Certitude; a study in philosophy

CHAPTER i. \ PAGE

INTRODUCTORY NOTIONS— Ignorance, Complete and Partial, Privative and Negative — X Doubt, Negative and Positive — Opinion — Suspicion — Certitude — Certitude merely Subjective, and Certitude at once Subjective and Objective — Certitude, Metaphysical, Physical and Moral — Certitude, Absolute and Hypothetical — Certitude, Natural and Philosophical I

Chapter 2. Requisites For Certitude

Article i. First Requisite for Certitude: Assent to Truth 20

Article 2. Second Requisite for Certitude: Infallible Motives 26

Article 3. Third Requisite for Certitude: Evidence of the Infallibility of the Motives 29

Chapter 3. Properties Of Certitude

Article 1. Metaphysical Certitude Absolute Certitude 35

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Article 2. Metaphysical Certitude the only Absolute Certitude 37

Article 3. Physical and Moral Certitude, though Hypothetical, still True Certitude. . 40

Article 4. Essential Grades of Certitude 70

The following pages present an exposition of Certitude according to the teaching of the Scholastics, and their purpose is to secure a greater esteem and love for the philosophy of St.

Thomas Aquinas.

Chapter First

Summary: States of mind falling short of certitude- Ignorance, complete and partial, privative and negative — Doubt, negative and positive — Opinion — Suspicion — Certitude — Certitude merely subjective and certitude both subjective and objective — Certitude, metaphysical, physical and moral — Moral certitude in a wider sense — Certitude, absolute and hypothetical— Certitude, natural and philosophical.

i. The inquiry into any new branch of knowledge should, according to Cicero's advice (de Officiis, 1. i. c. 2.), start out with a definition of the subject to be investigated, in order that we may clearly know what we are about to discuss.

2. Definition of certitude. What then is certitude? It is ordinarily described as the firm* assent of the mind to a statement without any] fear of error.

3. States of mind falling short of certitude. Before scrutinizing the above definition a little

I more thoroughly, let us first note the various states of mind falling short of genuine certitude.

4. Ignorance. When man comes into the world, his mind may be compared to a virgin page, or— as philosophers put it — to a "tabula rasa," that is, a smooth wax tablet upon which no inscription has as yet been made. This total absence of knowledge is ignorance. Little by little, impressions are made upon this tablet of the mind, becoming deeper and broader till frequently the knowledge acquired by the mind grows most varied and seemingly unlimited. However, finite intelligences, no matter how comprehensive in their breadth of thought, will always remain in ignorance of incomparably more than they know; for knowledge is infinite, and none but the Infinite can hold it all.

Hence, ignorance may either be complete or partial.

Again, ignorance is either a mere absence of knowledge, or it is the absence of such knowledge as a person, under given circumstances, is expected to have. The former is technically known as negative and the latter as privative ignorance. Thus if the physician is not acquainted with farming, we have an instance simply of ignorance: there is a mere negation — negative ignorance. But if he is not acquainted with matters the knowledge of which is called for by his profession, his ignorance is privative: there is a privation of some knowledge that is due — privative ignorance.

5. The mind's activity in the pursuit of its object, truth, may be compared to a journey, of which ignorance is the starting point, and certainty the destination.

6. State of doubt. The first stage in the route of travel is the state of doubt. When we say this, we do not mean to assert that the mind always passes first from a condition of ignorance to that of doubt. No, very often it takes a straight leap from ignorance to certain knowledge. Frequently, however, it is compelled to reach its destination by this roundabout way of doubt.

Doubt is a state of intellectual suspense between some statement and its opposite due to lack of evidence. In this state of doubt, the intellect views two or more ideas and compares them, but discovers no signs of their mutual relation or merely such slight ones as justify no positive judgment. Hence it remains undecided.

Suppose a boy were to ask you whether the number of fish in the Mississippi River is odd or even, you would perhaps say to him, if you took him seriously at all, that as you had no reasons whatsoever for asserting either the one or the other, you could not tell. This kind of doubt, where there is a total absence of grounds for either side, is called negative. It is really not doubt at all, but rather ignorance in regard to the relation between two terms. For to doubt means to refuse assent on account of the insufficiency of the motives advanced for a proposition and its opposite ; now in negative doubt, no motives whatever are discernible.

If the reasons for both of the opposite statements are very weak, doubt is likewise regarded as negative.

It is termed positive, when there are, indeed, grounds for both alternatives worthy of some consideration, but none weighty enough to induce a man of ordinary prudence to give or refuse his assent.

7. Opinion. If, on the other hand, sufficient reasons present themselves to justify the mind in embracing one of the two opposite statements, without, however, precluding the possibility of error on its part, then, should it venture on a judgment, it is said to form an opinion. This is the second stage on the road to certitude.

Hence, opinion may be defined as an assent of the mind to one of two opposite views on grounds not altogether incompatible with error. It is wavering assent, synonymous with belief in one of its meanings. Thus Webster says, "Belief is used for persuasion or opinion, when evidence is not so clear as to leave no doubt."

The grounds which give rise to an opinion, are called its probability. For an opinion to be rational, the reasons in its favor must be such as to move a prudent man to yield assent. It is not necessary that the grounds for the side embraced should preponderate. It is sufficient for them to be solid and sound, not light and delusive.

8. Suspicion. There is still another condition of mind on this side of certitude which might be regarded as a sort of bridge or transition between doubt and opinion, namely suspicion. Suspicion, as here understood, is not the same as a rash judgment formed on flimsy grounds ; but as entering into philosophic investigation, it is regarded as a leaning or inclination of the mind to pronounce judgment for reasons insufficient in themselves, but which seem to point in the direction in which the truth lies. Suspicion, as thus taken, is really nothing else than a certain scenting or divining of the truth. It is but the struggling of the "ingenium curiosum" in man, and an evidence of its restlessness and eagerness to soar aloft on the wings of thought. It gives rise to all manner of guesses, conjectures, hypotheses and theories, and thus often proves the fruitful mother of startling inventions. Hence in the purely intellectual region, such surmises are laudable and to be encouraged, provided, of course, they do not run counter to any well established principle or fact. But in the practical concerns of life, suspicions must be controlled by the dictates of a correct conscience.

9. Certitude. We have now arrived at the destination of our journey, namely certitude. We described it, at the opening of the treatise, as the firm assent of the mind to some statement, without any fear of error. This definition of certitude does not necessarily import that assent is given to truth. As a matter of fact, it is possible for the mind to adhere, without fear of error, not only to what is true but, even at times, to what is false. This seems puzzling and calls for an explanation ; it will be better, however, to defer this question to another place (No. 34) where we shall treat of the requisites for genuine certitude.

The above definition of certitude then, is general, and applies to firm assent given to one of two contraries, whether the side adhered to, be true or false.

10. First division of certitude. This leads us at once to the division of certitude into that which is merely subjective, and that which is both subjective and objective.

Certitude regarded in itself, is, of course, subjective; for it is a state of mind. But this subjective state may have been caused by objective truth, or it may be wholly due to the action of the intellect, unduly influenced by the

Introductory Notions J

will and deluded by the mere appearance of truth. If the origin of certitude is traceable to the former, i. e. to objective truth, certitude is called formal: if solely to the latter, i. e. to the subjective operation of the mind, it is styled purely subjective.

This purely subjective certitude may be defined as unyielding assent to a proposition on grounds which do not make it evident that the possibility of the opposite is excluded; whilst formal certitude, on the other hand, is described as firm assent to truth on grounds which show its opposite to be plainly absurd.

Formal certitude might not unsuitably be called genuine certitude, all the more so, as the ordinary meaning of our word "formal" suggests something quite different from the above technical signification.

We shall show further on, why this last kind of assent alone deserves to be dignified with the name of certitude properly so called.

Purely subjective and genuine certitude, it will be noticed, agree in this, that both are qualities of the thinking mind, but they differ from each other in that the former has its source in the mind exclusively, whilst the latter is the result of the mind determined by objective truth.

Objective certitude. Since we are allowed by metonomy to name the cause of a thing after the effect it produces, objective truth as giving rise to subjective certitude, has been termed objective certitude.

This so called objective certitude may be defined as objective truth manifesting itself to the mind in such a way as to compel assent.

In this connection, let it be remarked that objective truth as productive of firm assent should, if we wish to be exact in expression, be simply called "certainty," whilst the word "certitude" ought to be reserved for the subjective condition of the mind. Cardinal Newman in his "Grammar of Assent," p. 331, says: "Certitude is a mental state, certainty is a quality of a proposition." Thus, we often hear people say, that such or such a thing is a certainty ; or that they accept some fact as an inevitable certainty. But we say, "Skeptics will admit no certitude," or, "We have no certitude of the hour of our death."

However, this distinction is by no means always observed.

Let us illustrate the above definitions by a few examples.

" t was the belief of men for ages that the earth was flat. This conviction of theirs was purely subjective certitude, as the reason for it, namely the mere sensible appearance of the earth, was not of a nature to exclude the possibility of the opposite, namely that the earth was not flat, but round. The form of the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies must have often created doubt in the minds of the beholders, and should have set them to reconsider their hasty inference.

And now let us take an instance of genuine certitude.

We are firmly convinced that there is a Providence, lovingly caring for us and directing and controlling all that exists. Our belief in this divine guidance is unshakable and moreover rests on grounds, namely the wisdom, goodness and love of God, which are incompatible with the contrary statement that there is no Providence. Here we have a clear exemplification of the firm assent resting on objective truth, that is, of genuine certitude.

11. Second division of certitude. There is still another division of certitude, which by reason of its great importance claims our special attention. We defined (objective) certitude as truth manifesting itself to the mind in such a way as to compel assent. Now this manifestation of the truth takes place through certain objective grounds or reasons, which, however, are not all of the same general character; for there are essential differences amongst them. According to these differences both certainty and certitude are divided into three classes, namely, tneta^ physical, physical and moral.

12. Metaphysical certainty. A statement regarding some objective truth is said to be metaphysically certain, when it rests on grounds io Certitude

drawn from the very essence of that truth and involved in its very idea; and since what is essential to a thing is altogether inseparable from it, it follows that the metaphysically certain implies absolute unchangeableness, such as is withdrawn from Almighty power itself. Thus, it is metaphysically certain that two and two are four, and not even God can bring about that they should not be four.

The adherence of the mind to such truths constitutes metaphysical (subjective) certitude. It may be defined as assent to a statement on grounds with which its opposite is absolutely incompatible.

When we say that a statement is absolutely incompatible with certain motives, we mean that the truth of this statement together with the existence of those motives would imply a contradiction, that is to say, an affirmation and negation of the same thing.

13. Physical certainty. Let us now pass on to physical certainty.

A statement is said to be physically certain when its unchangeableness or permanent character, rests on the physical laws of nature. These laws, however, are subject to the controlling action of the Almighty power of God, as v. g. the law that a stone thrown into the air, if unsupported, will fall again to the ground. Hence it follows that physical certainty is hypothetical,

Introductory Notions n

being conditioned by the proviso, "if God does not interfere with the ordinary course of nature."

The adherence of the mind to a physical fact consequent upon the perception of nature's uniform mode of action is physical (subjective) certitude. It is defined as assent to a statement, on grounds with which its opposite is physically incompatible: that is to say, a statement made in opposition to nature's laws cannot become true, as long as these laws, which form the ground of assent, remain in force and are not suspended by the God of nature.

These laws of nature, as will have been gathered from the foregoing, are forces residing in nature, in virtue of which physical agents — that is, agents not endowed with freedom — always and of necessity produce the same effect. It is to these forces that the uniformity and constancy of nature are due.

Now let us throw a little more light on this subject by a few examples. It is contrary to the laws of nature, as known to us through legitimate induction, for a dead person to come back to life. These same inexorable laws make it impossible for a man to walk on the billows of the ocean without sinking, or to be shut up in a fiery furnace without being consumed. Hence any report that a dead man left the grave, or that some one walked on the water without being submerged, or dwelt in the midst of flames untouched, must be refused credence, unless it appears clearly that it pleased God to suspend the laws of nature in some particular case for wise reasons of his own.

14. Moral certainty. We now come to our last division of certainty, namely, moral certainty.

A statement is said to be morally certain, when the so called "moral laws" form the basis of its fixedness and unchangeableness.

15. Meaning of moral laws. But before we go any further, we *must first explain what is meant by moral laws.

Moral laws, as here understood, are certain, tendencies or propensities of free beings which prompt them always to act in a certain definite manner. True, they do not deprive the agent of his freedom : they leave it in his power to act counter to them.

Yet, as these laws are not only most helpful but even indispensable to the well-being of the individual and the race, they are in such complete harmony with reason that no one can set them aside except by an extreme abuse of his free will and by doing violence to his rational self. They possess then a certain necessitating or compelling force, yet so that they can, absolutely speaking, be overruled by the will of man. But more about this further on.

They are called moral laws because they are impulses, guiding agents capable of moral actions, and strengthening them in the performance of good.

The name "law" as referred to these promptings of man's rational nature is somewhat misleading. For by a law in the domain of morality, we generally understand a precept or commandment. But the moral laws as the basis of moral certainty are not precepts as such; they are rather, as explained before, moral forces, tendencies, proclivities, planted by God in man's nature, to help him to perform certain very important operations more readily and securely. In fact, they are called laws only, as bearing an analogy to physical laws.

But as the phrase "moral laws" in the signification just given is very rare, and moreover not sanctioned by our standard dictionaries, we shall avoid it, and employ instead expressions in current usage having the same meaning, as "moral or human instincts," "natural bias," "tendency or inclination of free agents," and the like.

From the above explanation we infer, that, like physical certainty, moral certainty is hypothetical, being dependent on the condition, that the free agent will not go counter to his rational instincts.

We may then define moral (subjective) certitude as assent given to a statement, the opposite of which is incompatible with man's moral instincts.

Let us, as before, illustrate our abstract definitions by a few concrete examples.

The love of life, as long as life is a source of enjoyment, is one of these moral instincts. No one who is in good health and held in honor, will take his own life, though he can do so.

Again, our correct natural inclinations urge us with irresistible power, not to maim or disfigure ourselves. Could you imagine a young man who is, moreover, rather vain of his appearance to slash himself with a razor? Yet, no one will deny that it is possible for him to do so. This love of keeping our bodies whole and intact, is another moral instinct, such as we described above.

"Nemo gratis mendax," that is, no one lies just for the sake of lying, is also an instinct of this sort, governing the rational activity of man. People do tell many lies, no doubt; so many in fact, as to make the Psalmist say in his excess, "Every man is a liar." But they do not lie unless some advantage accrues to them from this perversion of the truth. That the above dictum really embodies a human instinct, is also proven by the fact that every one considers it a great insult to be called a liar, and some resent it so much as to have recourse to violence. Yet there are found rare exceptions of moral depravity who set at naught this sacred bias of human nature, by lying just for the sake of lying.

"Parents love their children," is also accountedan instinct of the moral order. The love of parents for their offspring is planted in their hearts by the Almighty himself. Taking our stand upon this instinct, we consider ourselves justified in forecasting the actions of parents in regard to their children. True, there are unnatural parents ; the very fact, however, that men call them unnatural, proves that they regard their conduct as opposed to nature. Thus the correctness of our assertion stands confirmed by common opinion.

16. It might be added here that not all the human tendencies are common to the entire race ; but some of them are restricted to certain conditions and stages of man's life. We can hardly make our meaning clearer than by citing a passage from both Horace and Shakespeare, in which these great poets delineate the propensities and traits peculiar to certain states of human existence. Not all the characteristics set down by them as marking different periods of man's career, are moral instincts in the strict sense of the word; yet they bear at least a very striking resemblance to them, and thus serve as apt illustrations of the matter under discussion.

Thus Horace shows himself the keen observer and searching reader of the human heart that he is, by the portrait which he gives in "Ars Po etica" of the tendencies, likings and habits of the beardless youth. He says :

Shakespeare sets forth the traits of the School-boy, the Soldier and the Justice very tellingly in the following lines :

"And then the whining School-boy, with his satchel, And shining morning face, creeping like snail

Unwillingly to school

Then a Soldier,

Full of strange oaths, and bearded like a pard,

Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel,

Even in the cannon's mouth. And then the Justice,

In fair round belly with good capon lined,

With eyes severe, and beard of formal cut,

Full of wise saws and modern instances."

It will have been seen from the examples above given, that to know the human instincts, (whether properly so called or in a looser sense) is to know human nature. A thorough acquaintance with them makes the good ruler who is to guide men, and the good poet and novelist who describe their manners.

To guard against misapprehension, let it be

Introductory Notions ij

remarked that by human instincts in the looser sense, we understand mere whims or humors common to certain classes of persons, national traits developed by local conditions and the like.

Bear also in mind that at present we are simply endeavoring to clear up our notions ; later on, we shall examine whether physical and moral certitude are genuine certitude.

17. Moral certitude in the wider sense. The expression "moral certitude" is sometimes used in a somewhat different sense which we must notice, in order to avoid confusion. It often stands for what is highly probable, and may be denned, as assent to a proposition or. statement on grounds which render its truth highly probable without excluding the possibility of the contrary. Thus, if you send a letter or a parcel through the mail in a civilized country, you feel morally certain that it will reach its destination. You are also morally convinced that in a book of fair proportions, some printing mistakes will be found.

This quasi-certitude is called "moral," because actions performed with such mental assurance as it can give us, are justifiable before the tribunal of conscience.

Certainty of this kind might not unsuitably be called "prudential," since any measure taken in pursuance of it, must be regarded as prudent, that is to say, befitting a prudent man.

1 8. Third division of certitude into absolute and hypothetical. There is still a further division of certitude to be noted, which is fundamental in the study of philosophy, and especially in this question of certainty, namely, into absolute and hypothetical.

Absolute certitude. A statement is said to be absolutely certain, when its truth is independent of any condition whatsoever. Certainty of this description is possessed by such propositions as the following: "God exists"; "Twice three are six"; "All the points of the circumference of a circle are equally distant from a point within called the centre."

When we postulate independence "of any condition whatsoever," we, of course, mean conditions which are possible and conceivable ; for an impossible or inconceivable proposition must be regarded as non-existent. It might not be out of place to show by some examples how absolute propositions look, when yoked to an unthinkable condition. Here are two of them : "Three and three make six, provided three times three are not twelve;" or, "God is eternal, provided he did not begin to exist." It is plain that such senseless additions must be altogether set aside.

Hypothetical certitude. A statement is hypothetically certain when its truth depends upon the fulfilment of some condition. Under this head fall all statements which are grounded on the physical laws and the moral instincts, as, "A stone dropped into the water will sink to the bottom," or "This witness, well known for his uprightness will tell the truth, when cited to testify in court." For the first example is conditioned upon God not suspending the ordinary course of nature, and the second, upon man making a proper use of his free will.

19. Fourth division of certitude into natural and philosophical. Another division of certitude is that into natural and philosophical.

Natural certitude is the mental assurance which every one of sound mind has in regard to many things, even without full advertence to the reasons why he is sure. The natural light of reason, even when unimproved by study and reflection, guides us safely in many things ; if not interfered with from without, it never leads us astray within its own sphere.

Philosophical certitude is natural certitude perfected by an accurate scrutiny of the grounds of assent.

These two kinds of certitude do not differ essentially from one another. They are the same mental state in different stages of development; or, to express their dissimilarity in technical language, we might say that in natural certitude, the mind perceives the reasons for its firm conviction indirectly or by implication, whereas when in possession of philosophical certitude, it knows the same reasons directly and explicitly.

CHAPTER SECOND ARTICLE i

First Requisite for Certitude, Assent to Truth

Summary: Thesis: first requisite for certitude, assent to truth — An objection met — Proof of thesis — Truth the proper object of the intellect — Close connection between skepticism and the denial that assent to truth is required for certitude.

20. After describing certitude and enumerating its divisions, we must now prove what certitude is; and this we shall do by showing that the definition of genuine certitude is not arbitrarily formed, but possessed of objective validity, or, in other words, that it is in agreement with reality.

21. An objection met. An apparently serious difficulty, however, confronts us at the outset of our philosophical investigations. For, according to the statement just made, we intend to prove what certitude is ; but how is this possible without begging the question? For we beg the question whenever we assume in the premises the very thing to be proved. Now the premises to be of any service in reasoning must be recognized as certain: hence to prove what certitude is, you must already know that it exists and what it is.

We can meet this objection in two ways. In the first place, we can reply that we do not intend to give a proof or demonstration in the strict sense of the word, that it is our purpose^ merely to analyze certitude, and that in doing so, we adopt the external garb of the syllogism simply for the sake of clearness and convenience.

But we have another answer in reserve: it is our aim here to give a philosophical definition of certitude, and we deduce this from what common sense tells us about certitude. In other words, we base our scientific and philosophical knowledge of certitude upon natural certitude, and thus we can demonstrate our definition to be correct without laying ourselves open to the charge especially odious to philosophers, of begging the question.

22. Let us now restate the definition of certitude and point out that the elements involved in it, are based upon accurate observation and correct analysis of the mental processes.

True or genuine certitude is unflinching assent to truth from motives which show its opposite to be evidently absurd.

A glance at this definition reveals at once that for certitude strictly so called three conditions must be fulfilled, namely, first, the mind's assent must be given to a statement which is true in itself ; secondly, this statement must be accepted by the mind on grounds with which its opposite is incompatible ; and thirdly, these grounds must manifest themselves to the intellect as evidently infallible. For the sake of clearness, let us embody each of these requirements in a separate thesis.

THESIS i

In order to have certitude in the strict and highest sense of the word, the mind's assent must, in the first place, be given to a statement which is true in itself.

23. Note that we speak here of certitude in the "strict" and "highest" sense of the word, where, by the former, we mean "genuine" certitude and, by the latter, "metaphysical." For, as we shall see further on, there can be certitude strictly so called, (viz. physical and moral), which, however, is not certitude in the highest sense of the term.

24. We can derive the necessity of this essential condition for perfect intellectual assurance from the fact admitted on all hands, that e'ertitude constitutes the perfection of the human intellect. It is the culmination, the acme of human cognition. It is the full repose of the mind in the possession of truth. This, in fact, might be called the definition of certitude as given by common sense. For, a man of average intelligence will tell you, that he is certain when he has full assurance of something, and feels perfectly easy in mind in regard to its truth. Now it is impossible that the intellect should experience such complete repose in giving assent to what is in itself false. For, it would then be at rest without being in possession of its own peculiar object, truth; and to say that any faculty can rest altogether satisfied when exercising its activity on an object not its own, is a contradiction in terms.