A review of Edward's "Inquiry into the freedom of the will."

Front matter

^ V

0° ,.»

V ^

Introduction

Discussions respecting the will, have, unhappily, been confounded with theological opinions, and hence have led to theological controversies, where predilections for a particular school or sect, have generally prejudged the conclusions of philosophy. As a part of the mental constitution, the will must be subjected to the legitimate methods of psychological investigation, and must abide the result. If we enter the field of human consciousness in the free, fearless, and honest spirit of Baconian observation in order to arrive at the laws of the reason or the imagination, what should prevent us from pursuing the same enlightened course in reference to the will?

Is it because responsibility and the duties of morality and religion are more immediately con-

IV INTRODUCTION.

nected with the will ? This, indeed, throws solemnity around our investigations, and warns us of caution ; but, at the same time, so far from repressing investigation, it affords the highest reason why we should press it to the utmost limit of consciousness. Nothing surely can serve more to fix our impressions of moral obligation, or to open our eye to the imperishable truth and excellency of religion, than a clear and ripe knowledge of that, which makes us the subjects of duty. As a believer in philosophy, I claim unbounded liberty of thought, and by thinking I hope to arrive at truth. As a believer in the Bible I always anticipate that the truths to which philosophy leads me, will harmonize with its facts and doctrines. If in the result there should appear to be a collision, it imposes upon me the duty of re-examining both my philosophy and my interpretation of the text. In this way I may in the end remove the difficulty, and not only so, but even gain from the temporary and apparent collision, a deeper insight into both philosophy and religion. If the difficul-

INTRODUCTION. V

ty cannot be removed, then it remains a vexed point. It does not follow, however, that I must either renounce the philosophical conclusion, or remove the text.

If the whole of philosophy or its leading truths were in opposition to the whole of revelation or its leading truths, we should then evidently be placed on the alternative of denying one or the other ; but as the denial of philosophy would be the destruction of reason, there would no longer remain in our being any principle on which a revelation could be received. Such a collision would therefore disprove the claims of any system to be from Heaven. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that with every advance of philosophy the facts of the Bible are borne aloft, and their divine authority and their truth made more manifest, have we not reason to bless the researches which have enabled us to perceive more clearly the light from Heaven? A system of truth does not fear, it courts philosophical scrutiny. Its excellency will be most resplendent 1*

VI INTRODUCTION.

when it has had the most fiery trial of thought. Nothing would so weaken my faith in the Bible as the fact of being compelled to tremble for its safety whenever I claimed and exercised the prerogative of reason. And what I say of it as a whole, I say of doctrines claiming to be derived from it.

Theologists are liable to impose upon themselves when they argue from the truths of the Bible to the truths of their philosophy ; either under the view that the last are deducible from the former, or that they serve to account for and confirm the former. How often is their philosophy drawn from some other source, or handed down by old authority, and rendered venerable by associations arbitrary and accidental ; and instead of sustaining the simplicity of the Bible, the doctrine is perhaps cast into the mould of the philosophy.

It is a maxim commended by reason and confirmed by experience, that in pursuing our investigations in any particular science we are to con-

INTRODUCTION. Vll

fine ourselves rigorously to its subjects and methods, neither seeking nor fearing collision with any other science. We may feel confident that ultimately science will be found to link with science, forming a universal and harmonious system of truth ; but this can by no means form the principle of our particular investigations. The application of this maxim is no less just and necessary where a philosophy or science holds a relation to revelation. It is a matter of the highest interest that in the developements of such philosophy or science, it should be found to harmonize with the revelation ; but nevertheless this cannot be received as the principle on which we shall aim to develope it. If there is a harmony, it must be discovered ; it cannot be invented and made.

The Cardinals determined upon the authority of Scripture, as they imagined, what the science of astronomy must be, and compelled the old man Gallileo to give the lie to his reason ; and since then, the science of geology has been attempted, if not to be settled, at least to be limited

Vlll INTRODUCTION.

in its researches in the same way. Science, however, has pursued her steady course resistlessly, settling her own bounds and methods, and selecting her own fields, and giving to the world her own discoveries. And is the truth of the Bible unsettled ? No. The memory of Gallileo and of Cuvier is blessed by the same lips which name the name of Christ.

Now we ask the same independence of research in the philosophy of the human mind, and no less with respect to the Will than with respect to any other faculty. We wish to make this purely a psychological question. Let us not ask what philosophy is demanded by Calvinism in opposition to Pelagianism and Arminianism, or by the latter in opposition to the former ; let us ask simply for the laws of our being. In the end we may present another instance of truth honestly and fearlessly sought in the legitimate exercise of our natural reason, harmonizing with truths revealed.

One thing is certain ; the Bible no more professes to be a system of formal mental philoso-

INTRODUCTION. IX

phy, than it professes to contain the sciences of astronomy and geology. If mental philosophy is given there, it is given in facts of history, individual and national, in poetry, prophecy, law, and ethics ; and as thus given, must be collected into a system by observation and philosophical criticism.

But observations upon these external facts could not possibly be made independently of observations upon internal facts — the facts of the consciousness ; and the principles of philosophical criticism can be obtained only in the same way. To him who looks not within himself, poetry, history, law, ethics, and the distinctions of character and conduct, would necessarily be unintelligible. No one therefore can search the Bible for its philosophy, who has not already read philosophy in his own being. We shall find this amply confirmed in the whole history of theological opinion. Every interpreter of the Bible, every author of a creed, every founder of a sect, plainly enough reveals both the principles of his philosophy and their in-

X INTRODUCTION.

fluence upon himself. Every man who reflects and aims to explain, is necessarily a philosopher, and has his philosophy. Instead therefore of professing to oppose the Bible to philosophy, or instead of the pretence of deducing our philosophy solely and directly from the Bible, let us openly declare that we do not discard philosophy, but seek it in its own native fields ; and that inasmuch as it has a being and a use, and is related to all that we know and do, we are therefore determined to pursue it in a pure, truth-loving spirit.

I am aware, however, that the doctrine of the will is so intimately associated with great and venerable names, and has so long worn a theological complexion, that it is well nigh impossible to disintegrate it. The authority of great and good men, and theological interests, even when we are disposed to be candid, impartial, and independent, do often insensibly influence our reasonings.

It is out of respect to these old associations and prejudices, and from the wish to avoid all unne-

INTRODUCTION. XI

cessary strangeness of manner in handling an old subject, and more than all, to meet what are regarded by many as the weightiest and most conclusive reasonings on this subject, that I open this discussion with a review of " Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will." There is no work of higher authority among those who deny the self-determining power of the will ; and none which on this subject has called forth more general admiration for acuteness of thought and logical subtelty. I believe there is a prevailing impression that Edwards must be fairly met in order to make any advance in an opposite argument. I propose no less than this attempt, presumptuous though it may seem, yet honest and made for truth's sake. Truth is greater and more venerable than the names of great and venerable men, or of great and venerable sects : and I cannot believe that I seek truth with a proper love and veneration, unless I seek her, confiding in herself alone, neither asking the authority of men in her support, nor fearing a collision with them, how-

Xll INTRODUCTION.

ever great their authority may be. It is my interest to think and believe aright, no less than to act aright ; and as right action is meritorious not when compelled and accidental, but when free and made under the perception and conviction of right principles ; bo also right thinking and believing are meritorious, either in an intellectual or moral point of view, when thinking and believing are something more than gulping down dogmas because Austin, or Calvin, or Arminius, presents the cup.

Facts of history or of description are legitimately received on testimony, but truths of our moral and spiritual being can be received only on the evidence of consciousness, unless the testimony be from God himself; and even in this case we expect that the testimony, although it may transcend consciousness, shall not contradict it. The internal evidence of the Bible under the highest point of view, lies in this : that although there be revelations of that which transcends consciousness, yet wherever the truths come within the

INTRODUCTION. Xlll

sphere of consciousness, there is a perfect harmony between the decisions of developed reason and the revelation.

Now in the application of these principles, if Edwards have given us a true psychology in relation to the will, we have the means of knowing it. In the consciousness, and in the consciousness alone, can a doctrine of the will be ultimate - ly and adequately tested. Nor must we be intimidated from making this test by the assumption that the theory of Edwards alone sustains moral responsibility and evangelical religion. Moral responsibility and evangelical religion, if sustained and illustrated by philosophy, must take a philosophy which has already on its own grounds proved itself a true philosophy. Moral responsibility and evangelical religion can derive no support from a philosophy which they are taken first to prove.

But although I intend to conduct my argument rigidly on psychological principles, I shall endeavour in the end to show that moral respon- 2

XIV INTRODUCTION.

sibility is really sustained by this exposition of the will; and that I have not, to say the least, weakened one of the supports of evangelical religion, nor shorn it of one of its glories.

The plan of my undertaking embraces the following particulars :

I. A statement of Edwards's system.

II. The legitimate consequences of this system.

III. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will.

IV. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness.

V. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and responsibility.

VI. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of the Bible.

The first three complete the review of Edwards, and make up the present volume. Another volume is in the course of preparation.

A STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM,

A STATEMENT OF EDWARDS'S SYSTEM.

Edwards's System, or, in other words, his Philosophy of the Will, is contained in part I. of his " Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will/' This part comprises five sections, which I shall give with their titles in his own order. My object is to arrive at truth. I shall therefore use my best endeavours to make this statement with the utmost clearness and fairness. In this part of my work, m; chief anxiety is to have Edwards perfectly understood. My quotations are made from the edition published by S. Converse, New- York, 1829.

"Sec. I. — Concerning the Nature of thb Will."

Edwards under this title gives his definition of the will. "T%e will is, that by which the mind chooses anything. The faculty of the will, ia that power, or principle of mind, by which it is

16 STATEMEMT OF

capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice," (p. 15.)

He then identifies "choosing" and "refusing:" " In every act of refusal the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused." (p. 16.)

The will is thus the faculty of choice. Choice manifests itself either in relation to one object or several objects. Where there is but one object, its possession or non-possession — its enjoyment or non-enjoyment — its presence or absence, is chosen. Where there are several objects, and they are so incompatible that the possession, enjoyment, or presence of one, involves the refusal of the others, then choice manifests itself in fixing upon the particular object to be retained, and the objects to be set aside.

This definition is given on the ground that any object being regarded as positive, may be contrasted with its negative : and that therefore the refusing a negative is equivalent to choosing a positive ; and the choosing a negative, equivalent to refusing a positive, and vice versa. Thus if the presence of an object be taken as positive, its absence is negative. To refuse the presence is therefore to choose the absence ; and to choose the presence, to refuse the absence : so that every act of choosing involves refusing, and every act of refusing involves choosing; in other words, they are equivalents.

Object of Will

The object in respect to which the energy of choice is manifested, inducing external action, or the action of any other faculty of the mind, is always an immediate object. Although other objects may appear desirable, that alone is the object of choice which is the occasion of present action — that alone is chosen as the subject of thought on which I actually think — that alone is chosen as the object of muscular exertion respecting which muscular exertion is made. That is, every act of choice manifests itself by producing some change or effect in some other part of our being. " The thing next chosen or preferred, when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it." The same principle applies to any mental exertion.

Will and Desire.

Edwards never opposes will and desire. The only distinction that can possibly be made is that

2* of genus and species. They are the same in kind. "1 do not suppose that will and desire are words of precisely the same signification : will seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will. The thing which he wills, the very same he desires ; and he does not will a thing and desire the contrary in any particular." (p. 17.) The immediate object of will, — that object, in respect of which choice manifests itself by producing effects, — is also the object of desire ; that is, of supreme desire, at that moment: so that, the object chosen is the object which appears most desirable ; and the object which appears most desirable is always the object chosen. To produce an act of choice, therefore, we have only to awaken a preponderating desire. Now it is plain, that desire cannot be distinguished from passion. That which we love, we desire to be present, to possess, to enjoy: that which we hate, we desire to be absent, or to be affected in some way. The loving an object, and the desiring its enjoyment, are identical : the hating it, and desiring its absence or destruction, or any similar affection of it, are likewise identical. The will, therefore, is not to be distinguished, at least in hind, from the emotions and passions : this will appear abundantly as we proceed. In other works he expressly identifies them : " I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguishable from the will ; as though they were two faculties of soul." (Revival of Religion in New England, part I.)

" God has endued the soul with two faculties : one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is in some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers ; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined or averse from them. This faculty is called by various names : it is sometimes called inclination ; and as it has respect to the actions that are determined or governed by it, is called will. The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties : the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." (The Nature of the Affections, part I.) That Edwards makes but two faculties of the mind, the understanding and the will, as well as identifies the will and the passions, is fully settled by the above quotation.

" Sec. II. — Concerning the Determination of Will."

Meaning of the term.

"By determining the will, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, cansing that the act of the will or choice should be thus and not otherwise ; and the will is said to be determined, when in consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon, some particular object. As when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction, rather than in another. The determination of the will supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined, there is a determiner."

Now the causation of choice and the determination of the will are here intended to be distinguished, no more than the causation of motion and the determination of the moving body. The cause setting a body in motion, likewise gives it a direction ; and where there are several causes, a composition of the forces takes place, and determines both the extent and direction of the motion. So also the cause acting upon the will or the faculty of choice, in producing a choice determines its direction ; indeed, choice cannot be conceived of, without also conceiving of something chosen, and where something is chosen, the direction of the choice is determined, that is, the will is determined. And where there are several causes acting upon the will, there is here likewise a composition of the mental forces, and the choice or the determination of the will takes place accordingly. (See p. 23.) Choice or volition then being an effect must have a cause. What is this cause ?

Motive.

The cause of volition or choice is called motive. A cause setting a body in motion is properly called the motive of the body ; hence, analogously, a cause exciting the will to choice is called the motive of the will. By long usage the proper sense of motive is laid aside, and it has come now to express only the cause or reason of volition. " By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjointly. And when I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." And " that motive which, as it stands in view of the mind, is the strongest, determines the will." (p. 19.) This is general, and means nothing more than — 1. the cause of volition is called motive ; 2. that where there are several causes or motives of volition, the strongest cause prevails ; 3. the cause is often complex ; 4. in estimating the strength of the cause, if it be complex, all the particulars must be considered in their co-operation ; and, 5. the strength of the motive "stands in view of the mind," that is, it is something which the mind knows or is sensible of.

What constitutes the strength of Motive ?

** Everything that is properly called a motive, excitement, or inducement, to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what 1 call the strength of the motive." When different objects are presented to the mind, they awaken certain emotions, and appear more or less "inviting." (p. 20.) In the impression thus at once produced, we perceive their "tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." It is a preference or choice anticipated, an instantaneous perception of a quality in the object which we feel would determine our choice, if we were called upon to make a choice. The object is felt to be adapted to the state of the mind, and the state of the mind to the object. They are felt to be reciprocal.

What is this quality which makes up the previous tendency ?

" Whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good ; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such." Now, as the will is determined by the strongest motive ; and as the strength of motive lies in the previous tendency ; and as the previous tendency is made up of the quality of goodness ; and as the highest degree of this quality in any given case makes the strongest motive ; therefore, it follows that the "will is always as the greatest apparent good is." (p. 20.)

The sense in which the term "good" is used.

"I use the term 'good' as of the same import with ' agreeable? To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or seem pleasing to the mind. If it tends to draw the inclination and move the will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most ; and in that sense is the greatest apparent good. The word good in this sense includes the avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy." (p. 20.)

It follows then that the will is always determined by that which seems most pleasing or appears most agreeable to the mind.

This conclusion is in perfect accordance with the position with which Edwards set out : that will is always as the preponderating desire ; indeed, that the will is the same in kind with desire, or with the affections ; and an act of will or choice, nothing more than the strongest desire in reference to an immediate object, and a desire producing an effect in our mental or physical being. The determination of will is the strongest excitement of passion. That which determines will is the cause of passion. The strength of the cause lies in its perceived tendency to excite the passions and afford enjoyment. As possessing this tendency, it is called good, or pleasing, or agreeable ; that is, suiting the state of the mind or the condition of the affections.

The "good" which forms the characteristic of a cause or motive is an immediate good, or a good " in the present view of the mind." (p. 21.) Thus a drunkard, before he drinks, maybe supposed to weigh against each other the present pleasure of drinking and the remote painful consequences ; and the painful consequences may appear to him to be greater than the present pleasure. But still the question truly in his mind, when he comes to drink, respects the present act of drinking only ; and if this seems to him most pleasing, then he drinks. "If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his will ; and drink- 3 ing, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his will, and is most pleasing to him." The reasoning is, that when the drunkard drinks, we are not to conclude that he has chosen future misery over future good, but that the act of drinking, in itself, is the object of choice ; so that, in the view he has taken of it, it is to him the greatest apparent good. In general we may say, in accordance with this principle, that whenever the act of choice takes place, the object of that act comes up before the mind in such a way as to seem most pleasing to the mind ; it is at the moment, and in the immediate relation, the greatest apparent good. The man thus never chooses what is disagreeable, but always what is agreeable to him.

Proper use of the term most agreeable, in relation to the Will,

" I have chosen rather to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable ; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than the choice itself." (p. 21, 22.) Here the perception or sense of the most agreeable is identified in express terms with volition or choice. " The will is as the most agreeable," — that is, the determination of will, which means its actual choice, as a fact of the consciousness is embraced in the sense of the most agreeable ; and as the voluntary action, or the action, or change, or effect, following volition, in any part of our being, — as to walk, or talk, or read, or think, — has its cause in the volition, or the " mind's choice," — so it is entirely proper to say, either that this voluntary action is determined by the volition or that it is determined by the sense of the most agreeable. Edwards's meaning plainly is, that the terms are convertible : volition may be called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the most agreeable may be called the cause. This is still a carrying out of the position, that the will is as the desire. " The greatest apparent good" being identical with "the most agreeable," and this again being identical with the most desirable, it must follow, that whenever, in relation to any object, the mind is affected with the sense of the most agreeable, it presents the phenomenon of "volition" or "choice;" and still farther, that which is chosen is the most agreeable object, and is known to be such by the simple fact that it is chosen ; for its being chosen, means nothing more than that it affects the mind with the sense of the most agreeable, — and the most agreeable is that which is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than chosen ; for its being most agreeable, means nothing more than that it is the object of the mind's choice or sense of the most agreeable. The object, and the mind regarded as a sensitive or willing power, are correlatives, and choice is the unition of both : so that if we regard choice as characterizing the object, then the object is affirmed to be the most agreeable ; and if, on the other side, we regard choice as characterizing the mind, then the mind is affirmed to be affected with the sense of the most agreeable.