Christian conception and experience

Front matter

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Preface

be tested before its value can be determined, and the public are the only test of intellectual and moral arms.

Malebranche says that when a book is brought into the world no star presides over its nativity, and no astrologer would be bold enough to predict its future fate. In this uncertainty the author casts this little child into its ark of papyrus on the waters, watching from a distance, unseen, like the Hebrew mother, to see what will become of it. It is his sincere and earnest pra er that it may help many a soul to a firmer faith and to a more unfaltering fidelity in the service of the ' ■ great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ."

Wm. I. Gill.

Book First

THE CONCEPTION, OE A SUPEKNATUEAL IDEAL. CHAPTER I.

Conversion or a Skeptic 11

CHAPTER H.

Necessity of Ideals 18

CHAPTER HI.

Our Ideals a Measure of Our Worth 25

CHAPTER IV.

Culture op Ideals 32

CHAPTER V.

Influence of Ideals 41

CHAPTER VI.

Truth and Authority op Ideals 47

CHAPTER VH.

Conception of Theism and Evolution 52

CHAPTER Vm.

SUPERIORITY OF THE THEISTIC CONCEPTION 59

CHAPTER IX.

Jesus 64

CHAPTER X.

Faith and Works 76

CHAPTER XI.

Reward of Fidelity . 8-1

(vn)

vm PBEFACK

CHAPTER XH An Example. 92

CHAPTER Xm.

The Redemptive Economy 98

CHAPTER XTV.

Can God Suffer ? 114

CHAPTER XV.

Atonement 119

CHAPTER XVL Oeigin of the Christian Conception 143

CHAPTER XVLL Empirical Objections 153

CHAPTER XVHL Intuition ; or, Subjective Influence 162

Chapter I. Introduction. — Conversion Of A Skeptic

Some of the following arguments were substantially evolved in various discussions with a skeptical friend who was subsequently converted, and they were in some degree conducive to that result. I will therefore introduce the subject with a brief narrative. My acquaintance with this friend had its origin in his admiration of a somewhat remarkable and suspected book. This book propounded ideas which at first view seemed to him scarcely reconcilable with orthodox doctrines. It gave abundant evidence, in his estimation, of the author's philosophical mastery of the subject discussed, and of an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the arguments which militate against Theism and Christianity. Subsequently he learned that the author of this book is 11 not only a clergyman, but a clergyman who is thoroughly evangelical in his faith. He then reflected : " Here is a man who thoroughly understands the skeptical position, and all the difficulties which beset his own ; and if he can be orthodox, why might not I, if I had his explanation ? " Thus the earnest faith of the preacher, on the one hand, and the candor and hopeful intelligence of the philosopher on the other hand, staggered his belief in the probable overthrow and desuetude of Christianity, and made him suspect that mental repression and ignorance of " Modern Thought '* are not necessary conditions of devout Christian faith.

It was when he was in this state of mind that I formed his acquaintance, which became quite intimate. We met frequently, and our interviews were generally occupied with discussions of some of the knotty points of philosophy or theology, especially the respective claims of Christianity and Evolution, and the difficulties attending both.

It was always a pleasure to discuss a topic with him, because in opposition to my views he always adduced genuine reasons and arguments, and nothing but these could in return produce any impression on him, while these never failed. I always considered that the degree of my success or failure in convincing him was an index of the weakness or of the clearness and force of my arguments. It was a frequent delight to me to see how pleasantly he recognized the force of an argument which succes* fully assailed his own position. Yet, honest and skeptic as he was, he seemed for a while more disposed to trust John Stewart Mill and Herbert Spencer than to accept the conclusions of logic. While admitting that Spencer and Mill were in some of their main points apparently refuted, and even self-refuted, yet he thought there must be some undetected sophism in my method, and that these men could not be guilty of any such conspicuous blunders as were pointed out. Such faith, however, gradually gave way and logic asserted its rightful ascendancy in his mind even against them.

It was right in my friend to be cautious, and to suspend his judgment till he was satisfied that there was no mistake either in my premises or my reasoning ; and he had a right to withhold his assent till he could examine the point more carefully, if there was anything' more to learn on the subject. But the point I make is that this was not his ground of dissent to my conclusion, but that his ground was one of faith ; and he " could not hdieve" he said, " that Spencer or Mill could be guilty " of what was proved against them. In receiving them he had trusted his understanding, which he now distrusts, and he falls back on a faith which is confessedly groundless, and that in the face of an opposing intelligence. Through faith in Spencer, he, a pliilsophicai skeptic, rejected or evaded an argument against Spencer !

This fault is by no means uncommon among skeptics. However honest they are, they recognize the force of an argument more readily and allow it more force in some directions than others ; and while they avowedly repudiate all opinions and faiths which have not a philosophical support, yet in some directions of their own choosing they themselves cherish such opinions and faiths ; and sometimes even they make themselves an authority against their own reasoning. The reader may never have read David Hume's " Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding," but he has doubtless read of his remark that " the skeptic, when he awakes from his dream, will be the first to join in the laugh against himself." We are also told that Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, printed a book against supernaturalism, and was divinely directed to do so in answer to a prayer asking the guidance of God and an expression of his will.

Mr. K., of course, retorted this accusation of inconsistency on Christians, charging it on some of them of high standing and great ability. But the inconsistency of others is no justification of our own. It is alleged of Faraday that on being interrogated in reference to some of the articles of his religious creed, he replied : " There I prostrate my reason." If he did say this, I suspect he attached a limited meaning to it. If the Bible is the Word of God we ought to submit our judgment to its decisions. To do this is not to prostrate our reason, but to obey, and so enthrone reason. To do this is the highest reason. Any other supposition is self contradictory ; for it affirms that it is better to follow a fallible than an infallible judgment. In thus prostrating our reason before God, we preserve its dignity. Without any evidence to the contrary, therefore, I shall assume that it was only in this significance that Faraday confessed to the prostration of his intellect. He believed in the divine authority of the Bible, and he acted accordingly, as a philosopher should ; and he believed further that he had good reasons for this faith in the Scriptures. He was therefore right and reasonable throughout. That such a man as Lewes should adduce this passage in proof that Faraday was not as honest and rational in religion as in physical science, with the implication that all the orthodox are similarly irrational, only shows that his own reason forsakes him when he touches on religion. The Scriptures never require or affirm what is self contradictory. If they did I should so far reject them, since otherwise I should have to prostrate my reason absolutely.

Nearly a year had rolled around since my first acquaintance with Mr. K . I had seen evidences

that in some respects he had made some progress. He had acquired more respect for Christianity and its teachers, and more appreciation of Christian enterprises. He was finally induced to attend a certain religious meeting, which was one of quiet power. After the meeting I spent an hour or more urging and arguing with him to make an immediate consecration of himself to Christ. Such an exhortation may seem premature, since he yet questioned the existence of a personal God. But the soul often makes enormous advances in a few hours or even moments. I was assured that his false faiths were considerably shattered and paralyzed, and that therefore the void of skepticism might be suddenly filled with the true faith.

Mr. K. grew more serious as our conversation proceeded and I thought that he began to entertain a

CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION AND FXPER1EN0E. 17

new hope and resolve. My last word to him that night was an exhortation to instant resolute and persistant faith in accordance with the Christian Conception. Next day, which was the Sabbath, he told me in the afternoon that, aided by a sermon which he had heard in the morning from the Kev. Dr.

C -, he had complied with my exhortation, and

was now trusting in Christ as his Saviour. He was afraid to say much more, but he indicated that he was dimly conscious of the dawning of a new life. In a few days this life was so full and rich in its conscious working that all doubt was dispelled, and he knew the truth of the Gospel from his own experience.

CHAPTEE n.

NECESSITY OF IDEALS.

It is an interesting question, and not whollyforeign to a practical estimate of our life, how far any of us lives in an ideal world by the practice of imagining what might be or ought to be. There is a vast difference in this respect between different minds. Some have small power of thought or imagination to deviate from the forms of their own actual experiences, or even to reproduce them. Some who have a degree of power of ideal variation are so dominated by the perception of the need and advantage of attending to the real and actual, that this power finds no adequate scope for its development.

Hence it is in youth, before the stern realities and necessities of life and society have chrystalized the mind in rigid conformity with themselves, that the pleasures of reverie are generally indulged with the greatest freedom, and that the imagination is most frequently engaged in forming ideal combinations, in creating new worlds and forms of life and new orders of experiences. Such employment as this is so fascinating, and the temptation to it is consequently so strong, that perhaps very few youths of active and fertile minds entirely escape the temptation or fail to yield in some degree to its power. Incited by what they have heard in the tales of the nursery and their earliest reading, perhaps the story of Jack the Giant Killer, the Forty Thieves, Aladin's Wonderful Lamp, the hateful old Blue Beard, and the equally wonderful and healthier stories of the Bible ; and feeling troubled and perplexed in no very small degree by their own observations and experience in the real world which appears to them so strange and untractable, they have lain on the grass or sat on the fence, the door step or the curbstone, and found a quiet and intense delight in forming new economics to suit themselves, unhampered by the obtrusion of the hard unyielding forces of the real world in which they find themselves so restricted and crossed and thwarted. How much better to them appears their ideal creation than the real creation of God, and how much they wonder that God did not follow a plan somewhat like theirs !

"Within certain limits the indulgence and culture of such faculty of ideal thought may be of great value all through life. This is exemplified in many of the most gifted minds. It is seen in nearly all the writings of Plato, and in some of them it is their most conspicuous element and their most potent charm. It was at the age of thirty-six that Sir Thomas More, the most witty and eloquent man of his age, published his "Utopia." Of Bacon, the greatest Englishman of the next generation, it has been said that his imagination grew in power with his years. At the mature age of forty-nine he published his " Wisdom of the Ancients," in which learning, reason and fancy are blended together like the three primary colors of the spectrum. A good degree of this power under proper culture and discipline enlarges the resources and the scope of the intellect, while it widens and quickens our power of sympathy ; and in various ways it is useful in all the complexities of life as an incitement and a guide alike to the understanding and the heart.

Our ideal of anything is our highest conception or idea of that thing, whatever it may be, whether it be a boot-jack or an empire or a world. These ideals are a logical necessity to all who think on any topic. The mechanic cannot make a tool or the simplest article of his craft without making it perfect or imperfect, according to his conception. If perfect, it meets his ideal, and if imperfect he has an ideal above it. A mere slave and drudge who has no interest in his work and no thought or care except to execute the material task assigned him, needs and forms no ideals. He is only the instrument of other minds. But all who rise to the consideration of the proper method and aim and results of their toil, are so far artists, and have an ideal toward which and in the light of which they work.

In proportion as mental power and culture rises, this ideal action advances in denniteness and force and varied distinctness. Every statesman must have an ideal more or less full and definite of the method and ends of legislature and other functions of government. Every intelligent farmer must have some ideal toward which he works in the management of his estate. Every principal or president of a school will have some ideal of methods and ends to be practiced and pursued. All good hotel keepers and housekeepers must have an ideal of at least proximate definiteness and completeness respecting the style and management of their house.

Thus we have a practical idealism which rules all life, an ideal of effort and hope which presides over ail departments of intelligent activity.

The law of intelligent action in view of ideals

22 CHRIST] AX CONCEPTION AXD EXPERIENCE.

operates with full force in the sphere of religion and morals, since no where is there a wider and grander scope for an ideal activity than here.

Savage and imbruted minds, which are scarcely above the dog or the ape in then* intelligence, may be left out of account. Where there is no thought there can be no ideals. Where there is thought so as to form secular ideals, sacred ideals also become not only possible, but necessary. The thought of finite power and worth necessarily suggests by the law of logical correlation the thought of infinite power and w T orth. This, however, will be considered extremely vague, and it has never been of any great or definite force in the formation of religious ideals. It is sometimes affirmed that the infinite is a word without meaning. I consider this an error of the first magnitude both in philosophy and religion. I hold that the idea of the infinite is as definite and clear as the idea of the finite. But as this is disputed, I do not here insist upon it.

We come back to the finite. This we know to some extent. But our thought nearly always transcends our knowledge or experience ; and this rising superior to the thought, to the utmost of our ability to think, is our ideal on that subject. As we can construct an ideal machine superior to any real machine known to us, so we can construct an ideal character superior at least in some respects to any known real character, that is, any that is known to us immediately or by experience. Not only are we competent to this, but it is a necessity to us. We can no more escape it than we can escape the conception of the comparative degrees, good, better, best, of which it is an exemplification.

Any perceived limitation or defect in any character implies the conception of a superior character, which is our ideal. All known characters are known as imperfect by limitation and defect or by some positive element of evil which mars them. An ideal of superior excellence, therefore, goes with us, and presides over our contemplation and judgment of all known characters.

This ideal also may be said to always rise in a cultivated mind with the character contemplated ; and it must do so to whatever height, short of infinite perfection, the character rises ; and in all cases, except the infinite, the ideal will tower above the real. This ideal is therefore above all possible degrees of the finite ; and what is that but infinite ? Thus by another route we come to an ideal of the infinite as the necessary consequence of thinking the finite real. But still I shall not here base any argument on this. I shall be content with, the admission of the indisputable fact that Ave all have moral and spiritual ideals.

CHAPTEK HI.

OUR IDEALS A MEASURE OF OUR WORTH.

It is an obvious fact that there is a remarkable correspondence between men's ideals and their intellectual and moral rank. The ideals of Juggernaut, Kalee, Jupiter and Jesus mark the different grades of moral and spiritual elevation of their several subjects and devotees. There is no philosopher who does not claim and receive a degree of respect or homage in proportion to the acknowledged dignity of his conception of God and the universe. . On this ground, as well as others, Plato is assigned the highest place among ancient philosophers. On this ground chiefly Plato himself exalts Socrates to the zenith of distinction. On this principle Mr. Spencer tries at times to show that his theory is superior to that of Christianity, which he stigmatizes as " the carpenter theory."

We find, too, that as individuals, tribes and nations rise in character they rise in their conceptions and their ideals. This is so constant that we can with equal truth and propriety put it the other way, that their characters rise with their ideals.

There are exceptions to this in the case of these who have suddenly fallen from a previous moral elevation and come under the dominion of their appetites and passions. This is exemplified to some extent in all forms of sin and vice and crime.

But these form a peculiar class among the vicious. Conscious of their moral fall and degradation, they inwardly abhor themselves for their own wrong doing and wrong feeling. This is an element in them which always commands our respect as well as pity, and it inspires a just hope that with a change of circumstances they will recover themselves. On the other hand, the genuine and born criminal of every grade is unconscious of moral degradation and is therefore devoid of shame and self-condemnation; and till this perception and feeling are awakened there is no hope respecting him. It is the utter lack of a moral ideal which constitutes his deepest degradation.

This contains and proves our principle, that our ideals are a measure of our worth. I say a measure, for I'do not mean to say they are the only measure. For when two persons who have the same ideal in the main differ greatly in their actual conformity to it, we attribute to them a difference of worth. But this practical test transcends our subject, which seeks or affirms an ideal test of character ; and the facts we have adduced show that all men recognize the existence of such a test, and that this test is expressed in the above proposition respecting our moral and spiritual ideals.

This test is as broad as human thought, and it therefore takes on as many forms as there are lines of human action and development. The artist ranks according to his power of elevated ideal creation, and it is the same with the poet. That statesman is considered the greatest who combines with the loftiest and broadest views of national polity the wisest and most feasible methods of practical approximation to the realization of those views. That teacher is also the best and wisest who combines the most exalted theory of education with the nearest approximation to its attainment. All these would be only quacks or empirics without their theory or ideal, and the relative dignity and worth of their ideal constitutes their chief relative intellectual distinction.

The question of practicality does not come in here. This is accidental to the individual, and depends on external circumstances. If I am teaching children or barbarians, my practical achievement will be small ;

but my ideal of what an educated man should be would not necessarily suffer any abatement ; and if my ideal is far inferior to that which you cherish, I am thereby demonstrated to be myself inferior to you. These ideals are the measure of our respective mental breadth and culture, and mental aspiration for ourselves or others.

This must hold with augmented emphasis in the realm of philosophy, where we are constructing an ideal universe, including, therefore, all possible ideals. Here, where there is scope for all highest faculties, and work enongh to tax them to the utmost, our work unerringly exhibits our weakness or our strength, and the elevation or the platitude of our conceptions and taste.

We do not forget that it is the object of philosophy to construct theories or systems which conform to fact, and not to please and delude ourselves with ideal pictures and unreal fancies. But, I ask, what guarantee, except his own judgment, has the theorist or logician that his base is not inadequate or erroneous in some particular ? If his result is ignoble, may I not, therefore, come in and say, with as much logic and reason as this theorist can claim, that I cannot accept such a result, because I have an experience and a conception which it does not explain, and that, therefore, there must be some mistake either in his premises or his reasonings from them ? Further, if this theorist says, or otherwise indicates, that his theory is his ideal proper — that is, all that he desires and all that he can conceive of worth and excel lence ? is not this an explicit declaration of the limit and highest altitude of his mind ? If, then, this theory or ideal of this man is low and vulgar compared with the ideals or theories of some other men, are not his mind and character low and vulgar compared with theirs ? On this ground, I claim the right to reject and scorn, detest and antagonize with unutterable vehemence, a theory of mere material sensism. Whether this theory be true to fact or not, I should feel it a mental and moral degradation to accept it as my ideal, and therefore I am right in saying I will not I am, therefore, right in denouncing the universe as wrong, if this base theory is true ; and so its advocate himself is wrong in that case, in being contentedly true to fact.

I think, moreover, that the very existence of my ideal theory, as so superior in character to this asserted true theory, disproves the truth of the latter. I hold that it is an absurdity, amounting to a self-contradiction, to suppose that I, a mere infinitesimal fragment, who do not comprehend myself, and but little or aught of anything around me, should be able to be a judge of the universe, and condemn it, and, rising high above it, look down with supremest contempt upon its grand totality !

But this I do, if the atheistic sensist theory is correct. It is true, I know, that the less may despise the greater, through incomprehension. But this theory, and such abominations as I am execrating, I comprehend perfectly, and I hate them as much. If it were the true theory of the universe, I should then, with full comprehension,- detest and despise the whole totality of the universal force and cause of all things, myself included, as ineffably beneath myself. But that is impossible and absurd. Yet I do thus judge, and feel rightly and knowingly toward this theory ; therefore, that theory does not represent the universe. It is a base-born misrepresentation, more detestable than any ordinary falsehood, because it is alike in its intrinsic nature and origin and consequence of a viler quality.

It is a self-contradiction to suppose that I can rise above the forces to which I owe my existence, and all that I am. As nothing but a force can do anything, and as nature is one force, constant and immutable through all change, as witnessed by the law of the conservation of energy, therefore this force must at all times be at least equal to all conscious existence and unconscious operations. Our Author and the force which dominates our souls cannot be sensible matter which is inferior to thought and volition. Our Author is a power which is behind the material universe, and works constantly in it and through it.

CHAPTER IV.

CULTUEE OF IDEALS.

We have seen that as an ideal is that which expresses the highest conceptions, hopes and aspirations of its subject, so the relative dignity of ideals, other things being equal, proves the relative worth and dignity of their subjects.

This is a great point gained. It is a point which all who possess any moral and spiritual intuition can understand and appreciate in some degree ; and, with the ideal of Jesus before them and within them, they look down from a very lofty height on materialism ; and up there they are quite safe from all attacks of materialistic argument. What we heartily detest and despise will be powerless to convince us, whatever its pretense of logic. In the exalted state and position above conceived nothing will appear so logical as the inference that the loftier ideal is the shadow cast by an equally lofty real.

In proceeding I call attention to an obvious fact of very great importance, that there is a perpetual interaction between our ideals and our intellectual and moral character, so that they are forever modifying each other. An exalted ideal attained and preserved naturally operates as a celestial magnet to elevate the character ; and, on the other hand, any progress of the latter always advances the former. The culture of the real and the culture of the ideal, therefore, always go together. This is not a known fact only, but also a psychological and moral necessity. We may possibly advance in the moral ideal without advancing in the real, because we may wilfully refuse, or through temptation and weakness fail, to conform to an acknowledged obligation. But we cannot advance in the moral real without making some progress either in the distinctness or the conscious value and force or the elevation of the moral ideal.

Hence the obligation to cultivate the highest ideals, and especially the moral and spiritual ideal, as a means of cultivating the moral and spiritual real. This cultivation should be earnest, deliberate and constant. Of course, this is nothing new, but only that which we have heard from the beginning ; and its age and familiarity constitute a part of its credentials, for if it were new it could not be true. Its originality consists only in the connection in which it is used and in the end for which it is employed.

The obligation and advantage of cultivating ideals in all departments of human action are universally acknowledged and acted on. This is not only true of the votaries of art. It is equally true of the cultivators of science and philosophy, and it is true in all intelligent prosecution of the material and social tasks of life. With every advance in achievement, there will be an advance of the ideal which will promote another advance in the real.

In this eager effort after ideal plans and then after their realization, a plurality of ideals in their practical action will often come into competition, when the inferior will be replaced by the superior so far as their relative merits are recognized.

In practical life it is, of course, the practical results which control the preferences. But in works of pure art there is no such ground of preference. Here the most perfect art will always carry off the palm ; and where there is any symbolism the loftiest, the purest and the most perfect ideal representation will always by the best judges be preferred, as a matter of course.

While philosophy always has an ideal, yet unlike art, that ideal is not sought alone, nor is it valued generally by itself alone, nor is a philosophical theory always conceived of in the light of an ideal. Conformity to facts, and the practical results may occupy our attention, and by these wholly or chiefly the theory may be judged. This is all right. ISTo theory is worth anything which cannot stand these tests. But we may at our option leave these out of account for a while, and contemplate the philosophical theory as an ideal, intellectual and moral.