Germany's point of view

Preface

THIS book contains a collection of articles, revised, which appeared in the Wednesday editions of the Boston Evening Transcript, October 14, 1914, to May 5, 1915, under the caption "The German Viewpoint," and which, therefore, present a certain record of seven months of the European War. The last two chapters were prepared for The Transcript, but were delivered as an address before the German University League in New York.

The purpose of these articles was not to comment on the progress of the war, but to go to the root of things, and to explain, if possible, why those who had not lost faith in Germany differed from many of their fellow citizens in their interpretation of the relative merits of the causes of the several belligerents. These articles, therefore, contain a wealth of economic data, historical documents, and individual interpretations which it is hoped will show that in this war the right is on the side of Germany.

It was at first suggested that the publication of these articles in book form demanded the obliteration of all cursory references to the incidents of the war. On second thought, however, this appeared not to be desirable, because the articles as they stand, reflect, to a certain extent, the historical sequence of the presentation of the several ideas to the public opinion of the countr}^ Those readers who wish to pursue a given subject irrespective of the time when this or that part of it was offered to the original readers of The Transcript, are enabled to do so by a table of contents which is arranged by subjects.

Preface

The author had one more object in mind in collecting these articles in book form. There has been much bitter feeling against the American press among the pro-Germans in this country, and among the Germans in the Fatherland. Without, unfortunately, being able to affirm that Germany has received fair treatment, the author wishes to bear testimony to the fact that the spirit of fair play has nevertheless been more prevalent here than in some of the other neutral states. When the war is over the knowledge that articles like these appeared week after week, and at times when the passions were highest, in a distinctly .pro-Allies paper of such importance as the Boston Transcript will take some of the sting out of the charge of unfairness made against the American press. The defenders of the good name of Germany, had to contend against great odds, but they were not entirely denied the opportunity of pleading their case, as happened in other countries.

In this connection it is only right to state that not once during the thirty weeks that the author was asked by the owner and managing editor of the Boston Transcript to contribute his weekly "Viewpoints," was any request made or any pressure brought to bear upon him to lessen his freedom of expression. On the contrary, the author had an absolutely free hand, and his articles were printed as he had written them. This implies a degree of generosity which it would be difficult to duplicate outside of the United States of America.

Edmund von Mach.

Cambridge, Mass., May, IQ15.

CHAPTER

I

Contents

PAGE

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium? i

England's Conduct of the War ... 43 Japan and Kiau-Chau— Germany and

Chapter I Did England Want A Neutral Belgium?

IT IS a great mistake to believe that the German nation is ready to condone a criminal action for the sole reason that it was committed by their own government. On the contrary, no people will be severer in their censure of the infringement of Belgian neutrality than the Germans themselves, if it is found that the facts in the case are those presented by the British statesmen and not those given currency in Germany.

James Bryce recently introduced his general discussion of the subject with these words:

Moreover, the facts, at least as we in England see and believe them, and as the documents seem to prove them to be, appear not to be known to the German people, and the motives of the chief actors are not yet fully ascertained.

This very fair statement should make one willing, in the interest of truth, to listen to the facts as they appear to the German people. They are here given, not in a controversial spirit, but to complete the record, so to speak, of the case before the court of public opinion.

Much uncertainty exists concerning the treaties on which Belgian neutrality rests, and even James Bryce apparently neglected to look them up, although he doubtless knows that in such cases one cannot always rely on one's memory.

These are the facts : The division between Holland and Belgium, both of which countries had been parts of the old German empire, was established by the treaty of 183 1. In 1839 Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Prussia, and Russia signed a supplementary treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and accepting in toto the articles of the earlier treaty. In 1870 there was considerable uncertainty about the binding force of the treaty of 1839, some holding that the guarantee of Belgian neutrality forced the signatory Powers not only themselves to respect the neutrality but also to compel, by force of arms, all other nations to respect it; others — and among them Mr. Gladstone — declared in the British Parliament that a guarantee made under entirely different conditions was not enforceable. Since it was, however, desirable from every point of view that Belgian neutrality should be respected during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Great Britain negotiated special treaties with Prussia and France, respectively, on August 9 and II, 1870. The treaties are identical in wording, substituting in the second treaty, of course, France for Prussia wherever this name occurs. After the preamble the treaty reads :

Article I. His Majesty the king of Prussia having declared that notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on her part declares that, if during

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium? 3

the said Hostilities the Armies of France should violate that Neutrality, she will be prepared to cooperate with his Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in a manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her Naval and Military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with his Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty of thg United Kingdom of Great Britain and Irelai;id does not engage herself by this treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium and the Netherlands of 19th April, 1839.

Article II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing article, to cooperate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid, andthe case arising, to concert with her majesty the measures which shall be taken separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

Article III. This treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the Continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the Ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties, and on the expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article i of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. '^

If this treaty of 1870 is studied in the light of Mr. Gladstone's remarks in Parliament, the conclusion that the earlier treaty placed no enforceable obligations on Great Britain seems reasonable. For if it did, no valid reason for a new treaty appears, because a mere announcement on the part of Great Britain that it understood her guarantee of 1839 to be enforceable in 1870, would have been sufficient. And more, from the wording of Article I it may be possible to deduce that at that time neither France nor Prussia nor Great Britain saw in the treaty of 1839 a moral obligation of the contestants to respect Belgian neutrality. If they had done so, it is probable — some say certain — that the phrase "guaranteed by Prussia [France] in the treaty of 1839" would have been inserted after the phrase " his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium."

Mr. Lloyd George in an address to his Welsh compatriots, delivered in October, 19 14, ignored these treaties of 1870, referring merely to a preliminary enquiry whether both France and Prussia intended to respect Belgian neutrality, and continued:

That was in 1870. Mark what followed. Three or four days after that document (an address of thanks from Belgium) was received, the French army was wedged up against the Belgian frontier, every means shut out, a ring of flame from Prussian cannon. There was one way of escape. What was that? Violate the neutrality of Belgium. What did they do? The French on that occasion preferred ruin, humiliation, to the breaking of their bond. French emperor, French marshals, a hundred thousand gallant Frenchmen in arms, preferred to be carried captive to the strange land of their enemy rather than dishonor the name of their country.

It was the last French army in the field. Had they violated Belgian neutrality the whole history of that war would have been changed. Yet when it was for the interest of France to break the treaty [of 1839, Lloyd George did not mention the one 1870] she did not do it.

It is the interest of Prussia to break the treaty, and she has done it.

Mr. Lloyd George is silent on the fact that Great Britain would have automatically taken up arms against France, if she had thus violated Belgian neu-

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium f 5

trality. The most charitable view of this omission is that he did not know of the existence of the treaties of 1870. In this case, however, since he is a member of the present British Government the authority of the utterances by this government is somewhat lessened. A less charitable view, and one which one cannot blame the Germans for taking, is that he wilfully suppressed the mention of these treaties ; for the question occurs at once to all who have read these treaties, was it not possible to negotiate similar treaties in 1914 and keep Great Britain out of the war? To this question the British Government will find it difficult to give an answer, for Germany asked Great Britain before entering Belgium whether she would formulate conditions under which she would remain neutral. Great Britain refused to answer in the affirmative. Why? This why has never been explained. Why was she unwilling to do in 19 14 what she did in the treaties of August 9 and 11, 1870?*

If Great Britain had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium by similar treaties as those of 1870, Germany would not have felt that her unprotected flank on the lower Rhine was endangered. One glance at the map shows that a successful French attack here would have threatened the German naval base and the great ports of Hamburg and Bremen. Why did Great Britain refuse to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium? There may be many reasons as yet unknown, but since she has offered none, is it altogether unreasonable for the Germans to believe what they are told by a Government which through more than twenty-five years has won their confidence, namely, that on July 30, which .was several days before the declaration of war, Great Britain gave to France definite assurances of support against Germany in the expected war?

This is contrary to the official documents issued by the British Government, and the Germans, knowing the difficulty of proving such assertions, were willing to wait for the evidence. In substantiation of their claim the German Government has now published, in the official Gazette of September 12, the following letter and explanation :

On July 31, a letter was mailed in Berlin addressed to Madame Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles, Belgique. On the same day military law was declared in Germany, whereupon all foreign mail was stopped and returned to the place of issue. After having been bulletined the legal number of days, the letter was sent to the Dead Letter Office and opened to ascertain the sender. In the outer envelope there was another, addressed to Son Excellence Monsieur Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. This envelope also failed to contain a return address. It was opened and contained this letter signed by B. de I'Escaille, the Belgian minister, and dated : The Belgian legation, St. Petersburg, 795-402. The Political Condition, July 30, 1914. The letter in translation reads:

Yesterday and the day before passed In anticipation of the events which must follow the Austria-Hungary declaration of war on Servia. The most contradictory news is being spread and it has been impossible to separate truth from fiction concerning the intentions of the Imperial (Russian) Government. Only one fact is incontestable, namely, that Germany has endeavored here, as well as in Vienna, to find a means by which to avoid a general conflict, but that she has met on the one hand the determination of the Vienna cabinet not to yield one iota, and on the other the suspicion of the Petersburg cabinet as regards the assurances of Vienna that it is contemplating only the punishment, and not the acquisition, of Servia.

Mr. Sazonof has declared that it was impossible for Russia not to keep herself in readiness nor to mobilize,

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium? 7

but that these measures were not taken against Germany. This morning an official communique to the papers announced that the " reservists in a certain number of governments had been called to the colors." He who knows the reticence of the official Russian communiques may well assert that the mobilization is general.

The German ambassador declared this morning that he had reached the end of his endeavors as mediator, pursued incessantly since Saturday, and that he had practically no hope left. I have just been told that the British ambassador had expressed himself to the same effect. Latterly England proposed arbitration, but Mr. Sazanof replied : " We ourselves proposed this to Austria, who declined." The suggestion of a conference was met by Germany with the suggestion of an agreement between the cabinets. One is tempted to ask if the whole world is not wanting war, trying only to postpone the declarations of war in order to gain time.

At first England let it be known that she did not wish to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan openly said this. Today, however, St. Petersburg is convinced — nay, more, they have the assurance that England will support France. [Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu a St. Petersburg, on en a meme I'assurance que I'Angleterre soutiendra la France.^ This assurance carries great weight, and has done not a little to give the upper hand to the war party.

The Russian Government has given free rein to all pro-Servian and anti-Austrian manifestations these past days. In the cabinet meeting early yesterday morning differences of opinion still existed, and the announcement of the mobilization was postponed. Since then a change has taken place; the war party has gained the upper hand, and today at four o'clock in the morning the mobilization was publicly announced.

The army believes itself strong and is full of enthusiasm. It bases its hopes on the remarkable progress it has made since the Japanese' war. The navy is still so far from the realization of its programme of reconstruction and reorganization that it really cannot be said to count. This was the reason which gave England's assurance of support so much weight.

As I had the honor of telegraphing (T. 10) you today, every hope of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished. This is the view of the diplomatic corps. For my telegram I chose the way via Stockholm by the Nordisk cable as safer than the other. This despatch I am entrusting to a private courier, who will mail it in Germany.

With the assurance of deepest respect, Mr. Secretary, I am,

(Signed) B. de l'Escaille.

The genuineness of this letter has apparently not been challenged by any of the Allies ; and the claim that Great Britain promised her support to France on July 30, that is, five days before the German infringement of neutrality, seems to be borne out* by a communication in the Nation (New York) of August 2y (republished in the official German Gazette). It was sent by the London correspondent of the Nation, Mr. Towse, under date of August 11, and claims (i), that Lord Kitchener had visited Belgium secretly some time before to make arrangements for an English army in Belgium; (2), that the British troops in large numbers had reached Dover a week before the date of the letter, that is, on August 3 or 4, and, (3), that he had heard that one hundred thousand soldiers had reached Belgium on August 4.

It is not claimed here that either the account of the Nation or the information contained in the Belgian diplomatic letter is true; and that the statements to the contrary, supposed to be contained in the official announcements of the British Government, are not true. But it is asserted that the Germans are not without excuse if they believe their government so long as Great Britain's reply is wanting to the ques-

* See also discussion of British Blue Book, Nezv York Times, " Current History of the European War," Vol. I, No. 3, p. 438 ft'.

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium? 9

tions : Why was she wilHng to protect Belgian neutrahty against French and Prussian infringement aUke in 1870, and why was she not wilUng to do so in 1914? And further, why do her pubhc men misrepresent the facts of 1870 as Lloyd George did in the speech quoted above?

As regards the German belief that France had planned making her attack through Belgium, it is based on such a long sequence of events, and on so many public expressions of her statesmen and publicists from Thiers down, who said that *' the valley of the Meuse is the proper road open for France in an attack against North Germany," that anyone acquainted with French political writings will agree that this fear was not without some basis of probability.'^

Belgian hostility, however, is of a more recent day, for in the nineties most Belgians feared France. It was even said that a secret treaty existed between King Leopold 11 and the German Emperor by which Belgium was to open her fortresses to the German troops in the event of a. war with France. All this has been changed in recent years, partly no doubt by the rapid growth of German control over the commerce of the country, partly possibly also by those traits of the German character which were formed when Germany was a cluster of insignificant inland states and which we have not yet entirely outgrown. But whatever was the cause of this hostility, every visitor to Belgium in recent years has felt it. It showed itself in an unusual way during the last inter-

* For French plan of campaign, see North German Gazette, Sept. 30, 1914; and for documents found on the Secretary of the British Legation in Brussels, see New York Times, April 4, 1915.

national exhibition in Brussels. The German commissioner, who was well aware of this animosity, worked especially hard, and as a matter of fact was the only one who had his exhibition ready on the opening day of the exposition. With somewhat mixed feelings, therefore, he read the official . account next day in U Independence Beige, which said that the Germans had opened their exhibit avec une precision brutale. There are not a few Germans who, in view of Mr. Gladstone's statements in Parliament and the special treaties of 1870, claim that the treaty of 1839 contains no " enforceable obligations," and who wish that the Chancellor had said so. But since he did not say so, his attitude apparently was that Germany "would gladly have respected the stipulations of the treaty of 1839, although they were, according to Mr. Gladstone himself, of doubtful validity, and entered Belgium only in self-defence when the peril of the nation seemed to demand this step.

None of these considerations, hov/ever, will carry much weight so long as the now famous "a scrap of paper " quotation seems to characterize the German attitude toward international treaties. Yet strange as it may seem, these words imputed to the Chancellor are as little known in Germany as the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag discussing the Belgian affair is known here. No greater contrast is possible than exists between the flippancy which compares a treaty to *'a scrap of paper," and the deep seriousness and honest regret at having been forced, in self-defence, to violate a treaty of neutrality, which characterizes the Chancellor's speech. It was this speech which swept away the old class and party distinctions and

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium? ii

brought about a unanimous vote of the Reichstag. It is on the strength of this speech that Germany has risen like one man in support of the Government. Let no man think that Germany would, or ever could, follow "a scrap of paper" chancellor.

The true history of this phrase may perhaps never be told. Sir Edward Goschen is quoted as having reported it from his interview with the Chancellor. According to this report the Chancellor was then deeply moved, almost unnerved at seeing his British friendly policy wrecked, and Germany menaced by three powerful and several minor foes. It is quite possible that he does not remember exactly what he said. Following a German custom, which in moments of excitement expresses itself in disconnected words, the Chancellor may have dropped a phrase which Sir Edward Goschen thought he was justified in translating as he did.

One other fact is also little known. The Chancellor had delivered his speech and received an ovation in the Reichstag such as even Bismarck had never received, several hours before his interview with the British ambassador. The British inquiry, in fact, whether Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, which led to the declaration of war on Germany, was presented to the German Government after the Chancellor had announced in the Reichstag that Germany had already been obliged to enter Belgium. To a German it appears incredible that the Chancellor with the enthusiastic approval of his fellowmen still ringing in his ears at the noble dignity of his address, should have meant to say to Sir Edward Goschen anything so flippant as the phrase "a scrap of paper"

implies. And when the curtain has dropped on the present tragedy, and more people see the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, as the Germans see him, a man of deep and serious thought, it will appear to many that Great Britain made a mistake in publishing this private conversation. Together Sir Edward Goschen and von Bethmann-Hollweg had labored to improve the British-German relations. They had failed. The Chancellor saw, open before him, the near future: streams of blood flowing, young men dying, sorrow and want, hatred sown between two nations who should be friends, and both countries tottering on the brink of ruin. Would it not have been charitable to draw the veil of secrecy over the words which at that moment fell from his lips in the presence of none but the one man who had been his friend in a common labor? Is it, moreover, credible that the other was so unmoved by the Chancellor's grief and the rupture of the relations between Great Britain and Germany that he could be sure of the exact words used in this conversation?

This explains why Germans would give little credence to the "scrap of paper" quotation, even if they heard it. It is the noble dignity of the speech they remember, and the generous offers Germany made and Great Britain felt obliged to refuse.

These offers (British Blue Book, No. 123) are little known in America, and yet their acceptance would have been of untold benefit to the United States and the whole world. Germany offered to respect Belgian neutrality and to guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies. If Sir Edward Grey had placed this offer before the British Cabinet, or had mentioned it

Did England Want a Neutral Belgium f 13

to the Prime Minister, or even had reported it to Parliament, the European war might have been avoided. He did none of these things, but on his own responsibihty refused to consider the offer. For a full discussion of this incident see Dr. F. C. Conybeare's letter in the Vital Issue of April 17, 19 15.

Chapter II

THE October number of the National Geographic Magazine closes an illustrated article on Germany with a brief reference to the constitution of the country. At least this is the impression which the general reader receives, for he does not distinguish between Germany and Prussia. The electoral system, however, described in the magazine is that of Prussia, while Germany, like America, enjoys manhood suffrage. This mistake is often made, and occurred also a few years ago when the Manchu dynasty in China decided to yield to the reform party and to introduce a semi-constitutional system of government. They sent a commission to Europe to study the workings of the several constitutions, and after an exhaustive investigation recommended that the new Chinese constitution be modeled after that of Germany. What was meant, however, was not the constitution of the German Empire, but that of the kingdom of Prussia, and most especially the Prussian suffrage, with its division of the people into three numerically unequal classes, which nevertheless cast an equal number of votes. The joke was that a reform intended to advance freedom should be based on a constitution which even in Germany is considered reactionary.

There can be no doubt that the antiquated constitution of Prussia has done the Germans much harm in the world at large. It has been often quoted in connection with Germany, and people have received from it the idea that the Germans are suffering from the inability of enforcing their will because they are living under an illiberal constitution. Nothing is farther from the truth. The German constitution of 1871 is a liberal document, based on universal suffrage.

It lacks the lucidity and beauty of diction and the simplicity of thought of the Constitution of the United States, for it is somewhat in the nature of a compromise between opposing conceptions of statecraft. Withal it is solidly built on the foundation of every liberal government — universal suffrage. And for this the Germans are indebted to the insistence of Bismarck.

The legislative power of Germany, which is a confederation of twenty-odd states, is vested in the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, that is, the Council of the Confederation. Bills that have received a majority of the votes cast in each house are to be promulgated as law by the Emperor, who has no power of veto.

The Reichstag is by all odds the most important factor of the Legislature of the confederation known as the German Empire. It is elected by universal manhood suffrage " in a general election and by direct secret ballot" (Article 20). In it the union of Germany has found its most complete expression, and, according to Article 2g>, every member is bound to regard himself as the representative of the people as a whole and not only of his immediate constituents. In pursuance of this conception every German is entitled to vote at the parliamentary elections in any place in which he happens to reside. A citizen of Saxony, for instance, who is spending the season in Munich, Bavaria, may cast his vote there, and a Bavarian visiting in Berlin is entitled to cast his ballot in Berlin. No other provision probably could have brought home to the Germans the idea of national union so forcibly as this obliteration of narrowly defined State lines.

In the elections the constitution and the special laws provided by Article 20 recognize only absolute majorities. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in a district the voters proceed to another ballot, which is a continuation of the previous one and therefore necessitates no new election machinery. At this supplementary ballot only the two candidates who had previously received the largest number of votes are eligible. If there is a tie, the election is decided by lot, drawn by the chairman of the election commissioners, in the presence of the other members.

Finally it is interesting to note that the candidate need not be a resident of the district in which he offers himself for election. If the majority of the voters anywhere believe that there is no specially qualified man in their district they can vote for any German, wherever he may reside, who satisfies their requirements. This provision has done much to raise the general tone of the Reichstag, and has enabled country districts to send strong representatives to Parliament.

The powers of the Legislature are determined by Article 4 of the constitution. They are practically the

The German Constitution ly same as those granted to Congress by Article i, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. The most important of these powers have to do with the laying of taxes, duties and the Hke, with the legislation concerning their collection and the regulation of commerce (Congress can control interstate commerce only) ; further, with the coinage and issue of loans on the credit of the country, and with the right of citizenship, naturalization and absolute freedom of action of the individual citizen beyond his obedience owed to existing laws. In several cases the powers of the Reichstag and the Bundesrat are broader than those of Congress, for they have charge not only of the post offices and post roads, but also of telegraph afifairs, railways, and canals, and, in addition, of the " Police Regulations as to Medical and Veterinary Matters " in all the states of the confederation. Instead "of merely having the power of Congress " to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," the German Reichstag and Bundesrat are charged with passing " uniform legislation as to the whole domain of civil and criminal law, including legal procedure." They have acted according to this paragraph, and today Germany enjoys a uniformity of legal procedure in every one of its twenty-six states which is the surest pledge of justice to all the citizens.