What happened at Jutland; the tactics of the battle

Front matter

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Foreword

This work of Commander Gill, U. S. Navy, is a thoughtful, painstaking and thorough research into all the evidence bearing upon the now historic battle of Jutland and constitutes a valuable contribution to the list of publications upon the Art of War on the Sea.

H. B. Wilson,

Admiral U. S. Navy,

Commander-in-Chief,

Atlantic Fleet.

U.S.S. Permsylvama, Flagship.

Preface

A GREAT deal has already been written about the battle of Jutland. The most recent contribution is a 600-page official record of the original English reports and despatches. The British have presented their side of the battle — the Germans have described the action as it appeared from the other point of view. Admiral Jellicoe, the British Commander-in-Chief, and Admiral Scheer, the German Commander-in-Chief, have both written books and explained their respective maneuvers fully and frankly. For these two books students of naval affairs should be deeply grateful. It should be recognized, however, that they are, necessarily, onesided treatments. The subject, moreover, has become highly controversial, and, as a consequence, has been confused by somewhat misleading argumentative discussions.

Important questions of present and future naval policy depend, in large measure, upon conclusions drawn from the experiences of Jutland. The study of this engagement is an urgent matter and does not admit delay. No apology, therefore, is made for this attempt to gather together in one narrative authentic information available from both British

[vii]

PREFACE

and German sources, and to give, as accurately as may be, an unbiased analysis of the battle.

Acknowledgment is made to officers of the War College and officers of the U. S. S. Pennsylvania for valued criticism and comment received during preparation of the manuscript. Acknowledgment is also made to Lieutenant G. J. Hazard, U.S.N.R.F., for his skill and courtesy in the work of making the diagrams.

C. C. Gill.

[viii]

Contents

I THE TACTICS

OF THE BATTLE

II FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE

II Fleet Movements Before The Battle

At early dawn of May 31st, Vice Admiral Hipper, commanding the German advance reconnaissance force of 5 battle cruisers attended by 5 light cruisers and 33 destroyers, left the Jade Basin and stood out to sea followed one half hour later by the supporting High Sea Battle Fleet. (Diagrams 2, 3.) The "Third Squadron," 7 of Germany's most modern dreadnaughts, was in the van with the Flagship Koenig leading; then came Squadron One, 9 dreadnaughts of the Heligoland and Nassau type, led by the Fleet Flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, flying the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Scheer; and bringing up the rear was the "Second Squadron," 6 predreadnaughts of the Deutschland class. The entire fleet numbered 22 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers and about 78 destroyers. This second most powerful fleet in the world was a comparatively new creation. Germany had almost no naval traditions. At this time, however. Admiral Scheer's force was in a high state of efficiency with [32]

BEATTV.

LION ")

PRINCESS ROYAL ]^''^-^"^^^-^^^°^ ^' NEW ZEALAND ") 16.800 TONS, ESK.

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battle cruisers and fast battleships (showing tonnage, speed, armor and armament)

m.

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• KAISER I I PRINZ REGENT LUITPOLO I KAISERIN 1

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I0-I2"GUNS. SPEED 23.

ARMOR 14":

24.440 TONS. lO-t2"GUNS. SPEED 21.

ARMOR 13.75'

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% FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE I OSTFRIESLAND I THURmGEM • HELGOLAND i OLDENBURG I POSEN I RHEINLAND I NASSAU I WESTFALEN

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ARMOR ais:

german high sea fleet in cruising formation

(showing TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT)

Distance between ships 760 yards. Distance between squadrons 3,800 yards. For battle formation distances were closed to: 550 yards between ships and 1,100 yards between squadrons a personnel as yet untainted by the sinister influences which later broke down its morale and finally culminated in mutiny.

Mine sweepers had cleared a way through the British fields and screening destroyers zig-zagged in and out to keep down any submarines that might be lying in wait. When west of Amrum Bank, the course was laid north, and Admiral Hipper with his advance force proceeded to carry out his orders, which were to pass out of sight of Horn Reefs and the Danish coast, show himself off the Skaggerak before dark, cruise in the Skaggerak during the night, and at noon of the next day join up with the Main Fleet. Groups of English cruisers had been reported off the Norwegian coast. It was expected that the presence of Hipper off the Skaggerak would be reported, that British forces would start from England soon after the receipt of this information, and that, in all probability, a battle would result on the following day, June 1st.

On this day the British Grand Fleet was also at sea. It was part of British naval strategy to make periodic sweeps through the waters of the North Sea, and one of these sweeps was now in progress.*

It appears that on the 30th the German Flag-

* Admiral Jellicoe has stated : — "In accordance with instructions contained in their Lordship's telegram, No. 434-, of 30 May, the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea."

ship had been sending an unusually large number of messages. Although these code messages could not be deciphered, the sending ship was identified, and by directional radio instruments the British had determined a movement of the German Flagship of about 7 miles, indicating that she had shifted from the inner harbor of Wilhelmshaven to an outer anchorage in the Jade Basin. The British knew that the German fleet was ready for sea, and naval activity of some sort was inferred.

Because of this inference and the consequent timely sailing of the British Grand Fleet, however, it does not follow that Admiral Jellicoe had foreknowledge that a fleet to fleet action was pending. It is also to be remembered that a considerable force of British light cruisers and destroyers were held in port at Harwich. It is reasonable to suppose that had the British Admiralty been informed of the German plan this Harwich force would have been sent out to take part in the battle.

On the evening of May 30th, the British battle fleet of 24 dreadnaughts, attended by 3 battle cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, and 46 destroyers had sailed from the northern bases, and a few hours later Admiral Beatty's advance force of 4 fast dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 15 light cruisers, and 31 destroyers had set out from Rosyth. (Diagrams 2 and 4.) The entire British fleet formed a veritable armada totaling 28 dreadnaughts, 9 battle cruisers, 27 light cruisers, 8 ar- [88]

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tO-l^'& Vi'K british battle fleet of 24 dreadnaughts (showing tonnage, speed, armor and armament)

mored cruisers, and 77 destroyers. It represented the acme of naval development. Never before in history had such a powerful array of fighting ships been grouped under one command. These ships were manned, moreover, by a personnel steeped in the traditions of England's long mastery of the seas, traditions epitomized in the names of Blake, Hawke, and Nelson.

At this period of the war, no continuous British submarine observation was maintained off the German bases, and Admiral Jellicoe received no reports of the departure of the High Sea Fleet. The advantage of the initiative enabled Germany to send out observing U-boats which were stationed approximately as indicated on the chart (Diagram 1) : — Some off Scapa Flow; one off Moray Firth; a large number off the Firth of Forth ; several off the Humber; and the remainder north of Terschelling Bank watching the approaches to the Straits and Harwich.

At 5:30 A.M., on the 30th, U-32, about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, reported two British battleships, two cruisers, and several destroyers making a southeast course. These were probably part of Sir David Beatty's force which had sailed from Rosyth. An hour later this same submarine reported that she had intercepted English radio messages to the effect that two battleships and groups of destroyers had sailed from Scapa. Shortly after this, U-66 reported from about 60 miles east of Kinnaird Head, a squadron of eight British battleships, attended by light cruisers and destroyers, on a northeast course. These evidently belonged to Sir Martin Jerram's Squadron which was en route from Cromarty to rendezvous at sea with the rest of the battle fleet which had sailed from Scapa.

From the above reports Admiral Scheer estimated that the diverging courses of the detachments sighted did not indicate a large operation such as an advance on the German bight; nor, to his mind, did they appear to have any connection with the German enterprise. To Admiral Scheer this information from his submarine scouts presaged, not a British fleet concentration, but rather a likelihood that his hope of meeting with separate British detachments might be fulfilled. He was, therefore, the more encouraged to carry out his plan.

At 2 :00 P.M., on May 31st, the opposing forces were in the relative positions shown in Diagram 5.

The main body of the British Grand Fleet, commanded by Admiral Jellicoe, was about 70 miles off the Norway coast in Lat. 57° 57' N., Long. 3° 45' E. From JelHcoe Beatty bore S. 23° E. and was distant 77 miles, while Scheer bore about S. 40° E. and was distant about 150 miles. The Grand Fleet was disposed as indicated in Diagram 6. The 24 dreadnaught battleships were steaming in six columns of four ships each with a close anti-submarine screen of 4 light cruisers and about 34 destroy- [42]

JELLICOE

E/AN THOMAS i\\\ BEATTY

— 50 miles

SCREEN

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES AT 2:00 P.M.

ers; 5 light cruisers covered the front of the capital ships 3 miles in advance of the main body, 6 armored cruisers were spread 6 miles apart on a line 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet and a linking armored cruiser to relay signals was placed 6 miles toward the Commander-in-Chief's Flagship, the Iron Duke. Each armored cruiser was attended by one destroyer. The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, Hood's three Invincibles, with two light cruisers and four destroyers, was stationed 20 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. All this force had a fleet speed of 20 knots and was now zig-zagging, speed of advance 14 knots in the direction S. 50° E. The advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, consisting of six battle cruisers and four 25-knot battleships with attending light cruisers and destroyers, was disposed as shown in Diagram 7. The 1st Squadron of four battle cruisers was in single line ahead, led by Admiral Beatty's Flagship, the Lion, and screened by the light cruiser Champion and ten destroyers of the 13th Flotilla. The 2d Squadron of two battle cruisers was 3 miles E.N.E. of the JLion and screened by six destroyers. The 5th Battleship Squadron, four dreadnaughts of the Queen Elizabeth class, was 5 miles N.N.W. of the Lion and screened by one light cruiser and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla.* A scouting and screening line of eleven light cruisers was eight

* The name ship Queen Elizabeth was undergoing repairs after severe service in tie Dardanelles Campaign.

miles S.S.E. of the Liorij spread in a direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., distance between ships five miles. The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was also with these light cruisers. The link ship Yarmouth was midway between the line of light cruisers and the Lion. All this advance force had a fleet speed of twenty-five knots and was now advancing on a course north by east toward the rendezvous with the Battle Fleet, at a speed of nineteen and one half knots.

By the plan of the sweep Jellicoe was to be at position "A," Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. at 2:00 P.M. (Diagram 1.) The Battle Fleet had been delayed, however, to wait for a destroyer to examine some trawlers and was eighteen miles behind schedule. Beatty's 2:00 P.M. position, according to the plan, was Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 5° 00' E. (Point "A"' in Diagram 1.) He actually was about twelve miles N. 64° W. from this point, Lat. 56° 46' N., Long. 4° 40' E., thus bringing the relative positions of Beatty and Jellicoe within six or seven miles of the plan, but geographically some twelve or fifteen miles to the westward. Admiral Beatty had been informed that Admiral Jellicoe would sweep to the south from point *'A."

Considerable criticism has been made of this disposition of the British forces, to the effect that Beatty was too far away from Jellicoe. They were then operating seventy-seven miles apart. This is a matter of opinion, and depends upon the plan of [46]

^/JBLLI&E

^ / X^/ /4TH. LIGHT CRUISCR *=*» / ^^^ SQUADRON.'

Cochrane

2nd. cruiser

SaUADRON

OuKe of Edinburqh

1ST CRUISER SQUADRON.

Black Prino

HOOD ^^ * Contcrbury Chester cruising formation of forces under immediate command of admiral jellicoe and rear admiral

HOOD

[*7]

coordination. It will be noted later on that a discrepancy of twelve miles developed in the navigational reckoning of Jellicoe and Beatty. This caused confusion at the critical juncture when Jellicoe joined Beatty in action against the enemy. While it is not considered tactically unsound to operate a fast detachment this distance in advance of the supporting battle fleet, it is of utmost importance that proper touch be maintained by linking up ships or other means, and suitable precautions taken to assure that the detachment be not trapped and cut off by a superior enemy force.

The main body of the High Sea Fleet, commanded by Admiral Scheer, was now fifty miles west of Lyngvig on the Jutland coast. The twentytwo battleships were steaming in column with the seven most modern dreadnaughts in the van squadron, the eight older type dreadnaughts led by the Fleet Flagship, Friednch der Grosse, in the center, and the predreadnaught squadron of six ships bringing up the rear. The distance between ships was 763 yards and the interval between squadrons was 3,800 yards. (Diagram 3.) Six light cruisers with destroyers were spread ahead as a protective scout line, and the balance of the forty-four destroyers attending the battleships operated as a close-up anti-submarine screen. All this force had a maximum fleet speed of seventeen knots and was now on course north, speed fourteen knots. Comparing the cruising formations of the two fleets, it is seen from Diagram 6 that Jellieoe was in line of divisions with his strength fairly well distributed, favoring his left and center; the right center carried the weaker ships, while the right flank division was strengthened by the Marlborough and the Revenge: on the other hand, Diagram 3 shows that S cheer was in extended column, his most powerful ships in the van, the intermediate strength in the center, and the weak predreadnaughts in the rear. Diagrams 2, 3 and 4 show the order of ships, their heavy gun strength, their main armor protection, and their speed.

The advance German force, technically named the "Reconnaissance Force," under Vice Admiral Hipper, comprising 5 battle cruisers, 5 light cruisers and 33 destroyers, was about 50 miles ahead of Scheer and about 50 miles east of Beatty. (See Diagram 8.) The 5 battle cruisers were in column, attended by a close-up anti-submarine destroyer screen, while the light cruisers and other destroyers were spread out in a semicircle about ten miles ahead and on either flank. All this advance force had a fleet speed of about 26% knots and was proceeding on a northerly course at a speed of about 24 knots. Comparing the opposing battle cruisers, it is to be noted that the British were superior in gun power and the Germans in armor protection. German naval construction had, at a sacrifice in gun power, devoted a larger percentage of ship tonnage to armor protection. [50]

^EVAN THOMAS 'BEATTY

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BirKenhead ,.

jy 0*- Enqadmt

Southampton oBirminqham cruising formation op forces under immediate command of vice admiral beatty and rear admiral evan-thomas

TABLE COMPARING STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES

Type. British. German.

(Beatty) (Hipper)

Dreadnaught Battleships 4

Battle Cruisers 6 5

Light Cruisers 15* 5

Destroyers . . . . f 31 S3

* Including one Sea-plane Carrier.

Type. British. German.

(Jellicoe) (Scheer)

Dreadnaught Battleships 24 16

Predreadnaught Battleships .... 6

Battle Cruisers 3

Armored Cruisers 8

Light Cruisers 12 6

Destroyers 46 45

There is still some question as to the exact number of destroyers present. Lieutenant Commander Frost in the Naval Institute Proceedings gives the following comparative table: —

Dreadnaught Battleships 28 647,550 16 363,360 1.78 to 1

Destroyers 78 77,200* 77 or less 60,300* 1.28 to 1 * Approximate

Comparing the totals of the two fleets on a tonnage basis, the British had an aggregate superiority of about 7 to 4 or 1.75 to 1. (The armored cruisers of the British and the predreadnaught s of the Germans are not included in this comparison. ) Including the German predreadnaughts the aggregate tonnage of German capital ships was 561,110 as against the British 844,450.

The British had a total of 344 heavy guns: 48 15-inch, 10 14-inch, 142 13.5-inch, and 144 12-inch. The Germans had a total of 244 heavy guns: 144 12-inch, and 100 11-inch.

A 15-inch shell weighs 1,950 lbs., a 14-inch shell weighs 1,600 lbs., a 13.5-inch 1,400 lbs., a 12-inch 850 lbs.,* and an 11 -inch 760 lbs. A single discharge of all British heavy guns in the battle of Jutland weighed 713,600 lbs. as compared with 217,264 lbs. for the German side.f

In armor protection the German ships were better provided than the British. Tonnage is the fairest basis of comparison, as it represents capital that can be invested at discretion for offense and defense.

In the battle itself, submarines and aircraft took no actual part. The British had a sea-plane carrier which flew some planes during the approach but they accomplished nothing of note. No British submarines were in the battle. The Germans had twenty-four submarines and ten airships which took part in the operations, but none of these were present on the field of action during the afternoon and

* A 12-inch British weighs 850 lbs. The German 12-inch is heavier and Comdr. Bellairs gives its weight as 981 lbs.

t All the British 15-inch, 14-inch and 13.5 inch, except the Erin's 13.5-inch, were in center line turrets bearing on both broadsides. All the 12-inch and 11-inch, however, were not capable of being fired on both sides. Tlie Germans suffered particularly in this respect. The four Heligolands lost four 12-inch guns each, and the four Nassans lost four 11-inch each. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt gives the superiority of the Grand Fleet to the High Sea Fleet at Jutland as 175 per cent in weight of broadsides, or nearly 3 to 1. ("Naval Construction During the War" by Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt.)

iJteqensburq ••«»TorpfdoBoot»

Screen v^ HIPPES cruising formation of reconnaissance force com manded by vice admiral hipper evening of May 31st. Although between the hours of two and three P.M. five Zeppelins ascended for long distance reconnaissance in the sector north to west of Heligoland, they did not see their own fleet, nor the British fleet, nor did they hear anything of the battle.*

* In speaking of U-boat enterprises and their tactical employment. Admiral Scheer states: —

"Cooperation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not be suflBciently well organized to prove dependable for certain operations. Tactical cooperation would have been understood to mean that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of encountering the enemy, numbers of U-boats would be present from the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and torpedo boats in daylight battle to support the activity of the battleship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that respect and it would have been a very risky experiment to take U-boats into battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility of their not distinguishing between friend and foe.

"Only temporary cooperation was possible in the case of enterprises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had a special duty, to be mutually supplemented but without exacting any tactical union. If, for instance, there was the intention to bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed that English fighting forces would at once rush out from different harbors where they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their peace. If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was presumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have a chance of attacking.

"Consideration was given as to what would be the most desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbors; how they could be used in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or otherwise render assistance. . . ."

Ill

THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE

The battle of Jutland is conveniently divided into the following five phases (each of these will be considered separately and in turn) :

First Phase: (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.)

Bj'itish Advance Force under Beatty encotmters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects juncture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer, (Diagrams 9 and 10.)

Second Phase: (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.)

British Advance Force engaged with van of German High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jellicoe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest. (Diagram 15.)

Third Phase: (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.)

Scheer turns hack and attacks the British center with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage- [58]

THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE

ment Scheer again withdraws to the west under cover of a smoke screen. {Diagram 20.)

Fourth Phase: (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. Dark.)

In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, hauls around from west to southeast, and seeks to draw closer to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to regain touch on westerly courses, then turns to the southwest, and finally to south. (Diagram 22,)

Fifth Phase: (9:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M.)

During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south while Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light forces are intermittently engaged with the High Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.)

The day of the battle was partly cloudy to overcast, but the sun broke through in places most of the time. Except for a moderate swell the sea was smooth. There was very little wind. Visibility was reported as good in the first stages of the action, but later in the afternoon was considerably reduced by mist and smoke which hung low in the heavy atmosphere.

Note: The tracks of the heavy ships throughout the battle are shown in Diagrams Nos. 9, 10, 15, 20, 22, and 24 of the five phases. Important situations during these phases are portrayed in more detail by position diagrams which also show light forces. These diagrams have been constructed by combining data gleaned from the writings of Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Scheer, Commander von Hase, Gunnery Officer of the Derringer, and other authoritative sources, both British and German. No attempt has been made to plot in all the light forces. The positions of these are given approximately to indicate how the destroyers and light cruisers entered as factors, influencing the major tactics of the battle.

IV

THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE (2:00 P. M. to 4:55 P. M.)

British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects junctwe with the High Sea Battle Fleet wnder S cheer. (Diagrams 9, 10.)

In the early afternoon of the day of the battle the western destroyers of Hipper's advanced scouting line were diverted to the left to examine a steamer. This proved a small incident carrying in its train large events. While so engaged these German destroyers made smoke contact with Beatty 's eastern scout. A few minutes before this contact, the British Advance Force had turned to the north and as Beatty and Hipper were then on about parallel courses they would have just cleared each other had it not been for the timely appearance of this neutral steamer. Both sides proceeded at once to develop this contact, and by 2:30 Beatty and Hipper knew by radio of the presence of enemy light forces. Jellicoe also received the report and directed Hood to proceed with the three battle cruisers under his command to head off the enemy [60]

evAKTnoMAa mppea

KATTf

TRACK OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS DURING THEIR BATTLE

APPROACH (2:00 TO 3:48 p.m., 31 may)

BEATTf

MILES,

SCftCER track of the heavy ships during the first phase (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 p.m.)

British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action to the southeast and effects juncture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer should he attempt to escape via the Skaggerak. Hipper headed to the west and northwest to investigate. Beatty turned to the southeast to cut off the enemy in case he attempted to retire toward the Horn Reefs passage. Shortly after 2:30, Beatty was informed of the presence of Hipper's heavy ships. As the opposing battle cruisers approached each other the light forces became engaged, and the battle had begim.

In this approach (Diagram 9) Beatty maneuvered at a speed of nineteen and one-half knots. When assured of bringing the German ships to action, he changed from southeasterly courses and steered to the northeast toward the enemy. One hour later, at 3:25, Hipper's battle cruisers were sighted to the east, distant fifteen miles. By this time Beatty had concentrated his six battle cruisers, but, although the British had been maneuvering at a speed of only 19.5 knots, the four fast battleships under Evan-Thomas were still five miles away to the northwest. Admiral Beatty evidently estimated his battle cruisers as a sufficiently powerful force to destroy Hipper's ships unassisted. The British Admiral now increased speed to twenty-five knots, took a line of bearing formation to clear the smoke, and attacked. Hipper turned to the southeast. This placed the two columns about twelve miles apart on converging courses. When a little over eight miles from each other both sides opened fire simultaneously at 3:48. (Diagram 11.)

Admiral Evan-Thomas with his slower squadron of four battleships was now endeavoring to close up. He was so far astern, however, that he was unable to take an effective part in this first phase of the battle, and failure to concentrate before attacking proved costly to the British. The German fire was rapid and accurate. The Lion was hit twice three minutes after fire was opened and within ten minutes the roof of one of her turrets was blown off and two guns put out of action. By this time the Tiger and Princess Royal had also been hit and in a few minutes the Indefatigable was overwhelmed by a salvo. She fell out of line, sinking by the stern, was hit by another salvo forward, turned over and sank at 4:04. The range was now opening. Beatty had altered course to the south to confuse the enemy's fire control, and also to give Evan- Thomas opportunity to get into action by cutting a corner. (Diagram 12.) At 4:08 the Derfflinger ceased firing. Her target ship was out of range. (The Derfflinger s limit of gun elevation was for 20,000 yds. ) There was now a brief lull in the engagement between the battle cruiser lines.

At this time Evan-Thomas's battleships were able to open at the extreme range of 19,000 yards to 20,000 yards on the Von der Tann, Hipper's rear ship. At 4:16 the second ship from the rear was also taken under fire by the battleships, but, partly due to smoke, and partly to unfavorable light conditions to the eastward, difficulty was experienced [66]

BEATTY

V

ntppKE

N leooo JfOnfe.

V at 3:48 the opposing battle cruisers open fire in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. That the fire of Evan-Thomas's battleships was of slight effect is shown by the fact that the target ships of these battleships suffered little damage during this run to the south.

Beatty and Hipper soon closed again, and, as the range decreased, the battle cruiser big gun action was renewed. Hipper's third ship was seen to be on fire. The gunnery officer of the Derfflinger reported that the Lion had temporarily left the line, and that this had caused him to shift his fire from the Princess Royal to the Queen Mary. The latter was thus under the concentrated fire of the Derfflinger and the Seydlitz. At 4:26, after having been hit repeatedly, the Queen Mary sank in a terrific explosion, evidently caused by the blowing up of a magazine. The Tiger, following close astern, passed through a dense cloud of smoke and a great deal of debris fell on her decks, but except for this the Queen Mary had completely disappeared. This happened 38 minutes after the engagement started and 20 minutes after the loss of the Indefatigable. Eighteen of the Queen Mary's complement of 1,300 men*were subsequently picked up by a destroyer.