Naval power in the war, 1914-1917

Front matter

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Preface

The eleven chapters in this work, with one exception, were contributed to The New York Times Current History Magazine during the year 1917 and now appear in revised form. The exception is the sixth chapter — The Dardanelles Operations — which was written to complete the series covering the major naval operations of the war and is now published for the first time.

The author takes occasion to extend his acknowledgments and thanks to the editors of The New York Times Current History Magazine for permission to republish which they have kindly given.

Acknowledgment is also made to Allan Westcott, Ph.D., Instructor in the United States Naval Academy, for maps and diagrams contributed and for help given in editing the text. Sincere thanks are expressed to Mr. T. G. Frothingham, to the Staff of the English Department of the United States Naval Academy, and to the Officers of the Oklahoma and the Seattle for many helpful suggestions cordially given throughout the progress of these studies.

Charles C. Gill.

Introduction

The present volume had its origin in lectures delivered by Lieutenant Commander Gill at the United States Naval Academy in the winter of 1915-16 to midshipmen who have since been graduated and are now in active service. For this audience, the facts and lessons of recent naval history had a special significance, as a very practical preparation for the responsibilities they were soon to undertake. To quote the words of Napoleon, *'The happiest inspiration in battle is often a recollection of the past."

The discussion was afterward continued in The Nezv York Times Current History Magazine^ and, with the sanction of the Navy Department, is now published in book form. In selecting and preparing the material, the author had in mind not only the special needs of young naval officers, whether midshipmen or volunteers now entering the naval service, but also the general popular interest in naval affairs. The book is to be used this year by the Department of English at the Naval Acadn emy in the teaching of naval history.

viii INTRODUCTION

Undertaking these studies before the entry of the United States into the war, the author has maintained throughout the standpoint of the technical student of naval warfare, rather than that of the philosophical historian. Needless to say, he is not without strong sympathies and convictions ; but these, from the nature of the investigation, are subordinated to the search for truth. In other words, the book is not partisan and is not propaganda; it has no special thesis to maintain — except an underlying belief in the importance of naval power to a nation whose boundaries are the two oceans, and whose interests extend throughout the Seven Seas.

The wisdom of attempting to write naval history at such close range may be questioned. The question may be answered by pointing out that the book aims to draw the significant naval lessons, rather than to chronicle events in minute detail. Whatever the paucity of the data, it is important that these lessons should be drawn immediately. Frank discussion clears the air.

There is an advantage also in the contemporary point of view, with its appreciation of concurrent events and the feeling of the hour. If distant perspective gives proper proportion. It also throws a haze over the scene. And in naval history particularly, the facts are not always clearer with the

INTRODUCTION ix

lapse of time. Historians a century ago could have determined, more easily than it can be determined to-day, the exact manner in which Nelson brought his fleet into action at Trafalgar; and a century ago there was a recognition — more instinctive and less reasoned, perhaps, but not less genuine than to-day — of the greatness of that victory and its meaning in the Napoleonic War.

Students of naval history, therefore, may feel indebted to the writer for this book — written under pressure of duties afloat which since our participation in the war have left slight leisure for outside work.

Allan Westcott, Department of English, U. S. Naval Academy.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER

IN THE WAR 1

CHAPTER I Significance of Naval Power in the War

SEA power in the present war has been exerted for the most part behind the scenes. It is hard to realise that the achievements of the Allied fleets, accomplished with so little fighting, have proved, in their influence upon the war, more important than the much heralded land battles involving enormous loss of life and property. The German Government admitted this potency of sea power, when, in April, 1917, Hindenburg announced that it was only necessary for the German armies to hold their own on land while on the sea the U-boats hemmed in Great Britain and so crippled the ocean trade supplying men, food and munitions to Allied armies as to compel the acceptance of peace terms pleasing to the Prussian leaders.

It is strange that Germany's first soldier should have made the point, that the submarine, the only naval weapon able to evade the Allied blockade, promised a respite and a hope that the German armies could not give, even though the latter had been successful on all fronts and had conquered entire countries. Thus Germany recognised the jprinciple well taught by the distinguished American naval officer. Admiral Mahan, that in all great wars between commercial nations land power is ancillary to sea power.

At this stage of the war there can be no doubt of the effect upon its grand tactics of command of the sea. In this war, as in past wars, the force of sea power is slowly but surely shaping the issues. As the arteries of sea-borne commerce to the Teutonic Powers are more and more effectually blocked, and as the U-boat terror subsides while new strength and vigour from America, Africa and Asia is transported more and more easily to France, England and Italy — the realisation will slowly but surely be forced home, that Pan- Germanism has been defeated and Germany must give up the evil policies of her present Government which she has fought so desperately to propagate and defend.

In following the developments of the present war it is of interest to note that in the main noth-

SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 3

Ing startling has happened to upset expert predictions, either as to the part sea power would take, or as to which of the belligerent navies would dominate. In the course of the fighting there have not been any great surprises. Generally speaking, results have corresponded with the degree and kind of peace time naval preparation made by the warring nations.

The statement that there have been no great surprises should be modified by one exception, submarine warfare against merchant ships. Before the British blockade forced Germany to plan her unscrupulous submarine campaign against commerce it is doubtful if any country, not excepting Germany, ever thought seriously of such a campaign as a contingency of modern civilised war. It came therefore as a surprise, and its temporary success was due to the fact that in the years of pre-war time development of the submarine there had been no contemporaneous development of naval weapons to combat it as a commerce destroyer. The submarine had always been looked upon as a lawful weapon for use against enemy fighting ships, and its meagre success in this capacity shows that the preparations made against it were adequate ; but the submarine as an unscrupulous commerce raider had thirty years' start of the weapons science designed to use against it in this new and unexpected role. If it had been foreseen thirty years ago that submarines would be used in this way, step by step with the development of underwater craft, there would have been a corresponding improvement in scientific contrivances for safeguarding commerce; and had this been the case it is reasonable to suppose that the U-boat would never have reaped its grim harvest of peaceful shipping.

So this exception goes to prove the rule that naval weapons both for offence and defence are highly scientific products resulting from long years of development. There is always the chance, of course, that one side or the other will hit upon some revolutionising invention. Nor does it necessarily follow because none has appeared in three and one-half years of fighting that none will appear in the future; but there is, nevertheless, evidence that in shaping a policy of defence it is safer to heed the lessons of experience than to rely on a niere theory of inventive abilities adequate to meet any situation.

Neither an army nor a navy can be improvised, but it is an important difference between them that an army can be prepared more quickly and easily than can a navy. At the outbreak of this war Great Britain's army was small, but her powerful fleet was ready. Under the protection of

SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 5

this first line of defence a great army was recruited from British possessions all over the world, and equipped, and trained. Navies cannot so readily be built up; it takes years to construct a battleship fleet and train the personnel to fight it. When the war began Germany's army was ten times as strong as Great Britain's army, but three and one-half years later there was no such difference between the two and in some respects the British army was superior to that of Germany. On the other hand, in 1914 Germany's sea power was about two-thirds the strength of England^s sea power, and approximately this same relative strength has been maintained up to the present time. It takes so long to build fighting ships and the demands on a nation's resources are such that Germany could hardly hope to construct during the war a fleet to rival that of her enemy. But it is different in the case of land forces. Great Britain is rapidly overcoming an initial discrepancy in armies much greater than was the naval discrepancy facing Germany in July, 1914.

Careful analysis of the battles fought in previous wars has contributed much to naval science, and the general theories previously deduced have been verified by the events of this war. There is, however, by reason of improvements in ships and weapons, continuous change in the conditions affecting the application of strategic and tactical principles. This makes it advisable to alter rules of practice in the light of. lessons learned from day to day. In attempting a study of the naval operations of the present war the handicap of insufficient and unreliable data is admitted, but even if some of the premises are slightly in error, still, the inferences drawn will have value so long as they are logical and square with accepted naval opinion.

Secrecy forms an important part of naval strategy and is favoured by nature. The sea isolates and frequently swallows up all testimony of the fighting done. Hence in the present war, the Admiralty announcements of both sides have been laconic. Notwithstanding this, however, there is plenty of evidence that the silent navies have not been idle. This is indicated by a summary of the losses sustained up to November, 1917.

It is reported that in first line ships Great Britain and her Allies have lost six dreadnoughts and sixteen pre-dreadnoughts, while Germany and her allies have lost one dreadnought and three predreadnoughts. The Allies have lost eighteen armoured cruisers and twelve light cruisers, against six armoured cruisers and twenty-four light cruisers lost by the Central Powers. In other types the figures are less reliable, but the Allies have lost

SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL POWER 7

about forty-five destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, twenty-nine submarines, and forty-eight converted cruisers and auxiliaries, while the Central Powers ^ have lost about twenty-eight destroyers, fourteen \<^ torpedo boats, between fifty and one hundred submarines, and forty-two converted cruisers and auxiliaries. In addition to these, both sides have lost numerous small craft, including air scouts, patrol boats, yachts and mine sweepers.

This list of losses, however, indicates only a part of the naval work accomplished. Difficult and important operations are frequently unattended by losses. A complete narrative of the war would include not only the engagements fought, but in addition all the activities incident to mobilising, blockading, commerce destroying, transporting, convoying, patrolling, scouting, raiding, and mine laying. It will be many years before the data for such a work will be available.

The scope of this brief study is limited, therefore, to the more important naval events. These will be discussed not so much with a view to completeness in detail as with the aim of bringing out the points of policy, strategy, and tactics necessary to an understanding of the general principles governing the size, composition, training, and uses of battle fleets. These principles are important as the starting point from which more difficult scientific deductions proceed. To determine the latter is the function of naval experts who have devoted years to the exhaustive study of technical naval problems. The former comprise a portion of general knowledge which even a casual student of world politics can ill afford to neglect.

CHAPTER II Definitions and Estimate of the Situation

Sea Power — Sea Control — Plans of Warring Navies

SEA power

THE sea power of a nation may be said to comprise all its means for contesting the control of the sea. It includes the battle fleets and their auxiliaries, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, also naval bases and stations, fortified or naturally protected harbours, coast defences, the merchant marine (embracing armed and unarmed vessels engaged in commerce and passenger traffic), in short, everything the country possesses that may be useful, directly or indirectly, for the purposes of naval warfare.

Big-gun ships comprise the main reliance in battle and are known as "dreadnoughts." These are divided into dreadnought battleships and dreadnought battle cruisers, the difference between the two being that a certain amount of the gun power and armour of the battleship is sacrificed in the battle cruiser in order to get speed. Predreadnought battleships differ from dreadnought battleships in that, instead of carrying all big guns and torpedo defence guns, they carry some big guns and some smaller or intermediate battery guns, thus tapering down to the torpedo defence guns. The armoured cruiser carries a mixed calibre battery like her running mate, the predreadnought battleship, but is faster by reason of having less armour and less powerful guns.

Both pre-dreadnought battleships and armoured cruisers are discredited as shown by the fact that no more are being built, but they are by no means useless and still form an important part of the strength of the more powerful navies. The light i cruiser, used for commerce destroying and scouting, is a fast vessel without armour and carries torpedoes as well as a light battery of intermediate calibre guns. The light cruiser type, which has shown considerable usefulness in the present war, may be regarded as a development of the torpedo boat destroyer, as it is larger, more seaworthy, more habitable and better armed. The torpedo boat is a smaller edition of the destroyer, and the submarine requires no definition. An auxiliary cruiser or a converted cruiser is a merchant ship or private vessel requisitioned by the Government for naval purposes. Such a vessel is usually

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 11

armed for both offence and defence. She loses her character of a merchant ship engaged in peaceful pursuits and becomes a part of the fighting navy with the status of a regular man-of-war.

On the other hand, an armed merchantman is armed simply for defence. She is not a part of the fighting navy, and her character is determined by her employment. If she is still engaged in the peaceful pursuits of trade the fact that a ship carries one or two guns for defence only does not change her character into that of a man-of-war.

Strategy and tactics comprise the science and art of using sea power with the object of getting control of the seas. The word strategy conveys the idea of preparation for the fighting and tactics that of execution of the fighting. But before discussing the points of naval strategy and tactics exemplified in the present war, it is well to explain the uses of naval power and to outline the maritime situation in July, 1914.

SEA CONTROL

When nations of maritime importance are at war, relative control of the sea, or certain parts of the sea, belongs to the belligerent whose sea power has practically driven the sea power of the other from the areas in question, so that the maritime operations of the former, both naval and commercial, are practically unhindered, while the maritime operations of the latter are for the time being practically non-existent. For example, it is generally considered that since the beginning of the war the Allies have had control of the Atlantic. This does not mean that the maritime operations of the Central Powers in these waters have been literally extinguished. It would appear impossible, in the face of an enterprising and resourceful enemy, to prevent completely the operations of submarines and occasional commerce destroyers. But since these have not materially affected the maritime operations of the Allies it is proper to say that the latter have controlled the Atlantic. There are varying degrees of sea control, and the more extensive the submarine and commerce destroying activities of the weaker belligerent, the less completely does the stronger enemy control the sea areas in question.

Theoretically, in times of peace at least, the seas are free to all, but even then certain areas are said to be potentially controlled by certain nations by virtue of their relatively superior sea power in these respective waters. For example, the superior sea power of Japan in Asiatic waters gives her in peace times what might be called potential control of those seas, and it may be assumed that this

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 13

potential control increases the weight of her voice in international affairs of the Far East.

In times of war also the potential sea power of neutrals may easily prove an important factor. For example, at the beginning of the war had the United States possessed a navy superior to the navies of the Allies, although, relatively speaking between the belligerent powers, the Allies would still have controlled the Atlantic Ocean, the superior sea power of the United States would have given this country a potential control of this ocean, which might have affected the conduct of the maritime operations of all the belligerents, particularly in matters concerning the lawful interests of the United States.

International law is not very clearly codified, and it is natural that different nations should look at things from different angles. This means that when great wars are going on potential sea power may prove especially valuable in securing respect for neutral rights.

At the beginning of the war the Allies had superior sea power and consequent potential control in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, North Sea — in short, in all sea areas excepting those adjacent to the ports and naval bases of the Central Powers, namely, the Adriatic near Austria's ports, the North Sea and the Baltic adjacent to Germany's ports, and the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Bosporus, under the control of Turkey.

Making a similar estimate of the situation at the close of the first three and one-half years of war, we find no material alteration. The fighting, which has changed the potential control into active control, followed a course quite to be expected, and maritime operations have been singularly free of surprises. The Allies made a notable attempt to wrest control of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosporus from Turkey and her allies, but it failed, and, with the possible exception of the battle off the Jutland Peninsula, there has been no other active struggle to alter the areas of sea control as determined by the pre-wartime disposition of sea power. This apportionment of the seas has been manifestly disadvantageous to the Teutonic powers, but the sea power of the latter, the part their navies have played, and the waters they have controlled, have by no means been negligible.

PLANS OF WARRING NAVIES

Broadly speaking, Great Britain's plan of naval campaign at the outbreak of hostilities aimed: — first, to destroy the enemy fleets with superior

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 15

forces, or, failing in this, to confine the enemy fleets and restrict his trade by a system of distant blockades; second, to convert potential control of the high seas into active control by destroying, capturing, or bottling up enemy men-of-war operating on foreign stations.

On the other hand, the weaker German and Austrian navies instituted a different kind of campaign. The Teutonic powers planned: — first, to operate the home fleets so as to protect their coast lines and control as wide as possible sea areas beyond, thereby preventing a close blockade and permitting commercial intercourse with neighbouring neutral countries; second, to use their naval vessels abroad so as to inflict the greatest possible damage on their enemies before being cornered and destroyed by superior Allied sea power or escaping to the shelter of home or friendly ports, as was the case when the Go eh en and Breslau eluded numerous enemy ships in the Mediterranean and steamed safely through the Dardanelles to Constantinople; third, to interfere with and damage enemy commerce by means of submarines and commerce destroyers, such as the Moewe; and fourth, the Teutonic powers planned to lessen the disparity of force between their navies and the superior navies of their enemies by so-called attrition warfare, harassing and menacing the enemy in all possible ways, instituting raids with fast air and sea squadrons, attacking with mines and torpedoes, and watchfully seeking opportunity to fall upon a detached portion of the enemy fleet with a superior force.

How have these plans worked out? What has Teutonic sea power accomplished ? What has Allied sea power accomplished ?

Early in the war German commerce destroyers, of which the Emden is a historic example, did considerable damage to Allied shipping. Turkey, aided by Germany, defeated the Allies at the Dardanelles, where a costly attempt was made to wrest from Turkey waterways over which she had exercised authority practically since the beginning of modern history. The potential defensive power proved adequate when put to the test of active resistance. The exploits of submarines have astonished the world. The British shores have been raided both by air and by sea attacks. In minor engagements as well as in the battle of Jutland, Germany, hitherto without traditions of the sea, has made a record in fighting efficiency which, ship for ship, places her fleet in the front rank.

But to what purpose? The superior naval power of the Allies has slowly but surely swept the German flag from the seas. In the first month of the war, the German cruisers in American and

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 17

Far Eastern waters were skillfully drawn away from enemy-infested areas and concentrated under the command of Vice Admiral von Spee off the west coast of South America. Here they gained a brief respite by defeating an inferior British squadron. But they were doomed ships, and it was only a question of time before the more powerful enemy navies would find and destroy them. This happened in the Falkland Islands engagement, which took place a month after the German victory off Coronel. With no navy to protect them, the German colonies have been captured one by one. On the other hand, the colonies of the Allies have been secure, and a source of aid and comfort to their mother countries. German submarines have inflicted enormous losses 1 but have not succeeded in closing the sea highways vto the Allies. Supplies and munitions of war constantly stream into their ports. Transports bring their troops from all parts of the world.

It was the pressure of naval power which compelled Germany as a last hope to undertake her lawless submarine campaign against commerce. This precipitated the United States into the war. Again it is the ability of the naval power of the United States to check the submarine menace in the Atlantic which has made the money, food, and man power of America transported over-seas to the support of hard-pressed England, France, and Italy a decisive factor of the war.

Naval events in this war, therefore, have supplied corroborative evidence to inductions grounded in the experience of past wars, thus clarifying rather than confusing the principles already more or less firmly established. Naval power dominates the military situation. Unless there is an overwhelming discrepancy, the armies of the belligerent denied the sea will surely weaken and be overcome by the armies fed and equipped and supported by means of ocean traffic.

Chapter III

Strength and Disposition of Fleets — Goeben and Breslau Episode — Attacks on Cable and Wireless Stations.

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF FLEETS (JULY, 1914)

WHEN hostilities opened, the naval fleets of the countries involved were concentrated in well-defined theatres of operations. Disregarding the small detachments on independent or foreign service, the bulk of Great Britain's fleet faced the German high sea fleet in North Europe, while the French nav)^ was opposed to the Austrian navy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. Russia's navy had not been rehabilitated since the Russo-Japanese war, but the few ships she had guarded Russian Baltic and Black Sea coasts. The relative strengths of these belligerent navies at the beginning of the great war may be approximately indicated by the following figures.

Great Britain's navy consisted of sixty-three battleships, ten battle cruisers, thirty-four arm NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR

moured cruisers, seventy-four cruisers, two hundred destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and seventy-eight submarines. Of these, two of the older battleships, three battle cruisers, sixteen cruisers, and a few destroyers were on foreign stations.

Germany's navy consisted of thirty-five battleships, five battle cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, forty-five light cruisers, one hundred and fortythree destroyers, and about thirty-five submarines. This fighting strength was concentrated in home waters except for one battle cruiser, two armoured cruisers, eight light cruisers, and one destroyer on duty abroad.

The French navy comprised twenty-two battleships, nineteen armoured cruisers, twelve light cruisers, eighty-four destroyers, one hundred and thirty-five torpedo boats, and seventy-eight submarines. As early as 1912, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France resulted in the general scheme that France would look out for British naval interests in southern Europe, while Great Britain would protect French naval interests in northern Europe. France had only four cruisers engaged in distant service.

Austria's navy numbered twelve battleships, ten cruisers, eighteen destroyers, sixty-three torpedo boats, and ten submarines. All of these, with the exception of one armoured cruiser on the China station, were in home waters.

Table (approximate) of Belligerent Fleets July, 1914^

Battleships, dreadnought type

Battleships

Battle cruisers

Armoured cruisers

Cruisers

Destroyers

Torpedo boats

Submarines

Coast defense vessels '

England....

Germany. ..

France

Russia

Austria- Hungary..

4 0

10 5 0 0

34 9

19 6

200 143 84 91

78 30 78 30

0 2

1 Assuming 3 Queen Elizabeth class practically completed. 3 Assuming 2 Koenig class practically completed.

Just before the outbreak of war the British fleet had been mobilised at Spithead, and early on August 4th, the day of Great Britain's war declaration against Germany, this fleet put to sea under sealed orders. Less is known about the exact disposition of the German forces, but probably they were equally ready and concentrated in the vicinity of the fortified bases at either end of the Kiel canal connecting the North and Baltic seas.

On August 5th the British ship Drake cut two cables off the Azores, thus severing this means of communication between the German ships abroad and their Admiralty at home. On the same day,

*For further details of all the navies finally engaged in the war, see Appendix.

the crew of a fishing boat reported that they had seen a large merchant ship in the North Sea throwing things overboard. A British destroyer flotilla of four ships was sent to investigate and soon gave chase to the steamer Koenigen Luise. A shot across the bow was unheeded, thus confirming the suspicions that the fleeing steamer had been converted by Germany into a mine layer. An engagement lasting about six minutes followed, during which the mine layer was repeatedly hit and finally sunk by gun fire. Fifty of her crew of one hundred and thirty were saved and made prisoners. The next day the British light cruiser Amphion struck a mine, probably one of those laid by the Koenigin Luise^ and was destroyed. On August Qth a flotilla of German submarines made an unsuccessful attack against the light cruiser Birmingham, which escaped unharmed after sinking by gim fire the German U-15.

These early happenings give an idea of how the struggle on the seas began. As fast as the war news spread throughout the world the fighting ships and merchant ships of the nations involved proceeded, in accordance with instructions, to modify their conduct and movements to meet the change from peace to war conditions. The German warships at large did what they could to safeguard their own commerce, destroy enemy commerce, and evade destruction themselves. The Allied navies set to work blockading enemy coasts, protecting Allied commerce, clearing the seas of enemy flags, rendering assistance to the expeditions sent to reduce German colonies, and transporting troops with their impedimenta from all parts of the world to the fighting front.

Although the primary purpose of battleships is to give battle, it is readily seen that naval wartime work covers a wide and varied field. Sometimes there are Important naval happenings without attendant losses or even without fighting. The escape of the Go eh en and Breslau may be cited as of conspicuous political significance.

GOEBEN AND BRESLAU EPISODE

It is reported that during the first few days of the war the German battle cruiser Go eh en and light cruiser Breslau bombarded the Algerian coast, sank a few ships in Bona harbour, and then proceeded to Messina, arriving there on August 5th, 1914. It is also rumoured that while off the northern coast of Africa the two German cruisers, when hard beset by enemy forces, escaped during misty weather by the aid of the ruse of placing some musicians on a raft to attract the attention of enemy patrols by playing German airs, while the warships laid their course for Messina.