A critical exposition of mental philosophy

Front matter

A

CRITICAL EXPOSITION

11\1

Introduction

Mental Philosophy is a subject of intense and general interest. Most branches of it have been ably discussed by successive writers of ancient and modern times. As a science, however, it may be considered as of modern date. Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Kant, Cousin, and many others, have contributed to develop and establish its principles, and to diffuse a knowledge of them through the civilized world. Minds are as legitimate objects of knowledge, as material objects. The doctrines of mental philosophy, are not mere matters of conjecture and opinion, any more than those of mathematics and physics. The amount of knowledge attained and attainable, respecting minds, is much greater than many suppose.

Much knowledge, however, that is actually attained by some, is far less extensively diffused than its importance demands ; and other and higher truths belonging to this department of science, which are fully within the grasp of human reason, are yet unattained.

In the present work, considerable improvements have been attempted, in the theory of sensations, ideas, affections, and of the will ; and in the general division and arrangement of mental phenomena. In each of the generic departments of mental philosophy, particularly in that of ideas, it is believed that the doctrines of the following pages are in advance of the existing state of mental philosophy, as it appears in any other work. Whether this is really the case or not, and in what degree it is the case, if it is so at all, is submitted to the judgment of candid and competent critics, and to the still higher judgment of the public at large, by which that of the most enlightened individual critics is sometimes justly reversed.

This work is not put forth under any impression that it is perfect. Imperfection is common to all human productions; especially so to those which embrace the discussion of the

Vlll INTRODUCTION.

principles and operations of the human mind. Locke is not perfect ; Reid is not perfect ; Stewart is not perfect. The same will be true of all who undertake to prosecute and complete the investigations commenced by those illustrious men. That which is not perfect, however, may be better than nothing, and one imperfect thing better than others.

The nomenclature of the present work is conformed as strictly as possible ;

1. To established popular usage ;

2. To that of approved writers on mental philosophy.

No unnecessary innovation has been attempted in this respect. The only one which has been found necessary, is that of extending or restricting the meaning of several words, and using them in significations more or less general than is common. One instance of this occurs in respect to the word ideas, which is used to denote a particular class of mental exercises, exclusive of sensations and emotions. By most writers on mental philosophy, ideas are confounded with sensations, and sensations with ideas. These two classes of phenomena, however, are entirely distinct, and ought to be clearly distinguished from each other. In order to distinguish them, it is necessary to restrict the improper extension of the terms by which they are expressed. Such restrictions are fully authorized by the practice of the best writers, in all departments of science, and are required by the necessities of the case. They constitute a large and important class of the most valuable improvements in language, and are constantly and necessarily multiplying, in proportion as science advances.

The extension of the common signification of the word minds, and the application of the titles animal and vegetable minds, to denote the principles of animal and vegetable life, and the description of them as of the same genus with human minds, but of lower orders, are legitimate results of the principle of classification, by which we refer the subjects of all similar phenomena to the same ultimate genera, and distribute them into subordinate genera, according to their spe^ cific differences.

CHAPTER V. THE elements of reasoning

Section 1. — Abstraction, Comparison, and Sy -»boK ... 181 Section 2. — Generalization, and Ideas denoted by general terms, 185

Section 3. — A logical analysis of Discourses, 189

Section 4. — Mathematical Reasoning, 198

Section 5. — Philosophical Reasoning, 207

Section 6. — Testimony, • • 219

Section 7. — -Reason, Common Sense, and Conscience, 224

Chapter I

THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. SECTION I.

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF PHENOMENA.

Phenomenon is a word of extensive use in natural and mental science. It is applied to designate whatever is the direct object of observation, in the material and spiritual world ; and refers to events, operations, and experiences, considered irrespective of their agents or subjective causes. It is derived from the Greek verb <pouvw (phaino,) to produce, to show, to bring to view, to exhibit ; and denotes whatever is produced, shown, or exhibited.

Tides, eclipses, the successions of day and night, the fall and weight of bodies, their composition and de-composition, &c, are phenomena. The same is true of all the objects of consciousness ; such as sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, desires, acts of will, &c.

Phenomena are the primary objects of knowledge. With these, human knowledge uniformly commences, and to them a large and important portion of it relates. What we first know, are the objects of consciousness, commencing with sensations ; from them, and by means of them, we observe the phenomena of the material world, attending first to those of the solidity, forms, positions, motions, and structures of material objects, which are at hand ; and subsequently extending our observations to remote parts of the world, of the solar system, and of the visible universe.

What is exhibited to our eyes, we see ; what is addressed to our ears, we hear; what acts upon our other senses, we feel. From our sensations we judge. One judgment leads to another, and others to others still, multiplying without end.

Phenomena are of two generic orders :

1 . The phenomena of mind ;

2. The phenomena of matter.

This division of phenomena into two different generic orders, is made in conformity with the principle, that all phenomena must have subjective causes ; and that in every appearance, or exhibition, or object of consciousness, there must be something which appears or which is exhibited ; or which is the subjective cause or agent of those states of sensation, ideas, emotions, &c, that are the objects of consciousness.

Assuming the principle, that in all appearances and operations, there is something different from the appearance and operation, which appears and operates ; we are led, irresistibly, to the division of phenomena into the generic orders above specified. In multitudes of cases, we find that which is the subjective cause of the phenomena of matter, incapable of those attributed to mind ; and that which is the subjective cause of the phenomena of mind, incapable of those of matter.

Hence we infer, that the subjective causes in these cases are different; that is, possess peculiar properties ; and w 7 e distribute their respective phenomena into different corresponding orders.

This classification and distribution of phenomena is made to some extent, by all men, not excepting those of the most limited attainments. It is impossible not to make it ; or so far to revolutionize the opinions and judgments of men in reference to this subject, as altogether to supersede this mode of classification.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 15

The assumption of two classes of subjective causes is necessary, to account for the two orders of phenomena which are distinguished from each other, as those of matter and mind. They are sufficient for this purpose. All subjective causes of phenomena, must be either spiritual or material. There is no room for an intermediate order of agents. Spiritual and material agents may be of different orders and varieties, but there can be nothing besides, which is incapable of being reduced to one or other of these generic orders. All agents which are not material, are spiritual ; and all which are not spiritual, are material. Hence we infer, that all phenomena belong either to material or spiritual agents, and that they consist of two, and only two generic orders.

Having adopted the principle of classification above specified, our next business is to classify all known phenomena accordingly, by referring them to one or the other of these two orders. In some cases, this is easily done ; in others, the accomplishment of it is difficult; and in some, a few, perhaps impossible.

The most obvious phenomena of mind, are sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, and other exercises which are the immediate objects of consciousness. All men agree in the judgment, that these phenomena do not belong to material objects, such as earths, metals, salts, alkalis, acids, &c.

The most obvious phenomena of matter are resistance, attraction, motion, &c, of many different modes and degrees. All men agree in the judgment that these phenomena, as they occur incessantly around us, do not belong to minds or spiritual objects.

The discrimination of these two orders of phenomena, depends on their relation to subjective causes only, not on any other properties or relations. All those phenomena of every possible variety, of which the mind is the subject, are phenomena of the mind ; and all of every possible variety of which matter is the subject, are the phenomena of matter.

SECTION II.

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA.

Mental phenomena are distinguished from others, solely by their relation to minds as the subjects of them. This relation is sometimes indicated directly by consciousness, as in the case of sensations, ideas, &c. ; and sometimes by evidences of other kinds, which are less direct, but in many cases not less, or if any, but little less, decisive of the fact in question.

Mental phenomena are accordingly divided into two generic orders :

1. Those which are objects of consciousness;

2. Those which are not objects of consciousness.

Of the former class are sensations, ideas, &c. ; and of the latter, the phenomena of organic and animal life ; such as respiration, sensation, &c.

These two orders of phenomena agree in resulting from the immediate agency of minds or beings, which are not material. Mere matter is inadequate, and equally inadequate to the production of either of them. Considered with respect to their origin, therefore, they are of the same order.

They differ, however, by the element of consciousness being the uniform accompaniment of some and not of others. We are always conscious of sensations, ideas, &c; never of the processes of organic life. Considered with respect to this accompaniment, therefore, the phenomena of the mind are of two orders, those which are the objects of consciousness, and those which are not.

The essential and generic quality of these phenomena, is, that they originate in the mind or in spiritual agency, and the specific difference of the two classes in this order, that of attending consciousness in the case of the first, which are thereby distinguished from others of the same spiritual origin. Those mental phenomena which are objects of consciousness, are the objects of one department of mental science ; those which are not objects of consciousness, are the objects of another. The theory and

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 17

exposition of the former, is generally denominated mental philosophy ; that of the latter, human, animal, and vegetable physiology.

The idea that all mental phenomena are necessarily objects, of consciousness ; or, in other words, that the mind cannot act without being conscious of its action, is entirely conjectural. It is destitute of any rational support from experience or observation, and irreconcilable with certain facts and legitimate inferences from known phenomena. It is, therefore, manifestly and entirely erroneous.

Other phenomena bear evident marks of belonging to the same agents, and agents of the same spiritual or incorporeal nature, as those which are the objects of consciousness. The phenomena of animal and vegetable life are of this description, comprehending the animation, growth, vital and voluntary motions of animal and vegetable bodies, and their production of successors.

The state of a living animal or vegetable body, is a state of animation. In the case of man and most animals, the circulating and respiratory systems are in constant operation. The blood is constantly circulating, and the lungs constantly operating to fit it for useful circulation. Other processes of absorption, secretion, perspiration, and excretion, are also constantly going on, and co-operating with the circulating and respiratory systems. Every part of a living body is the theater of incessant action. The instruments of that action are material organs. But what is the agent ? By what are those organs kept in exercise, w 7 hich knows no remission ? That agent must be either the mind in the case of animals and of man, or else some other being not material. It is generally supposed to be some other being not material, denominated the principle of animal life. But what do we know of this principle ? Simply, that it operates incessantly in the various processes of animal life. How do we know, then, that it is not the soul or mind ?

' The soul or mind is a being not material. The circulation of the blood, respiration, absorption, secretion, perspiration, excretion, &c, indicate the presence and agency of a being not material. One such being is

2* present, to wit : the soul. Why then shall we not conclude, that the phenomena above referred to, belong to the soul, which we know from other evidences to be present, instead of supposing the existence of a separate principle of animal life, merely to account for them 1 There is evidently no sufficient reason for the hypothesis of a principle of animal and human life, separate from the soul or mind which is the subject of consciousness, and of various conscious exercises.

The doctrine, that the phenomena of animal life belong to the same spiritual agent as those of consciousness, is further supported by the following considerations.

1. The nerves which serve as the organs of the principle of animal and organic life, and those which serve as the organs of the mind in sensation and voluntary action,, constitute one nervous system, all the parts of which are in immediate communion with each other. We infer from this, the identity of the agent which operates by means both of voluntary and involuntary, sentient and motive nerves ; or, in other words, of the principle of animal and organic life, and the mind which is the subject of conscious exercises.

2. The destruction of organic life is attended with the cessation of all the phenomena of consciousness, in human and animal bodies. When respiration, the circulation of the blood, and the other processes of organic life cease, all signs of consciousness cease. The body ceases to be an instrument of sensation and theater for the other conscious exercises of the mind, whenever it ceases to be an instrument of the organic operations which constitute a state of animal and organic life.

If organic life could continue indefinitely without any capacity of sensation and volition either manifest or latent, or if sensation and volition could manifest themselves in in the absence of any signs of organic life, we might conclude that the principles of organic life and of mental phenomena were different. The facts, however, are the opposite of what is here supposed. The principle of mental phenomena may be latent in sleep, syncope, and various other states of the body. At the same time, however, there is always a partial suspension of the operations of

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 19

organic life ; and the principle of thought becomes latent in consequence of obstructions thus interposed, and cotemporaneously with the partial concealment of the principle of organic vital actions.

In no case is the mind supposed to be disengaged from the body, where any of the phenomena of organic life appear, clearly proving that in the common apprehensions of all mankind, the slightest indication of animal or organic life, is supposed to be indicative of the presence and connection of the mind with its material tenement.

In our waking hours, the presence of the mind and its connection with the body, are indicated by sensations, ideas, emotions, and other conscious exercises ; in sleep, by respiration, circulation of the blood, and the various operations of organic life ; so in syncope, lethargy, and every species of disease.

The vital processes of vegetable, are similar to those of animal life, and equally indicative of the agency of vegetable minds or principles of vegetable life which are not material.

The animation or vital action, growth, and production of vegetables, are analogous to corresponding phenomena in the animal kingdom.

The phenomena of animal, organic, and vegetable life, belong chiefly to animal and vegetable physiology ; but are equally, with those of consciousness, developments of mind, or of substances not material ; and as such, are legitimate objects of mental science, and entitled to a generic classification with other mental phenomena.

SECTION III.

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA WHICH ARE THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The phenomena of the mind, which are the objects of consciousness, are numerous and diversified. They consist of the following orders :

1. Sensations ;

2. Ideas ;

3. Emotions ^

4. Affections :

5. Desires ;

6. Acts of will.

All those mental phenomena which are the objects of consciousness, are of one or other of these classes, and none of more than one. Pain, for example, is a sensation, not an idea, emotion, or act of will; the idea, that five and five equal ten, is an idea, not a sensation, emotion, or desire ; an emotion of beauty, sublimity, or the ludicrous, is not a sensation or desire.. So of phenomena of all the other classes..

The different generic orders of mental exercises, which are objects of consciousness, are all continuous, and partly successive and partly cotemporaneous. They are also characterized by particular orders, both of cotemporaneousness and succession. Sensations give rise to ideas, and continue with them ; ideas to emotions, affections, and desires, and continue with them ; and so on.

The same is true of different varieties of the same order of mental phenomena. Different sensations, ideas, emotions, and other mental exercises of the same order, exist to a greater or less extent, in the same complex state of mind, and require to be separated by a careful analysis.

The continuity of mental exercises, which are the objects of consciousness, is one of their universal properties, and one which they possess in common with all phenomena. Their relations of cotemporaneousness and succession are consequences of this.

The generic orders of mental phenomena above specified, admit of being subdivided into various subordinate classes, and the subordinate classes into others subordinate to them, and so on, indefinitely.

Their highest generic distinction is phenomena ; next, mental phenomena ; next, phenomena which are objects of consciousness ; next, sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, desires, and acts of will ; then particular species of

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 21

sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, desires, and acts of will, &c.

Considered simply as phenomena, mental exercises stand in the same comprehensive genus with the phenomena of matter ; considered as mental phenomena, they are discriminated from those of matter ; considered as sensations, ideas, &c, they are discriminated from other co-ordinate classes of mental phenomena ; considered as different species of sensations, ideas, emotions, &c, they are discriminated from other co-ordinate species of the same generic orders.

Sensations occupy the first place among the generic orders of mental phenomena, in the order of succession. They are the first phenomena that appear in infancy ; and continue during every successive period of life, to stand at the head of numerous independent trains of successive mental phenomena; consisting of the different classes above specified.

Our first trains of thought originate in sensations. The same is true of numerous successive trains of ideas, belonging to the experience of every day, and almost every hour. Sensations are first, then ideas of sensible objects, then emotions excited by those ideas, then affections, desires, purposes, and volitions.

The theory of sensation is the basis or fundamental section of mental philosophy. Without a perfect and accurate knowledge of its leading principles, the successful study of other classes of mental phenomena is impossible. After having ascertained the true character and end of sensations, we pass easily to the investigation of ideas, many of which are not intelligible without these preparatory acquisitions. This is especially the case with that numerous class of ideas denominated perceptions ; or perceptions of material objects.

It is supposed by many, that sensations are uninteresting and unimportant subjects of philosophical investigation, and that they may be slightly and superficially examined, or passed over entirely, without subjecting us to serious embarrassment in the investigation of other mental phenomena. This, however, is not the case. An accurate knowledge of the nature and office of sensations, is highly important and interesting, as a primary department" of mental science, and as introductory to that of ideas, which is next in order. Many, and pernicious errors, have prevailed and still prevail, in respect to ideas, from not distinguishing properly between them and sensations, and from not ascertaining and observing the peculiar characteristics of each. To understand ideas, therefore, we must understand sensations.

There is a similar relation between all the other orders of mental phenomena, and those which occupy the next previous places in the natural order of succession. A knowledge of ideas is necessary to that of emotions ; a knowledge of emotions to that of affections ; a knowledge of emotions and affections to that of desires ; and a knowledge of emotions, affections, and desires, to that of purposes and volitions.

Emotions are subsequent to ideas in the order of succession, and, therefore, ought to be studied subsequently. Affections and desires are subsequent to emotions, and, therefore, ought to be studied subsequently to them ; so of purposes and volitions.

A neglect to observe the order of succession in the occurrence of mental phenomena, and to pursue a corresponding order in the investigation of them, has led to much confusion of ideas, and to many serious errors, in every department of mental science.

Section I. The Generic Properties And Orders Of Sensations

Mental phenomena, which are not the effects of any previous exercise of mind, but which result immediately from a peculiar condition of the body, or of some particular parts of it, are denominated sensations.

Those feelings which excite desires for food and drink ; feelings of weariness and fatigue, of heat and cold, of pain; together with the exercises of the five external senses, are of this kind.

Sensations are exercised by means of bodily organs, and may be distributed into several different classes, according to the different organizations on which they depend, and their corresponding differences of quality. The following are the principal divisions of this order of phenomena :

1. Sensations which are the basis and exciting causes of the bodily appetites ;

2. Sensations of weariness and fatigue ;

3. Sensations of heat and cold;

4. Sensations of pain ;

5. Sensations of touch ;

6. Sensations of sight;

7. Sensations of hearing ;

8. Sensations of taste ;

9. Sensations of smell.

The sensations obtained from the exercise of different organs, are of different qualities. Thus, those of sight differ in quality from those of hearing, touch, &c.

The quality of sensations is an object of consciousness, and is incapable of being accurately defined by words. Words are applied to denote this class of phenomena, embracing the idea of their quality. But these words can be interpreted only by their being referred to phenomena of the same class, as they have occurred in the experience of the interpreter. To understand colors, we must exercise the sensations of sight ; and to understand sounds, we must exercise those of hearing. The same is true of the other classes of sensations. The most elaborate descriptions are utterly incapable of giving the least idea of the quality of any class of sensations, to one who has never exercised them.

The description of sensations, by referring them to their organs, and the occasions on which they occur, is easily understood by those who have these organs, and the opportunity and ability to exercise them. This method of describing them, is that usually adopted, and is the only one which is practicable.

The different orders of sensations constitute one beautiful and harmonious system of phenomena, which may be easily distinguished from all other mental exercises, and which sustain important relations to all others.

The occurrence of sensations, by means of bodily organs, and in consequence of certain states of those organs, furnishes a convenient method of distinguishing them from other classes of mental phenomena, and from each other. But their fundamental properties, as objects of consciousness, considered without respect to the manner or means of their being excited, are quality and quantity ; both of which are objects of consciousness only.

1. The quality of sensations.

The quality of sensations, is that by which those of one class differ from those of another, and varieties of one class differ from other varieties of the same ; also by which sensations of every class and variety, differ from other classes of mental phenomena, which are the objects of consciousness, considered without respect to the means and manner of their being excited.

Considered with respect to quality, sensations are either pleasurable, painful or displeasurable, or indifferent. Those which arise from the legitimate gratification of the appetites, are pleasurable ; those which serve as the primary exciting causes of the appetites, are painful or displeasurable ; those which arise from a derangement or injury of the bodily organs, are painful ; those of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell, are either pleasurable, painful, or indifferent.

The quality of the sensations which we are capable of deriving from different material objects, is the basis of our estimates respecting those objects, as pleasing, displeasing, and indifferent. An object of pleasurable sensations, is pleasing and agreeable; one of displeasurable sensations, is displeasing and disagreeable. The sensible qualities of objects, are all relative to the capacities of sensation, according to which they are estimated. That which produces sensations of sweetness, is sweet, and those of bitterness, bitter. If two persons were so constituted, that the same object which was sweet to one, was bitter to the other, and the same object which was black to one, was white to the other, and the same state of the organs which was a cause of pain to the one, was a cause of opposite pleasurable sensations to the other, &c, the sensible qualities of objects to those persons, would be of a directly opposite character. The reason of this would be, not any difference in the objects, considered absolutely, but' a difference in the capacities of sensation in the persons concerned, by which objects are made relatively different, and of relatively opposite qualities.

Every degree of diversity in the capacities of sensation, considered with respect to the quality of the sensations obtained from given objects, leads to corresponding diversities of judgment, respecting the qualities of those objects.

Universal agreement respecting the sensible qualities of objects, depends on a corresponding agreement in the capacity of experiencing from them, sensations of given qualities.

2. The quantity of sensations.

The quantity of sensations denotes their relation to others of the same class and variety, considered as more or less, or capable of being estimated in common parts. The two elements of the quantity of sensations, are intensity and duration.

Sensations of every class and variety, may be of greater or less perceptible degrees of intensity, and may continue during longer or shorter periods of time.

The duration of sensations is capable, in many cases, of being easily and accurately estimated. This is true of the sensations connected with the appetites, heat, and cold, and pain, and the sensations of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell.

Sensations usually commence in immediate succession to certain states of their respective organs, and continue with such remissions as occur from other sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, and actions, till those organic states on which they depend, are superseded by others not adapted to excite them.

The occurrence of particular classes of sensations is limited to the periods during which the organic states adapted to produce them, continue. Particular sensations of those classes may commence and terminate during any part of the periods above specified, but cannot precede or follow them.

Sensations of the same class and of different classes, may be of different degrees of intensity. Thus the sensations connected with the appetites, may be estimated as of one, two, or many degrees of intensity. So of weariness and fatigue, heat and cold, and pain; and of the sensations of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell. The intensity of touch, all other things being equal, varies with the degree of resistance ; that of sight, with the number of rays of light, of given kinds, which emanate from given surfaces, so as to fall upon the eye ; that of hearing, with the extent of the vibratory motions, by which it is produced; and those of taste and smell, with the number and strength of sapid and odoriferous particles, which are simultaneously the objects of these sensations.

The objects of sensation being the same, the intensity of sensations in the experience of particular individuals, varies according to the condition of the organs of sense* and the cotemporaneous state of the other mental faculties. Those whose organs are most susceptible, other things being equal, experience sensations from given objects, of proportionally increased intensity ; and those whose organs are least susceptible, in similar circumstances, experience sensations of proportionally diminished intensity. Those also who are least engaged in other cotemporaneous mental exercises, whether sensations, ideas, or emotions, &c, other things being equal, experience from given sensible objects, sensations of the greatest intensity; and those who are most engaged in other cotemporaneous mental exercises, experience sensations of the least inten- The capacities of sensation are capable of different degrees of susceptibility. Some persons are much more susceptible of the different classes of sensations generally, or of one or more particular classes of them, than others; and the same person possesses different degrees of susceptibility, in different periods of life, and in different states of sickness and health.