A philosophical treatise on the passions

Preface

Amidst the numerous Branches of Knowledge .vhich claim the attention of the human mind, no one can be more important than that which constitutes the subject of the following Treatise. Whatever most intimately concerns ourselves must be of the first moment. The principle of self-love, which is inherent in our nature, immediately suggests that no other species of knowledge can stand in competition with it. Every thing is justly deemed interesting which has an immediate relation to ourselves ; and the degrees of its importance are measured by the degrees of its influence upon our Well-being, Therefore, to attend to the workings of our own minds ; to trace the power which external objects have over us ; — to discover the nature of our emotions and affections ; — to comprehend the reason of our being affected in a particular manner, must have a direct influence upon our pursuits, our characters; and our happiness.

It may with justice be advanced, that the history of ourselves in this department, is of much greater utility than abstruser speculations concerning the metaphysical nature of the human soul, or even the most accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers. For it is according as the pasions and affections are excited ; and directed towards the ob-

H PREFACE.

jecfs investigated by these intellectual powers, that we become useful to ourselves or others ; that we rise into respectability or sink into contempt , that we diffuse or enjoy happiness, diffuse or suir er misery.

An accurate Analysis of the passions and pff ec . tions, is to the Moralist, what the science of Anatomy is to the Surgeon. It constitutes the first principles of rational practice. It is in a moral view, the anatomy of the heart. It discovers why it beats, and hozc it beats ; indicates appearances in a sound and healthy state; detects diseases with their cause \ and it is infinitely more fortunate in the power it communicates of applying suitable remedies.

Yet, notwithstanding the superior importance of this Science, it has not engaged the attention of philosophers, to an equal degree with the intellectual powers of man. Those who are conscious of the acuteness of their own intellects, have loved to employ them upon subjects the most difficult and abstruse. Their chief delight has been in the study of natures and essences ; and their ambition, to solve difficulties which have repeatedly occupied and embarrassed the strongest minds. Patient attention to facts appears to them an employment best adapted to plain and common understandings : it is the province of Genius to soar above the common level, and penetrate the mists which surround the regions of intellect.

When it is asserted that the passions of the mind have not employed the attention of the philosophic world, equally with the other branches which relate to Man, the assertion implies that they have not been totally neglected. Philosophers, in their study of human nature, have not passed them over in silence. They have treated them occasionally, but generally speaking, superficially ; chiefly as appendages to their other philosophical pursuits. This circumstance, it is acknowledged, has been productive of a train of thought peculiar to each specula-

PREFACE. V

tor ; and thus has each been able to throw some light upon a subject, which it was not his sole or primary object to investigate.

Among the authors who have paid the most attention to the subject, Professor Hutcheson, Dr. Watts, Mr. Grove, the Writer of the article " on the Passions of Men," in the British Encyclopaedia, and Mr. Hume, may justly be placed in the first rank. The observations of Mr. Hutcheson chiefly respect the moral uses of the Passions, which it is not the professed object of the present Treatise to investigate. Objections to some of the principles advanced by Dr. Watts, and Mr. Grove, as well as other Writers of eminence, are stated in the Introductory Chapter, and will occasionally appear in different parts of this Work. It will therefore be sufficient to remark at present, that the very small degree of information obtained respecting many essential points ; the imperfection of every arrangement hitherto made ; the almost universal disagreement among philosophers, in their ideas concerning the precise nature of a Passion, Emotion, and Affection, or in what respect they specifically differ from each other, &c. were the principal inducements to the Author of the following Treatise, to pay much greater attention to the workings of the human mind, than he would have done, had their remarks been more satisfactory. In order to find his way through perplexing labyrinths, he was determined to extend the analytical method much farther than it has hitherto been pursued ; from a full conviction that, although it is not in general the most popular and acceptable mode, it is much the securest, and best adapted to procure a strength of evidence, in philosophical, moral, and religious subjects, which approaches to the nature of demonstration.

The Treatise now submitted to public candour,

contains the history and the result of this process ;

in which, however slow and tedious the steps, the

Author has been frequently relieved, and sometimes

1*

VI PREFACE.

amply rewarded, by discoveries which appeared to him equally new and important. If they should appear so to others, he will feel himself completely recompensed for his labour.

As he is not without apprehensions that the analytical part will appear much too tedious and prolix, thus he fears that the philosophical observations and inquiries will appear much too superficial ; but he would remind the Reader that his sole object in the present treatise, is to give an epitome of general and influential principles, and not to pursue the development of any to the extent of which it is susceptible.

The natural consequences of this immediate application to the genuine sources of knowledge, without any pre-conceived hypothesis, are, that, in some instances, the author has traced a perfect coincidence of opinion between his own and those of preceding Writers on the Passions ; in many, he has corrected his own previous ideas ; in others, he thinks that he has not only discovered errors in preceding Writers, but also the causes of them. Wherever the subject has appeared peculiarly important, the discrepancy great, and the Authorities opposed, repectable, he has stated the subject, and his reasons in the adjoined Notes ; that the concatenation of ideas, so necessary in the analytical method, might not suffer interruption.

Notwithstanding his utmost care, the Analyzer cannot flatter himself that nothing of importance has escaped his attention. Both the extent and intricacy of the subject will, it is hoped, furnish an apology for many defects. Nor can he expect that of the numerous explanations and definitions proposed, they will all be equally acceptable and convincing. Some of them will probably be erroneous. But it may not be improper to remark, that the extraordinary versatility of language renders it extremely difficult to seize the precise signification of terms, in every connexion ; and this will sometimes occasion a diversity of opinion, in cases where a criterion

FREFACE. VII

cannot always be found to which our judgments will uniformly submit. If the Reader should not agree with him in the precise signification of particular terms, the utmost care has been taken that the sense in which the Author has used them shall not be misunderstood : so that the principles he advances must either enforce conviction, or lay themselves fully open to confutation.

The copiousness of the subject has principally confined the Work before us to a philosophical investigation of the Passions. Yet in these abstruser investigations, many thoughts occasionally present themselves, properly belonging to the departments of Ethics, and requiring a larger amplification than would be consistent with the design of the present work. The Science of Ethics opens a field for contemplation still more extensive. Although it has so frequently engaged the attention of Moralists, it appears to be inexhaustible ; nor ought we to despair of perpetual additions being added to our stock of knowledge, concerning the nature and importance of our duty.

The degree of acceptance with which this Treatise has been received by the Philosophic World, encouraged the Author to prosecute his design, and he proceeded to consider the Passions and Affections in a more practical, and perhaps still more interesting point of view.

The apprehensions which naturally present themselves, lest public expectation should not be gratified, by much novelty, on a subject which has been so frequently treated, are in some measure silenced by a conviction that his attempts will be received with an indulgence similar to that which he has already experienced.

Although attention has been paid in these subsequent editions to several minuter corrections, yet the Author has been reluctant to make such alterations in them as might depreciate the value of the preceding, in the opinion of the Purchasers. The viii PREFACE.

most considerable change consists in the divisions of the first two Chapters : the new Arrangements, and introductory Emotions being placed at the commencement of the second Chapter instead of terminating the Jirst : by which he thinks that a more lucid order is preserved. Several additions might have been made, but as these could, with equal propriety, be inserted in a future Volume, that mode has been preferred.

©©wrasstm

Chapter I. General View Of The Subject

Page Sect. I. On Passions, Emotions, and Affections ; the specific difference between them ... 13

II. Plans of Arrangement examined . . .23

III. Love and Hatred; their Nature ... 28

IV. Desire and Aversion 35

V. Objects of Love and Hatred .... 38

Chapter II

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PASSIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR CHARACTERISTIC DIFFERENCES.

Sect. I. Efficient causes of the Passions, &c. examined . 4 J II. Introductory Emotions 44

III, Classifications of the Passions and Affections, as

they respect the Selfish or the Social Principle o\\ x CONTENTS.

Pag,

CLASS I.

PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, WHICH OWE THEIR

ORIGIN TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-LOVE 5 2

ORDER I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, &c. EXCI- TED BY THE IDEA OF GOOD . • 53

Joy, Gladness, &c ibid

Contentment 55

Satisfaction ibid

Complacency 56

Pride, he 50

ORDER II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS EXCITED

BY THE IDEA OF EVIL . . . .72

Grief, Melancholy, he 74

Patience, Resignation, Humility ... 75

2. FEAR 77

Consternation, Terror, Dread, Despair, &c. &;c. 7 8

Wrath, Resentment, Indignation, kc. kc. . 8'i

CLASS II.

PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS DERIVED FROM THE

ORDER I. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS, IN WHICH

GOOD IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA . 94

I. Benevolent Desires and Dispositions . . . ibid

2. Sympathetic Affections . . . .97

II. Affections derived from Good Opinion . 106

Gratitude 107

Admiration 10S

Esteem, Respect . . . . . .112

Veneration, he 113

Fondness, &c 114

ORDER II. PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS IN WHICH

EVIL IS THE PREDOMINANT IDEA 11".

I, Malevolent Desires and Dispositions . . .116

Malignancy, Envy, Rancour, Cruelty. &c, . 117

Contents

Rage, Revenge, kc. Suspicion, Jealousy II. Displacency indicated by unfavourable opinions Horror, Indignation, Contempt, kc. .

ibid

Part II

i'HILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS AND INQUIRIES.

CHAPTER I.

OBSERVATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS OF EX- CITEMENT . , 131

OBSERVATION I. Surprise the efficient Cause of Passion], ibid II. Affections alone permanent . . . 134 HI. Relations of Passions and Affections to

each other . . . . . . 137

IV. Seat of the Passions .... 146

CHPATER II.

♦ VISES WHICH CREATE A DIVERSITY IN OUR

AFFECTIONS, ENUMERATED . . 156

Experience .

Difference of Sex

. 157

3. 4. 5.

Diversity of Temperament .

Progress from Infancy to Age .

National Customs

. 162

163 . 165

Force of Habit

Self-Love . .

. 168

Education ....

Novelty ,

. 172

Fashion

Love of Singularity

12. 13.

Popular Prejudices .

Associated Affections .

. 177

Manner in which information is c onveyed ....

Imitative Tones and Representation;

. 183 . 164

Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence .

. 18.7

The Drams .....

. 190

Pre-disnosuig Causes

. 191 xii CONTENTS*

Chapter III

Sect. I. Medical Influence 195

II. Influence on Thought and Language . 209

III. Influence on Character ...... 216

IV. Influence on Happiness 222

PART I.

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS,

Section 1

>>■ PASSrO.NS, EMOTIONS, AND AFFECTIONS; THE SPECIFIC Djjfc FERENCE BETWEEN THEM.

By Passions, emotions, and affections, we understand those stronger or weaker feelings, with their correspondent effects upon the system, which are excited within us, by the perception or contemplation of certain qualities, which belong, or are supposed to belong to the objects of our attention ; and which, in some respect or other, appear interesting to us. In all cases, when the violence of the emotion is not too powerful for the animal economy, the feelings or sensations excited, are pleasant or unpleasant, according to the nature of the exciting cause, the ideas entertained of it, or the intenseness with which the mind is struck by it. These feelings differ in degrees of strength, according to the apparent importance of their cause ; according to certain peculiarities of temperament ; and also according to the manner in which the influential qualities are prerented to the mind.

One or other of the three terms, Passion, Emotion, Affection, is always employed to express the sensible effects which objects, or ideas concerning them, have upon the mind ; but they are so frequently employed in a vague and indeterminate manner, that some difficulty attends the attempt to restore them to their precise and discriminating significations.

The word, Passion, is thus rendered subject to several peculiarities, in the application of it. Sometimes it is used in a generic sense, as expressive of every impression made upon the mind. When we speak of the passions in general, or of a treatise on the passions, we mean not to express the stronger impressions alone, the mildest affections are also included ; and if we denominate any one to be a person of strong passions, we mean that he is subject to violent transports of joy, or grief, or anger, &c* indiscriminately. In one instance the word is emphatically employed to express suffering / as our Saviours passion ; in another it indicates anger exclusively ; thus when it is said of any one that he is in a passion, it is universally understood that he is very angry. The term passion, and its adverb passionately, often express a very strong predilection for any pursuit, or object of taste ; a kind of enthusiastic fondness for any thing. Thus we remark that a person has a passion for music, or that he is passionately fond of painting, &c. &c. In a sense similar to this, is the word also applied to every propensity, which operates strongly and permanently upon the mind ; as the selfish passions, the generous passions. Yet when we mean to particularize any of these, a different law of phraseology is observed. The word passion is appropriated by the evil propensities which are uniformly operative. Thus we do not say, the affection of pride, or of avarice, but the passion* The term affection, on the other hand, is appropriated by the virtuous propensities ; as the social, friendly, parental, filial, aflfee-

PASSIONS. Ij

tions, &x. though philosophically considered, the relation they bear to the state and workings of the mind, is perfectly analogous.

Nor is this capricious latitude of expression confined to common language, where accuracy is not always to be expected; it is also obvious among philosophers themselves, so that scarcely two authors, who have written upon the subject of the passions, are agreed in their ideas of the terms they emplo} r . While some consider the emotions as highly turbulent, others assert that they are in their own nature quiescent :* — Some suppose a Passion to constitute the strength of an emotion ; others confine the idea of a passion to the desire which follows an emotion : — Others again represent the Passions as the calmest things in nature, deeming them to be the steady uniform principles of action, to which reason itself is always subservient.f Hence it becomes highly necessary to seek after some rules, which may render our ideas more consistent and uniform.

In most of these applications, no attention has been paid to the primitive signification of the word Passion ; although this appears to be the safest method to recall us from those aberrations to which we are perpetually exposed. Few expressions wander so far from their original import, as to convey a sense which is totally foreign. The primary idea annexed to the word is that of passiveness, or being impulsively acted upon. In this sense the term properly signifies the sensible effect, the feeling to which the mind is become subjected, when an object of importance, suddenly and imperiously, demands its attention. If our imaginations be lively, our temperaments susceptible, the object interesting to us, we cannot avoid being affected, or suffering some powerful change in our dispositions, by its recent appearance, or by the suggestion of a something we deem of importance. In all such cases we are obviously passive ; we are acted upon without

* Lord Kaims. t Mr, Hume.

any previous determination of the will, or without any consent of our own.

As several of our passions are of a disagreeable and painful nature, and as this passive or helpless state is so frequently connected with suffering, the transition from one signification to the other, is not only natural but almost inevitable ; and Passion will often be considered as synonymous with Suffering. In medical language, a person oppressed with disease is called a Patient, an involuntary sufferer, and the calmness with which he submits is termed patience ; that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indispositions of the body. The word, Pathology, has also the same derivation : it is the history of the sufferings incident to the human frame. The Greeks expressed passions in general by n-aQoc., which signifies suffering ; and the Latin word Passio, from which we have adopted the term passion, has the same signification. The Stoics also gave the name of veiH to all extraordinary emotions of the soul, because they considered them as mental diseases, by which the soul, while under their influence, was reduced to a state of suffering. But this secondary sense, as far as it conveys the idea of an unpleasant or painful sensation, is alone applicable to the effects produced by passions of a certain class: for others are in their own nature pleasing ; as joy and hope : whereas the primitive import of the word, that of passiveness, equally belongs to them all. The mind is equally passive in every effect suddenly and unexpectedly produced upon it, where its influence be of a pleasant, or unpleasant nature. (See Note A.)

The term, Passion, therefore, may with strict propriety be used, and used exclusively, to represent the first feeling, the percussion as it were, of which the mind is conscious from some impulsive cause ; by which it is wholly acted upon, without any efforts of its own, either to solicit or escape the impression.

EMOTIONS. IV

Probably it is in allusion to this passive state of the mind, that the terms passion, and passionately, are employed to express the powerful attachment to particular objects mentioned above. They insinuate that the influence of these beloved objects, is irresistible ; and that the mind is completely under their dominion.

The state of absolute passiveness, in consequence of any sudden percussion of mind, is of short duration. The strong impression, or vivid sensation, immediately produces a reaction correspondent to its nature, either to appropriate and enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cause. This reaction is very properly distinguished by the term Emotion, The sensible effect produced at the first instant, by the cause of the passion, greatly agitates the frame ; its influence is immediately communicated to the whole nervous system, and the commotions excited in that, indicate themselves by attitudes and motions of the body, and by particular expressions of countenance. These effects are such universal concomitants, that no very important change in the state of the mind can take place, without some visible change, of a correspondent nature in the animal economy.

Emotions therefore, according to the genuine signification of the word, are principally and primitively applicable to the sensible changes and visible effects, which particular passions produce upon the frame, in consequence of this reaction, or particular agitation of mind. It is alone by these visible effects that the subject is discovered to be under the influence of any passion ; and it is alone by the particular changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we are enabled to judge of the nature of the passion. Thus, although the passion exists prior to the emotions, yet as these are its external signs, they must indicate its continued influence, as long as they continue to agitate the system. In consequence of this immediate connexion, the words passions and emotions, are, in familiar discourse, where no philoso- 2*

IS EMOTIONS.

phical precision is requisite, used synonymously: though, in reality, the latter are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, as in innumerable other instances, figurative modes of expression are adopted. The Synecdoche is perpetually employed, by which, cause and effect are confounded, or substituted the one for the other. Since emotions are faithful indications of their correspondent passions, and strong passions are always productive of emotions, we should deem it a pedantic precision to select, at all limes, the appropriate word, when we mean simply to express the general effect.

However, the term Emotion is sometimes expressive of lively sensations which do not produce visible effects, in any degree proportionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind is not so completely, or necessarily passive. In general it possesses some power over the external signs ; and in many cases, where the feelings would be too strong to remain concealed, were they totally void of control, some other influential affection, either of fear, respect, humanity, &c. may serve to repress or moderate their effects, and confine them to imoard emotions.

Again, the term is frequently employed to mark the first impression, which particular objects make upon susceptible minds, whether they remain concealed or not. Thus in the fine Arts, the charms of musical compositions which are novel to us ; — the first view of a gallery of paintings possessing distinguished merit ; — the surprise of a beautiful or elevated sentiment, or poetic description, will generally make a more vivid impression upon us, than that which is felt in a continued, or renewed contemplation of the same subjects ; and yet these impressions may not be so forcible as to produce the transports accompanying emotions from other causes. But the difference is simply in degree, not in kind. This species of enjoyment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, whose repeated enjoyments of

AFFECTIONS. 19

similar nature have gradually moderated transports, and whose emotions have gradually subsided into gentler undulations, if I may thus express myself, in place of those agitations which the inexperienced would inevitably betray upon similar occasions.

The third term, Affection^ has, in itself, a different signification from either of the above. It always represents a less violent, and generally a more durable influence, which things have upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner in which we are affected by them for a continuance. It supposes a more deliberate predilection and aversion, in consequence of the continued influence of some prevailing quality. This distinguishes it from the transient impulse of Passion. • Nor is it intimately connected with any external signs; which distinguishes it from Emotions. The affections sometimes succeed to passions and emotions, because these may have been excited by something which becomes permanently interesting ; or they may be gradually inspired, by a deliberate attention to the good or bad qualities of their objects.

In this philosophic sense of the word, Affection is applicable to an unpleasant as well as a. pleasant state of the mind, when impressed by any object or quality. It may be produced by whatever torments qr corrodes the heart, as well as that which charms and delights it. Usage, however, chiefly applies the word to the kindly and beneficent affections. When we remark that a person has an affectionate heart, we mean to applaud his being under the influence of the best affections, of a social and relative nature.

With other writers on the Passions, we shall always use the term in the philosophical sense ; and apply it equally to whatever produces more permanent feelings in the mind, whether they be pleasing or painful, of a benevolent or malevolent character.

20 AFFECTIONS.

As in Passions and Emotions, thus in the Affections, several gradations of influence are observable. Some affections indicate themselves so strongly, that they approach to emotions ; some may require a penetrating eye to discover them ; — some may be powerfully indulged with such self command, that they shall elude the most critical observation ; — and some have such an equal and uniform influence as to blend, as it were, with the temper, and almost lose the name of affection ; as generosity, fortitude, humility, patience, resignation.

When there is a propensity to indulge one particular affection, or class of affections, more than another, arising from peculiarity of temperament, education, connexions, habits, &c. we consider this propensity as an indication of Temper or habitual Disposition. Thus we speak of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, revengeful temper. These characters do not imply, that the subject is perpetually under the influence of the particular affection, but they mark his propensity towards it. The Affections therefore refer to the actual impression made upon the mind by certain qualities, real or supposed ; and the Temper or Disposition is that particular cast of mind, which renders the perception of certain qualities capable of making a more prompt, or a more durable impression upon one person than upon another. We deem that man to be irascible, who is disposed to be angry at trifles; and him we praise as humane, who is always disposed to commiserate sufferings.

It is hoped that the above explanations of the terms, Passions, Emotions, and Affections, will obtain the approbation of philosophic Readers, since they were suggested to the Author by an attention to the workings of the human mind. If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, as they will serve to indicate both mutual relations and characteristic differences, in the impressions which surrounding

PASSIONS, &C. 21

objects, or ideas concerning them, make upon us ; and although an attention to these minute distinctions may not always he necessary in common language, and would sometimes be absurd, yet the want of precision has always been severely felt in philosophical investigations, and is a principal cause of the obscurities in which they are too frequently involved. It will be allowed by every attentive observer, that the process which we have characterized by the above terms, does take place in the human mind, when exposed to the sudden and powerful influence of particularly interesting objects. Such objects are irresistibly forced upon his attention, independent of a will or determination of his own ; they often produce great agitations hoth of mind and body; and when these agitations have subsided, the mind retains some degree of predilection or aversion for them. As these distinctions are clearly and satisfactorily expressed, by the particular terms we have given to each, this is- a full indication that they are the most appropriate. (Sec Note B.)

The above observations are not confined to a simple process, which takes place from more simple causes. After we have supposed a passion, indicated by an emotion, to be succeeded by some correspondent affection, we may still consider this affection as the parent of new passions, emotions, and affections, according to the variety of circumstances connected with it. It may inspire fear, as when the object of our affection is in a perilous state; it may excite earnest desire, or sanguine hope. Some of these new passions and affections will arouse to action ; as when the strong sense of an injury excites to revenge : others chill and depress the spirits, as sorrow and despair. Yet in the midst of all these diversities, the characteristic differences between Passions, Emotions, and Affections, are equally obvious.

22 APPETITES.

Confining ourselves, therefore, to what we deem the genuine import of the words, in opposition to the irregularities of custom, we shall, as often as it may he necessary to observe distinctions, uniformly apply the term Passion, to the violent impression made upon our minds, by the perception of something very striking and apparently interesting ; Emotion, to the external marks, or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passion upon the corporeal system ; and Affections, to the less violent, more deliberate, and more permanent impressions by causes which appear sufficiently interesting. The range of affection, may be from those stronger feelings which are proximate to emotions, to the mildest sensations of pleasure or displeasure we can possibly perceive.

Most writers on the Pathology of the mind, agree to distinguish between Appetites and Passions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire ; and the indulgence of this desire is termed Gratification. The latter they ascribe immediately to the mind. In this the Moderns differ from the Ancients. The word Appetitus, from which that of Appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and Latinists, to desires in general, whether they primarily related to the body or not : and with obvious propriety ; for the primitive signification is, the seeking after whatever may conduce either to Gratification or Happiness. Thus Cicero observes, " Motus animorum duplices sunt ; alteri, cogitationis ; alteri Appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur ; Appetitus impeilit ad agendum." By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast to each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word Appetitus in the same latitude.