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Japanese expansion and American policies

James Francis Abbott · 1916 · Scanned text · Free in the US

61,612 words · about 4 h 19 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
James Francis Abbott
Language
English
Published
1916
Length
61,612 words · about 4 h 19 min
Sections
7 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (7)
  1. Front matter about 1 min
  2. Preface under 1 min
  3. Chapter I about 10 min
  4. Chapter II about 27 min
  5. Chapter III about 1 h 59 min
  6. II 1,831 about 1 h 34 min
  7. Index about 8 min

Continue:

Front matter

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Preface

historic resume, in order that the reader may orient himself with respect to the whole problem. The next four chapters deal with the material upon which is based the central conclusion of the book — that war with America would be national Sulicide for Japan. The last two chapters are an appeal to Americans to recognize Japan's aspirations as an Oriental power, in the belief that it will be to our own advantage to do so.

J. F. A.

Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.,

October, 1915.

JAPANESE EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLICIES

JAPANESE EXPANSION AND AMERICAN POLICIES

Chapter I

" Japan will make China a vassal and will militarize its millions. Then it will be for your country [America] to look out. Admiral Togo once said to a European, * Next Will come a general European war, then will come a great war in which my rac§ will be against yours.* "

Such were the statements credited in the press last

December to Admiral von Tirpitz, the chief of the

German navy. It is unlikely that Admiral von Tirpitz

said this; it is highly improbable that Admiral Togo

did. Yet, in a way, it does not make any difference

whether they did or not. So long as such statements

are published periodically all over America and so long

as hundreds of thousands of readers never dream of

questioning their accuracy or authenticity they might

as well be true as otherwise.

I

Repeatedly during the past ten years Have similar remarks been made and similar fears been expressed. And not always so crudely, nor through the channel of an anonymous newspaper reporter. Public men, both in Congress and elsewhere, have essayed the role of Cassandra, in season and out. Bankers, globe-trotters, merchants, and editors have enlightened us with their views until we have reached a state of mind in which the notion that " we are going to have trouble in the Pacific one of these days" has become almost an obsession. Said the Hon. James R. Mann of Illinois in the House of Representatives October i, 1914:^ "We who are legislating now, who do not bear in mind the inevitable conflict, commercial or otherwise, which we will meet in the Far East, have forgotten the principles that ought primarily to actuate us. [Applause.] I have no doubt that it is as certain as that the sun will rise tomorrow morning that a conflict will come between the Far East and the Far West across the Pacific Ocean ; all of that which has taken place in the world during the history of the human race up to now teaches us that the avoidance of this conflict is impossible. I hope that the war will not come ; I hope that there will be no conflict of arms. But I have little faith that in this world of ours people and races are able to meet in competition for a long 1 Congressional Record, 63d Congress, p. 17466.

period of time without an armed conflict. A fight for commercial supremacy in the end leads to a fight with arms because that is the final arbiter among Nations. iWe command the Pacific Ocean today with the land that we have on this side, with the islands which we possess in the sea and with the Philippines on the other side. Will we surrender our command? I say no, never."y [Applause.]

A few years earlier Mr. Hobson said on the floor of the same chamber : ^ " We are short on providing equilibrium in the Atlantic and we have not a single battleship in the Pacific and our relative naval strength is steadily declining. War is therefore a physical certainty." ** I will tell you frankly that in my judgment you can count almost on the fingers of your two hands twice around, the number of months. In my judgment war will come before the Panama canal is completed ! "

" Ever since this Nation went into the Hawaiian Islands the Japanese nation served notice that they would never acquiesce. Ever since 1898 when we went into the Philippines, and Japan asked us to let her go in there with us and we refused; ever since her citizens have come to this country in great numbers and our people, following the natural law of segregation of races, have not given them the treatment that they thought they 1 Congressional Record, Feb. 20, 1911, p. 2989.

ought to have, they have been preparing for war. . . . I repeat, in my judgment, war is inevitable and not far off. ... It will be humiliating, of course, for us to see the Philippine Islands occupied practically without a struggle. All we can hope to do there will be to hold out at Corregidor. Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and I have already mentioned Panama, San Francisco and the Puget Sound region, the whole Pacific Coast will be occupied without serious opposition on our part."

The prospect of a hostile nation "occupying" a stretch of coast line (with its hinterland) 7000 miles long and 5000 miles from her home base, to say nothing of the Philippines 1000 miles away in a different direction, is sufficiently startling, but more than one writer has pointed out precisely how it is to be done. One of the most detailed of these programs is that of Homer Lea's extraordinary book, " The Valour of Ignorance." ^ But military men also have discussed the invasion of California so often that a share of the public has grown to accept it as an inevitable coming event.

*Not the least extraordinary feature of Lea's work is the apparent seriousness with which it has been considered. William James, Norman Angell, and others have discussed his theses as if they represented the opinions of an expert militarist. As a matter of fact " General " Lea was an adventurer who never had any real position in China nor any real military training.

On October i8, 1912, General Leonard Wood is reported to have stated that it would be " very easy for an enemy to land in force in San Francisco unless we had a west-coast army of 450,000 men." (The regular United States army today is between 80,000 and 85,000 men, and England had but 250,000 men at the outbreak of the European war of 19 14.) Of course such an invading army could not be other than Japanese. Says another expert : ^ " If 200,000 fighting men of any first-class hostile power should be landed on our Pacific Coast tonight, we should have no course save regretfully to hand over to a foreign nation the rich Empire west of the Rockies, with its cities, its harbors, and the wealth of its valleys and mountains."

Now the American of influence is a hard-headed man of affairs, endowed with a sense of humor and not given to panic. He has taken the dire prophecies with a grain of salt. When the Panama canal was finished without a Japanese war, he recalled Mr. Hobson and smiled.

For many years we have grown accustomed to prophecies of wars, particularly of the certainty of war in Europe. We have treated them all in the same tolerant fashion. We are an optimistic people and not easily alarmed. We thought that Europe had too much to 1 Wheeler, "Are We Ready?" New York, 1915.

lose by war, that European nations were too closely knit together, that the spirit of socialism was too strong, that we had grown too wise to make a wreck of our civilization, that the bankers would not furnish the money, etc.

Then came the cataclysm of August, 19 14, and when we had recovered our senses, we began to recall the prophecies of the past. We read von Bernhardi's book and realized that common sense has its limitations when it comes to the judging of foreign politics. We reread books and articles that had vociferously predicted the European conflict and realized that the prophet for once had come into his own.

And now that the first shock has passed and we have grown somewhat accustomed to the incredible situation across the Atlantic, we recall once more the foretellings of coming war in the other direction and our self-complacency is a bit shaken. After all, may there not be something in it? If we were all wrong in smiling away the predictions of the European debacle, are we all right in disregarding those of a coming American- Japanese conflict? The man who is in the presence of an earth- ' quake loses his confidence in the stability of all things terrestrial.

In spite of our skepticism, the constant reiteration of the idea has left its mark. Subconsciously we have stored away in the back of our minds tags and ends of anti- Japanese statements, the while we have repudiated the conclusions based upon them. There is no question but that as a nation our former rather sentimental friendship toward the Sunrise Kingdom has cooled. Not knowing the best, we suspect the worst, and the background for a national sentiment is slowly crystallizing.

We might regain some peace of mind if we were careful to sort out from among the predictions those which hold a Japanese war to be inevitable from those which hold such a one to be merely probable or possible.

The writer does not think such a war is probable, but that is a purely personal opinion, worth only what it will bring. That such a war is possible cannot be questioned. Anything is possible in international politics. All wars have an economic basis, but most of them have a sentimental inception. Hardly a more striking example could be found than our own most recent conflict with Spain. Whether sooner or later we should have drifted into war in 1898 is not worth discussing. What did plunge us into war precipitately was the blowing up of the Maine. And the wave of unreasoning passion that swept over the United States took no heed of circumstances nor of consequences.

Now if during some racial controversy in California, such as might attend the passage of a new and drastic alien land law, after the press of both countries had been filled with acrimonious discussions, a Japanese cruiser should be anchored in San Francisco harbor, or an American man-of-war in Yokohama harbor, and either should be blown up, — no matter from what cause, — war would not only be possible but very likely inevitable. And this, in spite of the fact that the explosion might be entirely accidental. Such an accident, or some other of the same sort, might happen at any time, and happening by chance at a critical time, might have the direst consequences. Yet change the scene a little. Suppose that such a thing should happen to either a Japanese or an American warship in the harbor of Buenos Ay res. .War with Argentine on account of it, in the absence of any evidence of hostility, would be absurd. And why ? Because there would be lacking the background of suspicion and irritation which gives the mob-mind a chance to coalesce and overwhelm the rational thought and judgment of a nation.

Now it is precisely the constant reiteration of fears and suspicions of a foreign nation, of speculations as to her designs upon us and of anxiety as to the future, that spins the tissue of such a background. Nothing is harder to confute than vague accusations and aspersions of motives. Nothing is more persistent than a falsehood that is welcomed by the hearer.^ The innocent victim of a libel discovers that no amount of damages will compensate him or entirely wipe out the memory of the falsehood in the minds of his fellows. We have found it necessary to provide a libel law to protect the individual. Let us hope that the time will come when libels upon nations may be brought to some sort of an international bar of justice. The old English law applicable to sovereigns stated, " The greater the truth, the greater the libel." Whatever opinion we may have of that with regard to individuals, it is worthy of consideration in the present case. Suppose that we have grievances and that Japan has also. Nations are no more perfect than the people that compose them. Let us not talk about them too much. We have our appointed official representatives upon whose shoulders rests the responsibility.

lA shining example is. the oft-repeated statement that the Japanese are so dishonest that they cannot trust one another to handle bank funds, but are forced to employ the more trustworthy Chinese. As a matter of fact Chinese are employed to a very limited extent in Japanese banks and then, not because of their superior honesty, but because they are skilled, through long experience, in detecting the multitude of counterfeit coins that circulate through the Orient,

The great majority of Chinese who are observed by travelers in Japan to be employed in banks are not the employees of Japanese banks at all, but are the employees of Chinese and other foreign banks.

no JAPANESE EXPANSION

I would not favor a muzzled press nor a blind complacency and an indifference to what goes on in the world, nor should I care to see our national interests flouted nor our national pride humiliated. But at least, let us save our excitement for what does happen, not what we fear might happen. And let us allow the dust cloud of suspicion to settle instead of constantly stirring it up.

Wise old Francis Bacon said, long ago,^ "There is nothing that makes a man suspect much more than to know little; and therefore men should remedy suspicion by procuring to know more and not to keep their suspicions in smother."

Americans are little given to keeping " their suspicions in smother," but the remedy of "procuring to know more " is open to all. And nothing is more apt to dissipate the cloud of war or render conflict unlikely. Nations that know one another well are much less likely to gtt to fighting than if the reverse is true. And the cost of a battleship would pay for much national education.

1 Essays, XXXI, " On Suspicion."

Chapter II

The earliest inhabitants of Japan, according to the archaeologists, were a race of pygmies perhaps related to the Philippine Nigritos, who lived in caves or pits in the ground and are known in Japanese (or rather Ainu), as Koropokguru. These were succeeded by a fierce and warlike, very hairy race, known nowadays as Ainu, who occupied the main island until after the beginning of the Christian era. The Ainu never got beyond the stone age nor achieved a written language.

About the fifth century B.C. there came an entirely alien race, or rather two of them, in two migrations. One of these migrations was by way of the northwest and the immigrants were Mongolian or Turanian. The other was by way of the south, originating doubtless from India and hence of Aryan origin, although without question mixed with Malay and other elements on the way. These two streams, almost as unlike in racial characteristics and physiognomy as Italians and North Germans are unlike, have nevertheless mingled together in harmony, and constitute the Japanese people we know

IX today. On the other hand, inherent racial prejudice has prevented intermarriage, and the different types are today very obvious to the casual observer. The Mongolian element outnumbers the other, twenty to one, and constitute the heimin or common people. The southern element is the ruling caste and has been for centuries. Its members are known as shizoku (samurai) or gentry. The officials of modern Japan, the politicians, the officers of the army and navy, the educated classes generally, who represent Japan to the world and absolutely control her internal and foreign affairs, — these are mostly all shisoku. The farmers, laborers, coolies, and incidentally the bulk of Japanese emigrants to other countries, are heimin. The gulf between these classes, although perhaps not recognized officially, is certainly recognized socially, and the distinction between the two is never lost in the Japanese mind. For Americans to fail to make this same distinction (and most of them do so fail) inevitably creates confusion of mind and judgment. The resident of Boston, whose acquaintance with the Japanese is confined to students and officials, quite misapprehends the point of view of the Calif ornian, whose acquaintance with them is confined in the main to members of the heimin class. Each thinks the attitude of the other is perverse. In Japan the very language takes account of the difference. For

JAPAN ON PROBATION I3

an ordinary laborer to address a gentleman with the same personal pronouns and verbal conjugations that the latter does him would be the height of calculated insult. This caste distinction is largely a relic of feudalism, and there are many such relics persisting in the modern Japanese social system. It is gradually breaking down today with the rise of the commercial middle class, but nevertheless it is still a powerful factor in Japanese life.

The incoming Japanese found the Ainu occupying the land and disputing their advance. The presence of a common foe welded the invaders together into a nation. The Ainu were gradually driven north, until today only a few hundred of them remain in the northernmost island of Hokkaidd.

Chinese missionaries introduced the Chinese written language, art, and culture about the sixth century, and the Island Kingdom flourished under the rule of the Mikados. Japan at this time was an absolute monarchy. Early in Japanese history the absolutism of the Emperor began to crumble and various powerful families occupied the role of "king-maker." Toward the close of the twelfth century a feudal system similar to that of Europe appeared. The actual rule was then usurped by subordinates who with the title of Shogun held sway until 1868. The real Emperor was never actually done away with, but was kept a helpless prisoner in Kyoto while the Shoguns ruled in Yedo (the modern Tokyo).

'During the eight centuries of feudalism Japan was divided up into fiefs, each ruled by a clan chief called the daimyo (literally, "great name"). The daimyd owed allegiance to the Shogun alone. Within their own borders they were supreme, like the Barons of Europe, and their knights were subject to them. The heimin did the work and supported the military caste. Some of these families of daimyo were obscure, others were almost as great and powerful as the Shogun himself. This clan spirit, persisting today, has been an important factor in modern Japanese politics. Two of these clans attained great power toward the end of the feudal era. One, the clan of Satsuma, had its seat at the southernmost end of the country; the other, the Choshu, had its seat near the western entrance to the " Inland Sea." The combination of the two, called in Japan the " Sat-Cho " group, has largely controlled governmental affairs. The army today is officered chiefly by Choshu men, the navy by Satsuma men.

It is important to remember how very recent the feudal system is in Japanese history. Japan has today a' constitutional government with a parliament, but this doesjiot necessarily imply the same things that are true

JAPAN ON PROBATION I5

of England and her government, any more than the fact that Venezuela is a republic implies any similarity between her government and that of the United States. Eight centuries of feudalism cannot be wiped out of existence in a generation, no matter what verbal changes may be inaugurated.

Intercourse with the Occident

In 1542 the Portuguese discovered Japan, and seven years later the famous missionary St. Francis Xavier arrived. His proselyting was very successful. Both nobles and common people accepted the Faith by the thousands, and the land was in a fair way to become a Christian one. But the missionaries were overzealous and attempted to combine temporal with spiritual power. In consequence, the Japanese, fearing for their national existence, turned on the foreigners and their religion, forbade the practice of the Christian faith, expelled the missionaries, and closed up the country absolutely. In doing so they had the active assistance of the Dutch. This was in 1624. For over two hundred years Japan maintained her seclusion. Only the Dutch were allowed to have a trading post at Nagasaki, where they were compelled to pay annual tribute to the Sh5gun and were subject to very humiliating restrictions.

But the later generations of Shoguns did not have the strength of the earlier ones. Their authority crumbled. Japanese historians began to investigate the history of their country and to call attention to the fact that the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, was the real ruler, whereas the Shoguns were usurpers. There grew up also a restless element in the large cities that was ripe for revolt.

Accordingly, when Commodore Perry of the United States navy appeared in Tokyo bay in July, 1853, with his little fleet of four warships, his coming was the last push that sent the tottering structure of the Shogunate to the ground. The watchword now became, " Restore the Emperor to his full power." The Shogun and his staff were between two fires. The Americans were followed by the English, Russians, and French, and insurrection in the name of the true Emperor broke out against the Shogun's party, that had opened the gate to the hated foreigner. In 1866 the reigning Shogun died. The next year the old Emperor died, and in 1868 the young Emperor came to the throne which he was to occupy until 19 12.

It is a mistake to think that Perry, as it were, " happened upon." Japan at a fortunate time to negotiate. As a matter of fact, Americans, officially and unofficially, had made previously several futile attempts to enter into relations with the proud and warlike Japanese.

JAPAN ON PROBATION i7

Russia, England, and France had also made fruitless efforts. In 1797 an American vessel had visited Nagasaki, chartered by the Dutch, who were the only people the Japanese would permit to trade. When, a little later, the captain of the same ship tried to trade on his own account, he was sent away.

In 1837 an elaborate expedition was fitted out with the avowed purpose of returning to Japan a number of shipwrecked Japanese who had been picked up adrift on the open sea. This boat was fired upon and driven away both from Tokyo and Kagoshima, the seat of the Satsuma clan. History does not record that the shipwrecked Japanese ever saw their native land again.

In 1845 another attempt was made to return to Japan some Japanese castaways, twenty-two in all. This time the Japanese were allowed to land, but not the Americans. The next year an official expedition was dispatched under Commodore Biddle. This embassy was contemptuously received and was entirely unsuccessful.

These attempts had been made in the interest of furthering American trade, a very legitimate one, of course. But it was brought to the attention of the State Department soon after, that another reason existed for desiring some sort of understanding with Japan. The North Pacific at this time was full of American whalers who not infrequently suffered shipwreck. When these shipwrecked sailors were cast up on the inhospitable shores of Japan, their plight was a pitiable one. They were imprisoned and treated with great cruelty, even subjected to torture. Some of these sailors were rescued in 1849 by ^^ American ship of war dispatched for the purpose.

Perry's expedition was the culmination of these various attempts. Every effort was made to give it a dignified and official character, A personal letter of President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor ^ was inclosed in a magnificent case. All sorts of valuable presents were carried, including a miniature railway with engine and cars, telegraph instruments, champagne, and "many barrels of whisky."

Perry's squadron, the first steam vessels ever seen by the Japanese, went up Tokyo bay against a head wind, with black smoke belching from the funnels, and carried consternation and dismay to the people on land, although the panic was somewhat allayed when the threatened invasion did not occur.

The Japanese tried the same tactics they had adopted

on previous occasions, but Perry insisted upon treating

with no one but a high official, and while showing every

consideration and a consummate tact, yet demanded

1 In reality, the Shogun ; the Americans did not appreciate the true situation with regard to the Japanese sovereign.

JAPAN DN probation i9

the respect and dignity due to the personal ambassador of one of the great nations of the earth. The Japanese made a virtue of necessity and finally consented to receive the President's letter, contrary to their own laws, as they said. They, however, professed themselves quite unwilling to grant the American's request to conclude a treaty. Wisely refraining from pressing the matter too far or provoking hostilities which would have defeated the purpose of the mission, Commodore Perry departed, with the reminder that he would return with a larger squadron in the spring for his definite answer.

The Americans " felt highly gratified at what had been accomplished. They had received different treatment from any foreigners who had visited Japan for two centuries. They had commanded respect and secured intercourse upon the basis of equality. They held direct communication with the highest imperial authorities without the intervention of the Dutch at Nagasaki.^ They disregarded or caused to be with-

iWhen the Ambassador of the Dutch trading company was granted audience by the Shogun, "he crawl'd on his hands and knees, to a place shew'd him, between the presents ranged in due order on one side and the place where the Emperor sat on the other, and then kneeling, he bow'd his forehead quite to the ground, and so crawl'd backwards like a crab without uttering a single word. So mean and short a thing is the audience we have of this mighty monarch." [Kaempfer, "History of Japan, i6gi."] We may well believe that a Yankee naval officer would decline to participate in any such performance. On another occasion during drawn local regulations which were derogatory to the dignity of their nation. On the other hand, while exhibiting firmness as to their rights, they showed the utmost regard for the sovereignty and rights of the Japanese. The crews of the vessels were not permitted to go on shore. No native was insulted or maltreated ; no woman was outraged; no property was taken; no police regulation was violated — practices quite common on the part of the crews of other foreign ships." ^ It is important to keep in mind this attitude of the Japanese toward foreigners. A proud, self-satisfied people, with an extraordinarily complex and subtle code of etiquette, which was of course a sealed book to the Westerner, could not help but look upon the outsider as

the same visit the Emperor condescended, for the edification of his ladies, and Kaempfer relates that "he ordered us to take off our Cappa or Cloak, being our Garment of Ceremony, then to stand upright that he might have a full view of us ; again to walk, to stand still, to compliment each other, to dance, to jump, to play the drunkard, to speak broken Japanese, to read Dutch, to paint, to sing, to put our cloaks on and off. Meanwhile we obeyed the Emperor's commands in the best manner we could, I join'd to my dance a love song in High German. In this manner and with innumerable such other apish tricks we must suffer ourselves to contribute to the Emperor's and the Court's diversion." One is reminded of the Igorrotes in the Filipino village at the St. Louis World's Fair. The Japanese idea of this may be gathered from a remark made to Kaempfer by the Governor of " Osacca " to the effect that "it was a singular favour to be admitted into the Emperor's presence, that of all nations in the world only the Dutch were allowed this honor." 1 Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," Boston, 1903.

a hopeless barbarian, ignorant of everything that in the Japanese mind distinguished a cultured man from an ignorant boor. It cannot be gainsaid that the actions of sailors, traders, and others with whom they had previously come in contact had gone far to confirm this impression. The dignity and restraint of Perry was in sharp contrast to the demeanor of some of the foreigners that had come to Japan, and this, together with the suggestion of hidden powers revealed by his steamboats, impressed the Japanese dignitaries favorably in spite of their fears. The Dutch they frankly despised. That they granted a measure of " equality " to the Americans was a great concession, however absurd it may have seemed to the latter.

In February, 1854, true to his promise, Commodore Perry returned with a squadron of ten warships and carried through the somewhat delicate negotiations involved in making the treaty. Free trade in open ports was not obtained at once, but many concessions were gained; the best of feeling seemed to prevail between the Japanese and American officials, and Perry's successful conclusion of his difficult mission was acclaimed at home and abroad.

At once the United States took advantage of its newly gained treaty rights to send a consul to Japan. The man chosen was Townsend Harris. The name of

Harris deserves as enduring a place in national memory as that of Perry. Unsupported by a powerful fleet, living for over a year in fact without communication with his home country, apparently forgotten in Washington ( for Webster who had planned the Perry expedition was dead), in the midst of a semi-anarchy attendant upon the dissolution of the Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor, Harris nevertheless maintained a steadfastness of purpose, and displayed a tact and ability that deserve the highest praise. Every sort of obstruction was placed in his way by the Japanese, but in the end he won his way through to thd conclusion of a treaty, so skillfully drawn that it served as the model for all subsequent treaties entered into by Japan with other foreign nations. Indeed it served as the basis of Japan's foreign relations until 1899. Harris refused to crawl upon his hands and knees before the Shogun, and that monarch respected his prejudices in the matter.

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