Ethical questions; or, Speculations on the principal subjects of controversy in moral philosophy

Preface

In my Philosophical and Ethical Treatises on the Passions^ every subject merely speculative, was cautiously avoided ; the object being to collect and arrange the important truths, philosophical and moral, which are generally received, in some regular order, and give them a practical direction. But I indulged, and even expressed, the hopes that as my researches were made in the analytic manner, and without any reference to particular systems, they might spread before the reader many facts relative to controversial points, to which the partial and contracted nature of controversy may have rendered him too inattentive.

The following Speculations, although they may be considered as supplementary to the

preceding

PREFACE.

preceding volumes, did not form a part of my original plan. They are the result of those observations which were occasionally committed to paper, in the course of my inquiries into the moral history of the human mind ; and which were for many years totally forgotten. But upon a late revisal of them, I was surprised to find that they w^ere not only more numerous than I had imagined, but that some of them appeared of considerable importance, as having a tendency to elucidate several of the disputed points in speculative Ethics. I have, therefore, arranged them in the order which seems to be most eligible, and I now venture to submit them to the candour of the public.

Those who have perused Dr. Priestley^s Strictures on the Philosophy of the North, may think that I have taken unnecessary pains to confute the hypothesis of Dr. Beattie, so boldly advanced, and perseveringly supported, in the popular Essay on Truth, Had I been acquainted with that publication, at an early period, I should certainly not have undertaken the disagreeable task. But in consequence of having resided many years in a foreign country,

PREFACE.

V try, I had composed the Speculation before the Examwation attracted my attention; and after the perusal of it, I was induced by two considerations not to suppress what I had written. I perceived that our modes of attack, and the arguments we used, were very chfFerent ; and as our sentiments respecting Dr. Beattie's principles perfectly coincided, I was not unwilling to consider myself in the more humble station of an auxiliary. But the more powerful motive was, a recent edition of the Essay on Truth indicates that Dr. Priestley's arguments have not produced universal conviction. In the field of science, as well as of agriculture, the weeds which have not been totally eradicated, will spring up, and require a second hoeing.

These Speculations, being of a more controversial nature, will probably fall into the hands^f those who have not perused the Treatises a|ove mentioned. This lays me under the necessity of giving ample extracts from them. It is probable that the present publication may not meet with the same indulgence as was shown to the preceding. Thet/ had a

character

PREFACE.

character perfectly pacific. They attacked no favourite opinions; and consequently excited no alarm. My readers had notliing to defend ; and my errors have been passed over without animadversions. I have now to expect,- - should my arguments be deemed worthy of attention, — thatsome of them will be litigated. What I have to request is, that a detection of incidental errors may not be considered as a full confutation of my principles ; and what I have a right to demand is, that my opponents will pursue the analytic mode with equal attention and care ; and found opposite results upon more sohd arguments.

The sentiments I have been solicitous to support in these Speculations, appear to me so influential to the practice of virtue, so conducive to human happiness, and so honourable to the Supreme Being, that I sincerely hope every endeavour to confute them will be in vain.

JaHuary 1st, IB 17.

Contents

Qi'Esrii-tN

I. What are the Sources of Rntlonal Conviction ? and what are the characteristic Differences of each ?

II. Is Benevolence a Principle distinct from Self-love^ or a Modification of it? SI

Section I. Evidence of the Senses

0(JR senses inform us that external objects exist. We see them, or we feel their influence. By the organs of sight, we perceive not only the existence of bodies, but their comparative sizes, their figures, colours, situations. By the touch, we discover whether they be soft or hard, rough or smooth, sharp or obtuse ; we ascertain also their figure, size, &c. By the organs of taste, w^e perceive that they are bitter, sweet, sour, &c. and the peculiarities of their flavour. By the olfactory nerves, we are made acquainted with specific odours. By the ear, we learn whether and to w hat degree bodies are sonorous, &c.

These are facts of which we acquire an immediate knowledge by our senses alone. The impressions which they make are so strong that it would be superfluous to reason upon the subject, and we feel assured, prior to any exertions of the reasoning powers. No man will take the trouble of proving to himself the reality of his own existence. He will readily assent to the truth of the axiom when stated, that whoever thinks, feels, and acts, must exist ; but he will not suspend his sensations until he has proved the point : and few find it necessary to draw a formal inference, that if they see something, thing, there must be something to be seen ; if they hear a sound, it must proceed from some sonorous body.

Every one will also confess that the existence or sensible qualities of bodies cannot be known d prioj^i ; and that we should have remained totally ignorant of them, without the powers of sensation. Such truths are so simple and obvious, that it would be deemed idle to reason upon the subject; but there are arguments remaining, as it M ere, in a more latent state, and exerting perhaps a secret power without awakening the attention ; similar to what has been ascertained concerning light and heat.

Some there are who profess to distrust the evidences of the senses altogether, because there may be occasional cases of deception. A conviction that occasional deceptions have existed, or may exist, should inspire us with caution ; but these rare instances cannot invalidate the grand principle upon which the evidence rests. We know that our ideas of corporeal or material substances, of shapes, colours, sounds, &c. could never have been formed, if nothing had existed to excite them, and had we not been furnished with organs adapted to the excitements. A deception, in a singular ii:^stance, can alone be discovered by a conviction of realities, respecting the great mass of impressions. The extravagant position that we may always be deceived, destroys

HATTONAL CONVICTIOlsr.

stroys the idea of particular deceptions. We never can know that we have been deceived, in any case, but by the manifestation of a truth, which has detected the deception. The impressions of fancy are transient, are very seldom reiterated ; real existences repeat their influence, uniformly and invariably. We can act correspondent to them with certainty and success ; which is not the case with visionary scenes. The impressions made upon one man, will be made upon thousands and tens of thousands, in similar situations, and endowed with similar organs. Spectators at a theatre have never been in doubt concerning the reality of the exhibition, because some one of them had once dreamed that he was at a play, and discovered his mistake when he awoke. The numerous attendants at a concert, have never disturbed their minds with apprehending that the whole was a delusion, because some fanatic may have thought that he heard the music of the spheres.

In a word, the strange hypothesis confutes itself. It is supported by an argument which destroys the objection. How can the objector know that our senses deceive us at any time ? It can alone be by the accurate discoveries of these very senses. Thus is he compelled to place his confidence in a testimony which he professedly rejects.

Sectiois"

Section II. Quick Perception without conscious Reasoning

All animals, in the earliest stages of their existence, act, without the aid of profound philosophy, in a manner which a most intimate acquaintance with the laws of nature would dictate. Young quadrupeds use their legs with more agility than the most renowned pedestrian ; and young bipeds nicely balance their bodies without having served an apprenticeship to a balance-master. The chick scratches the ground, without calculating the probabilities of its finding food ; and the duckling seeks the water, without contemplating the adaptations of its conformation, or hesitating from apprehensions of being drowned. All young animals start at a sudden alarm, and fly with apparent apprehensions of danger, before they could know, from experience, that danger exists. At a very early period of his existence, before the reasoning powers of Man can be in exercise, the human race, in common with all other animals, are the creatures of instinct. The infant has not only an appetite, without knowing that food will nourish him, but it eagerly and most expertly applies to the breast, without being informed that it contains the nutrition necessary for its existence, or having studied the laws of

suction,

RATIONAL CONVICTION".

suction. It screams out from uneasy sensations, without knowing that it will excite compassion ; and seems, by its extended hands, to supplicate for aid, concerning which it can form no ideas. These instinctive movements are soon followed by a dawn of discernment. At first, the infant will apply to any breast, or will yield itself to the arms of any attendant; but it quickly learns to distinguish its mother or its nurse, rewarding their anxious cares with exclusive attachments. Thus are quick perceptions and accurate discriminations formed, before we are able to discover the process of ratiocination. These and the like perceptions are founded on the experience of gratifications, and the expectancy of their repetition. It is usual for young children to be shy towards strangers, as soon as they are able to distinguish between strangers and familiars : this is removed by frequent intercourse, and will be exchanged for affection by kind treatment.

From these commencements is the infant mind gradually led forwards to more enlarged perceptions and discriminations, respecting surrounding objects. It learns the names and uses of things, without any intentional application for the purpose; and makes accurate distinctions, before the su.biect knows that he is a rational being. At bow early a period does the child apply the appellations of J at Iter, /not her, brother^ iuter, uncle, aunt, CGUs'in,

with

SOURCES OV with perfect precision, although totally ignorant of the characteristic distinctions belonging to these relations 1

In such a manner is a larg^e stock of domestic and local knowledge treasured up in the mind, without any professed or conscious efforts of intellect ; a store, to which this mind has recourse in maturer age, as to a set of axioms in which the utmost confidence is reposed, and which never deceive.

The attention of the young pupil becomes at length an intentional act. He begins to find delight in learning the nature and properties of no'cel objects ; for he presumes that every thing familiar to him is sufficiently known. What is this ? what is it for ? who made it ? are pertinent questions, introductoiy to future knowledge. By receiving a judicious solution of such queries will he make a rapid progress in the knowledge of existences, properties, uses, &c.

Which leads us to the third source of knowledge we have mentioned.

Section III. Obsermtion and Ejcperiencel

Every thing which exists possesses properties. These are numerous and various, and they are incessantly

RATIONAL CONVICTION.

cessantly presenting themselves to our attention. Some are common to a] I bodies : others belong to particular substances ; that is, an aggregate number possess certain powers and properties in common, by which they are distinguished from others which possess in their turn properties peculiar to themselves. These are moreover subjected to subdivisions and gradations, until we arrive at those characteristic properties, by- which one individual substance is discriminated from every other. The greater and minuter distinctions are so regular, that they are arranged by natural philosophers into classes, genera, species, varieties, &c. Thus are certain distinguishing principles obtained, in consequence of scientific investigations, and greatly facilitating their progress.

The discovery of these generic and specific properties, can alone be made by minute observation and minute comparison.

The discovery is of great importance, because no one property in nature is perfecdy insulated and inert. Whatever exists may act upon other existent beings or substances. It must act according to the nature of its properties, producing a change in the state, relation, condition of the subject acted upon; and these changes may be injurious or beneficial to susceptible beings.

The nature and extent of this influence, the manner

SOURCES or ner in which it is effected, and also the nature and the degree of the changes produced, are ascertained by experience, in union with those obsermtmis which experience may excite in reflecting minds. The most common effects cannot be known a priori. A child, or an untutored savage, knows not that a knife will cut, that fire will burn, that water will extinguish fire, &c. &c.

The peculiar powers of nature are of such moment to personal well-being, or to the general good, that it is the leading, the worthy, the honourable object of science to discover them. They are so infinitely numerous and diversified, that astronomers, chemists, mechanics, naturalists, botanists, physicians, metaphysicians, have been assiduously engaged for ages in the investigation of them ; while it is confessed and lamented, even in the present day, that the progress is comparatively small !

The general influence of bodies being first known, subsequent observations and diversified experience enable us to acquire the knowledge of particular influences ; such as, for example, the different effects produced by the same agent upon similar substances, according to the strength or the weakness of its action ; and also the contrary effects which may be produced by the same agent upon different subjects. Thus may a certain degree of heat or of cold prove beneJiGial to bodies, while a considerable augmentation

RATIONAL CONVICTION.

tation of either may prove injurious: the heat which warms may also bum ; the cold which in a moderate degree may strengthen and invigorate, in extreme, will destroy : the heat which hardens clay will soften zva.v, Sec.

Innumerable are the facts of this kind, of high importance to human welfare, of which the knowledge is obtained by experience alone : without experience the philosopher and the savage would be equally unknowing.

Section IV. Of the Knowledge obtained by human Testimony

Human testimony is an extensive source of information. Without its aid we should remain entirely ignorant of every event and transaction which preceded our own existence ; and of every occurrence which takes place, or has taken place, at a di* stance from us, or that is not Vi^ithin the compass of our own personal knowledge. A confidence in human testimony is tiierefore absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the advantages to be derived from the social state. Without this there could not be a due accumulation of important truths, instructing the mind through the knowledge and experience of

others, others, and enabling us to direct our own conduct according to the information.

But this mode of acquiring a knowledge of facts, is more liable to deception and imposition than either of the preceding. There are many pre-requisites to an implicit confidence in the assertions and statements of others. Many things handed down to' us from antiquity, under great and revered names, are extravagant, and totally unworthy of belief. Many things which were formerly believed to be authentic, — so authentic that incredulity has been resented and punished as a crime, — are now deservedly rejected as fabulous or absurd.

By what criterion, then, shall we distinguish tmth from error in human testimony ?

We must previously remark, that there is a. natural propensity in the human mind to love and to speak the truth. Lying is not a natural, but an acquired vice ; it is not, like some others, the excess of an innate propensity, but it is in direct opposition to an innate propensity. It is very unusual for a child to tell a wilful falsehood, without some interested motive. It is mostly to conceal a fault in order to escape punishment ; sometimes to steal an advantage, but never from an inward hatred to truth. Whenever lying is become habitual to youth, it is either by the example of wicked associates, or

the

RATIONAL CONVICTIOIs^. 17

the criminal deceits which have been practised upon him by indiscreet parents, or to their total ignorance of the proper manner to direct the human mind.

In consequence of this strong attachment to truth, children and inexperienced persons are always disposed to place an unbounded confidence in the assertions of others. The most practised liar expects implicit credulity in those whom he attempts to deceive; and the uninformed mind sees no absurdity in the most extravagant declarations. It will be surprised and astonished, but it will not readily doubt the veracity of the narrator. In this it has a much stronger faith than in the accuracy of its own judgement A natural propensity to believe in stories the most absurd, and in the wildest fables the imagination can invent, will continue until the narrator has been detected in a falsehood, or a considerable degree of progress in the knowledge of facts, or in ratiocination, has been made by the auditor.

Here then is a principle founded in nature, which may be abused and trifled with, but it cannot be entirely subverted. This strong propensity to believe in the declarations and veracity of others, can alone be checked by a more extensive acquaintance with human imperfections and human depravities, and by repeated discoveries of mistakes, gross errors, misrepresentations, and intentional deceptions.

C These

These causes may create suspicions, which have sometimes driven the mind into the opposite extreme ; into the indulgence of sceptical doubts upon eveiy subject, and even to a denial of the existence of truth. This, however, is not only unnatural, but it is palpably absurd ! It authorizes ignorance and error to destroy truth. It denies the existence of truth, because men are imperfect or depraved ! Again, we cannot know^ that falsehood and error exist, but by the discovery of a truth. Every one who believes that falsehoods are detected, must believe in the facts which have led to the detection. We must therefore believe in the existence of a truth, though we may in many cases be ignorant where it is to be found.

Since there is a natural propensity to speak the truth, and to confide in the veracity of others, and since the commerce of human life peremptorily demands this confidence, it is much more becoming, and infinitely more useful, to inquire into the causes of those deceptions, and in what manner we can avoid their effects, than vainly to indulge scepticisms, which have a tendency, in their excess, to paralyse every action of our lives, coiTode every generous feeling of the heart, and render the intellectual faculties themselves, whose dignified office it is to discover truths, entirely useless.

The origin of all error and falsehood may be

ascribed

RATIONAL CONVICTION.

ascribed to absolute ignorance, with a presumption of knowing ; — misapprehensions ; — partial views of things, under the impression that the whole is completely known ; — an improper bias of mind, of which the subject himself may be unconscious; — and finally, a studied intention to deceive.

Absolute ignorance, however talkative, can make no report. Notwithstanding its pretensions, it knows nothing ; it ought to be silent, or to be disregarded when it speaks. A credulous mind soon thinks itself duly informed, and it is eager to make a report with a superficial degree of knowledge. A lively imagination is prone to misrepresent or exaggerate facts, which, although they seem to point towards the object, are thus made to deviate frorn it, or to give a false colouring, which disguises their nature. Prejudices and predilections bring forwards numerous ideas in favour of particular opinions, without proper attention to adverse facts. Intentional deceptions may arise from that vanity, and conceit, which loves to aggrandize Self, or to sport with the credulity of others, or firom a still more culpable design to defraud.

Untruths, therefore, of every description may arise from an unintentional abuse, or a disingenuous and criminal use, of an important principle which is deeply rooted in human nature. These are doubtless great impediments to the progress of know-

c 2 ledge, ledge, but they have not the power to annihilate truth. Facts are of an imperishable nature. They may be Concealed, or lie unperceived in the bosom of time ; waiting, like seeds in the bosom of the earth, for the season favourable to their shooting forth and flourishing. The grand impediments to their propagation are to be subdued by a progress in mental improvement; by the removal of ignorance; by minute and impartial investigation ; by substituting a sacred regard, not only for truth in general, but for accurate extensive knowledge, in the place of sanguine credulity, or superficial attention, a heated imagination, or the seductions of prejudice and partiality ; and finally, by holding up the wilful liar to the public detestation.

It is obvious from the above remarks, that, in our researches after knowledge from human testimony, we should make ourselves acquainted with the character and peculiar bent of the historian or narrator, and proportion our degrees of confidence accordingly.

Many incidental circumstances will also facilitate or discourage our confidence in human testimony.

The nature of an alleged fact will prepare tlie mind for admitting or rejecting it, and a stronger evidence is demanded in some cases than in others. If it be analogous to facts already known, it will appear probable^ and we shall be satisfied with

slighter

RATIONAL CONVICTION.

slighter evidence than if the probability was against it. We shall argue, that causes which have produced effects of a certain description, may produce others which are similar. But if the fact appear very extraordinary, or of a nature totally inexperienced, the weight of evidence is expected to be extremely powerful. Knowledge most accurate, character most respectable, and veracity unimpeached, are deemed indispensable requisites. Again, a concurrence of evidence greatly strengthens testimony. It is more credible that an individual or a few persons should be deceived, or attempt to deceive, than that a large number should conspire together, where there is no appearance of a common interest in the deception.

Thus, in physical phaenomena, those events which seem to oppose the laws of nature, where it is presumed that these laws have been investigated, de^ mand a stronger evidence than the events which are more consonant with them. For example, the projection of stones by a volcanic eruption to an unusual height or distance, and of a magnitude before unknown, will be more readily credited than the narrative of shozvers of stones having fallen in different parts of the world. In the one case, we have simply to admit an extraordinary exertion of a power- known to exist, concerning which no accurate measurement could have been taken, respecting

£2 ing size or extent. The latter cannot be explained by any laws of nature already admitted. In this case, \^'e are not easily satisfied with the declarations made, even by respectable persons. We still suspect there may be a delusion somewhere. Reiterated evidences respecting such extraordinary phaenomena; the strong assurances that they have taken place in various parts of the globe, and at different times, confirmed by all the force of respectable witnesses, begin at length to make a deep impression, not only upon the public mind in general, but also upon the cautious philosopher. It is argued, that so large a number of persons resident in places remote from each other, and living at distant periods, cannot conspire together to deceive the world ; can have no interest in the deception ; and that they are as competent to see these phasnomena as any other objects around them. It is now imagined that the laws of nature are not known to the extent which has been supposed. Philosophy is employed in more accurate investigations ; and it is expected that some chemical process in the atmosphere will ultimately furnish a solution.

These facts present us, however, with a strong proof of the deep respect paid to human testimony, where no suspicions concerning competency in gaining intormadon, or the veracity of narrators, can justly be indulged.

But

RATIONAL CONVICTIOl^^-.

But nothing establishes human testimony in a manner more satisfactory, than other events which succeed to those which have been candidates for our belief, and which could not have taken place without their prior existence. Events and transactions thus circumstanced corroborate each other, and they form a continuity of evidence that is irresistible. We ourselves- are, in numerous cases, witnesses to a concurrence which could not have existed without antecedent causes. The Pyramids of Egypt, which still exist, manifest the antiquity, the population of the country, and the riches of its sove^ reigns. The mummies which are in our cabinets, confirm the reports of historians concerning the ancient manner of embalming the dead. The tessellated pavements, Roman causeways, fortified stations, &c. observable in many parts of Great Britain, confirm the historical reports that the Romans had invaded these kingdoms, and obtained extensive conquests. The existence of ancient Greece, its renown for its cultivation of the arts of painting, architecture, and statuary, and the preeminence of the Grecians in intellectual endowments, are evinced by innumerable evidences before our eyes.

Section

SOUKCES OF

Section V

Of the Knowledge regained through the Medium of Memory.

The knowledge acquired by either of the preceding means could be of momentary use alone, had we not the power of reminiscence. It would be the same as if it had never existed. Although reminiscence is not the immediate source of information, yet it is a powerful retainer ; and it enables us to have recourse to treasures of knowledge, collected by our own experience, and from the information of others. Our powers of acting are thus greatly extended ; and it is an able director of our future conduct. By recollecting facts, we may recollect their properties, and put these to the test of experience as circumstances shall require. By recalling the qualities of objects, we may know how to employ those which are useful, and avoid the injurious. By tracing w'hat have been the consequences of different modes in thinking or acting, either respecting ourselves or others, we are enabled to foresee future results, which is so requisite for the discreet regulation of our own conduct, or administering of salutary counsel to others. By recollecting the important events of history^ we acquire

a more

EATIOISTAL CONVICTIO:\t.

£5 a more intimate knowledge of human nature : by observing what has been the state and conduct of men, and the consequences of their conduct, at a former period, we are frequently able to predict, as it were, the consequences which will necessarily result from particular modes of conduct. But upon this head it would be superfluous to enlarge.

The powers of memory are twofold. They consist in the actual reminiscence or recollection of past events, and in the power of retaining w^hat we have learned, in such a manner that it can be called into remembrance as occasions present themselves, or circumstances may require.

^lemory and recollection have different degrees of facility, according to the apparent importance of the subject, the vividness of the impression, associated ideas, &c. Thoughts from recollection frequently present themselves spontaneously ; sometimes with considerable difficulty ; and sometimes we are convinced that a latent idea exists, which we are not able to bring into accurate recollection. Many also are the instances, where certain facts or incidents may have made but a slight impression upon us at the time ; yet they have been deposited in the sensorium or seat of memory, and have remained for years in an inert state, until some unexpected circumstances shall evince that they were not obliterated. Objects which we had once seen,

sounds sounds which we had once heard, or sentiments uttered, seldom appear to us as perfect strangers upon reiteration. This'' indicates that they have made some change in the state of our reminiscent faculties, without the possibility of our ascertaining the nature or the physical cause of the change.

The physical laws of reminiscence have hitherto escaped our researches. Being under the necessity of having recourse to metaphorical language, taken from sensible objects, to express abstract ideas, or to discourse upon abstract subjects, we are insensibly led to substitute words for things. In the subject before us, the words which are in common currency are supposed to be perfectly appropriate ; and thus we deceive ourselves into a belief that we possess more accurate knowledge concerning the mode of Reminiscence, than facts will justify. All the objects of our knowledge are said to make an i??tpreS' sion upon the mind ; and as the brain is the allotted seat of the mind, the impression is supposed to remain inscribed or indented upon that organ : and the mind is supposed to have recourse to these impressions as the occasion may demand, as to something inscribed in a book. Hence subtile theories have been invented to explain the phaenomena of memory. The brain has been considered as a tablet, upon which images are traced or imprinted, in reserve for the uses of the thinking powers.

We

We should be distrustful of metaphorical expressions. They may, it is true, indicate some points of resemblance, existing in subjects essentially different in their nature ; but, by urging them too far, we may mistake them for literal facts. The words impression, inscription., Sec. manifest our opinions that there is some sort of analogy between thoughts treasured up in the mind, and those inscribed in a book : there is in each case a deposit, to which we may have a recourse as occasions require ; but when we descend into minutiae, the analogy vanishes. The substance of the brain is not of a consistence for such impressions or inscriptions. Its compass is too confined to retain, in so mechanical a manner, all that infinitude of thought with which the mind may be enriched. The immense mass of knowledge collected by the assiduous student during a long course of years, the numerous and lotty ideas of the learned and sublime philosopher, must be supposed to suffer a compression not less miraculous than that to which Milton has made the numerous fallen angels submit in their pandemonium, or there must be a want of space for the accommodation of the congregated hosts.