Recent discussions in science, philosophy, and morals

Preface

The present volume consists mainly of matter that is new to the American public. Three of the essays have not before appeared in this country, and two of the others, issued as a pamphlet, have had so small a circulation as to have been seen by but few readers. These several discussions have been drawn from Mr. Spencer at various times to correct misapprehensions and misrepresentations that have been made regarding the doctrines of his system of Philosophy. Some of them form valuable extensions of these doctrines, and all will be useful in promoting their right interpretation. Why the sixth article has been taken from another volume and included in this collection, requires a few words of explanation.

Seventeen years ago, Mr. Spencer published an elaborate Keview article entitled " The Genesis of Science," in which he objected to Comte's views of the classification of the Sciences. Although Mr. Spencer's criticisms involved a radical dissent from the peculiar views of M. Comte, and what was held as fundamental in his philosophy, yet upon the publication of his own philosophical

4 PREFACE.

system Mr. Spencer found himself ranked as a positivist and a follower of Comte. Against this he repeatedly protested in public letters ; but the charge was so continually reiterated that at length he found himself compelled to make a more formal statement of the differences between himself and the French philosopher. The result of this was a pamphlet published in 1864, in which he followed the rejection of Comte's classification by the promulgation of his own view, and appended a detailed statement of the differences between his doctrine and the doctrines of M. Comte. Some of his views of classification having been adversely criticised by Mr. Bain and Mr. Mill, he has replied to their strictures in a new article in the present volume. The general question is one of great interest to scientific students ; and, for the convenience of those who desire to form an intelligent judgment of Mr. Spencer's case, both as contrasted with that of Comte, and on its own independent merits, it has been thought desirable to incorporate the original article on " The Genesis of Science " in this collection. Though placed last, it should be read first by those not already familiar with the discussion.

The present revised edition of " Recent Discussions " contains six additional articles, and completes the first collection yet made of Mr. Spencer's miscellaneous essays.

Contents

PA03

I. — MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS, 7

II. OEIGIN OF ANIMAL- WOESHIP, 31

II. The Origin Of Animai-woesiiip

[FROM THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, MAY, 1870.]

THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP.

Mr. McLennan's recent essays on the Worship of Animals and Plants have done much to elucidate a very obscure subject. By pursuing in this case, as before in another case, the truly scientific method of comparing the phenomena presented by existing uncivilized races with those which the early traditions of civilized races present, he has rendered both more comprehensible than they were before.

It seems to me, however, that Mr. McLennan gives but an indefinite answer to the essential question — How did the worship of animals and plants arise ? Indeed, in his concluding paper, he expressly leaves this problem without a solution ; saying that his " is not an hypothesis explanatory of the origin of Totemdsm, be it remembered, but an hypothesis explanatory of the animal and plant worship of the ancient nations." So that we have still to ash — Why have savage tribes so generally taken animals and plants and other things as their totems ? What can have induced this tribe to ascribe special sacredness to one creature, and that tribe to another ? And if to these questions the general reply is, that each tribe considers itself to be descended from the object of its reverence, then there presses for answer the further question — How came so strange a notion into existence ? If this notion occurred in one case only, we might set it down to some whim of thought or some illusive occurrence. But appearing as it does with multitudinous variations among so many uncivilized races in different parts of the world, and having left equally numerous traces in the superstitions of the extinct civilized races, we cannot assume any special or exceptional cause. Moreover, the general cause, whatever it may be, must be such as does not negative an aboriginal intelligence essentially like our own. After studying the grotesque beliefs of savages, we are apt to suppose that their reason is not as our reason. But this supposition is inadmissible. Given the amount of knowledge which primitive men possess, and given the imperfect verbal symbols used by them in speech and thought, and the conclusions they habitually reach will be those that are relatively the most rational. This must be our postulate ; and, setting out with this postulate, we have to ask how primitive men came so generally, if not universally, to believe themselves the progeny of animals or plants or inanimate bodies. There is, I believe, a satisfactory answer.

The proposition with which Mr. McLennan sets out, that totem-worship preceded the worship of anthropomorphic gods, is one to which I can yield but a qualified assent. It is true in a sense, but not wholly true. If the words "gods" and "worship" carry with them their ordinary definite meanings, the statement is true; but if their meanings are widened so as to comprehend those earliest vague notions out of which the definite ideas of gods and worship are evolved, I think it is not true. The rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of dead ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be capable of working good or evil to their descendants. As a preparation for dealing hereafter with the principles of

RUDIMENTARY FORM OF RELIGION. 35

sociology, I have, for some years past, directed much attention to the modes of thought current in the simpler human societies ; and evidence of many kinds, furnished by all varieties of uncivilized men, has forced on me a conclusion harmonizing with that lately expressed in this Review by Prof. Huxley — namely, that the savage, conceiving a corpse to be deserted by the active personality who dwelt in it, conceives this active personality to be still existing, and that his feelings and ideas concerning it form the basis of his superstitions. Everywhere we find expressed or implied the belief that each person is double ; and that when he dies, his other self, whether remaining near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends. 1

1 A critical reader may raise an objection. If animal-worship is to be rationally interpreted, bow can the interpretation set out by assuming a belief in the spirits of dead ancestors — a belief which just as much requires explanation ? Doubtless there is here a wide gap in the argument. I hope eventually to fill it up. Here, out of many experiences which conspire to generate this belief, I can but briefly indicate the leading ones : 1. It is not impossible that his shadow, following him everywhere, and moving as he moves, may have some small share in giving to the savage a vague idea of his duality. It needs but to watch a child's interest in the movements of its shadow, and to remember that at first a shadow cannot be interpreted as a negation of light, but is looked upon as an entity, to perceive that the savage may very possibly consider it as a specific something which forms part of him. 2. A much more decided suggestion of the same kind is likely to result from the reflection of his face and figure in water: imitating him as it does in his form, colors, motions, grimaces. When we remember that not unfrequently a savage objects to have his portrait taken, because he thinks whoever carries away a representation of him carries away some part of his being, will see how probable it is that he thinks his double in the water is a reality in some way belonging to him. 3. Echoes must greatly tend to confirm the idea of duality otherwise arrived at. Incapable as he is of understanding their natural origin, the primitive man necessarily ascribes them to living beings — beings who mock him and elude his search. 4. The suggestions resulting from these and other physical phenomena are, however, secondary in importance. The root of this belief in another self lies in the experience of dreams. The distinction so easily made by us between our life in dreams and our real life, is one which the savage recognizes in but a vague way ; and he cannot express even that distinction which he perceives. When he awakes, and to those who have seen

But how out of the desire to propitiate this second personality of a deceased man (the words " ghost " or " spirit " are somewhat misleading, since the savage believes that the second personality reappears in a form equally tangible with the first) does there grow up the worship of

him lying quietly asleep, describes where he has been, and what he has done, his rude language fails to state the difference between seeing and dreaming that he saw, doing and dreaming that he did. From this inadequacy of his language it not only results that he cannot truly represent this difference to others, but also that he cannot truly represent it to himself. Hence, in the absence of an alternative interpretation, his belief, and that of those to whom he tells his adventures, is that his other self has been away and came back when he awoke. And this belief, which we find among various existing savage tribes, we equally find in the traditions of tbe early civilized races. 5. The conception of another self capable of going away and returning, receives what to the savage must seem conclusive verifications from the abnormal suspensions of consciousness, and derangements of consciousness, that occasionally occur in members of his tribe. One who has fainted, and cannot be immediately brought back to himself (note the significance of our own phrases "returning to himself," etc.) as a sleeper can, shows him a state in which the other self has been away for a time beyond recall. Still more is this prolonged absence of the other self shown him in cases of apoplexy, catalepsy, and other forms of suspended animation. Here for hours the other self persists in remaining away, and on returning refuses to say where he has been. Further verification is afforded by every epileptic subject, into whose body, during the absence of the other self, some enemy has entered ; for how else does it happen that the other self on returning denies all knowledge of what his body has been doing? And this supposition that the body has been "possessed" by some other being, is confirmed by the phenomena of somnambulism and insanity. 6. What, then, is the interpretation inevitably put upon death ? The other self has habitually returned after sleep, which simulates death. It has returned, too, after fainting, which simulates death much more. It has even returned after the rigid state of catalepsy, which simulates death very greatly. Will it not return also after this still more prolonged quiescence and rigidity ? Clearly it is quite possible — quite probable even. The dead man's other self is gone away for a long time, but it still exists somewhere, far or near, and may at any moment como back to do all he said he would do. Hence the various burial-rites — the placing of weapons and valuables along with the body, the daily bringing of food to it, etc. I hope hereafter to show that, with such knowledge of the facts as he has, this interpretation is the most reasonable the savage can arrive at. Let me here, however, by way of showing how clearly the facts boar out this view, give one illustration out of many. " The ceremonies with which they [the Veddahs] invoke them [the shades of the dead] are few as they are simple. The most common

INFLUENCE OF NICKNAMES. 37

animals, plants, and inanimate objects? Very simply. Savages habitually distinguish individuals by names that are either directly suggestive of some personal trait or fact of personal, history, or else express an observed community of character with some well-known object. Such a genesis of individual names, before surnames have arisen, is inevitable ; and how easily it arises we shall see on remembering that it still goes on in its original form, even when no longer needful. I do not refer only to the significant fact that in some parts of England, as in the nailmaking districts, nicknames are universal, and surnames scarcely recognized; but I refer to the general usage among both children and adults. The rude man is apt to be known as " a bear ; " a sly fellow, as an " old fox ; " a hypocrite, as " the crocodile." Names of plants, too, are used ; as when the red-haired boy is called " carrots " by his school-fellows. Nor do we lack nicknames derived from inorganic objects and agents : instance that given by Mr. Carlyle to the elder Sterling — " Captain "Whirlwind." Now, in the earliest savage state, this metaphorical nam-

is the following : An arrow is fixed -upright in the ground, and the Veddah dances slowly round it, chanting this invocation, which is almost musical in its rhythm :

" My departed one, my departed one, my God ! Where art thou wandering ? "

" This invocation appears to he used on all occasions when the intervention of the guardian spirits is required in sickness, preparatory to hunting, etc. Sometimes in the latter case, a portion of the flesh of the game is promised as a votive offering, in the event of the chase "being successful ; and they "believe that the spirits will appear to them in dreams and tell them where to hunt. Sometimes they cook food and place it in the dry "bed of a river, or some other secluded spot, and then call on their deceased ancestors "by name, ' Come and partake of this ! Give us maintenance as you did when living ! Come, wheresoever you may he, on a tree, on a rock, in the forest, come ! ' And dance round the food, half chanting half shouting the invocation." — Bailey, Trans. Eth. Soe. t London, N. S., ii., p. SOI.

ing will in most cases commence afresh in each generation — must do so, indeed, until surnames of some kind have been established. I say in most cases, because there will occur exceptions in the cases of men who have distinguished themselves. If " the Wolf," proving famous in fight, becomes a terror to neighboring tribes, and a dominant man in his own, his sons, proud of their parentage, will not let fall the fact that they descended from the Wolf; nor will this fact be forgotten by the rest of the tribe who held " the Wolf" in awe, and see some reason to dread his sons. In proportion to the power and celebrity of the Wolf will this pride and this fear conspire. to maintain among his grandchildren and great-grandchildren, as well as among those over whom they dominate, the remembrance of the fact that their ancestor was the Wolf. And if, as will occasionally happen, this dominant family becomes the root of a new tribe, the members of this tribe will become known to themselves and others as the Wolves.

We need not rest satisfied with the inference that this inheritance of nicknames will take place : there is proof that it does take place. As nicknaming after animals, plants, and other objects, still goes on among ourselves, so among ourselves does there go on the descent of nicknames. An instance has come under my own notice on an estate in the West Highlands, belonging to some friends with whom I frequently have the pleasure of spending a few weeks in the autumn. ' ; Take a young Croskeky * lias more than once been the reply of my host to the inquiry, who should go with me when I was setting out salmonlishing. The elder Croshek I knew well ; and supposed that this name, borne bv him and bv all belon^in^ to him, was the family surname. Some years passed before I learned that the real surname was Cameron ; that the

OEIGIN OF TRIBAL NAMES. 39

father was called Croshek, after the name of his cottage, to distinguish him from other Camerons employed about the premises ; and that his children had come to be similarly distinguished. Though here, as very generally in Scotland, the nickname was derived from the place of residence, yet had it been derived from an animal, the process would have been the same — inheritance of it would have occurred just as naturally. ISTot even for this small link in the argument, however, need we depend on inference : there is fact to bear us out. Mr. Bates, in his " Naturalist on the Eiver Amazon " (2d ed., p. 376), describing three half-castes who accompanied him on a hunting trip, says : " Two of them were brothers — namely, Joao (John) and Zephyrino Jabuti ; Jabuti, or tortoise, being a nickname which their father had earned for his slow gait, and which, as is usual in this country, had descended as the surname of the family." Let me add the statement made by Mr. Wallace respecting this same region, that " one of the tribes on the river Isanna is called ' Jurupari ' (Devils). Another is called ' Ducks ; ' a third, ' Stars ; ' a fourth, l Mandiocca.' " Putting these two statements together, can there be any doubt about the genesis of these tribal names ? Let the tortoise become sufficiently distinguished (not necessarily by superiority — great inferiority may occasionally suffice) and the tradition of descent from him, preserved by his descendants themselves if he was superior, and by their contemptuous neighbors if he was inferior, may become a tribal name. 1

1 Since the foregoing pages were written, my attention has heen drawn hy Sir John Lubbock to a passage in the appendix to the second edition of " Prehistoric Times," in which he has indicated this derivation of tribal names. He says : " In endeavoring to account for the worship of animals, we must remember that names are very frequently taken from them. The children and followers of a man called the Bear or the Lion would make that a tribal name. Hence the animal itself would be first respected, at last worshipped." Of the genesis of this worship, however, Sir John Luhbock does not give any specific

10 THE ORIGIN OF ANBIAL-WOESHIP.

" But this," it will "be said, " does not amount to an explanation of animal- worship." True : a third factor remains to be specified. Given a belief in the still-existing other self of the deceased ancestor, who must be propitiated ; given this survival of his metaphorical name among his grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc. ; and the further requisite is that the distinction between metaphor and reality shall be forgotten. Let the tradition of the ancestor fail to keep clearly in view the fact that he was a man called the Wolf — let him be habitually spoken of as the Wolf, just as when alive ; and the natural mistake of taking the name literally will bring with it, firstly, a belief in descent from the actual wolf, and, secondly, a treatment of the wolf in a manner likely to propitiate him — a manner appropriate to one who may be the other self of the dead ancestor, or one of the kindred, and therefore a friend.

That a misunderstanding of this kind will naturally grow up, becomes obvious when we bear in mind the great indefiniteness of primitive language. As Prof. Max Muller says, respecting certain misinterpretations of an opposite kind : " These metaphors .... would become mere names handed down in the conversation of a family, understood perhaps by the grandfather, familiar to the father, but strange to the son, and misunderstood by the grandson." We have ample reason, . then, for thinking that such misinterpretations are likely to occur, ^ay, we may go further. We are justified in saying that they are certain to occur. For undeveloped languages contain no words capable of indicating the distinction to be kept in view. In the tongues of existing inferior races, only con-

explanatiou. Apparently he inclines to the belief, tacitly adopted also by Mr. McLennan, that animal-worship is derived from an original Fetichism, of which it is a more developed form. As will shortly be seen, I take a different view of its orisin.

INDEFINITENESS OF PRIMITIVE LANGUAGE. 41

crete objects and acts are expressible. The Australians have a name for each kind of tree, but no name for tree irrespective of kind. And though some witnesses allege that their vocabulary is not absolutely destitute of generic names, its extreme poverty in such is unquestionable. Similarly with the Tasmanians. Dr. Milligan says they " had acquired very limited powers of abstraction or generalization. They possessed no words representing abstract ideas ; for each variety of gum-tree and wattle-tree, etc., etc., they had a name, but they had no equivalent for the expression, ' a tree ; ' neither could they express abstract qualities, such as hard, soft, warm, cold, long, short, round, etc. ; for ' hard,' they would say ' like a stone,' for ' tall,' they would say c long legs,' etc., and for ' round,' they said i like a ball,' ' like the moon,' and so on, usually suiting the action to the word, and confirming, by some sign, the meaning to be understood." * Now, even making allowance for over-statement here (which seems needful, since the word " long," said to be inexpressible in the abstract, subsequently occurs as qualifying a concrete in the expression, "long legs"), it is sufficiently manifest that so imperfect a language must fail to convey the idea of a name, as something separate from a thing ; ana that still less can it be capable of indicating the act of naming. Familiar use of such partially abstract words as are applicable to all objects of a class, is needful before there can be reached the conception of a name — a word symbolizing the symbolic character of other words ; and the conception of a name, with its answering abstract term, must be long current before the verb to name can arise. Hence, among tribes with speech so rude, it will be impossible to transmit the tradition of an ancestor named the "Wolf, as distinguished from the actual wolf. The children and grand-

£2 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHTP.

children who saw him will not be led into error ; but in later generations, descent from the Wolf will inevitably come to mean descent from the animal known by that name. And the ideas and sentiments which, as above shown, naturally grow np around the belief that the dead parents and grandparents are still alive, and ready, if propitiated, to befriend their descendants, will be extended to the wolf species.

Before passing to other developments of this general view, let me point out how not simply animal-worship is thus accounted for, but also the conception, so variously illustrated in ancient legends, that animals are capable of displaying human powers of speech and thought and action. Mythologies are fall of stories of beasts and birds and fishes that have played intelligent parts in human affairs — creatures that have befriended particular persons by giving them information, by guiding them, by yielding them help ; or else that have deceived them, verbally or otherwise. Evidently all these traditions, as well as those about abductions of women by animals and fostering of children by them, fall naturally into their places as results of the habitual misinterpretation I have described.

The probability of the hypothesis will appear still greater when we observe how readily it applies to the worship of other orders of objects. Belief in actual descent from an animal, strange as we may think it, is one by no means incongruous with the unanalyzed experiences of the savage ; for there come under his notice many metamorphoses, vegetal and animal, which are apparently of like character. But how could he possibly arrive at so grotesque a conception as that the progenitor of his tribe was the sun, or the moon, or a particular star I Xo observation of surrounding phenomena affords the slightest

CONFUSION OF METAPHOR WITH FACT. 43

suggestion of any such possibility. But by the inheritance of nicknames that are eventually mistaken for the names of the objects from which they were derived, the belief readily arises — is sure to arise. That the names of heavenly bodies will furnish metaphorical names to the uncivilized, is manifest. Do we not ourselves call a distinguished singer or actor a star ? And have we not in poems numerous comparisons of men and women to the sun and moon ; as in " Love's Labour's Lost," where the princess is called "a gracious moon," and as in "Henry YIIL," where we read — " Those suns of glory, those two lights of men ? " Clearly, primitive men will be not unlikely thus to speak of the chief hero of a successful battle. When we remember how the arrival of a triumphant warrior must affect the feelings of his tribe, dissipating clouds of anxiety and irradiating all faces with joy, we shall see that the comparison of him to the sun is extremely natural ; and in early speech this comparison can be made only by calling him the sun. As before, then, it will happen that, through a confounding of the metaphorical name with the actual name, his progeny, after a few generations, will be regarded by themselves and others as descendants of the sun. And, as a consequence, partly of actual inheritance of the ancestral character, and partly of maintenance of the traditions respecting the ancestor's achievements, it will also naturally happen that the solar race will be considered a superior race, as we find it habitually is.

The origin of other totems, equally strange if not even stranger, is similarly accounted for, though otherwise unaccountable. One of the New-Zealand chiefs claimed as his progenitor the neighboring great mountain, Tongariro. This seemingly-whimsical belief becomes intelligible when we observe how easily it may have arisen from a nickname. Do we not ourselves sometimes speak figuratively of a tall, fat man as a mountain of flesh ? And, among a people prone to speak in still more concrete terms, would it not happen that a chief, remarkable for his great bulk, would be nicknamed after the highest mountain within sight, because he towered above other men as this did above surrounding hills ? Such an occurrence is not simply possible, but probable. And, if so, the confusion of metaphor with fact would originate this surprising genealogy. A notion perhaps yet more grotesque, thus receives a satisfactory interpretation. What could have put it into the imagination of any one that he was descended from the dawn ? Given the extremest credulity, joined with the wildest fancy, it would still seem requisite that the ancestor should be conceived as an entity ; and the dawn is entirely without that definiteness and comparative constancy which enter into the conception of an entity. But when we remember that " the Dawn " is a natural complimentary name for a beautiful girl opening into womanhood, the genesis of the idea becomes, on the above hypothesis, quite obvious.

Another indirect verification is that we thus get a clear conception of Fetichism in general. Under the fetichistic mode of thought, surrounding objects and agents are regarded as having powers more or less definitely personal in their natures. And the current interpretation is, that human intelligence, in its early stages, is obliged to conceive of their powers under this form. I have myself hitherto accepted this interpretation ; though always with a sense of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was, I think, well grounded. The theory is scarcely a theory properly so called; but rather, a restatement in other words. Uncivilized men do habitually form anthropomorphic conceptions of surrounding things ; and this ol>

ORIGIN OF FETICIIISM. 45

served general fact is transformed into the theory that at first they must so conceive them — a theory for which the psychological justification attempted, seems to me inadequate. From our present stand-point, it becomes manifest that Fetichism is not primary but secondary. "What has been said above almost of itself shows this. Let us, however, follow out the steps of its genesis. Respecting the Tasmanians, Dr. Milligan says : " The names of men and women were taken frorii natural objects and occurrences around, as, for instance, a kangaroo, a gum-tree, snow, hail, thunder, the wind, flowers in blossom, etc." Surrounding objects, then, giving origin to names of persons, and being, in the way shown, eventually mistaken for the actual progenitors of those who descend from persons nicknamed after them, it results that these surrounding objects come to be regarded as in some manner possessed of personalities like the human. He whose family tradition is that his ancestor was " the Crab," will conceive the crab as having a disguised inner power like his own ; and alleged descent from " the palm-tree " will entail belief in some kind of consciousness dwelling in the palm-tree. Hence, in proportion as the animals, plants, and inanimate objects or agents that originate names of persons, become numerous (which they will do in proportion as a tribe becomes large and the number of persons to be distinguished from one another increases), multitudinous things around will acquire imaginary personalities. And so it will happen that, as Mr. McLennan says of the Feejeeans : " Vegetables and stones, nay, even tools and weapons, pots and canoes, have souls that are immortal, and that, like the souls of men, pass on at last to Mbulu, the abode of departed spirits." Setting out, then, with a belief in the still-living other self of the dead ancestor, the alleged general cause of misapprehension affords us an