An epitome of the synthetic philosophy

Front matter

t^

CORNELL

UNIVERSITY

Preface

After spending several years in the self-imposed task of making indexes to my books, for the efficient execution of which I am much indebted to him, Mr. F. Howard Collins volunteered to undertake a far larger and more difficult task. He expressed the wish to make an epitome of The Synthetic Philosophy ; and asked me whether, if an epitome were satisfactorily made, I would agree to the publication of it. After some consideration I assented.

Before starting on a journey through an unknown region, study of a map is desirable ; and a clear preliminary conception is more readily obtained from a small outline-map than from a large one full of details. In like manner, before commencing a series of volumes which, though all pervaded by certain organizing ideas, deal with various subjects, an introductory view presenting these organizing ideas in smaller space and freed from elaboration, can scarcely fail to facilitate comprehension. The epitome which Mr. Collins has prepared in the course of five years fulfils this purpose.

Ill-health hasprevented mefrom reading it through ; but I have read portions taken at random here and viii PREFACE.

there, and have found them very well done. The condensed statements are at once correct and clear. Indeed I have been somewhat surprised that it has proved possible to put so much into so small a space without sacrifice of intelligibility. Of course, divested as they are of all illustrative matter, these abstracts of chapters and sections do not sufiice to give vivid and definite conceptions ; but the undeveloped conceptions they give prepare the way for those developed ones to be obtained by perusal of the chapters and sections themselves.

To write an introduction to an introduction will be thought strange; but the epitome in one volume which Mr. Collins has made of matter occupying ten A^olumes may itself be epitomized in three pages — of course in a series of highly abstract propositions. Some eighteen or more years ago, an American friend requested me, with a view to a certain use which he named, to furnish him with a succinct statement of the cardinal principles developed in the successive works I- had published and in those I was intending to publish. This statement, which I wrote out for him, and which has since made its appearance in England in a form giving it but little currency, I here reproduce to prepare the way for Mr. Collins' epitome.

'^1. Throughout the universe in general and in detail, there is an unceasing redistribution of matter and motion.

2. This redistribution constitutes evolution where there is a predominant integration of matter and dissipation of

PREFACE. IX

motion J and constitutes dissolution wliere there is a predominant absorption of motion and disintegration of matter.

3. Evolution is simple when the process of integration, or the formation of a coherent aggregate, proceeds uncomplicated by other processes,

4. Evolution is compound when, along with this primary change from an incoherent to a coherent state, there go on secondary changes due to differences in the circumstances of the different parts of the aggregate.

5. These secondary changes constitute a transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous — a transformation which, like the first, is exhibited in the universe as a whole and in all (or nearly all) its details : in the aggregate of stars and nebulse ; in the planetary system ; in the earth as an inorganic mass ; in each organism, vegetal or animal (von Baer's law) ; in the aggregate of organisms throughout geologic time; in the mind; in society; in all products of social activity.

6. The process of integration, acting locally as well as generally, combines witli the process of differentiation to render this change not simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but from an indefinite homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity; and this trait of increasing definiteness, which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity, is, like it, exhibited in the totality of things and in all its divisions and sub-divisions down to the minutest.

7. Along with this redistribution of the matter composing any evolving aggregate, there goes on a redistribution of the retained motion of its components in relation to one another : this also becomes, step by step, more definitely heterogeneous.

8. In the absence of a homogeneity that is infinite and absolute, that redistribution of which evolution is one phase, is inevitable. The causes which necessitate it are these: —

9. The instability of the homogeneous, which is con-

X PREFACE.

sequent upon the different exposures of the different parts of any limited aggregate to incident forces. The transformations hence resulting are complicated by —

10. The multiplication of effects. Every mass and part of a mass on which a force falls^ sub-divides and differentiates that force, which thereupon proceeds to work a variety of changes; and each of these becomes the parent of similarlymultiplying changes : the multiplication of them becoming greater in proportion as the aggregate becomes more heterogeneous. And these two causes of increasing differentiations are furthered by —

11. Segregation, which is a process tending ever to separate unlike units and to bring together like units — so serving continually to sharpen, or make definite, differentiations otherwise caused.

12. Equilibration is the final result of these transformations which an evolving aggregate undergoes. The changes go on until there is reached an equilibrium between the forces which all parts of the aggregate are exposed to and the forces these parts oppose to them. Equilibration may pass through a transition stage of balanced motions (as in a planetary system) or of balanced functions (as in a living body) on the way to ultimate equilibrium ; but the state of rest in inorganic bodies, or death in organic bodies, is the necessary limit of the changes constituting evolution.

13. Dissolution is the counter- change which sooner or later every evolved aggregate undergoes. Eemaining exposed to surrounding forces that are unequilibrated, each aggregate is ever liable to be dissipated by the increase, gradual or sudden, of its contained motion; and its dissipation, quickly undergone by bodies lately animate, and slowly undergone by inanimate masses, remains to be undergone at an indefinitely remote period by each planetary and stellar mass, which, since an indefinitely distant period in the past, has been slowly evolving : the cycle of its transformations being thus completed.

14. This rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing

I'HEFACE. XI

itself during short periods in small* aggregates^ and in tlie vast aggregates distributed through space completing itself in periods which are immeasurable by human thought^ is, so far as we can see, universal and eternal — each alternating phase of the process predominating now in this region of space and now in that, as local conditions determine.

15. All these phenomena, from their great features down to their minutest details, are necessary results of the persistence of force, under its forms of matter and motion. Given these as distributed through space, and their quantities being unchangeable, either by increase or decrease, there inevitably result the continuous redistributions distinguishable as evolution and dissolution, as well as all those special traits above enumerated.

16. That which persists unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form, under these sensible appearances which the universe presents to uSj transcends human knowledge and conception — is an unknown and unknowable power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time."

Eeturning to the epitome made by Mr. Collins in the volume herewith issued, I will add only that it cannot with advantage be read in large portions at once. A Ibng series of abstract propositions, taken without concrete illustrations, is likely to prove wearisome, and to leave but faint impressions. It will be better for the student to read one section only at a time, and himself to seek illustrative cases before proceeding to the next.

Herbert Spencer.

Contents

PAET I. "TIEST PEINCIPLES."

Chapter L The Unknowable.

Keligion and science, 3-5. Ultimate religious ideas, 5-7. Ultimate Bcieutific ideas, 8-10. The relativity of all knowledge, 10-13. The reconciliation, 13-16.

Chapter II. The Knowable

Philosophy defined, 17-8. The data of philosophy, 18-20. Space, time, matter, motion, and force, 20-2. The indestructibility of matter, 22-3. The continuity of motion, 23-4. The persistence of force, 24-5. The persistence of relations among forces, 25-6. The transformation and equivalence offerees, 26-8. The direction of motion, 28-31. The rhythm of motion, 31-4. Recapitulation, criticism, and recommencement, 34. Evolution and dissolution, 35. Simple and compound evolution, 36-7. The law of evolution, 38-40. The law of evolution, continued, 40-3, 43-5. The law of evolution, concluded, 45-7. The interpretation of evolution, 47. The instability of the homogeneous, 47-50. The multiplication of effects, 50-3. Segregation, 53-5. Equilibration, 65'S. Dissolution, 59-60. Summary and conclusion, 61-3.

PAET n. " THE PEINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY."

Chapter III. The Data of Biology

Organic matter, 67-9. The actions of forces on organic matter, 69-71. The reactions of organic matter on forces, 71-3. Proximate definition of life, 73-4. The correspondence between life and its circumstances, 74-5. The degree of life varies as the degree of correspondence, 75-7. The scope of biology, 77-8.

Chapter IV. The Inductions of Biology. Growth, 79-82. Development, 82-5. Function. 85-7. Waste and xiv CONTENTS.

repair, 87-9. Adaptation, 89-91. Individuality, 91. Genesis, 92-5 Heredity, 95-8. Variation, 98-100. Genesis, heredity, and variation, 100-2. Classification, 102-4. Distribution, 104-6.

Chapter V. The Evolution of Life

Preliminary, 107. The general aspects of the special-creation-hypothesis, 107-9. The general aspects of the evolution-hypothesis, 109-110. The arguments from classification, 110-11; from embryology, 111-3; from morphology, 11.3; from distribution, 114-5. How is organic evolution caused? 115-6. External factors, 116-7. Internal factors, 117-9. Direct equilibration, 119-20. Indirect equilibration, 120-3. The cooperation of the factors, 123. The convergence of the evidences, 123-5.

Chapter VI. Morphologtcal Development

The problems of morphology, 126-7. The morphological composition of plants, 127-9, 129-34. The morphological composition of animals, 134-6, 13G''7. Morphological differentiation in plants, 138. The general shapes of plants, 138-40. The shapes of branches, 140-1 ; of leaves, 141 ; of flowers, 142-3 ; of vegetal cells, 143. Changes of shape otherwise caused, 143-4. ]\lorphological differentiation in animals, 144. The general shapes of animals, 144-6. The shapes of vertebrate skeletons, 147-8. The shapes of animal cells, 149. Summary of morphological development, 149.

Chapter VII. Physiological Development

The problems of physiology, 150. Differentiations between the outer and inner tissues of plants, 151-2; among the outer tissues of plants, 152-4 ; among the inner tissues of plants, 154-6. Physiological integration in plants, 156-7. ^Differentiations between the outer and inner tissues of animals, 157-8 ■ among the outer tissues of animals, 158-60; among the inner tissues of animals, 160-5. Physiological integration in animals, 165-7. Summary of physiological development, 167-8.

Chapter VIII. The Laws of Multiplication

The factors, 169-70. A priori principle, 170. Obverse a priori principle, 170-1. Difliculties of inductive verification, 171-2. Antagonism between growth and asexual genesis, 172-3 : between growth and sexual genesis, 173-4 ; between development and genesis, asexual and sexual, 174-5 ; between expenditure and genesis, 175-6. Coincidence between high nutrition and genesis, 176-7. Specialities of these relations, 177-8. Interpretation and qualification, 178-9. Multiplication of the human race, 179-80. Human population in the future, 180-2.

CONTENTS. XV

PAET III. "THE PKINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY."

Chapter IX, The Data of Psychology

The nervous system, 185-6. The structure of the nervous system, 186-9. The functions of the nervous system, 189-92, The conditions essential to nervous action, 192-3. Nervous stimulation and discharge, 193-5. ^stho-physiology, 195-8. The scope of psychology, 198-9.

Chapter X. The Inductions of Psychology

The substance of mind, 200-2. The composition of mind, 202-5. The relativity of feelings, 205-7 ; of relations between feelings, 207-9. The revivability of feelings, 209-10 : of relations between feelings, 211. The associability of feelings, 212-3 ; of relations between feelings, 213-4. Pleasures and pains, 214-5.

Chapter XL General Synthesis.

Life and mind as correspondence, 216. The correspondence as direct and homogeneous, 216-7; as direct but heterogeneous, 217; as extending in space, 217-9 ; as extending in time, 219-20 ; as increasing in speciality, 220-1; as increasing in generality, 221-2; as increasing in complexity, 222-4- The co-ordination of correspondences, 224. The integration of correspondences, 225. The correspondences in their totality, 225-6.

Chapter XIL Special Synthesis.

The nature of intelligence, 227-8. The law of intelligence, 228-9. The growth of intelligence, 230. Reflex action, 230-1. Instinct, 231-2. Memory, 232-3. Reason, 233-5. The feelings, 235-7. The will, 237-8.

Chapter XIII. Physical Synthesis.

A further interpretation needed, 239. The genesis of nerves, 239-40. The genesis of simple nervous systems, 240-1; of compound nervous systems, 242-3 ; of doubly-compound nervous systems, 243-5. Functions as related to these structures, 245-6. Psychical laws as thus interpreted, 246-7. Evidence from normal variations, 247-50 ; from abnormal variations, 250. Results, 251-2.

Chapter XIV. Special Analysis.

Limitation of the subject, 253. Compound quantitative reasoning, 253-5, 255-6. Imperfect and simple quantitatiA'e reasoning, 256-7. Quantitative reasoning in general, 257-8. Perfect qualitative reasoning, 258-60. Imperfect qualitative reasoning, 260-2. Reasoning in general, 262-5. Classification, naming, and recognition, 265-7. The perception xvi CONTENTS

of special objects, 267 ; of body as presenting dynamical, statico-dynamical, and statical attributes, 268-70; as presenting statico-dynamical and statical attributes, 270-1 ; as presenting statical attributes, 271-3. The perception of space, 273-6; of time, 276-7; of motion, 277-9 ; of resistance, 279-80. Perception in general, 280-2. The relations of similarity and dissimilarity, 282 ; of cointension and non-cointension, 282-3 ; of cocxtension and non-coextension, 283 ; of coexistence and non-coexistence, 284; of connature and non-connature, 284-5 ; of likeness and unlikeness, 285. The relation of sequence, 286. Consciousness in general, 286-7. Results, 287-8.

Chapter XV. Gteneral Analysis.

The final question, 289-90. The assumptions of metaphysicians, 290. The words of metaphysicians, 290-2. The reasonings of metaphysicians, 292-5. Negative justification of realism, 295. The argument from priority, 296-7 ; from simplicity, 297 ; from distinctness, 297-8. A criterion wanted, 298-9. Propositions qualitatively distinguished, 299-301. The universal postulate, 301-4. The test of relative validity, 304-5. Its corollaries, 305-6. Positive justification of realism, 306. The dynamics of consciousness, 306-7. Partial differentiation of subject and object, 307-9. Completed differentiation of subject and object, 309-11. Developed conception of the object, 311-2. Transfigured realism, 312-4.

Chapter XVI. Congruities

Pi-eliminary, 315. Co-ordination of data and inductions, 315-6 ; of syntheses, 316-7 ; of special analyses, 317-8; of general analyses, 318-9. Final comparison, 319-20.

Chapter XVII. Corollaries.

Special psychology, 321. Classification, 321-3. Development of

conceptions, 323-5. Language of the emotions, 325-7. Sociality and sympathy, 327-30. Egoistic sentiments, 330-1. Ego-altruistic sentiments, 331-3. Altruistic sentiments, 333-5. ^Esthetic sentiments, 335-7.

PAET IV. "THE PEINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGT."

Chapter XVIII. The Data of Sociology.

Super-organic evolution, 341. The factors of social phenomena, 342. Original external factors, 342-4. Original internal factors, 345. Primitive man — physical, 345-6 ; — emotional, 346-8 ; — intellectual, 348-50. Primitive ideas, 350-3. The ideas of the animate and inanimate, 354-5* of sleep and dreams, 355-6; of swoon, apoplexy, catalepsy, ecstasy, and other forms of insensibility, 356-7 ; of death and resurrection, 357-9 ;

CONTENTS. xvii

of sonls, ghosts, spirits, demons, etc., 359-60 : of another life, 361-3; of another world, 363-5 ; of supernatural agents, 365-G Supernatural agents as causing epilepsy and convulsive actions, delirium and insanity, disease and death, 366-7. Inspiration, divination, exorcism, and sorcery, 367-9. Sacred places, temples, and altars ; sacrifice, fasting, and propitiation ; praise, prayer, etc., 369-72. Ancestor-worship in general, 372-4. Idol-worship and fetich- worship, 374-6- Animal-worship, 376-9. Plant- worship, 379-80. Nature-worship, 381-3. Deities, 383-6. The primitive theory of things, 386-7. The scope of sociology, 387-8.

Chaper XIX. The Ixductions op Sociologv.

What is a society? 389. A society is an organism, 389-91. Social growth, 391-2. Social structures, 392-3. Social functions, 393-4. Systems of organs, 394-5. The sustaining system, 395-6. The distributing system, 396-7. The regulating system, 397-400. Social types and constitutions, 400-2. Social metamorphoses, 402-3. Qualifications and summary, 403-4:

Chapter XX. The Domestic Relations.

The maintenance of species, 405, The diverse interests of the species, of the parents, and of the offspring, 405-6. Primitive relations of the sexes, 406-7. Exogamy and endogamy, 407-10. Promiscuity, 410-1. Polyandry, 411-2. Polygyny, 412-3. Monogamy, 413-4. The family, 414-8. The status of women, 418-9 ; of children, 419-20. Domestic retrospect and prospect, 421-2.

Chapter XXI. Ceremonial Institutions.

Ceremony in genei-al, 423-6. Trophies, 426-8. Mutilations, 428-30. Presents, 430-3. Visits, 433-4. Obeisances, 434-7. Forms of address, 437-8. Titles, 438-40. Badges and costumes, 440-2. Further class-distinctions, 442-3. Fashion, 444. Ceremonial retrospect and prospect, 444-6.

Chapter XXIT. Political Institutions.

Preliminary, 447-8. Political organization in general, 448-50. Political integration, 450-3. Political differentiation, 453-5. Political forms and forces, 455-7. Political heads — chiefs, kings, etc., 458-61. Compound political heads, 461-4. Consultative bodies, 464-6. Representative bodies, 466-8. Ministries, 469. Local governing agencies, 470-2, Military systems, 472-3. Judicial and executive systems, 474-6. Laws, 476-8. Property, 478-80. Revenue, 481-2. The militant type of society, 482-5. The industrial type of society, 485-9. Political retrospect and prospect, 489-92.

xviii CONTENTS.

Chapter XXIII. Ecclesiastical Institutions. The religious idea, 493-7. Medicine-meu and priests, 497. Priestly duties of descendants, 498. Eldest male descendants as quasi-priests, 498-9. The ruler as priest, 499-500. The rise of a priesthood, 500. Polytheistic and monotheistic priesthoods, 501-2. Ecclesiastical hierarchies, 502-3. An ecclesiastical system as a social bond, 503-5. The military functions of priests, 505-6. The civil functions of priests, 506. Church and State, 507. Nonconformity, 508. The moral iufluences of priesthoods, 508-9. Ecclesiastical retrospect and prospect, 509-10. Religious retrospect and prospect, 510-12.

PAET V. "THE PRESrCIPLES OF MOEALITT."

Chapter XXIV. The Data of Ethics.^

" The principles of morality," 513. Conduct in general, 515. The evolution of conduct, 516-7. Good and bad conduct, 517-9. Ways of judging conduct, 519-21. The physical view, 521-2. The biological view, 522-4. The psychological view, 525-7. The sociological view, 527-9. Criticisms and explanations, 529-31. The relativity of pains and pleasures. 531-3. Egoism versus altruism, 533-4, Altruism versus egoism, 534-6. Trial and compromise, 536-9. Conciliation, 539-41. Absolute and relative ethics, 541-3. The scope of ethics, 543-4.

PART T 'FIRST PRINCIPLES."

Chapter I. The Unknowable

" Carrying a step further the doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel ; pointing out the various directions in which Science leads to the same conclusions ; and showing that in this united belief in an Absolute that transcends not only human knowledge but human conception, lies the only possible reconciliation of Science and Religion."

I. RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

1. However wrong many human beliefs appear, we may infer that they germinated from actual experiences, and that they originally contained, and perhaps still contain, some small amount of truth. We may assume this more especially of those -beliefs which are nearly or quite universal. 2. The varied opinions which have been held from age to age, from the most primitive to those of modern and civilized communities, as to the origin, authority, and functions of government, may serve to show that between the most opposite beliefs there is usually something in common. We cannot say that some one alone of all these varied beliefs — from the notion of savages that a monarch is a god, to the modern view that government is only the administrator of the moral principles underlying social life — is wholly right and all the others wholly wrong. A careful examination will show that each one of these beliefs contains some truth ; they all exhibit the principle of a subordination of individual actions to social requirements; although differing widely as to the origin, motive, and extent of the ruling power, there is on this one point complete uniformity. A postulate thus unconsciously involved by numerous bodies of men; otherwise diverging in countless ways and degrees, may rank next in certainty to the postulates of exact science. Our method to find this postulate is : — To compare all opinions of one genus; to set aside the special and concrete elements in which they disagree ; and to find for the remainder that abstract expression which holds true throughout its divergent modifications.

3. A candid acceptance of this general principle, and an adoption of the course it indicates, will greatly aid us in dealing with the chronic antagonism between Religion and Science. We shall not regard some men's judgments as wholly good, and others as wholly bad; but shall rather conclude that none are completely right and none are completely wrong.

4. Thus, however untenable may be any or all the existing religious creeds, however irrational the arguments set forth in their defence, we must not ignore the verity which in all likelihood lies hidden within them. The general probability that widely-spread beliefs are not absolutely baseless, is in this case enforced by a further probability due to the omnipresence of the beliefs. In the existence of a religious sentiment, whatever be its origin, we have a second fac^pf great significance. And we find a third fact of like implication, when we perceive that, as knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness, it must always continue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which transcends knowledge. Hence, there must always be a placeTor sonrasb^ing of the nature of Religion. Since Religion under all its forms is distinguished from everything else in that its subject matter is that which passes the sphere of experience.

S 5. What is Science ? To see the absurdity of the preju dice against it, we need only remark that Science is simply a higher development of common knowledge; and that if Science is repudiated, all knowledge must be repudiated along with it. It is nowhere possible to say where the dicta of common sense end and the generalizations of Science begin. The daily verification of its predictions ; the growth

12. If from the origin of the Universe wo turn to its nature, the same difficulties rise up before us under newaspects. The objects and actions surrounding us, not less than the phenomena of our own consciousness, compel us to ask a cause : commit us to the hypothesis of a First Cause; which we have no alternative but to regard as Infinite and Absolute. The mutual contradictions involved in this hypothesis may be shown from Dean ManseFs Limits of Religious Thought^ where he summarizes them in the following words : —

13. '^The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others ; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one ; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal ; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot without contradiction be represented as aottve ; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum." (1858, p. 58-9.)

14. And now what is the bearing of these results on the question before us? It is that Religions, diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. But an examination of the solutions they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid. And thus the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect — not a relative, but an absolute mystery. If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts — that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.

III. ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.

15. What are Space aud Time ? T\^^o hypotheses are current respecting them : the one that they are objective, and the other that they are subjective — the one that they are external to, and independent of, ourselves, the other that they are internal, and appertain to our own consciousness. But we cannot conceive Space and Time as entities, and we are equally disabled from conceiving them as either the attributes of entities or as non-entities. We are compelled to think of them as existing ; and yet cannot bring them within those conditions under which existences are represented in thought. To assert that they are subjective realities is merely to multiply irrationalities. It results therefore that Space and Time are wholly incomprehensible.

16. Matter is either infinitely divisible, or it is not: no third possibility can be named. Which of the alternatives shall we accept ? If we say that Matter is infinitely divisible, we commit ourselves to a supposition not realizable in thought. For really to conceive the infinite divisibility of Matter, is mentally to follow out the divisions to infinity; and to do this would require infinite time. On the other hand, to assert that Matter is not infinitely divisible, is to assert that it is reducible to parts which no conceivable power can divide ; and this verbal supposition can no more be represented in thought than the other. Matter then, in its ultimate nature, is as absolutely incomprehensible as Space and Time. Frame what suppositions we may, we find on tracing out their implications that they leave us nothing but a choice between opposite absurdities,

17. Absolute Motion cannot even be imagined, much less known. That a man standing still is moving 1,000 miles per hour East, and 67,000 per hour West, may serve to show how illusive Motion is. Motion as taking place apart from those limitations of space which we habitually associate with it, is totally unthinkable. As also is the transfer of Motion — the ability of a moving thing to generate movement in a thing that is stationary. Similarly the change from Rest to Motion, or Motion to Rest, is a transition that cannot be represented in thought. Neither Avhen considered in connexion with Space, Matter, or Rest, is Motion truly cognizable. All efforts to understand its essential nature do but bring us to alternative impossibilities of thought.

18. It scarcely needs to point out that the weight of a chair produces in us various feelings according* as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand, or the leg; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these sensations there is no reason to believe it like any. It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force existing in the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with consciousness. So that it is absurd to think of Force as in itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we realize it in consciousness at all. It is impossible to form any idea of Force in itself, or to comprehend its mode of exercise.

1 9. Let us now turn from the outer to the inner world ; from the agencies to which we ascribe our subjective modifications, to the subjective modifications themselves. It is beyond question that our states of consciousness occur in succession. Is this chain of states of consciousness infinite or finite? "We cannot say. For, while we are unable either to believe or to conceive that the duration of consciousness is infinite, we are equally unable either to know it as finite, or to conceive it as finite.

20. Nor do we meet with any greater success when, instead of the extent of consciousness, we consider its sub- _ stance. The question — What is this that thinks ? admits of no better solution than the question to which we have just found none but inconceivable answers. Though the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain.

yet it is a thing which cannot truly be known at all ; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought.

21, Ultimate Scientific Ideas, then, are all representative of realities that cannot be comprehended. The explanation of that which is explicable, does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness of that which remains behind.

IT. THE EELATIVITY OP ALL KNOWLEDGE.

22. The same conclusion is thus arrived at, from whichever point we set out. It yet remains to show how this belief — that the reality existing behind all appearances is^ and must ever be, unknown — may be established rationally, as well as empirically.

23. From the fact that the successively deeper interpretations of nature which constitute advancing knowledge, are merely successive inclusions of special truths in general truths, and of general truths in truths still more general ; it obviously follows that the most general truth, not admitting of inclusion in any other, does not admit of interpretation. Manifestly, as the 7n,ost general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, it cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation must evenfcually bring us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at, must be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended.

24. The inference which we thus find forced upon us when we analyze the product of thought, as exhibited objectively in scientific generalizations, is equally forced upon us by an analysis of the process of fchought, as exhibited subjectively in consciousness. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, must be thought of, as of this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to anything of which we have sensible experience ? Obviously not. Between the creatinoand the created, there must be a distinction transcendiuff any of the distinctions existing between diflFerent divisions of tlie created. Is it then tliat the Actual^ though unthinkable by classification with the Apparent, is thinkable by classification with itself ? This supposition is equally absurd with the other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause^ the Infinite, the Absolute; and this implication is self-contradictory. There cannot be more than one First Cause ; seeing that the existence of more than one would involve the existence of something necessitating more than one, which something would be the true First Cause. How self-destructive is the assumption of two or more Infinites, is manifest on remembering that such Infinites, by limiting each other, would become finite. And similarly, an Absolute which existed not alone but along with other Absolutes, would no longer be an absolute but a relative. The Unconditioned therefore, as classable neither with any form of the conditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot be classed at all. And to admit that it cannot be known as of such or such kind, is to admit that it is unknowable. Every thought involves relation, difference, likeness. Hence we may say that the Unconditioned, as presenting none of these, is trebly unthinkable.