Christian philosophy

Front matter

Chap. Copyright No.

Shelf_.B_Fj3^^

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Contents

I. Notion and subject-matter of Psychology.

II. Sources:

(a) Introspection: S. Augustine, S. Thomas; Compte, S. Mill,

CHAPTER I. Substantiality of Soul

I. Theories:

(a) Transcendental view, e. g., Kant and Wundt.

(b) Phenomenal view, e. g., Hume, Mill, Davis, Hoffding, Sully,

Murray, James.

(c) Agnostic view, e. g., Locke, Thomson, Spencer, Laing,

Hamilton, Bowen.

Vlll CONTENTS.

I. Theories — Continued:

(d) Materialistic view, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley.

(e) Scholastic theory, e. g., Aristotle, S. Thomas, S. Augustine.

II. Proof:

(a) From analysis of notion of substance: Its elements are:

Being, potency, stability, subject of modifications.

(b) Application to the soul.

(c) Concept more clearly defined.

III. Errors:

(a) Transcendental ego, i. e., the / is not a real, but only a

logical subject.

(b) Phenomenal ego; the contention of the school of Associa-

tionists; examination of S. Mill.

(c) Buddhist theory.

CHAPTER II. Materialism

I. History:

(a) Ancient and modern materialism.

(b) Origin and leaders of modern materialism, e. g., Moleschott,

Vogt, Buchner.

(c) Scientific materialism, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley.

II. Doctrine: ,

(a) Inorganic world, organic world, man. i

(b) Spencer's attempt.

(c) Two diverging tendencies: (i) Logical position; (2) double-

aspect theory, e. g., Clifford, Bain, Spencer.

III. Arguments drawn:

(a) From fact that soul is only known in matter.

(b) From mental processes.

(c) From dependence of mind on body.

(d) From evolution.

IV. Criticism:

(a) One-sided and partial.

(b) Based on confusion of concepts.

(c) Method not scientific.

V. Influence:

(a) Reason of its influence.

(b) Opponents in France, England, America.

CONTENTS. IX

. CHAPTER III.

Simplicity of Soul.

I. Soul a unity.

II. The soul a simple unity:

(a) Not a collective unity, e. g., Hume, Mill, Spencer, Bain,

Davis, Koelpe.

(b) Not a potential unity, e. g.. Prof. Ladd, Hegel.

(c) Soul not a result, i. e., Positivist position, e. g., Taine, Ribot.

(d) Proof of simple unity: (i) From consciousness.

(2) Ab absurdo.

(3) Criticism of Kant.

III. An immaterial simple unity:

(a) Mind and matter differently known.

(b) Mind and matter known as different things,

(c) From deaf-blind mutes.

CHAPTER IV. Positivism

I. History:

(a) A philosophy, a sociology, and a religion.

(b) Origin, author, and different schools.

II. Doctrine:

(a) Fundamental tenets: Positive method, denial of what is

above sense, idea of humanity.

(b) Law of historic filiation.

(c) Classification of sciences.

(d) Man and the science of man.

(e) Relation to Agnosticism explained: (i) By interdependence.

(2) By their common source in Hume.

III. Influence: |

(a) In general.

(b) In England, France, Germany, America.

(c) Adverse criticism.

IV. Criticism:

(a) Fundamental law is false.

(b) Not a philosophy.

(c) Doctrine of man is false.

(d) Proofs are assumptions.

(e) Positivism a misnomer. ;

X CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V. Spirituality of Soul

I. Explanation of terms:

(a) Spirit, pure spirit, spirit and soul.

(b) Question stated.

II. Argument:

(a) From acts of intelligence:

(i) Superorganic notions and abstract sciences.

(2) Manner of conceiving material objects.

(3) Self-consciousness.

(b) From acts of will:

(i) Tendency to abstract classification.

(2) To superorganic objects.

(3) From conscience.

(4) From free-will.

(c) From human speech.

CHAPTER yi.

Spirituality of Soul and Modern Science.

I. Correlation of thought to structure of the brain:

(i) From quantity of brain-matter:

(a) Weight: absolute, relative, of races and of individuals.

(b) Measurement.

(2) From quality of brain-matter:

(a) Chemical qualities.

(b) Physical qualities, e. g., convolutions and gray-matter.

II. Localization of function:

(i) Theory of Gall.

(2) Cerebral physiology:

(a) Sensation.

(b) Nervous movement.

(c) Reason.

III. Psycho-physics:

(i) Origin and basis. - .

(a) Intensity.

(b) Duration.

(c) Extension. ,

CONTENTS. XI

CHAPTER VII. Pantheism

I. Sources of modern Pantheism;

(i) Spinoza.

(2) German Pantheism of Kant, Fichte, Sclielling, Hegel, Schof-

fenhauer, Hartman.

(3) The VedaVta.

II. Influence: \

(i) In England, e. g., Coleridge, Carlyle, Arnold, Wordsworth. (2) In America, e. g., New England Transcendentalism: Emerson, Dr. Royce.

III. Neo-Hegelian School:

(i) Its beginnings.

(2) Its leaders in England and America.

(3) Professor Green's teaching.

IV. Criticism. ,

CHAPTER VIII. Soul and Body

I. Question stated.

II. Theories:

(i) Exaggerated Spiritualism, e. g., Des Cartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz.

(2) Accidental union, e. g., Plato, Locke, Lotze, Ladd, Rosmini.

(3) Monistic theory, e. g.. Prof. Clifford, Bain, H. Spencer.

(4) Scholasticjtljeory, i. e,, matter and form.

(a) A duality in every substance as shown by science and by ordinary observation. 1

(b) Hence the inference to a duality in its composition.

(c) " First matter " and " substantial form."

(d) Hierarchy of forms.

(e) Duality in man: hence body and soul: and place of soul

in human body.

CHAPTER IX. Brain and Thought

I. "Thought produced by the brain:"

(i) Battle-ground between Christian and non-Christian philosophy.

XU CONTENTS.

I. " Thought produced by the brain " — Continued:

(2) Meaning of word " thought."

(3) Meaning of word " produced."

II. Brain and sensation:

(i) Simple subject necessary. i

(2) Sensation is quantitative.

(3) Hence animated organism is subject of sensation.

III. Brain and thought:

(i) Mind essentially different from sensation.

(2) Cerebral activity a condition for thought.

(3) Hence body not organ of thought.

IV. Thought not cerebral motion:

(i) Opinions of Spencer, Tyndall, Clifford, Bain, James.

(3) Testimony of Du Bois, Reymond, Ferrier, Tyndall, Ladd.

CHAPTER iX.

Origin of Soul.

I. Theory of emanation, i. e.. Pantheism. II. Theory of traducianism, i. e., Tertullian. III. Theory of manifestation, i. e.. Prof. Ladd. IV. Theory of evolution, i. e, Mr. Spencer. V. Theory of creation, i. e.. Christian philosophy.

CHAPTER XI. Immortality

I. Theories:

(i) Materialistic, e. g., vulgar and scientific materialism.

(2) Pantheistic.

(3) Sceptical, e. g., S. Mill, Emerson, Arnold, G. Eliot.

II. Substitutes:

(i) Indestructibility of material elements of the body.

(2) Conservation of energy.

(3) Doctrine of Karma.

(4) Immortality of Glory.

III. The fact:

(i) Belief in future life is universal. (2) Exceptions:

Early Jews.

Buddhists.

CONTENTS. ^ , xm

IV. Reasons for the belief:

(i) Psychological, e. g., S. Thomas, criticism of Prof. Ladd.

(2) Moral.

(3) Philosophical:

(a) From intellect.

(b) From will.

(c) From fundamental desires.

(4) Analogical — no such word as annihilation.

CHAPTER XII. Personality

I. Definition of personality the task of Christian philosophy.

II. Theories:

(i) Memory, i. e., Locke and Mill.

(2) Consciousness, i. e., Kant.

(3) The Bampton Lecturer of 1891. ;

(4) Of evolution, e. g., Ribot.

III. Christian philosophy:

(i) Definition of S. Thomas.

(2) Person embraces:

(a) Rational nature.

(b) Individual substance.

(3) Illustrated:

(a) In Incarnation.

(b) In civil law.

(c) In human speech.

I

§ I. Psychology, from the Greek ^'o^ij- and /^o^'o?, means a disputation or treatise about the soul. Taking the word in its widest signification it means a philosophy of the soul, in contradistinction to Cosmology, which is the philosophy of the external world.^ By the soul is meant the principle of life, the principle Notion. which animates and vivifies an organism. We can distinguish three grades of life: vegetative, sensitive and intellectual. Plants possess vegetative hfe; i. e., they grow; animals possess vegetative and sensitive life; i. e., they grow and feel; man possesses vegetative, sensitive and intellectual life; i. e., he grows, feels, thinks. Man, therefore, possesses life in all its fullness. With the plant he grows and nourishes; with the animal he grows and feels; but over and above he has what is characteristic of his nature, marking him off from other living beings; i. e., thought and will.^ Psychology, therefore, means the philosophy of the soul of man, of the soul as the principle and source of sensitive and especially of intellectual operations, and has been designated the " science of mental life." ^

^ Dr. Ward says Psychology cannot be defined because we cannot limit its subject-matter, i. e,, we cannot distinguish at the outset between internal and external experience, cf. Encyc. Britt. art. Psychology. This is not true. Consciousness testifies to the contrary.

2 S. Augustine De Lib. Arb. 1. II, n. 13.

3 For history of the term " Psychology," cf. Sir W. Hamilton's " Metaphysics," I, p. 130.

Subject matter.

Conscious-

§ 2. The subject-matter of Psychology is set forth in its definition. By mental life is miderstood consciousness, our states of consciousness, the sum-total of our conscious experience. In this sense we speak of mind as subjective in relation to the external world which is objective. However, Psychology employs objective methods, as we shall see. It does not consider the mind as personal, but as the endowment of the human race; it does not view the mind as independent and apart, but treats of the phenomena of consciousness in themselves as such, in their relations to the principle producing them, i. e., the soul, and to what conditions their actual exercise, i. e., the bodily organs. Hence its complete subject-matter is animated body or a " sound mind in a sound body." It places before our view all the operations and phenomena of our conscious life. Thus it investigates sensations, thoughts, wishes, desires, feelings, imaginations, memories, afifections and emotions. It formulates the laws which rule their working, and finally from these, as data, determines what we are to hold concerning their source or internal cause, and the relation of this principle to the bodily organism.

§ 3. In employing the term consciousness we must guard against ambiguity. The word has more than one meaning, (a) In the most general and widest signification it is used to designate mental life as a whole, i, e., our states of consciousness, as opposed to unconsciousness. In this sense, as we have seen, it includes emotions, volitions, etc., and forms the subject-matter of Psychology, (b) It designates immediate and direct knowledge which the mind has of its own acts or of something external acting upon it. In

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

this sense it includes only cognitive acts of a special kind, and is opposed to mediate and reflex knowledge, (c) Finally, it signifies the reflex and deliberate act by which the mind attends to its own operations or states, and recognizes them as produced by its own activity. In this sense it is more properly called self-consciousness. It is thus a special kind of mental activity which investigates and studies the working of our minds, brings out clearly and distinctly what we have directly experienced. In the second and especially in the third meaning consciousness becomes the chief method and instrument of Psychology.

§ 4. By keeping in mind the different meanings which the word consciousness has, we can easily understand the position of writers who at first sight seem to disagree. The mistake of confounding different things shall thus be avoided. Thus Rabier^ distinguishes two theories and two schools divided on the nature of consciousness: (a) Those who hold that consciousness means the very essence of psychical phenomena, the common form of all the faculties of the soul, and is to them as light is to color. This view, he says, is the opinion of Aristotle.^ (b) Those who consider consciousness as an accident, an additional phenomena, somewhat as light is to objects without which they cannot be conceived. Thus it becomes a distinct faculty and its function is to perceive the acts of inner life. It is the open eye of the mind, the witness of our psychic phenomena. This,

^ Psychologic, p. 52.

^ '' The interior hght that illumines everything that takes place in the soul." Cousin History of Mod. Phil, xi, p. 247; Stuart Mill Logic, BI, ch. i, §§ 3, 5.

he says, is the opinion of Reid, Stewart/ Royer- Collard, Hamilton. But on a close examination there is no real opposition. Consciousness is both one and the other. In the first meaning it is the common form of all our mental activities. In the second it is the eye and witness of our mental life. In the former it is what we study; in the latter it is the chief source and instrument of our knowledge. For we not only are conscious of mental states, but we also have the power of viewing self as the subject and agent of our mental states. This perfection is the crown of our intellectual life just as the power of self-determination is the crown and glory of the acts of volition.

II

Sources. intro-^ § 5. The subject-matter of Psychology is conscious-

method, ness. The states of consciousness are only observed by the act of self-consciousness or introspection, i. e., by " looking within." This is the subjective or introspective method. It is the primary, direct, immediate source through which a knowledge of mental life is obtained. Socrates was the first to make self-examination a philosophical method. His principle was ** know thyself."'' The science he elaborated by its aid was more moral than mental. With St. Augustine this principle and method was of great value. 'T desire," he says, "to know God and the soul; nothing

^ Cf. Hamilton Met. Lect. xii, p. 145. " It is the recognition by the mind or, ego, of its acts and affections." Hamilton Met. Lect. xi, p. 133; yet the same author writes " The fundamental form, the generic condition of all modes of mental life." Met,, p. 127; cf. Porter, the Human Intellect, p. 83.

7Cf. Phaedros.

more."^ For this it is necessary to enter into one's self. From the knowledge of self man can rise to a knowledge of God.^ With St. Thomas introspection is the ^^j^ethod^ basis of a beautiful and profound exposition of the gpiJuon. virtues and vices.^°

§ 6. Compte ^^ maintains that direct observation Compte. by introspection is impossible. To him direct contemplation of the mind by itself is an illusion for two reasons: (a) The thinker cannot divide himself in two, of whom one reasons while the other observes him reason. " The organ observed and the organ observing," he says, *' being, in this case, identical, how could observation take place? This pretended psychological method, therefore, is null and void." (b) Internal observation gives almost as many divergent results as there are individuals who practice it. This objection is well met by J. Stuart Mill, who holds " that a fact may be studied in two ways, either by direct knowledge at the very time or through the medium of memory a moment after." And, he adds, " Mr. Compte would scarcely have observed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. This simple fact destroys the whole of his argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe." ^^

^ " Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino." Soliloq. 1. I, 7; cf. Trin. xiv, 7; Confess, x, 17, 24, 25; de Ordine, n. 47.

i<^ Cf. Sum. Theol. 2a, 2ae.

11 Positive Philos., London, 1875, vol. i, pp. 381-389; Cours de Phil., Posit. I, 34 sq.

12 Aug. Compte & Posit., p. 64; cf. Sully Illusions, pp. 208-211.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Maudsley.

James.

Spencer. § y^ ]\ji-_ Spencer holds that no one is conscious of what he is but of what he was a moment before. His reason is that it is impossible for the mind to be at the same time subject and object.^^ We admit that it may be difiFiCult to thus conceive the mind; nevertheless it is a fact. Dr. Maudsley/* and Mr. James/^ say that in observing our mental states, we lose them or modify them so that they are no longer the same. Mr. James is unreserved in praising Compte's reasoning. He' writes '* that a feeling to be named, judged or perceived must be already past; that no subjective state while present is its own object, e. g., when I say ' I feel tired/ 'I feel angry/ the present conscious states are not the direct feelings of fatigue or of anger. It is the state of saying-I -feel-tired, or of saying-I-f eel-angry , entirely different matters, so different that the fatigue and anger apparently included in them are considerabe modifications of the fatigue and anger directly felt the previous

Hoffding. instant." ^^ So Hoffding: ''In the moment when I wish to observe a state of consciousness, that state is already past, or has blended wdth other elements. What has been fully and clearly experienced will remain in memory and by means of memory can be examined." ^^

§ 8. Thus introspection becomes retrospection. This position cannot be held. It is true that I can recall past states in order to observe them; but it is

^2 Cf. Spencer's First Principles, p. 65.

1^ Physiology of Mind, ch. i.

1^ Vol. I, pp. 189, 190. Mr. Hamilton also says that the phenomena can only be studied through it reminiscence. Met. xix, p. 263.

1" Outlines of Psychology, p. 17.

also a fact verified by the conscious experience of every one that I can directly observe my own thoughts and emotions; or, in the language of Mr. Mill, " Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe." Mr. James again falls into an error in his reflection upon the value of introspection. He holds that the only grounds on which the infallible veracity of the introspective judgment might be maintained are empirical. " If we had reason to think it has never yet deceived us," he \xrites, " we might continue to trust it." ^^ The mistake is in confounding the primitive testimony of consciousness with a judgment formed by associations of ideas or habits, e. g., consciousness of a sensation and the localization of the organic part affected. These are found joined together. The former is a fact immediately known in consciousness; the latter is a judgment based on the association of ideas and whose correctness depends on bodily sensibility and the development of acquired sense-perceptions. The judgment may be erroneous, as we shall see.

§ Q. To establish a science of the mind, introspection intro-

-^ . '■ spective

emplovs objective means of verification and of control, method

'^ ' ■^ aided by

Hence the external, indirect and mediate source which objective

sources.

embraces all those means of acquiring a knowledge of mental life which are outside of and beyond the immediate observation of my own mental states. In obtaining material from this source w^e reason by analogy, i. e., we reason on the ground that other persons have like motives and acts. By the testimony of my own consciousness I might write Confessions, as St. Augustine, Memories as Rousseau, an Apology pro Vita Sua,

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

These sources are (a) ordinary observation.

(b) Science literature and art.

(c) Study of mental development in the individual. '

as Card. Newman; bint the result would not be Psychology. It would be an important contribution to the study of mental life, but not a scientific treatise. My own individual experiences as such, however beautiful and valuable, are only personal; whereas Psychology is the science of the human mind, and treats not of the individual but of the species, of mankind. Introspection, therefore, calls to its aid the object ire method. This method consists : (a) In the observation of others. We watch their words and actions, their looks and gestures. From these we strive to learn their mental states, their habits and tendencies. In the class-room, on the street, in society, we study Psychology. This can be done indirectly, as when we infer the condition of mind from an ordinary conversation or behavior; or directly when another in words makes known his desires, thoughts, sentiments or passions, and sets forth their interdependence or the part they play in his mental life, (b) The products of the mind in science and in art furnish rich stores of information. Science is the effort and proof of intelligence. Art is nature as mirrored in the human soul. Poetry, literature and the fine arts are the highest and most perfect work of the soul. They reflect the noblest sentiments, they express the most delicate thoughts. The man is revealed in his work, (c) Great assistance is derived from the study of the mind, in its various stages of development. Thus, a new department of Psychology has been opened up by investigations into the childmind.

The information gained is put to account in devising the best means of education. Action of environment, influence of home, religion, society, education are taken into account. Not only the development of the individual is of value. The records of civilized life and growth of J? J^'^^^'^^' nations contain rich stores. History is the world's stage. The customs, institutions, laws, civil and politi- • cal annals, religion, traditions — all these express the efforts of the human soul. There imagination, taste, genius in war or in the peaceful avocations, the great and noble faculties, expand and bloom. Side by side we behold heroic and sublime resolves which uplift and ennoble, and low and fatal passions wdiicli bring degradation and ignominy. Man appears before us at his best and at his worst, (d) Animal Psychology, as ^^^/^'J? it is called, brings light from another quarter. It pre- f^}^^^^ sents the results of studies concerning the instincts, habits and activities of the lower animals. Care must be taken, however, not to apply these conclusions to human life with too much rigor. Man is an animal and shares with the animal, sensation, instinct and lower sensitive feelings. Thus their action can be illustrated to a certain extent from animal life. But man is more than a mere animal. He possesses intelligence and free will. These must be taken into account in the analogies drawn from the lower forms of life, (e) Physiology and Anatomy supply us with much g^^|^,^^ useful information. They explain the structure and ^"^y^*^ functions of the different parts of the nervous system. They give the physical bases of the operations of sense. Psychology studies the human mind working in the body. Hence, brain and nerve Physiology is necessary. It shows that phenomena of thought are accompanied by phenomena of the nervous system. Formation of habits, transmission of hereditary tendencies are questions for the solution of which we depend more or less on these studies.^^

1^ Cf. Aristotle's Psychology by E. Wallace, Introd., pp. XXX, cxxvii.

parati^e (^) Another source is langauge and the study philology. Qf language. The connection between language and thought is intimate. The one is the expression of the other. The thinker may pass away and his place taken by another, but his thought has a permanent embodiment in the written word, and lives on for the instruction and delight of future ages. The study of language is the study and discipline of mind. Its words reveal the nicer shades of thought, the endless variety of conceptions, as in the Greek or Latin, or the imagery and comparative poverty, as in the speech of savages.^" Its structure shows the forms of thought, the characteristic turn and traits of their minds. The labors of Whitney,^^ of Muller,^^ are of great value to the Psychologist. Sufficient attention has not been given to the help which these studies afford. " It is remarkable," writes M. Ribot,^ " that EngHsh contemporary Psychologists, who have profited so largely by the recent progress of physiolog}^, have borrowed nothing from linguistics." He expresses a belief that comparative philology will reveal things to us of much more intimate and delicate bearing upon the mechanism of the soul and its rariations than physiology. dfseSes*^^ (g) Finally, we have recourse to Pathology, the science of organic disease. Criminals, persons- under hypnotic influences, the deaf and dumb, eccentrics, the insane, are examined and studied with a view to illustrate mental activities. Abnormal mental operations, e. g., dreams, illusions, somnambulism, hallucinations, are explained and traced as far as possible to their

20 Cf. Quatrefages the Pigmies.

21 Cf. Language and Study of Language.

22 Science of Language.

causes. It is wise to avoid the mistaken notions of some writers, e. g., Dr. Maudsley, '^^ E. W. Cox in Mechanism of Man, Ribot,^^ who lay too much stress on this study. These activities are abnormal and must be so regarded. They therefore furnish no positive data on which to build the science of Psychology. Nor are they to be considered as constituting the proper and direct subject-matter of our study. Psychology investigates " the sound mind in the sound body," and abnormal phases or states should be viewed in this light.

§ 10. By uniting the results obtained in these various ways to the subjective method a normal psychology of introspection is established. By it we study the mental phenomena in each human being, and study them in each condition. Psychology, therefore, does not treat of what is personal, accidental or particular, but of what is essential and universal.

§ II. It is true that introspection is the real basis, just as an anatomist by dissecting one human body, finds there materials to construct a science of the structure of every human being. So, when I know myself, I know human nature. But comparison of knowledge thus acquired with the other sources, help me to separate the particular from the universal, the personal from what is part of our human nature. Philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas; moralists as Seneca, Pascal; poets as Homer, Euripides, Horace, Shakespeare; novelists as Goethe, Scott, Dickens, Thackeray; preachers as St. Chrysostom, Bossuet, Newman, did not speak of the individual simply, but of man; not of man in one countr}- and time, but of universal man. In studying them we study human

^ Cf. Physiology of mind. 25 Diseases of Personality.

nature. We see reflected in a masterly manner the thoughts, sentiments, wills which throb in our own souls. Thus internal and external methods, both united, give a true scientific basis to Ps}xhology.

III

A Science. § 12. Psychology seeks to know the nature of the soul, the nature and laws of mental and moral phenomena. It claims to be and is a true science. The conditions and processes which go to constitute a (a) proper science are here found, (a) First of all it has a real

object. , ^ ^ ^ ^

and proper object. It investigates sensations, sentiments, ideas, memories, judgments, reasonings, desires, passions, etc. These are as true and as real as the circulation of the blood, as the existence of physical or chemical forces. Even materialists who deny the existence of the spiritual principle in man, must admit that they think, and feel, and wall. This subject-matter is proper to Psychology, and constitutes a field apart where no other science enters.^ Thus, m.athematics studies the general properties of material bodies in a most abstract manner; physics deals with forces; physiology and anatomy with the functions and structure of the human frame. Only Psychology claims as

26 It is not true, therefore, to maintain that " Psychology must be regarded as a branch of general biology." cf. Hoffding Elements of Psychology, p. 25; G. Lewis cf. Ribot English Psychology, p. 287; also Problems of Life and Mind, 1st Series, p. loi; or to hold, with H. Spencer, that there is no precise line of demarkation between physiological and psychological facts, cf. Ribot, p. 148 sq. ; or with Hoffding, that Physiology and Psychology " deal with the same matter as seen from two different sides, like, e. g., the convex and concave sides of the same curve." Outlines of Psychology, p. 69.

its own the varied phenomena of mental and moral life.2^

§ 13. (b) Again, it has an infallible means of know- ^^^^^^j. ing and investigating its subject-matter. This instru- sources. ment is self-consciousness or introspection. Introspection reveals the inner life with all its phenomena of sensation, of intelligence, of appetite and will. Care must be taken, however, not to attribute solely to self-consciousness facts which are the outcome of judgments in which an element of experience or of association of ideas is found, as, e. g., the localization of a sensation.

§ 14. (c) It has a scientific method. Method is an re) a

, T ^ ^ , . , , . . - scientific

orderly process of arrangmg facts and reasonmgs with method. a view to form a compact and well-connected whole. It embraces the statement of facts, the formulation of laws which explain them, and finally their systematic classification. Now, Psychology acquires its facts by observation. The student enters into himself, views his own mind working, and notes down its processes and their results. To observation, experimentation is added. In this act we recall a past fact through memory, analyze it, compare it with a present fact of consciousness. Having possession of facts which have stood the test, we then proceed to discover the laws

^ Dr. Bain seems to hold that mental phenomena are not distinguished from material by any common character. This is the contention of Materialism, cf. Bain Sense and Intellect Intr., ch. I, 2. Prof. James holds that there is only one kind of conditions which the student of scientific Psychology cares to know about, and these are the brain-states; and that until some Gahleo or Lavoisier arises with a psycho-physic law that will govern all mental facts, we can have no science of Psychology, cf, "is Psychology a Science?" by Prof. Ladd, in Amer. Joun. of Psych., 1894, vol. i, p. 392, coll. p. 286. cf. also Philos. Rev., 1892, vol. i, pp. 24, 146.

CHRISTIAN -PHILOSOPHY.

This

method

followed.

which regulate their interaction, the faculties or principles whence they spring, the nature of the thinking principle which is the bond of their unity. This process is induction and seeks to formulate the principles and laws of the human mind. These laws are then subjected to a process of verification, for, by means of deduction, their practical application is tested. Our own personal experience is illustrated and confirmed by results drawn from the various other sources. The interrelation of facts, of principles and of laws is the basis for a true classification of mental phenomena and of the processes involved in their production. Finally, the conclusions thus established are thrown into a system in which facts are brought naturally into relation with their causes and with one another .^^