The doctrine of the will, determined by an appeal to consciousness

Front matter

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

THE

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL,

Preface

To form theories is too often rather the sport of fancy than the labor of philosophy. Deductions from theories, however logically made, instead of correcting errors already introduced, only perpetuate them in an elaborate and stately manner. In the following treatise I have not aimed to form a theory, but in honesty and simplicity, to examine facts; and through facts, to arrive at principles.

Although I claim not infallibility for all the processes and details of my investigation and thinking ; I do claim, to have presented in the main, the true doctrine of the will, as determined in the only legitimate way.

Neither do I claim entire originality for my labors. It is only in theorizing, that at this age of the world, we can gain this distinction. Genuine philosophy is engaged in adjusting, explaining, and applying the labors of those who have preceded us; or in making advances in the researches which have already been iv PREFACE.

promisingly opened to view. Original discoveries so far from being precluded in this way, are really invited: and when they appear, they will have the two-fold merit of having. fully considered the truths already known, and of having placed them in a sub- . ordinate position by areach of mind beyond them.

The Review of Edwards’ Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, which I have already given to the public, necessarily anticipated some points discussed in the present volume. :There, however, they were brought up incidentally, and for the purpose of placing the work reviewed, in a true point of view : here they are taken up as a part of a full and methodical discussion.

Edwards’ work, consists not of psychological investigations, but of acute logical deductions from an — ingenious theory.

In reviewing his work, I could not but enter largely into purely logical considerations. As the present effort claims to be for the most part psychological, I have referred to the Review when logical points came up, which had been there fully discussed. Still, what I now present to the public, will be found to be not a mere continuation of the Review, but an independent treatise, and complete in itself as a psychological argument.

When I commenced my undertaking, I intended to comprise my lucubrations within the compass of one

PREFACE. Vv volume; and when I had so far departed from my original plan as to contemplate two volumes, I thought myself at the end of my scheme: but as in the case of many wiser men than myself, thought has outgrown forecast, and I must now threaten the public with a third volume, containing the application of the doctrine of the will to morals and religion.

What I have written, I throw not out as a bait to logomachists, either in philosophy or theology: but I submit it to the cool, candid, and generous perusal of those who love truth, and who fear not to think.

Chapter I, Of Consciousness

Sect. I. Consciousness defined, - - - -

II. The perfection of consciousness as a form of intelligence, - - - - - - HI, The true mode of interrogating consciousness, -

Chapter II. Of Cause

Sect. I. Preliminary view of definition in general, -

II. Marks by which we distinguish a first truth, -

Hi. Space, time, and substance, given as examples of first truths, - - - = é e IV. Cause, a. first truth, - c = i V. How do we arrive at the idea of cause? - -

VI. What are the experiences, or phenomena, in connection with which the idea of cause is first given? -

VII. Principle of causality, - = S < VIII. First, or Infinite Cause, - - : - IX. Physical causes, - - - = 3

Chapter III. Of The Will

Sect. I. Definition ofthe Will, - - : 2

Il. By what do we distinguish the action of the Will?

17 20

21 24 35

36 48 51 53

60 60

Vill CONTENTS.

Page Sect.III. Contingency of the Will, - - = - 62 IV. Of Choice, - - - - - =O V. Choice and Volition distinguished, - - - 73 VI. Is every act of Volition pre-determined by the Will? - 77 VII. Freedom of the Will, - - - - - 79 VIII. Absolute and Conditional Freedom, - - - 94 IX. Self-determination of the Will, - - - > 99

X. Where and how do we first obtain the idea of Self-determination ? - - - = . - 116

XI. Does Actual Existence presume Necessary Existence? 119

Chapter IV. Of The Relations Between The Intelligence And The Will

Sect. I. The Will distingushed from the Intelligence, - - Ie II. The Action of the Will in. the direction of the Intelligence, - - - - - - - 124 III. The Developments of the Intelligence in the direction of the Will, - - - - - - 134 IV. Objects and Laws, - - - - - 138 CHAPTER V.

OF THE SENSITIVITY.

Sect. I. What is included under Sensitivity, - - - 142 II. Sensations defined and distinguished from the Intelligence and Will, - - - - - 142 III. The Emotions and Passions distinguished from the Sensations and Intelligence, - - - - 152

IV. Emotions and Passions distinguished from the Will, - 154 V. The Distinction between the Emotions and Passions, and the Will, particularly illustrated, - - - 156

VI. Desire, or Relative Emotion, and Passion, - - i161 VII. Whether a given Passion can be resisted only by an

opposite Passion, - - - - - 165

VIII. Preceding Distinctions summed up, - - = dine

CHAPTER VI. Or THE PERSONALITY, - - - - - - 174

CONTENTS. ix

Chapter VII. Of The Relations Between The Sensitivity And The Will

me Page

Sect. I. The Action of the Will in the direction of the Sensitivity, - - - - 183 TI. Moral and Natural Ability and ie - - 207

III. The Action of the Sensitivity in the direction of the - Will, - = os e : = = Ot CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORY OF A WILL NECESSITATED BY THE SENSITIVITY, OR IDENTIFIED WITH IT.

Sect. I. Philosophizing by Physical Analogies, - - a PAR

II. In the condition of corrupted humanity, ‘‘ the Will is as the most agreeable,” = - - - - 235

III. The actual Predominance of the Be: eee for, - - - - - - Be By IV. Of the Calculation of Future Events, - - - 244 V. Theories of a Moral Government, - - SME)

Chapter IX. Of Motives

Sect. I, Motives Defined, - . - - - - - 281 Il. The Strongest Motive, - - - - a PAE III. Of the Indifference of Will to Motives, - - - 300

IV. Why does the Will choose one thing rather than another? 304

CHAPTER X. ConcLusion, - - - - ca - 315

Page

CORRECTIONS. 73, line 16 from the bottom, for giving, read going.

138, line 8 from the bottom, for effected, read affected.

139, line 2 from the top, for show read shows.

143, line 4 from the bottom, for inquiry, read inquiring. 179, line 12 from the bottom, for for, read from. Ibid, line 3 from the bottom, for theorum, ead theorem. 219, line 13 from the bottom, for consciousness, 7ead conscience, 226, line 11 from the top, for phenomenas, read phenomena, 245, line 11 from the bottom, for if any, read in any.

272, line 9 from the bottom, for first, read last.

293, line 6 from the bottom, for particuly, read particular. 305, line 14 from the bottom, delete it, after referring.

310, line 10 from the bottom, insert is, befure constituted.

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

$. ul * a ee 231 bn

SECTION I. Consciousness Defined

I. Consciousness is the necessary knowledge which the mind has of its own operations. In knowing, it knows that it knows. In experiencing emotions and passions, it knows that it experiences them. In willing, or exercising acts of causality, it knows that it wills or exercises such acts. This is the common, universal, and spontaneous consciousness.

This definition may appear to some to be an identical proposition. ‘The mind knows its knowledges, the mind knows its emotions, the mind knows its acts of causality, may seem to be implied, if not affirmed, when we say, the mind knows, feels and wills. Therefore, we would farther observe :

II. By Consciousness more nicely and accurately defined, we mean the power and act of self-recognition: not, if you please, the mind knowing its knowledges, emotions, and volitions ; but the mind knowing itself in these.

Consciousness in every knowledge, emotion and aS volition, brings to view two terms, suBsEcT and opsect. The subject is that which knows; the object is that which is known. ‘The subject is that which feels ; the object is that in view of which, the emotion or passion springs up. The subject is that which wills or causes ; the object is that existence or modification of existence which is caused, or made to appear. 'T’o suppose these two terms not to exist, would to our consciousness be contradictory ; because knowledge, passion, and causation, cannot be thought of or defined without them. What is knowledge? It is a pereipient perceiving ; perceiving something of course. ‘The percipient is the subject; the something perceived the object. What is causation? It isa power producing phenomena. The power is the subject; the phenomena the object, What is emotion or passion? It is an affection of the sensitivity ; but that which is affected is the subject; that on occasion of which the affection arises is the object.

Knowledge, causation, and emotion, involving subject and object, are primary facts. There is nothing in which we are more at home.

If it should be said that the mind recognizing itself, is implied in the very knowing, doing, and feeling; and that hence there is the same tautology in affirming that the mind knows itself, as to affirm that it knows its operations: I reply, that although subject and object are implied in all these mental operations and affections, yet the knowledge of them is not implied, and really can be possible only on condition of consciousness, or a faculty of self-knowledge. It is conceivable that acts of knowledge, and of causation, and emotions, and passions, might take place as results of a certain fixed constitution and mechanism of being, without the faculty of knowing the antithesis of subject and object. The antithesis would indeed exist, but in this case the subject would not have the power of knowing it, just as now the object has not the power of knowing it; and consequently, would not have the power of defining its operations and affections ; it would be absorbed in these without the power of distinguishing itself from them.

Now that we have this power or faculty of consciousness or self-knowledge, is a fact which is universally granted. It appears in the very structure of language. I see—I do—I feel; that is, I see an object; I do in reference to an object; I feel on occasion of an object and its qualities—give it clearly. The use of the Ego is the affirmation of the subjectivity of which we are conscious.

Consciousness is not a power or faculty of knowledge distinct from the reason. It is only a peculiar form or exercise of reason—or reason in a peculiar relation. It is reason knowing itself, and its triune coordinates in the one mind or soul ; it is the subject becoming its own object.

The first act of consciousness is to distinguish subject and object. Subject and object, as distinguished, the one from the other, both become objects of knowledge. It is the same faculty which knows both; but the faculty is named differently, accordingly as it is directed now towards the object simply, and now towards the subject taken as an object.

When it is directed towards the object simply, it is named perception, or understanding ; and its act is called perceiving, or observing. When it is directed towards the subject taken as an object, it is called consciousness, and its act is called selfknowing, or reflection. The last is a metaphorical term, and represents the mind as bending back to look upon itself.

In object we have all the phenomena:of nature—all phenomena but those which relate to subject or myself; or to subjectivity in general.

Subject thus distinguished from the object, and forming the sole object of self-consciousness, contains all the phenomena of mind—both those which relate directly to object, and those which arise only upon occasion of object.*

III. Consciousness may be dlistitinaished into natural or spontaneous, and philosophical or reflective.

The first is that which is common to all men in the natural development of their minds, under the circumstances in which they chance to be placed. All men are conscious of mental phenomena, as _ belonging to them in distinction from physical pheno-

* The distinction here alluded to isimportant. Phenomena of mind, which relate directly to object, are perceptions of natural phenomena, and induction and generalization, emotions arising from these phenomena, or volitions to produce these phenomena. Phenomena of mind, which arise only upon occasion of object, are the intuitive perceptions of the reason—those first truths which are the foundations of all logic and science. These may be called phenomena of the mind only, under the conception that they are perceived by the mind. After we have come to know them, we feel assured that their existence is antecedent to, and wholly independent of, our acts of perception. These first truths are perceived upon occasion of object, as, space upon occasion of body; time upon occasion of succession; cause upon occasion of phenomena, mena, which do not belong to them. They may be unable technically to speak of the antithesis of subject and object, but they know what is contained under these terms, as well as the distinction between their personal being and the world without.

The philosophical or reflective consciousness, is that more perfect consciousness which appears, when by a special, and it may be laborious effort, we turn the mind back to notice its operations, with a nice, particular, and analytical observation.

These two forms of consciousness are analogous to the two forms of observation which exist in reference to the external or objective world. All men do naturally and spontaneously observe the phenomena of the world around them, and draw conclusions more or less true and useful: but there is an observation which we distinguish from this as philosophical observation, because it is close, particular, analytical, and thoughtful in an eminent degree. It is an observation which leads to investigation, and brings to light the powers and laws of nature. So this philosophical consciousness brings to light the powers and laws of mind, ‘This consciousness, which we have called also reflective, is, indeed, reflection itself. The mind in this form of its intelligence, instead of looking out upon the world, bends back to look upon itself.

It is thus by consciousness that psychology or the philosophy of mind, ‘becomes possible. ‘The operations and affections of our being, viewed in the antithesis of subject and object, are capable of being understood in their various characteristics and relations. In order to know myself I have only by conscious-

ie ness carefully to recognize myself, in every operation and affection of my mind, as distinguishable from the object of these operations and affections. Investigations in mental philosophy, are simply investigations of facts.

SECTION If.

The perfection of Consciousnessasa form of Intelligence.

I. Ir is a great error and prejudice that mental philosophy is peculiarly obscure, difficult, and uncertain. The knowledge of ourselves will readily be granted to be of the utmost importance to ourselves. A priori, therefore, we might expect that under the constitution of an infinitely wise and good Being, it would not be peculiarly obscure, difficult, and uncertain.

All our knowledge must relate either to subject or object; that is, to that which is ourselves, or that which is not ourselves. In its nature also, it must be knowledge of subjectivity in general, or of that which is the basis and cause of phenomena; or of phenomena themselves.

Objects are known by the faculty of perception, or the intelligence taken under its general designation. The subject, or myself, is known by the. intelligence under the peculiar form and designation of consciousness. Subjectivity in general is also known as well as the phenomena which it accounts for. Now, consciousness does not appear less perfectly adapted to its particular office than perception, in reference to any office that can be named as belonging to it out of consciousness. ‘The phenomena and facts which are viewed in relation to object, seem not more certainly such than those which are viewed in relation to: subject: e. g., it does not seem more certainly true, that such and such forms, relations and qualities, are in objects, than that I have such and’such perceptions and emotions, and that [make such and such volitions. Inasmuch as subject must be granted to be an object of knowledge, its phenomena may stand as clearly in the view of the mind as the phenomena of object in general.

The faculty of Knowledge, whatever direction it may take, proves itself to have taken a legitimate direction when positive knowledges, and well grounded beliefs are the result. But no knowledges, and beliefs are more firm than many respecting the subject in particular, as well as the subjective in general. Nay, the phenomena of the senses may be presented under various illusions—e. g. the reflection of the setting sun may be mistaken for a conflagration ; but the feelings, thoughts, and volitions of our minds, as simple phenomena, cannot be mistaken.

II. There is one point of view in which this comparison may be placed which is absolutely decisive.

The perception of the objective by means of the senses, men generally think clear enough ; but the consciousness of the subjective they represent as obscure and doubtful. But where is the perception of the objective? Is it not within us? Yes, truly, all our knowledge of the forms, relations, and qualities of the objective world are within us. We know this world by sensations, and sensations within us. Body is defined by primary and secondary qualities inhering in substance. Of primary qualities we reckon resistance and form. 'They are those without which body cannot be conceived to exist. Of secondary qualities, we have a great variety, as those of color, taste, smell, &c. These are not essential to our conception of body. The secondary qualities plainly are named from sensations produced in us—e. g. Sourness is the name of that modification of body, or that cause inhering in the substance of body which. produces in us a certain sensation ; and so of al] the other secondary qualities. But the primary are known and named inthe same way. By resistance, we mean an experience within ourselves produced by a resisting cause inhering in the substance of body. Form: is but the extension of a resisting point ; and magnitude; but a collection or conglomeration of resisting points. The world without, or body, is then really known by effects produced’ within ourselves, and: effects known in our consciousness. If consciousness then were not a.legitimate source of knowledge and a source to be relied’ upon, we should be destitute of all real and certain knowledge.

III. Wherein does. our knowledge of the phenomena of mind differ from our knowledge of the phenomena of body? There is really no difference either as respects the conditions, the processes, or the certainty of the knowledge. The conditions of all knowledge are certain experiences appearing within us, that is within our consciousness, and primitively wholly irrespective of any agency of ourown. Upon these experiences, our intelligence from. its inherent force and capabilities forms judgments and knowledges. Some of these knowledges respect the objective and some the subjective. The knowledges which respect the objective are knowledges of that which is exterior to ourselves, or of that which is not ourselves. The knowledges of the subjective are knowledges of ourselves. Certain experiences through the senses of seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling, and the experience of muscular resistance, form the conditions and means of knowledges of time and space, of body, of relative position and distance, and of various modifications or qualities of body. Again, these same experiences in connection with the intelligence from within acting upon them, and forming the above named judgments or knowledges, and the springing up of emotions and feelings as consequents of these knowledges, and the putting forth of an: activity to determine, appropriate, change and modify, form the conditions. and means of knowing mind or spirit, power and, causality. In relation to both object and subject, there are spontaneous experiences first presented in the general and natural consciousness, and: these experiences are.followed by the action of the intelligence according to its own constitution and laws, appropriating these experiences to find both object and subject; and the one is found just as necessarily, andinaturally, and certainly, as the other.

This view of consciousness justifies us in presenting it under a very comprehensive form.

IV. First: Consciousness is the common and broad field of all experience, thought, knowledge, and activity. In our consciousness we know both the objective and the subjective—both the world and ourselves.

Secondly: When, as above, (page 3,) we distinguish consciousness as a form of the general intelligence—a form in reference to ourselves—a self-knowledge in antithesis with ordinary perception or objective knowledge, we intentionally limit it for the sake of convenience, and to avoid doing violence to: the established modes of psychological representation. But, under the more comprehensive view which we here take, instead of presenting consciousness as a mere form of the intelligence, we make it the very birth-place of the intelligence itself, and the arena of al] its movements: and developments; the birth-place,. too, of the will, and of the emotions and passions. In consciousness we know, we feel, we do. But then, again, in this very comprehensive view we are brought back to our first definition of consciousness, as the power and act of self-recognition; for the whole play of our being, our experiences, thoughts, volitions and emotions, as presented in consciousness, are presented as. ours, and we are distingushed to ourselves with all our capacities and faculties, from the vast variety and complication of particulars which make up the objective world. In consciousness we have all knowledge, activity and passion; and in consciousness we have the perpetual recognition of self in all knowledge, activity, and passion.

Thirdly : Consciousness, as comprehending all intelligence, may be distinguished into the interior and the exterior. Consciousness, when contemplating its phenomena in connection with the subject, and as revealing the constitution and laws of the subject, and of the subjective in general, may be called the interior consciousness. Consciousness, when contemplating its phenomena in connection with the objective, and as revealing its constitution and laws, that is, revealing the system of external nature, may be called the exterior consciousness. In the one consciousness, our aim is to know ourselves, and to know all causality, all spirit, all pure and necessary truth, as far as it 1s possible to know them. In the other consciousness, our aim is to know body in space, and events in time, with their relations and successions. ‘The interior and exterior consciousness embrace all possible knowledge.

SECTION III. The true mode of interrogating Consciousness

I. If we take the most comprehensive view of consciousness as the birth-place of all our knowledges, feelings, and activities; and as the broad field in which all phenomena are presented to us; the phenomena springing out from ourselves, and therefore phenomena of the subject; and the phenomena coming in upon us, and therefore phenomena of the object ;— in laying down rules for interrogating consciousness, we are, indeed, laying down universal rules of obser-

Ae OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

vation, induction, and investigation. All phenomena are here grouped together, and they are all within the bosom of consciousness. ‘The first rules given under this point of view are, undoubtedly, the two following: They are drawn directly from the Baconian system, and have been expressed in different forms, and are well and universally known among philosophers :—

1. Observe all the phenomena, and only the phenomena—omitting none, and conjecturing none.

2. Observe all the characteristics of each particular phenomenon, and only the characteristicts—omitting none, and conjecturing none.*

This act of observing the phenomena and their characteristics, is an act of determining the intelligence to patient and persevering attention. 'This observation, being supposed, the results must depend upon the capacity and reach of the intelligence. What is to be known must depend upon the faculty of knowledge.

II. Now it is.a fact indisputable that the faculty of knowledge, fixing itself in attention upon the phenomena of the consciousness in general, does make the distinction of subject and object, or to use the phrase of Cousin (which to say the least is convenient) of the me and the not me, and knowledge receives at once its most. general division of nature and spirit. Men have agreed as to vast number of particulars which are to be regarded as objective or nature; and observation, investigation and discovery have pro-

* Cours de Phil., Tom. IL, Sec. 16. Par M. Cousin; or Henry’s Translation, Ch. Ist. ;

ceeded, without interruption in reference to these. Indeed the definition of nature has become very simple. All the phenomena of sensation and resistance make up nature. The laws of these phenomena have been assigned by the reason. ‘The science of nature has therefore attained a high degree of completeness.

Now, not only are the general rules above given in reference to all phenomena indiscriminately—rules which apply to investigations in psychology—but the rules which have been particularly applied in natural philosophy, admit no less legitimately and strictly of application in the philosophy of mind. Thus, it is a rule in physics that we begin our investigations with the simplest, most obvious, and best understood phenomena. But, this rule will apply with equal force, to psychology. Both mind and matter are known only by means of their phenomena, and of course, in relation to both, it must be true that we are to begin our researches with those phenomena which are indubitable, or which are attended with the least degree of doubtfulness. But, without going into particulars on the subject of this comparison, we remark that, generally, that inductive method which since the time of Bacon has been so highly extolled, and so successfully applied in the field of nature, can most manifestly be applied in psychological researches. All researches in nature go upon the admission that every phenomenon has a cause, and that every cause has a rule of action. And the whole aim of these researches is, to ascertain the causes of the phenomena, and the laws of the causes: Thus gravitation is a j4 OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

cause of phenomena: the law of the centripetal force is a law regulating the gravitating power. Now, the phenomena of mind must have causes and laws in like manner; for the axiom above named is a universal axiom, embracing all phenomena. And what are researches in psychology, but researches in order to ascertain the causes and laws of the phenomena presented? All the rules of the inductive method, therefore, we adopt to regulate our interrogations of the consciousness under its technical limitation, as the faculty and act of self-knowledge.

III. But we have already settled, that subject and object appear in all our sensations, knowledges, activities, emotions, and passions. It must follow, therefore, that in examining the phenomena of consciousness in reference to self-knowledge, we are not examining altogether new phenomena, but that in addition to phenomena diverse from those we term natural, we are really compelled likewise to examine the natural. 'The phenomena of nature are related to the development of the subject or the mind. The qualities of body, (as I have already neted,) both primary and secondary, are experiences within ourselves; and how can we know ourselves, unless the sensations by which we know the secondary qualities, we take care to mark as phenomena of our own being— and the resistance by which we know the primary, we take care to mark asa resistance experienced within our own being to a force contained in our own being, and developed in the muscular organism? ‘To know ourselves, we are to examine every thing which appears in consciousness in its subjective relations, that is, in its interior relations; thus making the consciousness, by the peculiar direction given it, an interior consciousness. Every phenomenon of consciousness is necessarily immediately and primarily apprehended by the intelligence in two relations, the objective and the subjective; the subjective being always myself; the objective being pure objectivity or matter, or that which is subjective in its nature, and. taken as objective in relation to myself.

All mind, all life, all causality, all truth, are subjective in their nature, because antecedent to all phenomena; but taken as objects of my mind, by an act of contemplation, they become objective to me; and as calling forth, in the act of contemplation, and in the cdéordinate acts, the energies of my being, become occasions of developing the faculties of myself, considered in _ this way the sole subject. How, then, do mental and natural philosophy differ in their methods? They differ not at all in their methods. They differ only in their direction and extent. The one aims at the subject, myself; the other aims at pure objectivity, or the material world. ‘The one considers all the phenomena of consciousness in their subjective relations ; the other considers only the phenomena introduced by the senses, and that in their objective relations merely. Where universal subjectivity is arrived at, we have metaphysics, which is the science of the causes and laws of being in general. It is to be observed, likewise, that in natural philosophy we are compelled to avail ourselves continually of metaphysics. The very idea of cause, and the axiom that every phenomenon must have a cause, belong to metaphysics. In all our researches after truth, we are engaged with our one mind; we are in a universe of one Creator, who is the infinite mind comprehending all intelligence, and the infinite cause comprehending all power: we may not, therefore, Separate ; it is only permitted us to distinguish and define, in order that we may the better know and comprehend,