Truth and error : a study in critical logic / by Aloysius J. Rother

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A STUDY IN CRITICAL LOGIC

BY ALOYSIUS J. ROTHER, S.J.

Professor of Philosophy in St. Louis University

ST. LOUIS, MO., 1914

Published by B. Herder

17 South Broadway

FREIBURG (BADEN) I LONDON, W. C.

IMPRIMI POTEST

Praep. Prov.

NIHIL OBSTAT

Sti. Ludovici, die 17. Nov. 1913

IMPRIMATUR

Sti. Ludovici, die 18. Nov. 1913

Copyright, 1914

by

Joseph Gummersbach

All rights reserved Made in U. S. A.

INTRODUCTION,

Truth is the goal of the intellect as well as its perfection and ornament. In spite of this there are philosophers who maintain the inability of the intellect to attain truth and make bold to deny the very existence of truth. Their systems are known by various names, such as: skepticism, idealism, relativism, pragmatism. In refutation of these systems and in defense of the rights of reason, the schoolmen have developed a special science which they call " Critical Logic."

The purpose of this science is threefold: to examine and demonstrate the nature of truth, to vindicate the ability of the intellect to attain truth, and to establish the criterion for distinguishing truth from error.

The following treatise on " Truth and Error " is submitted as an exposition of the first of these three purposes.

Special stress has been laid on the positive doctrine, and many unnecessary controversies have been dispensed with in the hope of assisting the earnest student to a clear understanding of the foundations of knowledge.

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Contents

PAGE

Introduction - . . . . iii

CHAPTER x

CHAPTER FIRST Introductory Notions

Summary: Purport of treatise — Definition of truth — Division of truth into ontological, logical and moral — Moral truth and propositional truth compared — Truth used metaphorically — Truth contrasted with its opposite, falsity — Truth an analogical concept — Truth of knowledge, truth properly so called — Thesis — Proof — Some subsidiary terms explained — Apprehension — Idea —

Notion and Concept — Subjective and objective concept — Corollary — Material object and formal object of an idea — Difference between idea and phantasm — An objection answered — Judgment defined — Essence of judgment determined — Division of judgments into immediate and mediate, analytical and synthetical — Proposition — Return to main topic.

I. Purport of Treatise. The treatise we are about to present is inscribed " Truth and Error." The truth here discussed is logical truth or truth of knowledge. For truth in contradistinction to error always designates the truth of knowledge.

2. Definition of Truth. Truth in general

is described as " conformity between thought and thing." The accuracy of this definition is best shown by what is known as the " analytical process." In this process (fully set forth in Dialectics) we first consider the objects to which the notion whose definition is sought can be applied ; then, disregarding what is peculiar to each of these objects we disentangle the element common to all. This common element constitutes the definition desired. Thus if I wish to find the definition, say of " man," by this method, I place before my mind the different races of men, Caucasians, Indians, Negroes, Malays, and Mongolians, and then suppressing in whatever they differ, retain only what belongs to all, viz. : animality and rationality. In this manner I come to know that " man " is a rational animal, and this is the definition of "man." We shall now employ the same method of procedure in the case of truth.

Truth, according to its ordinary acceptation, is a term of the broadest application. It is applied to things as well as to the mental and oral expression of these things. Here are a few instances typical of this diversity of usage. " William is a true friend of mine " ; " My idea of God is true " ; " The words this witness has just spoken, are true."

In all these examples, the adjective "true" is

Introductory Notions g

used to indicate that there exists some sort of conformity between thought and thing. " Conformity between thought and thing " is then the general definition of truth.

To make this definition clearer, we shall submit the sentences just given to an analysis. What do I mean when I call William a true friend of mine? I mean that his sentiments and conduct towards me correspond to my conception or idea of " friend " and " friendship." And when I ascribe truth to my ideas and judgments, what do I intend to express? Nothing else except that they are conformable to reality. And lastly, why do I say that a witness speaks the truth or that his words are true ? I do so because his utterances accord with his (subjective) judgments regarding the matter about which he gives me information.

Thus it becomes manifest that truth always implies some sort of correspondence between thought and thing. This is sufficiently evident as regards the first two instances given. For in the first instance the conformity of William to my idea of friend and in the second instance, the conformity of one of my ideas to God plainly denote correspondence between thought and thing.

It is needless to point out that when we oppose thought to thing we use " thing" in a restricted sense, namely as contradistinguished from the mere expression or representation of something; for taking thing in its broadest signification, it includes thought.

But how does the third sort of conformity — namely the conformity between the spoken word and the (subjective) judgment in a person's mind — tally with our general definition of truth? What corresponds to "thing" here? Perhaps the " spoken word "? But how can the " spoken word " be regarded as a " thing " any more than " thought " since it is likewise merely the expression or a sign of something else? To this we reply that words can be looked upon as things in so far as they stand for things, and so they must be taken in our present discussion, since there can be no resemblance between the material word and the idea but only between the object signified by the word and the idea. Hence conformity of speech (or words) with thought must be understood to be conformity of speech as expressive of things with thought. Consequently, it is correct to say that truth in general is " conformity between thought and thing."

3. Division of Truth into Ontological, Logical, and Moral. We now pass to the classification of truth. Truth is threefold, namely, ontological, logical, and moral. The meaning and correctness of this division will become readily apparent if we examine a little more closely into the examples given above.

When I say, " This man is a ' true ' or ' genuine ' friend/' I mean that he combines in himself all that goes to make up my idea of " friend " ; in other words, that his sentiments and conduct are in conformity with this idea. It is plain that in this instance " true " indicates the correspondence of a reality or thing (a person in the case cited) with an idea; and this is what is called " ontological " truth or truth of " being " ; it is defined as " correspondence of thing with thought." Now this correspondence may be twofold according as a thing is compared with an idea as a pattern which it imitates or as a standard by which it is judged or estimated. Thus a vein of yellow metal in a rock is said to be " true " gold in respect to the Divine idea because it has been patterned after a conception in God's mind. The mine-owner, on the other hand, pronounces the glittering streak of precious metal " true " gold because he knows what gold is and because he finds that the newly discovered vein imbedded in the wall of his mine exactly answers to his conception of gold. He uses his conception as a standard by which to gage the object under consideration.

The other example which we gave to illustrate the general notion of truth was, " My ideas regarding a certain matter are true." A little reflection will show us that here we have to do with a species of truth different from ontological. For I call my ideas true because they are conformable to things, and not because things are conformable to them. This kind of con- / formity is named logical truth or truth of knowledge and may be defined as " conformity of thought with thing or of knowledge with the object known."

We would remark here that though the definitions of ontological and logical truth seem to be alike — the terms of comparison " thing " and " thought " being the same in both — they are by no means identical. For in defining ontological truth, "thing" is the subject of the relation between thing and thought, and " thought " - the term, while in defining logical truth the reverse is the case. Again, thing and thought fulfil altogether different functions in each of the two cases. For in logical truth, the thing known produces or gages my perception of it whereas in ontological truth, the thing is produced, gaged, or estimated according to the idea to which it is compared. Thus when I say, " The judgment, David was a hero, is logically true," I regard the Jewish king's heroism, namely his physical prowess and nobility of soul, as determining or giving rise to this judgment. But when I affirm, " King David is a true

Introductory Notions J

hero/' I gage or estimate the genuineness of his heroism according to my idea of a hero.

We may confirm the foregoing statement as to the difference between ontological and logical truth by a short quotation from St. Thomas. 1 He says : " Similitudo rei cognitae dupliciter est in cognoscente, uno modo sicut causata a re . . . alio modo sicut causa rei, ut patet in artifice, qui cognoscit artificiatum per illam formam, per quam ipsum fecit." This passage may be rendered thus : " The likeness of the object known is in the mind in a twofold manner; namely either as caused by the object ... or else as the cause of the object: the latter we see in the case of the artist who knows the work of art he is producing by the conception which guides him in making it."

The above discussion shows that the relations between thought and thing in the definitions of ontological and logical truth are as different as are those of father to son and son to father.

We now come to the consideration of the third example given before, namely, " The words of this witness are true," " He speaks the truth." When I say this I do not want to denote either correspondence of thing with thought, nor of thought with thing, but what I want to signify is, that the speech or the words of the witness express his mind or are conformed to what he judges in regard to the matter to which he bears testimony. Such conformity between speech and subjective judgment is called moral truth. One whose utterances are habitually in accord with his beliefs, whether right or wrong, is called truthful. It is for this reason that this kind of truth is characterized as " moral." For the employment of language expressing the hidden thoughts of the mind depends upon the proper exercise of our free will, and hence constitutes a praiseworthy or moral action.

4. Moral Truth and Prepositional Truth Compared. Moral truth must not, however, be confounded with the truth of a proposition. For a proposition is said to be true when it expresses a judgment conformable to reality, whereas moral truth or truth of speech consists in this that my words — which, of course, will likewise take the form of a proposition — set forth a judgment I have formed of something, regardless of the fact whether this judgment is in itself true or false.

5. Truth Used Metaphorically. The word " true " ds also frequently employed metaphorically without any distinct reference to thought, as when an officer is said to be true to his charge, or a patriot true to his country, or a copy a true likeness of the original. But a little reflection will show that even here the word " true " is used on account of some sort of conformity or correspondence of one thing to another as to its rule, standard, or pattern. Hence " true " in all the aforenamed significations bears at least some analogy to the same word taken strictly.

6. Truth Contrasted with Its Opposite Falsity. A little additional light might be thrown on the definition of truth by offsetting it with the definition of its opposite, falsity. Since truth is conformity between thought and thing, its contrary or opposite is, of course, want of conformity or rather discrepancy between thought and thing. Like truth, it is either ontological, logical, or moral, according as thing is at variance with thought, or thought with thing, or speech with the speaker's private judgment.

Here it should be further noted that logical and moral falsity have received special names, the former being called error and the latter, a lie or falsehood.

From these remarks we infer that logical truth may be accompanied by moral falsity, as when one knows that he is chargeable with theft, but denies his guilt. Again, there may be moral truth and logical falsity in regard to the same thing; and this always happens when one is mistaken about something and asserts his mistaken views in good faith. It is also possible that logical and moral falsity should go together ; such would be the case if a person at the same time erred in respect to some fact and asserted jo Truth and Error^

the contrary of what he thought Suppose a young man who has been kidnaped in his childhood were to give himself out as the son of his real parents thinking, however, that he was practicing deceit, he would at the same time be mistaken and tell a lie.

7. Truth an Analogical Concept. The preceding considerations show that the concept " truth " is applied to thing, thought, and speech in a meaning partly the same and partly different. For the three classes of truth all imply conformity between thought and thing; but the kind of conformity is different in each as an examination of their definitions will readily reveal. Hence the concept of truth is what is called an " analogous " concept, that is, a concept which is affirmed of the classes contained under it in a signification partly the same and partly different.

8. Truth of Knowledge Truth Properly So^ called. We are now done with the division of truth into its three kinds, viz., ontological, logical, and moral, or, truth of being, truth of knowledge, and truth of speech. The question now arises, to which of these three kinds of truth is the term " truth " most properly applied.

For the sake of greater clearness and emphasis we shall state the answers to all leading questions in the form of theses or propositions.

Introductory Notions II

THESIS m

The name " TRUTH " belongs primarily to truth of knowledge.

9. Proof. What we wish to say when we make this statement is, that, according to common usage, truth is ascribed first and foremost to mental acts, and to things and speech only in a secondary sense by reason of their resemblance to truth of thought. In other words, all we maintain «is, that the principal and ordinary signification of " truth " is logical truth, just as the principal meaning of the word " sharp " is, " having a thin edge or fine point/' although it is also taken in a number of other senses more or less connected with the principal one. Now dictionaries are generally the best authorities to determine the common usage of words. Let us then turn to one of the best of them, the Century Dictionary. This dictionary — and with it all the others of any completeness are in substantial agreement — arranges the meanings of truth in this order:

(a) Conformity of thought with fact, conformity of a judgment, statement, or belief with reality.

(b) The state of being made true or exact; exact conformity to model, rule, or plan; accuracy of adjustment.

(c) (In the fine arts.) The proper or correct representation of an object in nature. . . .

(d) Veracity, truthfulness . . .

Now the first of these definitions describes logical, and the second, ontological truth; the third refers to one of the metaphorical acceptations of truth, and the fourth relates to moral truth.

We shall now confirm the verdict of the dictionaries by the authority of St. Thomas, who, let it be noticed in passing, has been particularly lauded for his concise and exact definitions of terms.

We will make Sir William Hamilton our spokesman and thus at the same time corroborate by the eminent Scotch philosopher's sanction what we assert to be the prevailing signification of the term under consideration. He says : 1 " All admit that by truth is understood an agreement, or correspondence between our thought and that which we think about. This definition we owe to the schoolmen. ' Veritas intellectus,' says Aquinas, ' est adaequatio intellects et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, et non esse quod non est/ "

It will be well to subjoin another quotation from St. Thomas more directly to the point. He writes : 2 " Veritas proprie est in solo intel-

1 Logic 27.

2 Sum. Theo., p. i f q. 16, a. 8.

Introductory Ndtions 13

lectu; res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo intellectu," that is to say, " Truth is properly in the intellect alone; things are called true by reason of the truth which is in some intellect."

Logical truth or truth of knowledge then is truth properly so called; things and speech are styled true only in a secondary or analogous sense, as bearing a certain resemblance to truth of knowledge. At present our concern is with truth of knowledge. The truth of words and propositions, technically known as " the truth of the sign" 1 (sc. of logical truth), is likewise considered here. It is plain that truth is ascribed to words and propositions by way of metonymy. For this figure of speech names the sign after the thing signified.

10. Some Subsidiary Terms Explained. But before we go any further, a short digression will be of service in order to explain a few terms of frequent occurrence in these pages, to wit, the terms apprehension, idea, concept, notion, and judgment.

11. Apprehension. Apprehension in philosophical language has a variety of meanings. It is applied not only to acts of the intellect, but also to those of the sensitive faculties, especially of the imagination. Thus the Century Dictionary tells us that apprehension has been

1 Cf. Vocabulary of Philosophy bv W. Fleming, under "Truth."

used to express intellection in general, cognition, understanding, conception, attention, memory, imagination, formerly emotion or sensibility." In this treatise apprehension is taken in a restricted sense for the first or most fundamental operation of the intellect and may be defined as the act by which the mind merely perceives or " seizes " an object. Now the mind perceives an object by representing it to itself, by, so to speak, depicting it in mental colors on itself. For this reason apprehension has also been described as an operation by which the intellect represents an object to itself. Note that in the definition given first we stated that through the apprehension the understanding merely perceives an object. The qualifying adverb " merely " was employed to indicate that the first operation of the mind neither affirms nor denies anything. On this account apprehension in its present technical signification is often designated as " simple " to distinguish it from the more " complex " act of cognition, the judgment. Hence simple apprehension has been aptly called " conception without judgment."

12. Idea. Idea, the second term to be explained, is defined as the representation of an object by the mind. If we compare this definition with that of apprehension, we will find apprehension and idea to be the same thing, only

Introductory Notions [ig

conceived in a somewhat different way. For the definition of apprehension (viz., an act of the mind representing an object), gives prominence to the fact that a certain thought-formation is an act, and reduces to a secondary position, the circumstance that this thoughtformation results in a representation, whereas the definition of idea (viz., the representation of an object by an act of the mind), reverses this order.

13. Notion and Concept. Notion and concept are synonyms of idea, the three differing merely in this that idea (from Sea, image) regards a mental representation as a picture — notion (from noscere, to get knowledge of) views it as that by which we come to know am object — and concept (from concipere, to conceive) considers it as something to which the mind, as it were, gives birth.

14. Subjective and Objective Concept. The term concept is often qualified as either " subjective " or " objective "; and as these two uses of the word have considerable bearing on our subsequent discussions, we must give them some further attention. A concept, as just stated, is a mental expression of an object. This is the "subjective" concept; for a mental expression of an object is a cognitive act, and hence something subjective. But the word d6 Truth and Error,

" concept " is likewise employed to signify the object expressed by the subjective concept, and then it is styled " objective " concept.

To confirm the foregoing remarks by the authority of others, we shall set down the definitions of the " subjective" and the " objective " concept as given by two well-known recent exponents of scholastic philosophy, Fr. Lahousse, S. J. and Fr. Urraburu, S. J.

Fr. Lahousse says: 1 " Conceptus subjectivus seu formalis definitur: Repraesentatio intellectualis rei alicujus. Res ipsa seu subjectum, quod proprie et immediate per conceptum f ormalem repraesentatur . . . vocatur objectum ideae seu etiam conceptus objectivus." In English: " The subjective or formal concept is defined as the intellectual representation of something. The thing or object itself which is properly and immediately represented ... by the formal concept is called the object or the objective concept." Fr. Urraburu writes : 2 " Formalis conceptus est actus ipse cognitionis objectum quodlibet repraesentantis ; objectivus est objectum prouti tali conceptu expressum. . . . Ita cum bovem concipio, conceptus formalis est meus actus cognitionis, nimirum entitas quaedam spiritualis inhaerens intellectui; objectivus vero est bos ipse intellectus prouti intelligitur ; " that

2 Logica, p. 129.

Introductory Notions 1J

is to say, "The subjective concept is the act of cognition representing some object; the objective is the object as expressed by such a concept. . . . Thus when I conceive of an ox, the subjective concept is my own act of cognition, namely, a certain spiritual entity inhering in my mind, but the objective concept is the ox itself in so far as it is known."

Nor should the employment of the phrase "objective concept " for the thing as known seem strange; for it is not unusual to name the object of an act after that act. Thus a mother will call her little son, " My love," meaning that he is the object of her love. — Many a traveller on first beholding the falls of Niagara exclaims : " What a magnificent sight ! " where sight, though it properly denotes the act of seeing, stands for the object of the act of vision. This way of naming a thing by one of its attributes or accompaniments is called metonymy by rhetoricians.

15. Corollary. Such being the nature of the subjective and objective concept it follows that when logical truth is defined to be the conformity of a concept with the object as it is in itself, there is question of the subjective concept; for the objective concept being the object as known, is identical with the object as it is in itself, and not comformable to it.

16. Material and Formal Object of an i8 Truth and Error

Idea. There are two other expressions intimately connected with those just explained that claim our special consideration, namely, the expressions "material object of an idea" and " formal object of an idea." But first of all we must state what is meant by the object of an idea in general. The word "object" is derived from the Latin verb " objicere " which signifies " to throw or set before." Hence the object of an idea in general is that which is set before the mind by means of the idea, or that which the idea represents. Now this object regarded as it is in itself with all its notes or attributes is called the material object of the idea — its subject-matter, as it were. But the particular attribute or assemblage of attributes which the intellect actually represents to itself in the material object is called the formal (or proper) object of the idea. The object is thus qualified by the adjective " formal," because the attributes actually perceived in a thing, are, so to speak, the aspects or " formalities " under which the material object is viewed. Hence the formal object is nothing else than the material object considered as to the aspects (or formalities) actually expressed by the idea. To illustrate our definitions by an example: Suppose you see a deer running in a forest and you fix your gaze exclusively, say, on its graceful figure, then this figure will be the formal object of the idea you have formed of the animal you are observing. Now suppose you note that the creature is fleet of foot and bears antlers, then these peculiarities will become the formal object of the idea you have of the deer. If you view all the three properties named together, all three combined go to make up the formal object of the idea by which you represent the nimble, graceful quadruped before you to your mind. The material object is the same throughout — the entire deer with all its attributes, properties, and qualities as it exists in the physical world.

17. Difference between Idea and Phantasm. One more point in connection with ideas needs clearing up, namely, the difference between an idea and a phantasm. For there is danger of mistaking the one for the other, all the more as in our present state of corporeal existence, a phantasm in the imagination regularly accompanies the idea in the mind. Phantasms are images of the fancy or imagination. Now since the fancy is an organic faculty (that is to say, a faculty intrinsically dependent on a bodily organ for the exercise of its functions), it follows that its activity is restricted to the representations of sensible, individual objects.

The idea, on the other hand, is a representation in the intellect which is a spiritual or immaterial faculty, i. e., a faculty intrinsically independent of matter. Hence, being the product of a faculty of an essentially higher order than the imagination, the idea can also express spiritual things (as God, the soul), and likewise universal material essences, i. e., essences of material objects in the abstract or shorn of their individualizing characteristics.

1 8. An Objection Answered. This last remark brings to mind an objection to which it will be well to reply now so as to avoid confusion later on. We asserted that the idea can express material essences. But how is it possible for the idea which is spiritual in nature to express the material? Should not the substitute and the thing for which it is substituted, be of the same character? We answer; the image need not be of the same nature as the thing imaged any more than the symbol need be of the same character as the thing symbolized. Hence an intellectual image, though neither material and extended, can represent the material and the extended. In an analogous manner, a mirror, though colorless itself, can nevertheless make the beholder see color. — This much regarding the difference between the idea and the phantasm will suffice for the purposes of our treatise; an exhaustive discussion of this subject belongs to psychology.

19. Judgment Defined. It still remains for us to say something about the other operation of the mind, the judgment, before taking up again the thread of our main inquiry.

Internal experience tells us that the mind often compares two objects of thought (or two objective concepts) with a view of discovering their agreement or disagreement, and that if it perceives them to agree, it unites them by affirmation or assents to their agreement, but if it ascertains that they disagree, it disunites them by negation or assents to their disagreement. The mental process just set forth is called judgment. As appears from the description given, it embraces three steps, first, the comparison of two ideas, secondly, the perception of their agreement or disagreement, and thirdly, the assent to either the agreement or the disagreement. Various definitions of judgment have been given, all of which, however, at least implicitly, express these three steps. Here are a few of them : " The act of the mind by which one thing is affirmed or denied of another " — " The operation by which the intellect unites two ideas by affirmation or disunites them by negation " — " The assent of the mind to the perceived identity or discrepancy of two objects of thought " — " The operation of the mind by which two concepts are compared with a view to discovering and declaring their agreement or disagreement."