The oriental policy of the United States

Front matter

Class

The Oriental Policy of the United States

By HENRY CHUNG, A. M.

Preface

THE world's greatest war has come to an end, and, in so far as we are able to judge, autocracy and militarism have been driven from Europe once for all.

Now the all-important question is : " Is this the last war, or has the Peace Conference failed to solve the problem, thereby sowing seeds for another world war — perhaps more horrible than the one just concluded? "

Political cynics all over the world are already beginning to criticize the work of the Peace Conference as being no better than that of the Congress of Vienna; they assert that all the statesmen of the leading Powers went to the Peace Conference with the intention of getting out of it as much of material gain for their respective countries as they could, and that they have obtained as much as they had expected although not as much as they wanted; that the " Fourteen Points " were made a political revolving door to admit whatever the Powers wanted to have included, and to exclude nearly everything that did not serve their purposes of nationalistic gain ; and that " self-determination " of weaker nations turned out to be selfish

10 PEEFACB

determination of stronger Powers. These are extreme views, unpleasant to be reminded of, but, perhaps, they are not without foundation. The League of Nations is as yet nothing more than a mere experiment, basing its strength upon the moral support of humanity. Will it be a new Holy AUiance, or will it serve as the framework for a world organization that will bind humanity into a mosaic of lasting peace and mutual good-will? The Peace Conference has virtually recognized the validity of secret treaties made prior to and during the war. Will the Powers, under the guidance of the League of Nations, abandon secret diplomacy and discontinue their economic exploitation of less civilized lands, thereby surrendering the particular purpose of individual states to the common will of mankind? Since the League of Nations is a league of free nations, will it not, even if it becomes a complete success, be but another nail driven into the coffin of the already crushed nations, whose claims to the right of resurrection were denied them at the Peace Table? It must be remembered that a right to revolt against foreign oppression is an inalienable right — a right upon the foundations of which the Fathers of the American Revolution built their nation. Peace at any price — especially, at the price of the political aspirations of nations whose people are crying for justice and free-

PEEFACE 11

dom — is the worst kind of tyranny. It is, however, quite possible in this pregnant century, that a new international standard of moral rectitude will be born of mankind, which will bring pressure to bear upon the League so that this new world organization will slowly succeed in disentangling itself from the many things that have bound us in the past, and be guided in its actions by a sense of justice that plays no favourites.

These are more or less academic speculations that occupy the minds of political students at the present as the aftermath of the war and the peace settlements. But the most vital question that is bound to engage the attention of the statesmen of the world is the Far Eastern question.

The open door in the Far East cannot be maintained permanently by a balance of rival powers under the guidance of intrigue. China must not be left to herself, staggering under the strain of " spheres of influence," as she has been during the last twenty years. The present Eastern question is far more menacing to the future peace of the world than was the Balkan problem ten years ago. And if the Powers of the world do not solve it now by peaceful methods, then they must be prepared to solve it ten years hence on the field of battle. It must be remembered that China has one-fourth of

12 PEEFACE

the world's population and an unlimited supply of natural resources — especially in coal and iron — to be exploited for peace or war. If this reservoir of power is permitted to be dominated by one nation — especially by such an ambitious empire as Japan — then it is obvious that the world cannot be made "safe for democracy"; there will be a drawn dagger at the heart of the United States and of the British possessions in the Far East. Consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination is the vision of the Japanese statesmen; and toward the attainment of this national goal there is unity of purpose among Japanese leaders. With this in view, Korea was annexed, Manchuria was absorbed, Inner Mongolia and Fukien province are being overwhelmed, and last but not least, Japan has obtained from the Powers at the Peace Conference the official recognition of her paramount interests in Shantung. At the present rate of Japanese aggression, China cannot last very long. Shall she be left to her own fate, or will the Powers of the West take an active interest in the Far Eastern aflFairs and save her national entity? The United States is not interested in any particular European or Asiatic problem, individual in character. But the United States is interested in a problem that has far-reaching effects on the world's peace and the welfare of mankind. What are her obligations, by treaty.

PEEFAOE 13

by policy, by moral rights, to her sister Republic in the East? These are some of the questions the author has in mind in presenting the following chapters.

The author is not unaware of the possible criticism on the part of the reader that Parts I and II lack coordination. But the opinion of the writers on the Far Eastern questions are so often conflicting, even diametrically opposed to each other at times between those who regard the Japanese as a " model people " and those who regard them as "treacherous savages" masquerading in the garb of civilization, that it is almost impossible for the average American reader to have a clear-cut conception as to what the Oriental policy of the United States ought to be unless he knows the subtle undercurrent that directs, in a large measure, the course of public opinion in the West with regard to Japan's foreign policy. In this respect the author feels justified in considering the two parts as supplementary to each other.

In preparing this volume, the author had at his disposal abundant Oriental sources. But he took pains to use as much as possible only those facts that had been corroborated by Western historians and publicists of unquestioned integrity, in order that the reader may have available references for the fuller support of the present author's statements.

14 PREFACE

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his sincere appreciation of the kind encouragement and constructive criticism given him by Professor Hartley Burr Alexander, who has aided him to a deeper insight into and higher appreciation of Western culture.

New York, Henry Chung.

PART I The Development of the Policy Introduction 21

I. The Opening of the East ... 25

1. Japan.

-|f- 2. Korea.

3. China.

II. China in the Twentieth Century . 49

1. "Spheres of Influence" versus *' Open

Door."

2. The Boxer Uprising.

3. The Russo-Japanese Struggle.

III. Aaierican Rivalry with Japan . . 62

1. TKe American Fleet in the Far East.

2. American and British Policies.

3. " Dollar Diplomacy."

4. The Twenty-one Demands.

5. China and the European War.

IV. The Lansing-I§hii Agreement . , 83

1. The Diplomatic Procedure.

2. Reception of the Agreement.

3. Effect on Japanese Attitude.

V. Present Policies and Opportunities . icx)

1. Japanese Plans and Ambitions.

2. American Duties and Opportunities.

16 CONTENTS

Part II

An Undercurrent Shaping the Policy: Japan's Control of Publicity Introduction 113

I. The Official Espionage . , .116

1. The Philosophy of the System.

2. Spies in Other Lands.

3. Espionage in Japan and Korea.

II. *rHE Government Censorship . .129

1. Press Censorship.

2. Censorship of Postal and Telegraphic Com-

munications.

III. Publicity Propaganda . . . .144

1. Official Publications.

2. Government Agencies in Foreign Lands.

3. Manipulation of Foreign Visitors in Japan.

Conclusion 167

Comparison of Russian and Japanese Diplomacy.

\ PART III

A. Treaty Between the United States and Japan . 177

B. The Emigration Treaty Between China and the

United States 192

C. Protocol Between China and the Treaty Powers

Respecting the Settlement of the Boxer War . 198

D. The Hay Doctrine of the " Open Door " in China 21 1

E. The Anglo-Japanese Alliances . . . .216

CONTENTS

'^ F. Senate Resolution Requesting the President to Transmit to the Senate the Official Correspondence Between the United States and Korea . 227

^' G. The President's Reply 228

^ H. The Kflrean-AmericanJTreaty .... 229

I. Petition from the Koreans of Hawaii to President

American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium 245

Korea Under Japan .... . — - • 258

The Root-Takahira Agreement Concerning China 266 M. Count Okuma's Message to the American People

Concerning China ..... *70 ■

The Twenty-One Demands . . . . 271 '

A Resume of Japan's Procedure in Connection

with the Twenty-One Demands . . . 276

The Revised Demands Presented by Japan to China 278 China's Concession to the Demands . . .285 R. American Note to China and Japan Concerning the

S. The Peking Petition 287

^T. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement . . . ,289

U. The New Sino-Japanese Military Agreement . 292

Selected Bibliography 296

J.

K.

L.

N.

O.

P.

Maps

Possessions of the Great Powers in the Pacific . Frontispiece "Spheres of Influence" in China — 1898 and 191 8 . 49 Rail w^ays in China, 191 5 . . . . . 63

Trade Routes of the Pacific . . . . .83 China in 1919, Showing Railways and Spheres of Influence ......>• loi

PART I The Development of the Policy

Introduction

SOME years ago Ex-Premier Kang Yu- Wei in an address before a group of Chinese in California made a statement that if China had been a strong and aggressive empire, California would be to-day a part of Chinese territory/ If we reflect for a moment that at the time of the American occupation of the Pacific coast, China was nearer to it than any other great empire excepting Japan, and that travel between China and California was less difficult, before the time of railroads, than that across the continent, we shall see that this utterance from the wise Chinese is not an empty remark. As early as 1860 there were 34,933 Chinese in the United States." And it would have been a comparatively easy matter for

* Kang was premier under the late Emperor Kwang-Hsu, and was the leader of the reform movement of 1898. He has been the head of Pao Huang Hwei (empire reform association), and is known among the Chinese as the " Modern Sage." He made a trip around the world in 1905-06 at which time the writer heard him in California.

2 "Thirteenth Census of U. S., Abstract " (1910), p. 79. 31

China, had she been a powerful nation, to send colonies to the Pacific coast before that part of the continent became a part of the United States/

It is also easy to believe that had the American Government, impelled by imperial tendencies, encouraged its merchants and seamen by subsidy and ample protection, the American " sphere of influence " would be to-day larger than that of any other nation in China, and American merchants would be enjoying the lion's share of the Oriental trade. The enterprising Yankees who sailed to all parts of the globe as merchants and fishermen were not at all slow in getting their share of the Oriental trade. Thus the first American merchant vessel appeared in Chinese waters in 1784;* and the commerce of the United States in the palmy days of its Oriental trade was second in volume among that of the Western nations. But American statesmen of the early period believed that there was " room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation " on this

8 In 1850 California had a population of 92,597 (most of whom went out there after gold was discovered in 1848) ; Oregon had only 13,294; and the territory of Washington was not yet setoff from Oregon, which act came on March 2, 1853.

* For a full account, see Callahan, " American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East," Johns Hopkins University Studies, XIX : 13 ff. ; also, Coolidge, " The United States as a World Power," 313 ff-

INTEODUOTION 23

continent/ and the American Government was too busily occupied with internal problems to safeguard the commercial interests of its citizens in the Far East. The intercourse, therefore, between North America and the Orient, built up at the close of the eighteenth century, was practically abandoned in later years, and so remained until the new efforts of the middle of the nineteenth century.

The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century inaugurated indeed a new political regime in Europe and in America. By utilization of steam, electricity, and labour-saving machinery, an industrial nation can produce manufactured articles far beyond its own needs. Two things are essential to commercial expansion of a nation — to find raw material either at home or abroad, and to find a market for manufactured goods. Commerce has become the greatest of all political interests. Territories are sought to enlarge commerce, and great armies and navies are maintained to enforce commercial rights in foreign lands. The United States, which had remained hitherto a self-contained nation, could no longer hold its isolated position. With the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, and the coming of the " spheres of influence " in China, the United States was forced to become an

8 Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, Richardson, " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," i : 321-24.

active participant in Oriental politics. From now on, American diplomacy was what the Jeffersonian Republicans might have called aggressive imperialsm.

I. Japan

WHEN Commodore Perry reached Japan in 1853, he presented to the Emperor of Japan President Fillmore's letter asking for the friendship and commercial intercourse of the two nations. The American Government had long since wanted to open Japan to American trade. In 1815 Secretary Monroe had planned to send Commodore Porter to open Japan to trade. In 1837 the American ship Morrison had arrived in Yedo Bay, Japan, in hope of opening up trade, but had been driven away by bombardment. The motive of the American Government in its attempt to open Japan in 1853 was, as stated in President Fillmore's letter to the Japanese Emperor, " friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people." The American whale industry in the Pacific Ocean about this time was estimated at about $17,000,000. In several instances American whalers had been wrecked on the Japanese coasts and the crews had been maltreated by the Japanese officials, as in the case of the Lawrence in 1846, and the Ladoga in 1848. Then, too, it was quite necessary for ocean liners plying between California and China to stop over in Japanese ports to provision themselves. In addition to all these material reasons, there was some sense of moral duty on the part of Christian America to open up heathen Japan to the penetrating rays of Christian civilization. Indeed, as early as 1816, John Quincy Adams urged the opening of Japan as a duty of Christian nations.

Between 1854, when the first American-Japanese treaty was signed at Yokohama, and 1899, when the Western nations recognized the full sovereignty of Dai Nippon, many significant historical events happened in the Sunrise Kingdom. It was during the early part of this period that the Japanese embassies returned from Europe and America with the astonishing discovery that " it is not the foreigners, but we ourselves who are barbarous." Japanese students were sent abroad to learn Western arts and sciences; foreign teachers were employed to reorganize the school system; the army was organized after the Western model, and the navy changed from fishermen's junks to iron-clad men-of-war; and feudal barons were forced to give up their powers to the central government. In short, Japan emerged from a state of mediaeval feudalism into that of a modern constitutional monarchy, strongly centralized and highly efficient in its working order. In the Boxer uprising, 1900, she joined hands with the Western nations, and in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-6, she completely surprised the world with the efficiency of her mihtary organization. It was the first time since the Turk had pounded the gates of Vienna that a heathen nation of the East had shown itself able successfully to meet a Christian power of the West on the military field. With good reason did President Roosevelt pay high tribute in his message to Congress, 1906, to the spirit and methods of Japan in her acceptance and promotion of modern civilization; and it was largely through the instrumentality of President Roosevelt that the peace negotiations at Portsmouth were brought to a successful issue. When in 1908 Japan sent her first envoy, Viscount Shuzo Aoki, to the United States with the rank of Ambassador, it was the culmination of the long friendship between the two countries.

American relations with Japan in international questions have always been fair, and Japanese statesmen have looked up to the United States for moral support in their struggle for recognition by the Western Powers.' They

* The United States was the first of Western nations to withdraw the right of extra-territoriality from Japan by a treaty signed Nov. 22, 1894. See Part III.

knew the American lack of sinister designs in foreign lands, and had the utmost faith in the American sense of fair play, until the question of Japanese immigration and citizenship in America came up. This embarrassing question was complicated by discriminatory laws passed by some of the western states of the American Union — especially California — against aliens not qualified for citizenship. The labour element on the Pacific coast carried on a crusade against the Japanese on the grounds that the market for labour was cheapened by the presence of the Orientals. Politicians found a popular issue in vehement denunciations of the Japanese. For a time the Japanese question in California, serving as a football in local politics, furnished a source of grave complications between America and Japan.

It is not the purpose of this study to trace the historical relations between the United States and Japan, nor to deal with the Japanese problem within the United States. Many excellent volumes have been written on these topics.'

* On the historical relations between Japan and the United States, P. J. Treat, " Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan ; " John W. Foster, " American Diplomacy in the Orient ; " W, E. Griffis, " America in the East ; " J. M. Callahan, " American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East," are among the best accounts. For full treatment of the Japanese question in the United States, see : Sidney L. Gulick, " The American Japanese Problem ; " K. K. Kawakami, " American Japanese Relations,

SufHce it to say here that the present friendship between the United States and Japan is largely traditional/ although the recent Imperial Commission headed by Viscount Ishii painted over the ugly spots of local friction with a fresh varnish of alliance against the " Common Enemy,"* and the Japanese question in the United States is still an unsettled issue. No unbiased student of international relations will deny that a sovereign nation has a right to close its doors to undesirable immigrants, or that citizenship is a privilege to be granted and not a universal right to be claimed by every alien that comes to its shores. But in the interest of fairness, the question presents itself, should the United States, the champion of world democracy, continue to deny its citizenship, which is open to all other races, including the blacks from the jungles of Africa, to Asiatics permanently settled in this country, who have educational and financial qualifications for all the duties and obligations of American citizenship? The future affairs of the world must be settled by both the white and

Asia at the Door; " Harry Alvin Mills, "The Japanese Problem in the United States ; " Lindsay Russell, " America to Japan ; " Montaville Flowers, " Japanese Conquest of American Opinion; " J. F. Steiner, " The Japanese Invasion,"

' Cf. K. K. Kawakami, " Japan and the United States," Atlantic 119:671-81, May, 1917.

*See Viscount Ishii's speeches during his visit in America, 1917, together with editorial comments on them by the American press.

the yellow races. Let it be known to the statesmen of the world — especially to the American statesmen — that the ultimate welfare of the human race depends largely upon the wise adjustment of the relations between these two dominant races, that the peace of the world cannot be "planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty," unless this complicated problem is correctly solved. Surely the American public should not, through indifference, leave this problem to the hands of agitators and propagandists, when a lasting solution can be made only in the light of its best reason and highest wisdom.

(2. Korea

Before passing to the Chinese question, it might be worth our while to take a glance at the closing chapter of the least known nation — once a nation — in Asia.

The United States was the first Western power to enter the gates of Korea." The first article of the Korean-American treaty signed at Wonsan, Korea, May 22, 1882 (ratifications exchanged at Seoul, Korea, May 19, 1883), reads as follows:

" There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States

■ For early diplomatic intercourse between America and Korea, see Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," chap. IX.

and the King of Chosen and citizens and subjects of their respective governments. If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good ofjfices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." '

Interpreting this diplomatic phraseology into every-day language, it meant that America would stand sponsor for the political independence and territorial integrity of Korea. Andthe simple-minded Korean Government from the Emperor down literally believed in it. In fact, they had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the United States. They saw the splendid work of American philanthropy through missionary channels ; the integrity of the American Government was exemplified by the integrity of American citizens there. They thought that there was at least one great nation that was unselfish and honest and upon which they could rely for support, as it was provided in the Korean-American treaty, whenever their national life was in jeopardy. American citizens were accorded greater privilege than any other foreigners in Korea. The first Korean railway — Seoul-Chemulpo line — was built and owned by an American concern; the first elec-

' Complete text of the treaty reprinted in Senate Document, No. 342, 64th Congress, 1st Session.

trie plant in Korea was installed by the Edison Company in 1895. The first and largest electric road and water works in Korea were built and owned by Americans/ The richest gold mine in Korea was given to an American firm. Dr. Horace N. Allen, former American minister to Korea, thus describes the gaining of the concession : "As the result of a long train of circumstances, it had become known to me exactly which district was considered the richest by the natives, and it was this district, twenty-five by thirty miles in extent, that I named in the concession.*'^ It must be remembered that America did not get all these concessions from Korea by force as European nations got theirs in China. They were given to American concerns by the Korean Government in return for the good will and friendship of the United States.

Numerous other American industries in Korea might be mentioned, but it is enough to say that while Korea was an independent nation, the American business man had the best of the advantages open to foreigners in Korea. After mapping out her imperial program, and through the clever use of her publicity propaganda' Japan convinced the American public — espe-

'See Horace N. Allen, "Things Korean," chap. XIV; Thomas F. Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," chap. XII, " The Open Door in Korea."

* Allen, "Things Korean," pp. 232-233.

» See Part II.

THE OPENING OP THE EAST 33

daily official Washington — that she must have Korea in order to preserve peace in the Far East. "Japan began and carried through this whole matter," said Homer B. Hulbert, an American educator and for some time political adviser to the Korean Emperor, " by clever use of misinformation and broken promises, which successfully hoodwinked the American public.""

The first obvious step taken by the United States in handing Korea over to Japan was at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan violated Korean neutrality and exacted certain concessions from the Korean Government under " military necessity." The Secretary of State, John Hay, instructed the American minister at Seoul, Horace N. Allen, to observe strict neutrality and not cable the text of any agreement that Korea and Japan might come to." This was undoubtedly done to avoid recognition of Korea's appeal against Japanese aggressions.

The next move the United States made to aid Japan in this game of Oriental politics was the recall of Dr. Allen from Korea. Dr. Allen had stayed in Korea over twenty years and was highly esteemed by both the natives and for-

" Homer B. Hulbert, " The Passing of Korea," p. 462.

"Cablegram sent from Washington, Feb. 23, 1904; recorded in Senate Document, No. 342 p. 11, 64th Congress, 1st Session.

h eigners. When the Japanese began to tighten their grip in the peninsula, he told his government a few unpalatable truths about what the Japanese were doing in Korea. Immediately subtle influences were put in operation at Washington intimating that Minister Allen was a persona non grata to the Japanese. As a result Dr. Allen, despite his unquestioned integrity and long years of loyal service to his government, was summarily recalled, to the great surprise and indignation of American communities in Korea.

When hostilities began between Russia and Japan, America was officially neutral, but her sympathies were with Japan. There were three possible reasons for this: (1) Japan through her publicity propaganda created a favourable opinion of herself in America;" (2) Japan borrowed vast sums of money from America for war purposes, and Japanese success was naturally wished for by American capitalists; (3) at the beginning of the war Japan was thought of by the outside world as an " under-dog " trying to get loose from the brutal clutch of the Russian Bear. An incident which happened at Chemulpo Harbour immediately preceding the naval encounter of the two belligerents fur-

"For various methods of controlling American public opinion by Japan in regard to Japanese affairs, see Part II, "Japan's Control of Publicity." See also Flowers, "Japanese Conquest of American Opinion."

THE OPENING OP THE EAST 35

nishes an illuminating illustration of American attitude toward the three nations directly concerned in the war, — ^Japan, Russia, and Korea.

On February 9, 1904, Admiral Uriu, the commander of the Japanese fleet, sent an ultimatum to the captain of the Variag, the Russian war-ship lying in the harbour of Chemulpo, that he would give the Russian ships until twelve o'clock to leave the harbour, and if they had not moved by four o'clock that afternoon, the Japanese fleet would come in and sink them at their anchorage — in a neutral port of a neutral country.

There were at that time in the harbour four other foreign war-ships : the Talbot (British), the Blba (ItaHan), the Pascal (French), and the Vickshurg (American). The commander of the British war-ship, notwithstanding the fact that Great Britain was an ally of Japan, was indignant at the insolence of the Japanese Admiral, and invited the commanders of the other foreign ships to a conference on board the Talbot to decide what action should be taken. " The British, French, and Italian commanders at once decided that Admiral Uriu was proposing to commit a gross breach of international law, and they unanimously resolved to give the Russian ships whatever protection they could. A message was sent to the commander of the Variag informing him of this determination, and ad-

36 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICT

vising him to refuse to leave the harbour.** But the captain of the Vicksburg explained to the other commanders that he had received explicit instructions from his government to remain strictly neutral in the coming event. And the American war-ship Vicksburg, with its proud name, skulked into the inner harbour of safety. The Russian naval ofHcers keenly resented this action of the Vicksburg, and the Russian press made bitter references to this incident as well as to the generally pro-Japanese tendency in America at that time as a breach of the historic friendship between America and Russia."

At the time of the Portsmouth Conference between Russia and Japan, July, 1905, the Koreans in Hawaii sent their two delegates, Syngman Rhee and P. K. Yoon, to present a petition to President Roosevelt, asking that he " see to it that Korea may preserve her autonomous government."" The delegates were received unofficially, and their petition was given a sympathetic consideration. But this did not