What Germany wants

Front matter

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Book

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Contents

A Personal Foreword I. What Germany Wants II. Alsace - Lorraine

III. The German Emperor

IV. The Past .

Chapter I

In moments of great stress, when horror at terrible agonies strikes deep into the souls of men, their overwrought nerves need an outlet somewhere. Those friends of Germany who see in the spontaneous outburst against that land only hatred, ignorance, and prejudice, do not know America. If Americans could not give vent to their pent-up emotions by joining in the headliner's righteous indignation at the less harrowing concomitants of war, such as the burning of a city, but were obliged to think of war itself, of the " poor devils " dying in the ditches, of the machine guns w^iping out with a few turns of the crank the youths of an entire village; if they were forced to think of the wounded over whose maimed bodies the battles are raging, or of those who are forgotten and alone, they would not be Americans, warm-hearted and quick of sympathy, if they could stand it.

Underneath all this seeming bluster and seeming bitterness the real American, even he of German descent, detects the desire of all classes to be fair to the contestants. This appeared very clearly in the advice of prominent men publicly offered in the early days of the v^ar, to the effect that America should distinguish between the Kaiser and the German people. Later it was found that no such distinction could be made because the agreement between the German people and the Emperor had never been closer than it was in the early days of August, 19 14, and is today.

Many friends of Germany, in their eagerness to plead her cause, have added to the general confusion by attacking the sincerity of her opponents. As if a course could be made righteous by the mere fact that there was unrighteousness also on the other side. This argument is useless in America, where people are convinced that Heaven does not always employ angels only to carry out its purposes.

Paul Rohrbach, a well-known German publicist, has stated the case very well, when he said to his countrymen two years ago : " We need not disguise the fact from ourselves that in many parts of the world we are less liked than, for instance, the English or the French. People will say how can this be possible, since both England and France have often been guilty of violence and insolence in their dealings with weaker nations? This is true, but the more important fact is also true, that powerful cultural influences have emanated from both countries, and have been gratefully felt in the whole world. Many people therefore possess a vivid picture of what the English and the French people have done for the culture of the world while few have any similar feeling toward Germany. Individual citizens of foreign states who have made our acquaintance or whose education enables them to appreciate even without such an acquaintance the German contributions to the general culture of the world, will no doubt do justice to our achievements, but nations as such are little acquainted with each other, and are hardly able to judge one another objectively and fairly. It is therefore not at all astonishing that the younger people of the western hemisphere, whose states have recently been formed, and the older states of Asia, who are gradually leaving their seclusion of thousands of years, should know little more of us than our most recent accomplishments since the foundations of the German Empire. Our former achievements, such as the liberation of the human mind in the age of the Reformation, the part we played in the literature of the world from the middle of the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, and the foundation of the philosophy of ideas, these are all matters which people of average cultivation do not understand. What people do know is this — forty years ago the Germans suddenly rose from an existence which was insignificant both economically and politically to one of great strength; they fought for and won the rank of a world power, and have since created a mighty army; they have tremendously increased their commerce and their industries, and have built ships; and they have now also begun to demand consideration for their interests in the world at large."

Friends of Germany should be grateful for every American who knows Germany better than Rohrbach here implies — and there are many — and should endeavor to supply all the others with information from which to form a correct picture of the fatherland.

England is pretty well understood here; not a saint by any means forgetful of her own interests, but on the whole drawing nearer all the time to the moral perfection which her leaders proclaim, and advancing the civilization of the world in a way that America can understand.

France, once the mistress of the world and still holding a preeminent place, is dear to Americans because of the charm of her language, her art, her good taste, the courtesy of her people, her form of government, and the help she gave America in her War of Independence.

Russia is very little known, although her literature, her art, and her music are constant topics of study and conversation. As a country she is felt to be a power with which the world has to reckon. She is, she was, and she will be.

Whoever, therefore, is to blame for the actual outbreak of this war, the belief is widely held that Germany and her aspirations were directly or indirectly responsible for it. It can be freely admitted that there are aspects of the situation under which such an interpretation is possible, and it is therefore at this point that the question arises, What does Germany want?

This is the really important question and one which it should not be impossible to answer. It differs therefore from others which it would seem futile to propose at present for only the future will be able to decide whether Germany, or Russia, or perhaps Great Britain, could have avoided the war; whether the Allies or the Germans are responsible for the atrocities mentioned in the papers, or whether, perhaps, both should be acquitted from the charges of unnecessary brutality. To a certain extent the facts are not yet available, and to a certain extent the perfectly natural bias of the several editors — they would not be human if they could refrain from taking sides — presents the facts in such a way that the careful reader must refuse to form his opinion only on what he reads. On September 28, for instance, one paper contained this item under the caption " A Detestable Form of Warfare " : " Can anyone doubt what would have been the answer of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, or Grant, had it been proposed to them to drop bombs into the throng of Sunday promenaders of a city not besieged or invested? . . . These great generals bombarded cities whose inmates had to take the chances of war. But there is a distinction between bombardment and bomb dropping under such conditions as governed the practice in Paris yesterday." Another daily referred to exactly the same incident as follows : " The dramatic event of yesterday was the attack on the Eiffel Tower by a German aircraft which suddenly appeared high above Paris and made four unsuccessful attempts from a great height to wreck this well-known landmark. It would have been a pretty coup had it succeeded, as it would have cut off wireless communication between France and Russia, a thing which the Germans no doubt are very desirous of accomplishing. The casualties resulting from this unsuccessful attack were small. The accounts differ as to whether there were any fatalities or not. In some a man and a child were killed, in others only injured."

Which account should a man in search of the truth believe ? Did the Germans wish to destroy the Eiffel Tower with its powerful wireless station and was the resulting injury to the civilian bystanders one of the unavoidable chances of war? Or did the Germans, in fiendish brutality, drop bombs on a throng of .Sunday promenaders, using the Eiffel Tower as a pretext ? Unless the reader has a previous knowledge of the character of the German people which makes the one or the other account probable, he is at a loss, since the proof of the accuracy of either report is obviously impossible at present.

The character of the German people, however, will be fairly well established when their aspirations are known and an answer is given to the question. What does Germany want?

Some people may feel that a satisfactory answer has been supplied by such books as Germany and the Next War, by General von Bernhardi, and Pan-Germanism by Professor Roland G. Usher. Since the German, Bernhardi, and the American, Usher, are said to be in substantial agreement, and the present war, in general, seems to follow Bernhardi's prophecies, it is natural that these two writers should seem to be correct. >

The conclusions which the reading public has drawn from them are briefly these: Germany, drunk with her material successes of the recent past and trusting in the strength of her huge army, has formed the plan of conquering the world. She has nailed to her mast Madame de Stael's motto " The patriotism of nations ought to be selfish ", and recognizes no other law than that of brute force. The present war marks a step in her well-planned scheme. If successful, she will annex Belgium and Holland, humiliate France, try to despoil Great Britain of her navy and her colonies, push Russia back towards Asia, and establish, together with Austria, a huge Balkan empire which will open for her a way to Egypt and India. Just what will become of Italy and Spain is not quite clear for, without resting on her laurels, Germany will turn her eyes unto the western hemisphere and make war on the United States of America.

Although few readers believe that Germany will succeed in the first step of this career they see nothing improbable in Professor Usher's presentation, for, whom the gods would destroy they first make mad, and Germany is riding for a fall.

Those who know Germany do not agree with Professor Usher, but then — that is their opinion against his. Unfortunately for his argument Mr. Usher has added to his book a bibliography which at least casts doubts on the impartiality of his judgment for it shows that he consulted many British journals, the Encyclopcudia Britannica, nth Edition, six British books, three French books, and not a single German book, while he says of a volume of essays by British and German statesmen " They do not afford much information." He thus leaves us in doubt as to the sources and contexts of those German writings on which he has obviously drawn in support of his own theory. They would seem to be taken largely from the writings of a so-called Pan- Germanic league which Mr. Usher himself considers of insufficient importance to deserve mention in his bibliography.

Nobody can deny that there may be persons in Germany holding the views attributed to the German nation by Mr. Usher, and that some British publicists have frightened their countrymen into regarding the Germans as dangerous madmen.

It is more difficult to prove that General von Bernhardi also does not adequately represent the Germans. Since the war began he and his writings have jumped into public notice, and in a much quoted interview (September 27, 19 14) President David Starr Jordan, of Leland Stanford University, relates that he heard Bernhardi lecture in San Francisco on May 25, 1913:

" He had been on a tour round the world, stopping at places where there were Germans, and giving lectures under the official support of the consuls of the Empire, and with the respective consuls presiding in the chair."

At that time the author was the president of the Bostoner Deutsche Gesellschaft, a society of about six hundred members, Americans, Germans, and Frenchmen, interested in all phases of German culture. He was constantly on the lookout for speakers of prominence and was in close touch with the Germanistic Society of America. The German consul in Boston was a member of the governing board of the Gesellschaft and so were several professors of the neighborhood whose intimate relations with the German Government are well-known. The German Ambassador was an honorary member of the Gesellschaft. Bernhardi's name was not brought to the attention of the lecture committee through any one of these channels, which proves that his writings meant little or nothing to the Germans of New England. Their number may be comparatively small but since most of them have home ties in Germany it would seem that also there Bernhardi was not the man of the hour he is believed to have been.

As a matter of fact, Bernhardi's book did not voice the popular sentiment of Germany, for

Bernhardi himself said in his introduction : " In striking contrast to this military aptitude [of the Germans] they have today become a peace-loving — an almost too peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength," These words were written in October, 191 1, and no rude shock came to awaken the German nation from pursuing its ways of peace until August, 19 14.

The reason why Bernhardi's book, Germany and the Next War, did not make a greater stir was that such books ^ are by no means rare in Europe. Written by military men, they are often altogether technical, as for instance General von Bernhardi's other great book War Today, and when they touch upon social and political matters they are often so extreme that people do not acknowledge them as true.

In the same year 191 1 a French officer, Colonel Arthur Boucher, published a book entitled La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain (France Victorious in the Next War) ; and even more remarkable was La Guerre de Demain (The Next War) by M. Keller, published September 10, 1 89 1, in which not only the invasion

1 For a very similar book presenting the British view see The Day of the Saxon, by Homer Lea, in which Great Britain is urged first to attack and to destroy Germany^ and then to attack Russia. For extracts from this book see Appendix B.

^■^f but also the final annexation of Belgium by France was outlined. These designs on the neutrality of Belgium induced Charles Woeste, ex- Minister of Justice, to write his eloquent book La Neutralite Beige (Brussels, 1891).

While the two French books mentioned and their discussions of tactical problems may have been carefully studied by the French General Staff nobody would be rash enough to claim that they were representative of the aspirations of the French people. The same is true of Bernhardi's book published under a similar title. In so far as his advice is strategically good it will probably be followed by the German army; but it will, on reflection, hardly be doubted that Bernhardi neither spoke for the Germans as such, nor that his book had any influence on the people as a whole.

If, then, Pan-Germanism is not what Germany wants what was the purpose of her huge armaments which brought her to the brink of bankruptcy, as has been claimed, and made an " armed camp " of her country?

Strangely enough neither of these assertions,

• both of which have been readily believed outside

of Germany, is true. On June 16, 19 14, Mr.

Edgar Crammond read a paper ^ before the

^ Printed in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , July, 1914.

Royal Statistical Society in London on The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires, and stated that " the debt of the Imperial German Government and the German Federal Governments amounted to 1,028,600,000 pounds, or £15.16.8 per head of the population, while the debt of the United Kingdom amounted to 747,750,000 pounds, or £16.10.0 per head of the population." In the ensuing discussion, in which Lord Welby, Sir George Paish and others took part, it was brought out by Mr. J. Ellis Barker that " In Germany there was on balance no national debt, because the assets of the State were considerably greater than all the State and National Debts combined." These assets consist of the State railways, forests, mines, salt works, and so forth. While therefore the National Debt of the United Kingdom amounts to £16.10.0 (about $80.00) per head of the population, there is in Germany a balance on the credit side, the assets being larger than the liabilities. No figures of the actual size of this balance are available. A country, however, which makes such a favorable showing on the figures presented by its greatest rival can by no stretch of the imagination be called bankrupt, and with this, one of the causes of the war frequently mentioned by the " man on the street " is seen to be fictitious. Germany did not go to war because " she had spent on her armaments as much as her credit would stand ", nor because " she would have to disarm unless she could retrieve her fortunes by an enormous indemnity to be paid to her after a successful war."

As regards the statement that Germany had made an armed camp of the country, and that this state of affairs had become unbearable, it should be noted that the regular term of service of her soldiers was two years and of all young men of some education only one year, while more young men of the proper age presented themselves annually than could be used in the army. At the outbreak of the present war more than one million men, many of them not previously trained in the army, volunteered their services, and early in September the Government was obliged to announce that for the present no more men could be enlisted.

Compare this with the conditions in other European countries, where, in some instances, all able-bodied young men had to serve in the army not only one or two but three years. Remember, also, the tens of thousands of German reservists on furlough in every part of the globe, and unable to return home at this time, and you will readily see that the picture of Germany as an armed camp is overdrawn. Germans, moreover, do not look upon the one or two years they spend in the army as so much time wasted but as an invaluable training. They would agree with Dr. Levi M. Powers, who wrote in the Gloucester Times, September 12, 1914: "The German boy at sixteen or seventeen is a spindled-shanked prig. By the time the army is through with him he is physically the best developed man of Europe, democratised by contact with all classes. Because of her army Germany is a nation physically disciplined, and taught as no other people the value and meaning of law and order."

This brings us to the point, so often overlooked outside of Germany, that the German army is a Citizen Army existing for the defence of the fatherland. When its constituent units are not in commission they are in commerce throughout the world basing their commercial actions on peaceful international relations, which are best expressed by the lengthy terms of their business contracts with citizens of other nations.

Since Germany started on her industrial development she has never desired war. Her aggressiveness has been solely commercial, and commercial aggressiveness and military aggressiveness are mutually destructive.

Germany wants to keep the confines of her home-land inviolate but is not desirous of joining to them new lands of unwilling people.

She wants to develop her colonies and invest her money in the building of extra-territorial railways which will ultimately bring her into relation with new markets.

She wants to develop her home commerce and industry, and increase the usefulness of her agriculture that she may give employment to a population growing at the rate of about a million a year. There has been no balance of emigration from Germany for many years.

Over and above these desires she has the very natural and proper ambition to be worthy of her great past and to make her own contributions to the civilization of the world. She wants social justice, and she wishes to remove from her laboring classes the ills of poverty.

Germany wants peace, for in peace only can she do what she has set out to do. She wants an honorable and a stable peace, and in so far as the defects of her character have been contributory causes to misunderstandings she wishes to eradicate these defects. She desires the goodwill of the world.

CHAPTER 11

ALSACE - LORRAINE

Contrary to the general belief Bismarck is said to have regretted more than anyone the necessity of taking Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871. It is true that these provinces had belonged to Germany from the time of the division of Charlemagne's empire in 843 to 1648, when Germany, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War and torn by internal dissensions, was forced to cede the greater part of them to France ; Strassburg and the surrounding territory was seized by Louis XIV in time of peace in 1681. The people of Alsace are almost entirely of German stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from the name of which the French name for Germany, Allemagne, is derived. That their native speech is German will appear even to the uninitiated from such names as Miilhausen, Breisach, Strassburg, Weissenburg, Saarburg, etc. Similarly, the population of Lorraine is for the most part closely related to that of the adjoining part of Prussia.^

* H. C. G. von Jagemann, The Outlook, September 16, 1914.

In spite of this Bismarck foresaw that France would not rest while she could hope some day to regain these provinces. The very peace, therefore, which concluded the Franco-Prussian war laid the foundation of another war in the future. This was a heavy price to pay, but without Alsace and Lorraine the South German States felt unable to join the federation of the German Empire. Bismarck therefore yielded and gave his reasons in a speech delivered May 2, 187 1. He pointed out that there had not been " a generation of our fathers for three hundred years which had not been forced to draw the sword against France ", and that after the successful war of 1870 it had become our duty to take steps against similar attacks. The first step was the federation of the German States in the German Empire, which, owing to the then existing geographical and strategic frontier, was impossible of fulfillment without the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck says, " I cannot describe our condition, and especially that of South Germany, better than with the words of a thoughtful South German sovereign, the late King William of Wiirtemberg, who said to me, 'The crux of the situation is Strassburg; for as long as Strassburg is not German, South Germany will be unable to give herself unreservedly to German unity and a national German

ALSACE - LORRAINE 19

policy. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever-ready army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, Germany finds herself unable to appear on the upper Rhine with an equally numerous army on time. The French will always be here first.' I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says everything. I need not add one word."

Bismarck then discusses the suggestion, which had been offered, of making a neutral State of these provinces, similar to those of Belgium and Switzerland, so that there would have been a chain of neutral states from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps. He points out the impracticability of this plan for several reasons but especially because " neutrality can only be maintained when the inhabitants are determined to preserve an independent and neutral position. This supposition would not be true in the immediate future for the neutrality of Alsace and Lorraine. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the strong French elements which will survive in the country for a long while will induce the people to unite with France in the case of another Franco-German war. The neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been merely a sham working harm for us and benefits for France. Nothing was left, therefore, but to bring both these countries with their strong fortresses completely under German control. It was our purpose to establish them as a powerful bulwark in Germany's defence against France, and to move the starting-point of a possible French attack several days marches farther back."

Germany heartily concurred in Bismarck's conclusion and has ever since believed that her possession of these two provinces is necessary for her safety. For France, however, their loss was of great sentimental moment. The statue of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde in Paris has been draped in mourning forty-three years, and France has made no secret of her intense desire to regain possession of these provinces. It is idle to deny that all advances to a better understanding between Germany and France have failed on that account, and this in spite of the sincere friendship which has drawn individual Frenchmen and Germans together, especially when they have met in foreign lands. Germany could not be safe without Alsace- Lorraine, and France would not be happy while she mourned their loss.

This feeling in France, moreover, has been artificially fanned by a small part of the Alsatian press and most of the French press, who have tried to make the world believe that the inhabitants of these provinces wished to return

ALSACE - LORRAINE 21

to French rule. How ill-founded this appeal to French chivalry was appears from the letter written to the presiding officer of the Reichstag under date of August 5, 19 14, by the Alsatian representative in the German Reichstag, Dr. Ricklin. Dr. Ricklin is also the speaker of the second chamber of the Alsatian legislature. The letter, translated, reads:

Dear Mr. Speaker: Please excuse my absence from the Reichstag. I started for Berlin Sunday night, August 2, but was taken ill suddenly and had to return to Carspach-Sonnenberg. I regret my absence from the Reichstag very much because I should have liked to take the opportunity of expressing there in the name of my constituents my regret and deep sorrow at the political difficulties which have arisen. The idea of war between Germany and France is so terrible and awful for us people in Alsace- Lorraine that we hardly dare to think of it. We do not want a war between Germany and France at any cost, certainly not for the sake of altering our political position. People who have spread a different view among the French and have thereby fanned the French thoughts of war, are traitors to our people and have drawn upon themselves the curses of thousands of Alsace-Lorraine people, fathers, mothers, and wives, who with bleeding hearts must see their sons and husbands go into the most terrible of all wars.

To the last we hoped that we might be spared the terrors of a war between Germany and France, and even now our people refuse to give up hope. If, however, God has decreed differently, well — then the Alsace-Lorraine people too will do their whole duty and they will do it without a single reservation.

The rules of the Reichstag do not permit a representative to vote by mail, but I have the right to inform you, Mr. Speaker, that I should have voted, if I had been present, in favor of all the bills which the present state of affairs demanded, including the bill granting the necessary funds for carrying on the war.

You have the right, Mr. Speaker, to make any use you choose of this letter. With the expression of great respect I am very sincerely yours, (signed) Dr Ricklin, member of the Reichstag.

This letter proves the accuracy of Bismarck's prophecy that in time and by patience the hostility of the people of Alsace-Lorraine would be overcome. " For we have," he said, " many means at our disposal. We Germans are accustomed to govern more benevolently, sometimes more awkwardly, but in the long run really more benevolently and humanely than the French statesmen. We are, moreover, able to grant the inhabitants a far greater degree of communal and individual freedom than the French institutions and traditions ever permitted." This has been done and the loyalty of these prov-

ALSACE - LORRAINE 23

inces in the present crisis is undoubtedly due to the amount of communal and individual freedom which they have enjoyed under German rule, and which is far in excess of the amount of liberty granted Ireland under the recent Home Rule Bill, or enjoyed by any French province or municipality.

Added, therefore, to her firm belief that Alsace and Lorraine are necessary for her safety, Germany has felt the need of -defending her latest countrymen in the possession of their individual and communal freedom, possible for them only under German rule.

Germany knew that France had not abated her desire to possess herself of these provinces, for like an honorable opponent France had never disguised her expectations in this matter. When France, therefore, mobilized her troops after war had been declared between Germany and Russia — to which latter country she was bound by a defensive, and possibly an offensive alliance — war between France and Germany became a certainty, especially when France declared that she could give no assurances of peace, but would do what her interests demanded.