necessary to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is then only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have existed at a time and place, at which time and place we being present did not perceive i to exist ; as if it should be asserted that, in a particular room, and a a particular hour of a certain day, a man was raised from the dead in which room, and at the time specified, we being present, an looking on, perceived no such event to have taken place. Here th assertion is contrary to experience, properly so called : and this is contrariety which no evidence can surmount. It matters nothin whether the fact be of a miraculous nature or not. But although this be the experience and the contrariety, which archbishop TilJotson alleged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And short of this, I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the term ' contrary to experience,' but one, viz. that of not having ourselves experienced any thing similar to the thing related, or such things not being generally experienced by others. I say ' not generally :' for to state concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to assume the subject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is that, if the thing were true, we should experience things similar to it, or that such things would be generally experienced. Suppose it then to be true that miracles were wrought on the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles could be repeated so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general experience ? Is it a probability approaching to certainty ? is it a probability of any great strengtn or force ? is it such as no evidence can encounter ? And yet this probability is the exact converse, and therefore the exact measure, of the improbability which arises from the want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human testimony.

It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in natural philosophy ; because when these are related, it is expected that under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow universally ; and in proportion as this expectation is justly entertained, the want of a corresponding experience negatives the history. But to expect concerning a miracle, that it should succeed upon a repetition, is to expect that which would make it cease to be a miracle, which is contrary to its nature as such, and would totally destroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought.

The force of experience, as an objection to miracles, is founded

B2

Paley^s Vieiv of the in the presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, of that if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general Has the necessity of this alternative been demonstrated \ Permit us to call the course of nature the agency of an intelligent Being; and is there any good reason for judging this state of the case to be probable ? Ought we not rather to expect that such a Being, on occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet that such occasions should return seldom ; that these interruptions consequently should be confined to the experience of a few ; that the want of it, therefore, in many, should be matter neither of surprise nor objection.

But as a continuation of the argument from experience, it is said that when we advance accounts of miracles, we assign effects without causes, or we attribute effects to causes inadequate to the purpose, or to causes of the operation of which we have no experience. Of what causes, we may ask, and of what effects does the objection speak? If it be answered, that when we ascribe the cure of the palsy to a touch, of blindness to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raising of the dead to a word, we lay ourselves open to this imputation ; we reply that we ascribe no such effects to such causes. We perceive no virtue or energy in these things more than in other things of the same kind. They are merely signs to connect the miracle with its end. The effect we ascribe simply to the volition of the Deity ; of whose existence and power, not to say of whose presence and agency, w r e have previous and in* dependent proof. We have therefore all we seek for in the works of rational agents, — a sufficient power and an adequate motive. In a word, once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not in credible.

Mr. Hume states the case of miracles to be a contest of opposite improbabilities ; that is to say, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false : and this I think a fair account of the controversy. But herein I remark a want of argumentative justice, that, in describing the improbability of miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation which result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity ; his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle, the importance of that end, and its subserviency to the plan pursued in the work of nature. As Mr. Hume has represented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occasions the most deserving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no assignable end whatever, or for an end confessedly trifling or pernicious. This surely cannot be a correct statement. In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every possible accumulation of historical proof, by telling us that we are not obliged to explain how the story of the evidence arose

Evidence of Christianity.

Now I think that we are obliged ; not, perhaps, to show by positive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothesis how it might, so happen. The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon ; the truth of the fact solves the phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to rest in ; and none, even by our adversaries, can be admitted, which is not inconsistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different kind of beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion, is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case, and if it produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible that they should be deceived ; if the governor of the country, hearing a rumor of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet ; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case ; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed ; if I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account; still, if Mr. Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now I undertake to say, that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe them, or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles, supported by strong apparent testimony, undoubtedly demand examination ; Mr. Hume has endeavored to fortify his argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to show, that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the Christian evidence. In these, however, consists the weight of his objection : in the principle itself, I am pei* suaded, there is none.

Part I

OF THE DIRECT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY AND WHEREIN IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EVIDENCE ALLEGED FOR OTHER MIRACLES.

The two propositions which I shall endeavor to establish are these :

I. That there is satisfactory evidence that many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labors, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely m consequence of their belief of those accounts ; and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct.

II. That there is not satisfactory evidence, that persons professing to be original witnesses of other miracles, in their nature as certain as these are, have ever acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and properly in consequence of their belief of these accounts.

The first of these propositions, as it forms the argument, will stand at the head of the following nine chapters.

PROPOSITION I.

4 There is satisfactory evidence that many, professing- to be original witnesses to the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labors, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of those accounts , and that they also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of con duct:

Chap. I

Evidence of the Sufferings of the First Propagators of Christianity, from the nature of the case.

To support this proposition, two points are necessary to be made out: first, that the Founder of the institution, his associates and immediate followers, acted the part which the proposition imputes to them : secondly, that they did so in attestation of the miraculous history recorded in our Scriptures, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth of this history.

Before we produce any particular testimony to the activity and sufferings which compose the subject of our first assertion, it will be proper to consider the degree of probability which the assertion derives from the nature of the case, that is, by inferences from those parts of the case w T hich, in point of fact, are on all hands acknowledged.

First, then, the Christian religion exists, and therefore by some means or other was established. Now it either owes the principle of its establishment, i. e. its first publication, to the activity of the Person who was the founder of the institution, and of those who were joined with him in the undertaking, or we are driven upon the strange supposition, that, although they might lie by, others would take it up ; although they were quiet and silent, other persons busied themselves in the success and propagation of their story. This is perfectly incredible. To me it appears little less than certain, that, if the first announcing of the religion by the Founder had not 1 een followed up by the zeal and industry of his immediate disciplts, the attempt must have expired in its birth [ nen as to the kin d and degree of exertion which was employed

Evidences of Christianity.

and the mode of life to which these persons submitted, we reasonably suppose it to be like that which we observe in all others who voluntarily become missionaries of a new faith. Frequent, earnest and laborious preaching, constantly conversing with religious persons upon religion, a sequestration from the common pleasures, engagements, and varieties of life, and an addiction to one serious object, compose the habits of such men. I do not say that this mode of life is without enjoyment, but I say that the enjoyment springs from sincerity. With a consciousness at the bottom of hollowness and falsehood, the fatigue and restraint would become insupportable. I am apt to behave that very few hypocrites engage in these undertakings ; or, however, persist in them long. Ordinarily speaking, nothing can overcome the indolence of mankind, the love which is natural to most tempers of cheerful society and cheerful scenes, or the desire which is common to all, of personal ease and freedom, but conviction.

Secondly, it is also highly probable, from the nature of the case, that the propagation of the new religion was attended with difficulty and danger. As addressed to the Jews, it was a system adverse not only to their habitual opinions, but to those opinions upon which their hopes, their partialities, their pride, their consolation, was founded. This people, with or without reason, had worked themselves into a persuasion, that some signal and greatly advantageous change was to be effected in the condition of their country, by the agency of a long-promised messenger from heaven.* The rulers of the Jews, their leading sect, their priesthood, had been the authors of this persuasion to the common people ; so that it was not merely the conjecture of theoretical divines, or the secret expectation of a few recluse devotees, but it was become the popular hope and passion, and like all popular opinions, undoubting, and impatient of contradiction. They clung to this hope under every misfortune of their country, and with more tenacity as their dangers or calamities increased. To find, therefore, that expectations so gratifying were to be worse than disappointed ; that they were to end in the diffusion of a mild unambitious religion, which, instead of victories and triumphs, instead of exalting their nation and institution above the rest of the world, was to advance those whom they despised to an equality with themselves, in those very points of comparison in which they most valued their own distinction, could be no very releasing discovery to a Jewish mind ; nor could the messengers of uch intelligence expect to be well received or easily credited. The doctrine was equally harsh and novel. The extending of the kingdom of God to those who did not conform to the law of Moses, was a notion that had never before entered into the thoughts of a "Jew.

The character of the new institution was, in other repects also, ungrateful to Jewish habits and principles. Their own religion was in a high degree technical. Even the enlightened Jew placed a great deal of stress upon the ceremonies of his law, saw in them a great deal of virtue and efficacy ; the gross and vulgar had scarcely any thing else ; and the hypocritical and ostentatious magnified them above measure, as being the instruments of their own reputation and influence. The Christian scheme, without formally repealing the Leviticai code, lowered its estimation extremely. In the place of strictness and zeal in performing the observances which that code prescribed, or which tradition had added to it, the new sect preached up faith, w T ell-regulated affections, inward purity, and moral rectitude of disposition, as the true ground, on the part of the worshipper, of merit and acceptance with God. This, however rational it may appear, or recommending to us at present, did not by any means facilitate the plan then. On the contrary, to disparage those qualities which the highest characters in the country valued themselves most upon, was a sure way of making powerful enemies. As if the frustration of the national' hope was not enough, the long-esteemed merit of ritual zeal and punctuality was to be decried, and that by Jews preaching to Jews.

The ruling party at Jerusalem had just before crucified the Founder of the religion. That is a fact which will not be disputed. They, therefore, who stood forth to preach the religion, must necessarily reproach these rulers with an execution, which they could not but represent as an unjust and cruel murder. This would not render their office more easy, or their situation more safe.

With regard to the interference of the Roman government w 7 hich was then established in Judea, I should not expect, that, despising as it did the religion of the country, it would, if left to itself, animadvert, either with much vigilance or much severity upon the schisms and controversies which arose within it. Yet there was that in Christianity which might easily afford a handle of accusation with a jealous government. The Christians avowed an unqualified obedience to a new master. They avow 7 ed also that he was the person who had been foretold to the Jews under the suspected title of King. The spiritual nature of this kingdom, the consistency of this obedience with civil subjections, w T ere distinctions too refmea to be entertained by a Roman president, who viewed the business at a great distance, or through the medium of very hostile representations. Our histories accordingly inform us, that this was the turn which the enemies of Jesus gave to his character and pretensions in their remonstrances with Pontius Pilate. And Justin Martyr, about a hundred years afterward, complains that the same mistake prevailed in his time: 'Ye having heard that we are waiting for a kingdom, suppose, without distinguishing, that we mean a human kingdom, when in truth we speak of that which is with God.'*

* Ap. Ima. p. 16. Ed. Thirl.

Evidences of Christianity.

And it was undoubtedly a natural source of calumny and misconstruction.

The preachers of Christianity had therefore to contend with prejudice backed by power. They had to come forward to a disappointed people, to a priesthood possessing a considerable share of municipal authority, and actuated by strong motives of opposition and resentment ; and they had to do this under a foreign govern ment, to whose favor they made no pretensions, and which was constantly surrounded by their enemies. The well-known, because the experienced fate of reformers, whenever the reformation subverts some reigning opinion, and does not proceed upon a change that has already taken place in the sentiments of a country, will not allow, much less lead us to suppose, that the first propagators of Christianity at Jerusalem, and in Judea, under the difficulties and the enemies they had to contend with, and entirely destitute as they were of force, authority, or protection, could execute their mission with personal ease and safety.

Let us next inquire, what might reasonably be expected by the preachers of Christianity, when they turned themselves to the heathen public. Now the first thing that strikes us is, that the religion they carried with them was exclusive. It denied without reserve the truth of every article of heathen mythology, the existence of every object of their worship. It accepted no compromise ; it admitted no comnrehension. It must prevail, if it prevailed at all, by the overthrow of every statue, altar, and temple, in the world. It will not easily be credited, that a design, so bold as this was, could in any age be attempted to be carried into execution with impunity.

For it ought to be considered, that this was not setting forth, or magnifying the character and worship of some new competitor for a place in the Pantheon, whose pretensions might be discussed or asserted without questioning the reality of any others ; it was pronouncing all other gods to be false, and all other worship vain. From the facility with which the polytheism of ancient nations admitted new objects of worship into the number of their acknowledged divinities, or the patience with which they might entertain proposals of this kind, we can argue nothing as to their toleration of a system, or of the publishers and active propagators of a system which swept away the very foundation of the existing establishment. The one was nothing more than what it would be, in popish countries, to add a saint to the calendar ; the other was to abolish and tread under foot the calendar itself.

Secondly, it ought also to be considered, that this was not the case of philosophers propounding in their books, or in their schools, doubts concerning the truth of the popular creed, or even avowing their disbelief of it. These philosophers did not go about from place to place to collect proselytes from amongst the common people; to form in the heart of the country societies professing their tenets; to provide for the order, instruction, and permanency of these societies; nor did they enjoin their followers to withdraw themselves from the public worship of the temples,* or refur e a compliance with rites instituted by the laws. These things are what the Christians did, and what the philosophers did not ; and in these consisted the activity and danger of the enterprise.