Paley's moral philosophy, abridged and adapted to the constitution, laws and usages of the United States of America

Front matter

" PALEY’S: . ( RAL PHILOSOPHY, ABRIDGED AND ADAPTED

TO THE

OF THE »- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Chapter II

THE LAW OF HONOUR. | : ca ets, The law of honour is a system of rules cons _ structed by people of fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one another, and for no other purpose. _ This prescribes and regulates the duties between equals, omitting such as relate to God and to our inferiors ; as public and private devotion, 1*

Pa i cruelty to servants, want of charity to the poor, and numberless examples of the same kind.

The law of honour, being constructed for men of fashion and pleasure only, is favourable to the indulgence of the licentious passions ; as drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and revenge ; and it lays no obligation upon men to practise virtue.

————

CHAPTER iil.

THE LAW OF THE LAND.

Tus law of the land consists in the civil regulations of a country, or any portion of it which may have been established for the protection of the rights, and for the redress of the wrongs of the community.

This is necessary for the protection of the innocent and the punishment of the guilty ; but that part of mankind who are beneath the law of honour, and the law of God, are satisfied with themselves, so long as they do or omit nothing, for the doing or omitting of which, the law cannot punish them.

_ Human flaws, therefore, labour under the two

‘follo ing defects : , Ea They omit many duties, as piety to God, ee to the poor, the education of children, aegis to benefactors. ) aa 2, They permit many crimes that ca defined by any previous description, as luxury, prodigality, parsimony, disrespect to paket and a multitude of similar examples.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1s

Where the distinction between right and wrong is of too subtile or of too secret a nature to be ascertained by any preconcerted language) the laws of most countries, rather than commit the hberty of the subject to the discretion of the magistrate, leave men in such cases to themselves, and the dictates of their own consciences.

CHAPTER IY.

THE SCRIPTURES.

‘Tue Holy Scriptures contain the most perfect laws for human government;/ for they. impose their obligations, not only upon the outward behaviour, but upon the consciences of men, adding to them the highest motives and the strongest inducements to obedience. _

Morality is taught in the scriptures by general rules of piety, justice, benevolence, and purity ; such as worshipping God in spirit and in truth, doing as we would be done by, loving our neighbour as ourselves, forgiving others as we expect forgiveness from God, and that mercy is better than sacrifice. Some of these rules are illustrated by examples, as in the good Samaritan, the poor widow who cast in her only mite, the censure of the Pharisees who chose out the oms, and the cruel servant who refused to his fellow-servant that compassion which his ainaiapened shown to him.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL SENSE.

‘Morat sense is the intuitive perception of right and wrong.

The following are among the reasons that are given in proof of a moral sense; viz. that we approve of examples of generosity, gratitude, and fidelity, and that we condemn the contrary, without having any interest of our own, and many times without being conscious of any particular reason for the determination of our own minds ; that the same sort of conduct is approved or disapproved in all countries, and has been so in all ages.

On the other sidc uf the question, itis denied that there is any uniformity, and it is asserted, that in one country it is esteemed an office of piety in children to sustain their aged parents, and in another, to despatch them out of the way ; that suicide in one age of the world has been considered an act of heroism, and in another, felony; that theft, which has been punished by most laws, by the laws of Sparta was not unfrequently rewarded ; that moral approbation follows the customs of the country we live in ; that experience and education are the governing principles of human approbation ; and that imitation lends its aid in establishing moral sentiments.

Upon the whole, it seems that either there is e no instinctive moral sense, or that it is not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits, on which account it cannot be depended on in moral reasoning, and we may well enough view the question of a moral sense, as rather curious than useful.

ee

CHAPTER Vi.

HUMAN HAPPINESS,

Hapriness is a relative term.

Any condition may be denominated happy, when the amount of pleasure exceeds that of pain, and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of this excess. We mean by happiness the greatest quantity of enjoyment attainable in human life, when we inquire or pronounce what happiness consists in.

To explain this subject I will show,

{. What human happiness does not consist in.

I. What human happiness does consist in.

1. Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of s sense. By pleasures of sense, I mean, as — wvell ys animal gratifications of eating and drinking, as the more refined pleasures of music, bo Sach painting, splendid shows, theatrical exibitions, hunting, shooting, fishing, Xe. These pleasures: re of short duration, This is true a all, especially of the grosser sort of

“These pleasures lose their relish by repeti- ‘tion. The eagerness for intense delights takes away the relish for others, and as these are seldom within our reach, the greater part of our time becomes empty and uneasy.

Expectation often promises too much, so that when we expect to be very much delighted, we seldom fail of disappointment.

The men who pursue pleasure the most eagerly, are always restless and miserable when deprived of it, and the shortness of its duration leaves a very great proportion of their time for painful reflections, so that we may safely say, that happiness is not to be found in the pleasures of sense.

2. Happiness does not consist in an exemption from pain, labour, care, business, suspense, molestation, and those evils that are without ; for imaginary or painful anxieties fill up the chasm, and supply the place of care and business. ‘A moderate pain, upon which the attention may fasten and spend itself, is to many a refreshment ; as a fit of the gout, a controversy, or law suit will sometimes cure the spleen.

3. Happiness does not consist in Baa tee rank, or elevated station.

Superiority gives us no pleasure, except it is possessed or obtained over them with whom we compare ourselves. *, *

The shepherd perceives no pleasure in his | superiority over his dog, nor the nobleman ae, his superiority over the shepherd, for this of superiority is never contemplated. But if the same shepherd has a better flock than any — one in the village, he feels all the pleasure of distinction that is felt by the nobleman, who has.

MGRAL PHILOSOPITY. il mofe influence at court than another nobleman with whom he compares himself.

The pleasures of ambition are common to all stations. It isinot what a man possesses, but what he possesses more than his rival, that constitutes the pleasure of ambition.

If happiness consisted in greatness, the greater man would be the happier man, but this is not so. ‘The pleasure of success in any station may be exquisite, but in the purstit there is pain and anxiety more than enough to overbalance all the enjoyment derived from success.

II. We have seen what happiness does not consist in. a We are next to consider in what it does consist.

We can judge of this only from appearance, and though the apparent happiness of mankind is not always a true measure of their real happiness, yet this is the best measure that we have. 1. Happiness consists in the exercise of the social affections. — Those persons commonly possess good spirits who have about them objects of affection and endearment, ‘as wife, children, kindred, and friends, and this is more frequently the case ‘when their maintenance or their respectability requires bodily or mental exertions. And there is a pleasure in seeing others pleased, that cannot be found in solitude.

2. Human happiness is increased by the ex- : -ercise of our faculties, either of body or mind,

in the pursuit of some engaging end. - We must bave something in reserve, some object of hope or anticipation, without which, there is always dejection of spirits.

Hope is of two kinds, as where there is something to be done, to obtain the object of our wishes, and where there is nothing to be done. The first only is of any value, and the latter is apt to create impatience by compelling us to sit still and wait, which soon grows tiresome. -

To provide ourselves with a succession of pleasurable engagements, is a desirable object, and to effect this we must have judgment in the choice of ends adapted to our opportunities, and the talent of transferring a pleasure to the means, by which the end is to be attained.

A man who is in earnest in his endeavours after the happiness of a future state, has an advantage over all the world: for he has constantly before his eyes an object of: supreme importance, productive of perpetual engagement and activity, the pursuit of which, lasts him to his life’s end.—Yet he must have many ends besides the ultimate end, but they all conduct him to that, and derive their satisfaction either directly or indirectly from that great source of anticipated enjoyment. For the pursuit of happiness, engagement is every thing, and the more advantageous our engagements are, the more happiness they bring along with them. Sueh are the planning of laws, institutions, manufac tures, charittes, improvements, public. works, and exertions to carry them into effect 5 or upon smaller scale, the procuring of a maintenance and fortune for our families, ina course of industry and application to our callings, training up our children, making ourselves masters of <

Tanguage, or science, improving or managing an estate, or any engagement that is innocent— even the cultivation of a flower is better than no employment.

When the mind is engaged in any lawful business, we are commonly happy ; but when the mind is wandering, we are often miserable.

3. Happiness depends upon ‘the prudent constitution of the habits.

The art in which the secret of human happiness ina great measure consists, isito set the habits in such a manner that every change may be a change for the better. j

‘The epicure receives no greater pleasure from his dainties, than the peasant does from his bread and cheese, but whenever the peasant has any thing better, he enjoys it, whereas the epicure must always be well entertained to escape disgust.

The indulgent mother aes strives for dainties to gratify her children, makes them unhappy in proportion to her success ; for their fancies are not long pleased with the same thing ; and they have continued pain, when they are deprived of what they wish for; whereas the judicious mother that feeds them with plain and wholesome food, besides the blessing of health,

_ gives them the means of enjoying at proper seasons the luxuries of nature and art. A student who is inured to books of science, may take pleasure in a novel, or a well-written essay, and return again without pain to the pursuit ‘of sci-

aie but the one who reads only works of hu-

our or pleasantry, will soon exhaust his stock,

and be left without any resource of innocent 2 amusement. / So far as circumstances of foriune conduce to happiness, it is not the income that a person possesses, but the increase of income that affords the enjoyment. A man who begins with an hundred pounds a year, and increases his income to a thousand, has more satisfaction than the man who set out with ten thousand and has diminished it to one thousand ; though their income is at last the same, the enjoyment is vastly different.

4. Happiness consists in health.

By health, I. understand not only a freedom from disease, but tranquillity, firmness, and alacrity of mind, that we commonly call good spirits. This gives not only a relish to objects of sense, but it is a means of improving the works of nature and art, to the gratification of the mind and of the imagination.

Heaith, in this sense, is the one thing needful ;) therefore, no pains, self-denial, or sacrifice, can be too great to be made for it. This is an enjoyment that the Deity hath annexed to life, and ought not to be trifled with, and it is best preserved by temperance and moderation both of body and of mind.’ Resignation to the dispensations of Providence may give us happiness under the pains of disease, and this is a virtue to be sought for by all, as a security in time of sickness and adversity, which we have no reason to hope to escape.

The conclusion is, first, that happiness is pretty equally distributed among the different orders of civil society; secondly, that vice bas no advantage over virtue, even with respect to this world’s happiness,

CHAPTER VIL VIRTUE.

Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.

According to this definition, the good of mankind is the subject ; the will of God the rule, and

| everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue.

Virtue has been variously divided by men, who have written on the subject, but the most

common division at this day, is into duties to ' God, to man, and to ourselves,’

To God; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c.

To man ; as justice, charity, fidelity, &c.

To ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, &c.

These duties are very concisely expressed in the Catechism of the P. E. Church.

‘‘ My duty towards God is to believe in him, to fear him, and love him, with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul, and with all my strength, to worship him, to give him thanks, to put my whole trust in him, to call upon him, to _ honour his holy name, and his word, and to serve him truly all the days of my life.”

‘¢ My duty towards my neighbour is, to love him as myself, and to do to all men as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour, and obey the civil authority. To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors, and masters. To order myself lowly, and reverently to all my betters, to hurt nobody by word or deed. ‘To be true and just in all my dealings. ‘To bear no malice, nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from stealing, and my tongue from evil speaking, lying, and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity. Not to covet, nor desire other men’s goods, but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living, and todo my duty in that state of life, unto which it shall please God to call me.”

Habit has so much influence upon our actions, that, on most occasions, we do not stop to reason, and to refer to principles, but we are determined, without reflecting upon the tendency of our actions. On some few, and great occasions, we deliberate, but in the rapidity of thoughts and multiplicity of actions, there is not time to compare every one with the exact standard of virtue ; and we are determined by habit, without any immediate reference to the correctness of the principle.

If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where, it is asked, is the exercise of ‘virtue or the guilt of vice, or any use of moral or religious knowledge? I answer, in forming and contracting these habits. ,

A man of confirmed good habits, will practise virtuous any actions, without any consideration, at the time of the performance of the actions, merely from the tendency produced by a habit of virtue.

For instance, if a man have a dread of lying, and a habit of speaking the truth on all occasions, it isnot easy for temptation to draw him from his accustomed practice of speaking the truth.

sh

There are habits of drinking, swearing, and lying,’ which are commonly called so, but there are also habits of every modification of action, speech, and thought.)

There are habits of/industry, attention, reasoning, methodizing, and reflection, as well as indolence and inattention.

There is not a quality nor function, either of body or of mind, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature} for ‘* Man is a bundle of habits.”

Upon principles of scripture morality, we may, advance the following general positions.

1.| That a state of happiness cannot be expected by those who are conscious of no moral or religious rule.)

2.: That a state of happiness is not to be expected by these who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any one sin, or the neglect of any one known duty,

When our duties. are recited in Scripture, they are put ‘collectively, that is, they are all required to constitute the Christian character} as ‘add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness, charity.”

On the other hand, when vices are enumerated, they are put/ disjunctively, that is, severally, excluding the sinner from the kingdom of heaen,’as, ‘neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of heaven.”) ‘The omission of one

Ox id MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

of these virtues is adeparture from duty, as also the commission of one of these offences.

3. A state of mere ale as will not go unpunished.)

This is expressly laid down i Christ, in his parable of the talents.) ‘ Take therefore the talent from him (the slothful servant) and give it unto him that sil ten talents ; for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but, from him which hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath ; and cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.”

In every question of conduct. where one side is doubtful, and the other safe, ‘we are bound to take the safe side.) -

Suppose, for example, it appears doubtful with a reasoner on the subject, whether he may lawfully destroy himself.

He can have no doubt but that he may lawfully let tt alone. This isa case in which one side is doubtful and the other safe. By the conditions of the rule, he is bound to take the safe side, that is, to forbear offering violence to himself.

It is not merely prudent to take the safe side, in all doubtful cases, but. it is a duty, and it is sanctioned as such by the declaration of an Apostle, ‘(to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. Happy is he that condemneth not himself, in that thing which he alloweth, and he that doubteth is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is not of’

faith (done with s full persuasion of the lawful. ness of it) is sin.’

BOOK Ii. MORAL OBLIGATION

CHAPTER I.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD ? CONSIDERED.

Wuy am I obliged to keep my word? Because it is right, says one. Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another. Because it is conformable to reason and nature, saysathird. Because itis conformable to truth, says a fourth. Because it promotes the public good, says a fifth. Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a sixth.

From these different accounts, two things are observable,

1, They all ultimately coincide.

The fitness of things means, their fitness to produce happiness ; the nature of things means, the tendency of such things to produce happiness.

For what promotes the public happiness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, to truth, and to the will of God.

2. These answers all leave the matter short ; for the inquirer may ask, why am I obliged to do what is right, to act agreeably to the fitness of things, to conform to reason, nature, or truth, to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, First, to examine what we mean when we say, a man is obliged to do any thing, and, Secondly, to show, why he is obliged to do the thing which we have proposed as an example, namely, “ to keep his word.”

CHAPTER II.

WHAT WE MEAN, WHEN WE SAY A MAN 1S OBLIGED TO DO ANY TERING.

A man is said to be obliged, when he is urged by a violent motive, resulting fiom the command of another.

First, the motive must be violent.

ff a man who has done me some little service ask me for my vote, I may give it to him from a sense of gratitude, but I cannot by this be obliged to do it. Butif a father or benefactor, on whom my maintenance depends, require my vote, I can say, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.

Secondly, It must result from the command of another.

If a gratuity is offered to a man, to induce him to seize an offender, he may be tempted or persuaded, but he is not thereby obliged to do it. But when the magistrate commands, he considers himself obliged to comply.

*

BIORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21

CHAPTER Il.

YHE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WoRD? RESUMED.

Wuy am I obliged to keep my word? Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive, (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, or punished if 1 do not,) resulting from the command of another, (namely, of God.)

Private happiness is the motive, and the will of God the rule.

Moral obligation is like all other obligations, and that obligation is thing more than an inducement of sufficient strength, and this resulting in some way from the command of another.’

The difference between an act of prudence, and an act of duty is this, that prudence relates to things temporal, duty to things eternal as well as temporal.

It is absurd to attempt to form a code of moral rules, without making’the moral system of the Scriptures the basis, ‘and in the following treatise, we shall take for granted. not only that the morality of the scriptures is correct, but that after death, a reward will be bestowed upon the obedient, and punishment wit be inflicted

. upon the disobedient.

— i

Chapter IV. The Will Of God

To inquire what is our duty, or what we are _ obliged to do in any instance, is to inquire what ‘the will of God is in that instance.

There are two methods of coming at the will of God. ;

1.\By his express declarations in the scriptures.

2. From the light of nature.

The object of both natural and revealed religion is the same, the discovery of the will of God. Where this will is plainly declared, there is no need of any reasoning upon the matter; but where the design must be inferred, by comparison with known quatities or attributes, there the principles of natural religion may be brought. to the aid of human reason.

The method of cout at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of the action, to promote or diminish the general happiness.

This rule proceeds upon the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, and that the actions, which accord with that will, are agreeable to Him, and that such as do not accord with that will, are disagreeable to Him.

— a CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

Wuen God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. )

Ff he had wished our misery, he might have — made our senses instruments of pain tous. He might have made every taste bitter, every touch a sting, every smell a stench, and every sound a discord

If he had been indifferent about us, we might impute to our good fortune, the means and capacity for enjoyment. But these are too much to be attributed to chance.

Contrivance proves/design, and the predominant tendency of the contrivance, indicates the disposition of the designer.

(Evil no doubt exists, but it is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat with, nottoache. Thesickle is made to reap the wheat, not to cut the fingers.

If you were to describe the instruments of

torture or execution, you would say, this is to extend the sinews, this to dislocate the joints, this to brealk the bones, and this to scorch the soles of the feet.’ Here pain and misery are the objects of contrivance. But no anatomist ever discovered a system of organization, calculated to produce pains and disease. _ The world appears to have been designed for ‘the happiness of its inhabitants, and evil is only incidental. God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures, ance is the tendency of the desiga of the Creator in all his works.

Chapter VI. Utility

AcTIONS are right or wrong, according to their tendency. (The agent is virtuous or vicious according to his design. Actions are to be estimated/ by their tendency to promote happiness. It is the utility of any moral rule that constitutes its obligation.

‘Some things may appear useful which are not right ; as it may seem to be useful to rob a miser, and to give his money to the poor ; to obtain a place by fraud, that we may accomplish some great benefit to the state. But these actions are not useful, for the principle would tend to sanction robbery and fraud, and the same of every other crime.

To understand this subject, we may consider the consequences of actions as twofold, \ particular and general.

The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that particular action directly occasions.

The general bad consequence is the violation of some useful general rule.

The particular bad consequence, of the robbery above mentioned, is the pain the miser may experience in the loss of his money. The general bad consequence is the violation of this general rule : that no man take the property of another, but by authority of law. An action may have no particular bad consequence, yet if the general consequence is evil, the action cannot be useful.

But as this solution supposes, that the moral government of the world proceeds from general tules, the necessity of this must be shown.

Or

Chapter VII. The Necessity Of General Rules

You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a difference between them ; therefore, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted, or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them. For example ;/the money was taken from the miser to feed and clothe the poor, and the miser was better without his money than with it: If this is allowable in one instance, then no man’s money would be safe, for if itis right to rob a miser, and every man must be his own judge of the character of the miser, such a latitude of interpretation would be given to the term, that the property of no man would be safe.

‘General rules are necessary to every moral government, ;for without them rewards and punishments ‘would become mere accidents. Whatever reason, then, there is to expect future rewards and punishments at the hand of God, there is the same reason to believe that he will proceed in their distribution by general rules.

Secrecy does not justify any action that is evil in its general consequences, and the Scriptures teach us, (that, at the general judgment of the world, the most secret actions will be brought to light; and this will be done to make them objects of reward and punishment; and when they are brought to light they will fall under the operation of those equal and impartial rules by which God deals with his creatures.

——- CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL CONSEQUENCES PURSUED.

Tue general consequence of an action may be estimated,/by considering the consequences, } if the same sort of actions were generally permitted. The guilt of an action isin proportion ito the whole mischief that would arise from. the impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort.) ‘* Whatever is expedient is right ;’ but it must be expedient ‘in all its effects, collateral and remote.,‘ The particular consequence of an action may be very insignificant, when the general consequence is ruinous to the happiness of society. For instance, the particular consequence of coining money is the loss of a dollar to the person who receives the counterfeit money ; but the general consequence is, the abolition of the use of moneys The particular consequence of sheep-stealing or horse-stealing is the loss to the owner of the value of the animal stolen, and the general consequence is, that the land would not be occupied, nor. the market supplied with this kind of stock. . The particular consequence ‘of breaking into a house, empty ofinhabitants, is, perhaps, the loss ofa few spoons.