Christian philosophy, God; being a contribution to a philosophy of theism

Front matter

'V

M

1'^ o >

CHAPTER I. Agnosticism

I. Modern Philosophy compared to: page.

(i) Greek Philosophy, V cent. , B. C. 6

(2) Scholasticism of 13th cent. 6

II. Agnosticism: (i) Origin:

(a) the term : Mr. Huxley 7

(b) the doctrine: fundamentally the same as Greek Scepti-

cism, but circumstances are different 7

(2) Development:

(a) philosophical: Real Phenomenalism, e. g., Locke;

Ideal Phenomenalism, e. g., Kant; both combine in Huxley, Spencer, etc S

(b) scientific: decline of Hegel; rise and spread of phys-

ical science 12

(c) false representations of religious truth 15

III. Doctrine:

(i) with Tyndall, Huxley: fragmentary 16

(2) with Spencer: systematic 17

(a) phenomenon and noumenon.

(b) Relativity of Knowledge, e.g., Hamilton, Mill, Grote,

Spencer.

IV. Criticism:

(i) true method 19

(2) True and false Agnosticism 21

(3) contradictions of Mr. Spencer 22

(4) Philosophy of Religion 23

V. Influence: in Science, Biblical Studies, Theology, Literature ... 23

CHAPTER II. The Fact

Belief in God a psychological fact 26

I. U niversal in place, , , , , 27

[vii]

Vlll CONTENTS.

PAGE.

II. Universal in time: primitive monotheism. 29

(i) in general 29

(2) speciatim:

(a) Indo-EuropSLns:

(i) Hindus 30

(2) Persians 33

(3) Greece and Rome 35

(4) conclusion 35

(b) Egyptians 36

(c) China 37

(dj Semites 38

(e) Savages:

(i) Individual testimony 39

(2) Traditions , 41

(3) theory of evolution disproved 41

(3) Conclusion: primitive purity, degeneracy, primitive revela-

tion, monotheism = 42

III. Expression of the Fact:

(i) by moral and metaphysical relations 43

(2) by phenomena of the external world 44

CHAPTER III. Origin of the Belief

I. Theory of Innate Ideas. . 45

1. Defenders 46

(a) False Assumption 47

(b) False basis.

(c) Idea of God.

II. Theory of Evolution , 49

1. Defenders: Spencer 50

(a) Assumptions.

(b) False.

(c) Fallacious.

III. Theory of Theosophy 55

2. Forms:

(a) Ontologism:

(i) De Bonald, Bonnetti 56

CONTENTS. IX

III. Theory of Theosophy — Continued. page.

(2) Neo-Hegelians 57

(b) Special faculty:

(i) Forms 58

(2) Muller 58

(c) Theory of feeling:

(i) Defenders 59

IV. Theory of Christian Philosophy , 60

1. Sources.

CHAPTER IV. Mental Life

I. Grounds for idea of God in consciousness 63

II. Errors:

(i) The ^/!'rzWz proof: Anselm, Scotus, DesCartes, Leibnitz... 64

(2) The Neo-Hegelian: Fichte, Hegel, The Neo-Hegelians .... 67

III. Theory of Christian Philosophy 70

(i) Method a posteriori 71

(2) Argument.

(a) The universal idea viewed as to its content 72

(b) The judgment: first principles > 75

(c) Reasoning: error, mathematics, reign of truth 76

(d) St. Augustine, Bossuet, Fenelon — the facts of ignor-

ance, of discovery 78

IV. Criticism of Prof. Royce: criticism . 80

CHAPTER V. Argument is two-fold: law of conscience and aspirations of the

soul 83

I. Argument from conscience 84

1°. The Moral Order:

(i) right and wrong 84

(2) obligation, moral necessity and moral order 85

(3) sanction in the individual and in history 86

X ' CONTENTS.

I. Argument from conscience — Continued. page.

2°. Conscience. 87

(i) the voice of the moral law. (2) its nature and office. 3°. Argument 88

(i) how formulated.

(2) its conclusion: a just and good God.

(i) his notion of morality.

(2) Independent morality, e.g., Neo-Kantians, disciples

of culture, ethical societies, etc. (3") criticism.

II. Argument from fundamental desires. 91

i^. aspiration for truth. 2° . love of the good. 3°. desire of life. 4°. longing for happiness. 5°. man's religious nature.

Conclusion ; force of the argument 93

CHAPTER VI. Contingency

I. Basis of the argument: the fact of change 96

II. The argument 97

(i) chemistry 97

(2) Physics:

(a) mechanical physics 99

(b) Thermo-Dynamics 100

(3) Astronomy 103

(4) Geology 105

(5) Biology 106

(6) Anthropology no

(7) Mathematics in

CHAPTER VII. Causality

I. The principle:

(i) cause „ 117

(2) efficient cause: its nature 118

(3) how expressed:

(a) every effect has a cause 119

CONTENTS. XI

I. The principle — Continued. page.

(b) the dependent demands the independent. 120

(c) a thing beginning to be demands a reason for the

beginning 120

(4) how proved , 121

II. Errors 121

(i) Hume:

(a) genesis of cause: its value 122

(b) criticism: experience — value of Hume's position. . . 122 (2) Mill:

(a) nature of cause 125

III. Argument 126

CHAPTER VIII. Motion

I. The Principle 129

(i) motion: potential and kinetic energy 130

(2) definition of Aristotle 131

II. Errors: Hegel . 131

(i) The TO fieri. „ 132

(a) false philosophically 132

(b) false scientifically « 133

(c) falsity of Neo-Hegelianism 133

III. The Argument 133

IV. The Argument from Local Motion , 133

(i) nature of local motion 134

(2) nature of attraction:

(a) theory of Mechanists 135

(b) theory of Dynamists 137

(3) objections:

(a) eternal motion 138

(b) Kant's theory 139

V. Argument from Mutation 140

(i) question stated 140

(2) basis:

(a) everything in motion is moved by something else . . . 140

(b) infinite series impossible 143

(3) reducible to local motion .- 144

VI. Conclusion 145 xii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I Order. page

History — importance I47

I. Basis 148

final cause: question stated 149

n. The Fact 151

(i) efficient and final cause 151

(2) final cause necessary:

(a) Physiology 152

(b) Psychology , 153

(c) Ethics 154

HI. The Principle 156

(a) facts: hypothesis of chance.

(b) conscious experience.

(c) animal life.

(d) external nature: nature and art

(e) material universe.

IV. Theories 161

i". Mechanical:

2°. Evolution:

(a) forms: Monism, Agnosticism, Darwinism 165

3°. Pantheism: Schoppenhauer, Hartman 172

V. Theory of Christian Philosophy 174

1°. Doctrine. 2°. Proof:

(i) by exclusion.

(2) by reasoning from facts.

(3) method and conclusion.

CHAPTER X.

Creation.

I. Theory of Pantheism 179

i'^. Theory of Emanation l8o

(i) doctrine.

CONTENTS. Xlll

I. Theory of Pantheism — Continued. page.

(2) forms:

(a) India 181

(b) Gnostics 182

(c) Neo-Platonism 183

(d) Erigena 183

(e) Cousin 184

2°. Theory of Manifestation 185

(i) doctrine.

(2) forms:

(a) India 186

(b) Stoic 187

(c) Spinoza 188

(3) Influence 189

3°. Transcendental Theory. > 190

(i) doctrine. (2) forms:

(a) Vedanta 191

(b) German Transcendentalism 198

II. Dualistic Theory 200

(i) history and forms 200

(2) Ethical dualism 201

III. Theory of Creation 202

(i) notion 202

CHAPTER XI.

Unity.

I. Unity . . 209

II. Simple Unity 211

(1) not collective unity 211

(2) not potential unity 213

(3) not abstract unity 217

III. Theory of Christian Philosophy 223

(i) simple unity , 223

(2) not a physical composite, e. g., body. 223

(3) not a metaphysical composite, e. g., soul 224

(4) not a logical composite 227

(5) God a pure act, a pure spirit 228

Immanence and Transcendence of God 229

XIV CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XII.

Providence. page.

Question stated , 231

I. Notion of Providence : law, government, order, meaning of law, 233

II. The Material World 235

reign of law: Astronomy, Chemistry, Physics:

III. Organic World 240

reign of law: Biology, Anatomy, Physiology.

IV. Difficulties:

(i) perturbations in stellar universe, e. g.. Astronomy, Meteorology 246

(2) prodigality in organic kingdom 248

(3) useless organs 250

CHAPTER XIII.

Prayer.

The question 253

I. The Fact ., 254

II. Theory of Modern Science 255

(i) prayer opposed to physical laws: its true value 256

III. Miracles . 260

(i) nature 260

(a) Pantheists: Spinoza, Spencer, Hegel , 265

(b) Physical Scientists 266

(c) facts denied, e. g., Tyndall, Huxley 268

IV. Special Providences 270

(i) nature 270

(2) how illustrated 271

V. Conclusion ^ 273

CHAPTER XIV.

Pessimism.

I. Buddhism.. 276

(i) Buddhism of Gotama 278

(2) Four Noble Truths 279

CONTENTS. XV

PAGE.

II. Schoppenhauer 283

(i) doctrine:

(a) sources, basis 283

(b) will the only reality 284

(c) value of life:

(a) a priori 285

(b) a posteriori 286

(a) theory of knowledge false 287

(b) principle is false 287

III. Hartman 289

(i) doctrine:

(a) genesis, the unconscious, matter and mind 289

(b) Hedonism, value and goal of life, 290

IV. Influence 292

V. Causes 294

(i) Philosophical.

(2) Ethical.

(3) Religious.

CHAPTER XV.

Evil.

I. The Problem 297

(i) nature of evil.

(2) nature and kinds of good.

II. In the Material World 300

(i) Principle of finality 300

(2) ends, tendencies, final cause , 303

(3) mutual fitnesses, existence of goodness fundamental and

universal 305

III. In Human Life 307

(i) Theory of Hedonism:

(a) exposition , 308

(2) Theory of Utilitariarism:

(a) exposition. 310

(b) Empirical, Intuitional and Evolutionary Ethics 311

(c) criticism 312

(a) in Animal Life: tendencies; pleasure and pain; animal

and human pain 314 xvi CONTENTS.

III. In Human Life — Continued. page.

(b) in Human Life:

(i) good, and moral order 316

(2) nature of evil 317

(3) physical pain and moral evil . . . , 319

(4) pain in Human Life 319

IV. Conclusion 320

CHAPTER XVI.

Natural and Supernatural.

The Problem 322

I. Theory of Positivism 322

(a) teaching.

(b) supernatural.

(c) idea of humanity.

(d) criticism.

II. Theory of Pantheism , 326

(a) teaching.

(b) defenders.

III. Theory of Dr. Bushnell 329

(a) teaching.

(b) criticism.

IV. Theory of Christian Philosophy 332

(a) natural.

(b) supernatural.

Conclusion.

Introduction

§ I. God is the greatest word ia language, the most profound and far-reaching problem in philosophy.^ Found on the lips of every rational creature, it yet unfolds a depth of meaning which the greatest intelligence has never exhausted. It enters into the lowliest lives to restrain, uplift and sanctify. In times of sore trial the thought of God is like a beacon in the gloom, breaking through the darkest cloud with a ray of hope, and brings the message of light and peace, and happiness beyond. Speak of God to the sorrow-laden and depressed; their burden becomes Hghter and their heart more strong. The great astronomer, after untold labor spent in investigating the laws of the heavenly bodies, lifts his soul in humble thanksgiving to God for the unutterable joys experienced in the contemplation of His works.'* To bring a message about God to our fellow-men is the highest duty and privilege. The message is a glad tidings to the human soul which ever yearns for more knowledge concerning its origin and destiny. " Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee.'"

§ 2. A message, to be of value, must appeal to living men. Special questionings and difficulties are a part of every individual mind. A wise physician examines the nature of the disease before prescribing a remedy.

* Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 400. ^ E. g. Kepler, cf. Order in the Physical World, tr. from the French, by T. J. Slavin, p. 9. ^St. Aug. Confess. 1. i, c. i.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

History is a reflex of the individual. Its periods are characterized by a predominance given to certain problems or to varied aspects of life. Hence special difficulties arise which mast be answered. The knowledge of God's truth is ever increasing, an abundance of material is at hand. The need is to gather this and give to it a shape and form best fitted to break the advance of error.

§ 3. Our age is an age of scepticism. The storm of doubt, bitter and relentless, has swept over our lives. Beliefs and truths, dear to the soul and sanctioned by time-honored tradition, have been ruthlessly assailed. Timid minds have seen the dark hosts rapidly forming, have beheld positions believed impregnable successfully assailed and viewed in anticipation the ruin and desolation of what made life precious. The fundamental truths of religion are the object of attack. The existence of God, the nature of the soul, the fact of revelation are questioned. At such a time it is not wise to fly to the refuge of faith. The most decisive battles of to-day are fought beyond the breastworks of revealed truth. * The arms we use are those of reason, the missiles are the most certain facts of consciousness and of physical science. In employing these we claim the right to use any legitimate m.ethod. We deny the claim of adversaries to limit us to any one method or any one class of facts, and then cry out that the reasoning is not conclusive. Methods vary, even though legitimate. In time of war the wise leader disposes his array with a view to capture the position of the enemy. In like manner we claim the right to employ the method best suited to the present exigencies of the subject.

,^ Balfour, Foundations of Belief, p. 2; Wordsworth, The One Religion, p. 6.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 4. The considerations adduced are the heritage of Christian Philosophy handed down by the pens of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The marvellous advance in the sciences furnish mcreased data for argument and illustration. The question is considered under all aspects. All sources of knowledge are investigated. History, Language, Psychology, Ethics, the Physical Sciences, each comes with its special testimony. The aim is simply to collect the data and show their bearing on the Idea of God; to answer the question: What is meant by God and has the idea of God an objective vaUdity?

§ 5. This is a problem of modern thought. Is the mind constrained to admit that the Theistic interpretation of the universe is the true one? All that is true and noble in human life depends on the answer. The trend of philosophic speculation renders the discussion imperative. The wide interest and large circulation of treatises on the Idea of God is a sign of the times. In our own country the recent contributions of Prof. Royce and of Prof. Fiske hold the attention of readers. In chapter IV the views of the former are critically examined. Under a thoughtful and attractive style he proposes an ethical and idealistic Pantheism. The Idea of God by Prof. Fiske is a popular work, and appeals strongly to the undisciplined mind. In the present treatise however the reader will clearly see: (i) That his theory of the origin of the idea of God is flatly contradicted by facts. ^ (2) That his presentation of the Christian idea of God as set forth by St. Augustine is absolutely false.® (3) That he confounds the teaching of St. Athanasius and of Clement of Alexandria with the doctrine of Spinosa, Lessing,

' Idea of God, ch. III., pp. 154, 163; infra, ch. III., s. II. « Idea of God. ch. V., VI.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

and Schleiermacher/ (4) That far from presenting a Theistic doctrine, his is rather a Cosmic Pantheism.*

CHAPTER I.

AGNOSTICISM.

§ I. History is the record of the human race. It sets forth what man has achieved in the various spheres of human activity. We there behold the many phases of a nation's life from its early rise through all its progress in government, in science, in letters, in conquest on to its decline and fall. Thus nation comes after nation and government gives way to government. The map of the world is ever changing and each change appeals to us with keen interest as involving the hopes, resolves and fortunes of human beings like ourselves.

§ 2. The mere narration of facts may please the Philosophy young; it is not sufficient for the more mature mind. ° ^^°^^- He seeks to get behind the facts, to grasp the causes, to know why and how a people rose from amidst their neighbors and exercised an influence upon contemporaneous and subsequent periods. Thus we are led to the most attractive study of the Philosophy of History.

§ 3. Our interest is now centered upon the history of thought. The world has seen epochs characterized by the activity and splendor of literary work. They have been called the intellectual ages of mankind. In spite of many differences we may still detect some striking resemblances which form a basis for comparison and contrast. Thus the thoughtful student sees reasons to compare the present period of philosophic thought to the period of Greek Philosophy at the birth of Socrates and to the Middle Ages at the time of St. Thomas Aquinas.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Agnosticism.

Present § 4. In the fifth centurv, B. C, Athens was the center

time can be ^ ^ j ■> ^

compared of intellectual life in Greece. There from all parts

to Greece

at the birth 2:athered teachers and those anxious still to learn. To

of Socrates. ^ . . . ,

the Athenian success meant position in the state and an influence in public affairs. For this the knowledge of Rhetoric or of public debate was a necessity. Hence the multitude of individual teachers who claimed to propose what all so eagerly sought. They became known as Sophists, /. e., wise men — an appellation of honor at first, but with Socrates and Plato indicating boastful, fallacious and venal men. work of 8 r. The Hfework of Socrates was to expose the pretensions of these men, to show the distinction between true and false knowledge. This is done by a process of intellectual analysis. At times he leaves the adversary in doubt as in the Dialogues of Search; again he proposes positive and definite truths. In both the aim is apparent, viz., the necessity of forming clear conceptions. The principal elements of Logic are found in the dialogues; afterwards they were thrown into scientific form by Aristotle. Thus was given a deathly blow to the universal scepticism of the time.'

^o^ern g 6_ Modcm thought is running in a parallel course.

cism. The current tone is Agnostic, which is as Prof. Schur-

man says, the " Apotheosis of Scepticism." ' The passing generation has been deeply imbued with its spirit. In Philosophy, Mr. Spencer is its acknowledged leader; in Science, Mr. Huxley and Mr. Tyndall champion its teaching; in Literature, George Eliot,

^ Cf. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools. ' Cf. Belief in God, by Pres. Schurman.

AGNOSTICISM.

Mrs. Humphrey Ward are its open defenders. Not confined within the walls of the university or lecture hall, it has become a topic of conversation in the parlor, the dining-room and on the railway carriage. The collegegraduate and the daily laborer are heard to voice its sentiments. The tendency is to question everything; and philosophy, science, as well as common sense assure us that the only state of mind on the important problems of life and of being is one of doubt.'

Origin. 87. The term "Agnosticism" is of very recent origin of origin. Mr Huxley is very mgenuous m telling how it was coined. When a young man, he became a member of the Metaphysical society of London, he found himself out of place in the company of men each of whom had a reputation as the parent of an I'sm of some kind. He felt constrained to be like his associates and broached the doctrine of Agnosticism. In a spirit of humility he openly confessed that he was an Agnostic because he did not know nor could he ever hope to know a solution for the fundamental truths of religion."*

8 8. The doctrine, however, signified by the term the

" . . ' . doctrine.

Agnosticism is not new.^ It is of the same nature as that proposed by the Sceptics in the time of Socrates. Nevertheless in its modern form it cannot claim to be

^Theological Essays, R. H. Hutton, p. 22; Is Life Worth Living, W. H. Mallock, ch. VIII; The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, ch. III., IV.

^ Essays on Some Controverted Questions, IX., Prof. Huxley; his article in XlXth Century, Feb., 1895, in criticism of Mr. Balfour's " Foundations of Belief."

'The Roots of Agnosticism, by James Seth in the New- World, Sept., 1894.

a direct offspring. It is a truth of history that like effects may be traced to the working of independent causes. The cause at the base of the Greek Scepticism as well as of modern Agnosticism is the failure on the part of the human mind to acquire definite and true knowledge of things. Thus we find Socrates ever occupied in an analysis of the definition. The Dialogues are discussions concerning the meaning of words. In our own day the fundamental problem of Philosophy is in like manner the theory of the notion. The circumstances, however, which brought the cause into play are not the same in both periods. We shall briefly indicate the sources and development of modern Agnosticism. They can be summed up under three heads: Philosophical, scientific and religious.

^° Its

causes Phil- I . Philosophical.

osophical.

§ 9. (a) Locke is called the parent of English PsytelSXng^^ chology. A disciple of Descartes, he yet shows inde- Agnost?? pendence of mind in differing from his master, e. g., ^'^™' rejecting innate ideas, and in working out his own

peculiar theory of knowledge. He teaches that sensation and reflection are thie two sources of knowledge. The former embraces the knowledge of external objects. The latter is so much like this that it might be properly called the internal sense.®

§ 10. Thus is found an explanation for Locke's empiricism. To him reflection is a more refined form of sensation. The radical difference between sense and thought is obliterated; the one runs into the other, of which it is a more shadowy form. The higher powers of mind are ignored. As a consequence we only know the qualities or sensitive appearances of

* Human Understanding, b. II., ch. i, sec. IV.

thinefs: the real substance or essence is beyond reach/ Substance

^ ' •' unknown.

Therefore in the founder of English philosophy we find traces of the modern school of Agnosticism.

§ II. Starting from Locke's principle that the mind developed knows external objects only through mental representa- and Hume?' tions,^ Berkeley quickly developed into Idealism. Ideas, /. ^., mental representations are the direct and proper objects of cognition; the esse of things is their pei'cipi.^ Hume combined the Agnosticism of Locke and the Idealism of Berkeley and taught an open and radical scepticism.^"

§ 12. The destructive character of Hume's writings aroused Kant. For upwards of twenty years he labored on his great work A Critic of Pure Reason. He was confident that he had given a death blow to scepticism and placed human knowledge on a firm lasting basis.

8 13. (b) Kant tausfht that the mind independent of (b) Kant all experience, creates in itself certain pure forms of source of knowledge. Into these forms and clothed by themcism. are fitted the materials of knowledge, /, ^., the phenomena furnished by the senses. The forms of Intuition are Space and Time; the forms of thought are the twelve Categories." The categories are purely ideal; they have no objective validity. Yet they are the direct object of the perceiving mind. For the mind in the act of apprehending an object clothes the object with its own ideal vesture. The forms or vesture constitute with Kant the phenomena. The

' " Indeed as to the real essence of substances we only suppose their being without precisely knowing what they are." lb. B. III., ch. IV., sec. VI.

Hb. B. IV., ch. I, sec. I.

^^ Berkeley's Works V. i, sec. 3, The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, p. 42.

'^Treatise on Human Nature; The Theistic Argument, J. Dimon, DD., pp. 6, 7.

" Critic of Pure Reason.

lO

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Influence of Locke and Kant upon modern thought.

Philosophy of Association is Agnostic.

real objects, as they are in their own concrete existence independent of the mind, are never known. ^' "We know nothing but oar manner of perceiving them." ^^ The objects in their own objective nature are called by Kant nou}ne7ia. Hence the famous distinction which obtains even to our day between the phenome7ia and the noumena. The ideal appearances make up our knowledge; the real things are unknown and unknowable. The speculative reason cannot know God; He becomes the postulate of practical reason. Thus in attempting to refute Hume, Kant becomes the parent of modern Agnosticism.^*

§ 14. The direct influence of the real phenomenalism of Locke, and the ideal phenomenalism of Kant upon the formation of modern thought can be easily traced. The two currents worked their own way along until in our own day the waters intermingle and their separate identity is merged into a wider and more powerful stream.

§ 15. Locke's theory of knowledge developed by Hume influenced Hartley, Priestley, Bentham and James Mill. Drawing the inspiration and teaching from his father, J. S. Mill proposes it with a wealth of detail and analysis in his Logic, a work which exercised a profound influence on the English mind of the past generation. He thus became the logician, while Mr. Spencer is termed the metaphysician, and Mr. Bain the psychologist of the Association School.

§ 16. Hence the only system of philosophy which can be considered as the product of the English mind is the direct offspring of Locke and Hume. It teaches with them that we can only know the external appear-

'' Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 321, 360.

^^ Critic, Transc. ^sthet., p. 37.

'^ A. K, Rogers, Modern Philosophy, p. 225.

ances of things, that what we term substance is only a bundle of qualities united by the laws of association, that the real essence is unknown and unknowable." The bounds of human knowledge are confined within the domains of sense. The notions of cause, of substance, of essence are explained in a new meaning. God, soul, etc., may exist; the human mind is unable to say so; therefore to us they are as good as not existing. But this is the distinctive character of Agnosticism.

§ 17. The influence of Kant comes through another Kant course. During the eighteenth century the Scotch Hamilton a

source of

school of philosophy alone withstood the power of Agnosti- English scepticism and materialism. With Reid it became a strong citadel of Theistic argument. Sir W. Hamilton, however, recognized the weakness in the position of his predecessor. At the time Kant was in the zenith of power and his teaching was considered impregnable. To him, therefore, Hamilton went for the material to supply what was lacking in Reid. His work was an attempt at a reconstruction. It was eagerly welcomed by Christian writers and for upwards of fifty years was the recognized manual of Theistic philosophy outside of the Catholic church.

§ 18. The real effect of Hamilton was contrary to^js^hemy what he and his disciples expected. His theory of the edge. notion was riddled by J. S. Mill.^^ His philosophy of the conditioned is nothing more than an exposition in English form of the categories of Kant. The mind in the act of knowing fixes limits on the object known." Thus we can only know the limited, /. ^., the finite.

*^ Essays on Religion, J. S. Mill, p. 263. '* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton.

"'* To define a thing is to give it limits." Knight, Aspects of Theism, p. 157.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Mausel a disciple of Hamilton.

2° Scientific.

position and influence of physical science.

The infinite is a mere negation, /. <?., of the finite. God becomes not an object of knowledge but of faith. ^^ § 19, Dean Mansel in his Bampton Lectures ^^ publicly and expressly attempted to harmonize this doctrine with the tenets of Christian teaching. The result was disastrous. The fallacy of the reasoning, the weakness of his position were too patent to be passed by in silence. Christianity suffered by being allied to a false philosophy. And the effort to follow the lead of Hamilton and Mansel has brought English non- Catholic Apologetics to its present low position and made it so easy a mark for trenchant writers like Huxley and Spencer."

2°. Scientific.

§ 20. A second factor in the development of modern Agnosticism is found in the rise and progress of physical science. Our century is truly an epoch of scientific discovery. By observation and experimentation every department of nature has been compelled to disclose its treasures and to reveal its laws. The old classic curriculum in the most conservative universities has been shattered and scientific departments formed with special academic degrees. The importance of a scientific education is loudly proclaimed, the methods of scientific mvestigation are praised to the exclusion of any other."

^^ The Limits of Religious Thought.

'^^ The Theistic Argument, by J. Dimon, p. 22. Thus Prof. Fraser holds that the alternative lies between either " a sceptical alienation from an uninterpretable universe " or " reconciliation vrith the universe in hopeful moral faith." Phil, of Theism, 2d series, p. 3, This is the position of Kant. Cf. also The Christian Doctrine of God in Lux Mundi, p. 88; Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, B. H., ch, IX.; Pres. Schurman in the Philosophical Review, vol. IV., May, 1895.

2^ The Great Enigma, W. S. Lilly, p. 201.

§ 21. The Physical sciences are of great value. No their value. one will deny that a larger knowledge of nature ennobles man and contributes to the material comfort of life. Nevertheless the physical sciences investigate only one department of nature. Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics cannot be classed as physical sciences.

§ 22. The exclusive attention paid to physical science the source is due to the rise of Positivism and the decline of power. Hegelianism. The metaphysics of Hegel, the culminating point in the development of Kant, was considered Metaphyto be the last and final effort of the human mind in solving the mystery of the universe. Its merits were instantly recognized, but its critics were not silent. They succeeded in exposing the assumptions on which it was based and the contradictions it involved. The result was a division of Hegel's disciples into three warring camps. The controversy was bitterly carried on by the small parties of followers. Many minds, however, paused in dismay. To them metaphysics was a synonym for whatever is extravagant, unintelligible and absurd."

§ 23. At this crisis Comte broached the system off^^^J^°,^ Positive philosophy. His aim was to constitute a ^^^^°^°p^5^- hierarchy of the physical sciences and set forth sure and true methods to be followed in the pursuit of knowledge. His success was very great. The system was propagated in England, America, Germany, Italy^ as well as in France. He taught that observation and experimentation were the only channels of knowledge, that what was beyond the limits and scope of the senses did not exist, that the only knowledge deserving the name was physical knowledge. In England J. S.