Elements of mental and moral science; designed to exhibit the original susceptibilities of the mind, and the rule by which the rectitude of any of its states or feelings should be judged

Front matter

I

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Preface

The subsequent pages owe their origin to the professional engagements of the writer. Expected to impart instruction to the students committed to his care, in the philosophy of the human mind, as well as on subjects strictly theological, he devoted all the time he could command to the task of drawing up a course of lectures on the Elements of Mental and Moral Science, which should be made to combine, as far as he found it prac-" ticable, comprehension with brevity, and might be used as a text-book in his future prelections.

His object in the preparation of his lectures was not originality, but usefulness. His sole desire was to guide the minds of his pupils to what he regarded as the right decision upon the multifarious topics of inquiry which his plan embraced ; and whether he attained that end by presenting to them the statements of others, or what might be more properly denominated his own, was to him a matter of no importance whatever.

In the prosecution of this object, the quotations made from the works both of living and departed genius were of course numerous. In short, it appeared to him that t> PREFACE,

to present to his young friends a statement of the sentiments of our most approved writers in relation to the important subjects to which he directed their attention, combined with an effort to guide them to the truth amidst this conflict of opinions, would prove one of the best modes he could adopt for securing a competent acquaintance with those subjects ; nor when he afterwards proceeded to prepare his manuscript for the press, did he see reason to adopt a different course of proceeding.

The preceding statement will account for the free use which he has made, in the following pages, of the writings of those illustrious men to whom the friends of mental science are under such deep obligations. He ventures to state, however, that the present work is not a mere compilation. He has endeavored at least to think for himself; and though he has mainly adopted the views and the system of the late Dr. T. Brown, the attentive reader will perceive that he differs from that writer on several important points — whether justly so or not, must of course be left for the public to decide ; the difference will at any rate show that he does not slavishly follow any leader, nor consent to hold his mind in bondage to any man.

Unless the reader should be familiarly acquainted with the writings of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Welsh, <fec. it is presumed that he will deem it a great advantage to be presented with an account of the views of these illustrious men ; he will thus be put in possession of better and more ample means for forming an enlightened judgment for himself, than if the sentiments of the writer had been singly exhibited. And even many who are tolerably conversant with the subjects on which this volume treats, may be glad to have their memories refreshed, and to be spared the labor of making references — a trouble which they must otherwise have undergone : while all who may honor this Work, by taking it as their guide in the commencement of their studies, will, it is hoped, be better prepared, in consequence of the plan which it adopts, for an extensive course of reading, to which it is designed to invite and allure them.

The author wishes to add a few words in reference to the system which, as it has been already intimated, is mainly followed in the present work, viz. that of Dr. Thomas Brown, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh; — a system which differs very considerably from the one which is still advocated with so much ability by his predecessor, Mr. Dugald Stewart. The sentiments of this latter gentleman are avowedly formed upon those of his preceptor, Dr. Reid ; yet he has presented the same radical principles in so much more elegant a dress — has adorned his pages with such varied and beautiful illustration — and maintained so high a tone of moral eloquence, that his writings, although it should be admitted that they have not perhaps very greatly enlarged the boundaries of Mental Science, have gained for their author a larger measure of public applause than has been bestowed upon those even of his more original predecessor.

The works of these distinguished men formed an epoch in the history of Mental Science, second only in importance and splendor to that which had been introduced by the labors of our immortal Locke. Yet, without intending to detract from their great merits, the present writer ventures to predict that the time is not far distant, when the publication of Dr. Brown's Lectures will be regarded as constituting an era not less brilliant than any of the preceding ones. The public have not as yet been just to the great merits of the latter gentleman. Many circumstances, which it is unnecessary to specify, have operated to prevent his attainment of that unrivalled distinction as a metaphysician, to which " his transcendent genius, blending together/' as it did, " all that is most graceful in fancy, with all that is most arduous and recondite in original speculation," most justly entitles him. There is one point only to which the author of these pages would refer. He was a poet, and therefore, as it has been too hastily inferred, cannot have been a solid and judicious philosopher. Now, if it were admitted that a brilliant imagination is not, generally speaking, found in union with those powers which qualify an individual for abstract speculation and "patient thought," it might still be maintained that Dr. Brown was an exception. In his writings "the lighter graces of poetry are interspersed amongst the demonstrations of a profound and original metaphysics. Never was philosophy so abstruse, yet never was it seasoned so exquisitely, or spread over a page so rich in all those attic delicacies of the imagination and the style which could

PREFACE.

make the study of it attractive."* It ought also to be further observed, that the poetry, which is doubtless to be found in Dr. Brown's philosophical works, is not only exquisite in itself, but invariably subordinated to the reasoning. His imagination is yoked to his argument, and it is only for the purpose of carrying it forwards with greater rapidity and power that he ever gives to the former the reins. In short, that splendor of fancy which sometimes, it must be confessed, eclipses thought, serves, in Dr. Brown, as it always should do, to set it in the clearness of noon-day before the view of the reader.

Were it as certain that the man who is not a poet must be a metaphysician, as that Dr. Brown possessed, in an eminent degree, the higher qualities of both, the writer of the present work might venture, on that ground, to prefer some claim to the character of a mental philosopher. No one can be more fully aware than he is himself, how impossible it is for him to shed over his work those graces of style which give to the pages of Dr. Brown so irresistible an attraction. He has not, accordingly, been guilty of the folly of attempting it. His sole effort has been to render the 'principles he advocates as intelligible as the abstract nature of the subjects would allow. He has aimed only at correctness and perspicuity—to think with accuracy and clearness himself, and to convey to his readers a distinct conception of his meaning. He ventures not to say, nor even to imagine, that he has been uniformly successful. In a volume

* Vide Prospectus for a monument to the memory of Dr. Brown, byone of the most eloquent writers of the present day.

comprehending so wide a variety of topics, each of them requiring for its full elucidation considerable power of abstract thought, it were presumption to conceive that there are no mistakes of doctrine as well as of phraseology ; and he expects to derive much instruction from the friendly remarks (for he will not anticipate any of a different description) of the various critics who may honor his work with their notice. He trusts, however, that it will not be entirely useless. He can with truth say, that his object in thus venturing to appear at the bar of the public, has been to advance the interests of what he acknowledges is to him a favorite science. He regards that science as being even yet in a state of infancy ; and when succeeding writers shall have carried it, as they doubtless will, to a higher point of advancement than that to which it has at present attained, he trusts that, though he may be constrained by their labors to relinquish some of his present sentiments, he shall not be the last to offer them his thanks.

In committing this volume to the press, the author has had more immediately in view the benefit of his junior brethren in the ministry ; and of that large body of British youths whom the advancing spirit of the age will compel to devote some attention to the subjects on which it treats, and who may feel their need of some such assistance as the present work attempts to supply. At the same time it has not received any such peculiar adaptation to either of these classes as to render it, on that account, less fit for circulation beyond the boundary of the circle just referred to. The connexion between some of the doctrines 'of Mental Science and various parts of

Theological Truth has indeed been exhibited ; and it is hoped that this circumstance will not render the volume less acceptable to those whose religious opinions are in harmony with the sentiments of the writer. Yet he is not aware that his Theology has influenced his philosophical opinions. He rests the views he entertains concerning the nature and properties of the human mind, upon the ground on which he believes in the ductility, &c. &c. of gold — on the ground, that is, of observation alone. He has endeavored to examine the substance mind, as we examine the substance gold ; and he has ascribed no properties to it but such as in this manner he found, or, at least, fancied he found it to possess. He has certainly rejoiced to see that what he regards as the true principles of Mental Science are in union with those views of revealed truth which appear to him of great and paramount importance ; his faith in both has been confirmed by the discovery of the alliance. Yet it would be to do injustice to the work to suppose that it attempts to found a system of Mental Philosophy on any peculiar religious opinions. It is conducted on philosophical principles ; and it respectfully invites the candid attention of the man of science, as well as of the friend of eligion.

A regard to brevity has prevented the author's enlai'ging.on some points upon which he wished to enter more fully. He deemed it, on various accounts, inexpedient that the work should extend beyond one volume. Should it happen to obtain so much favor from the public as to render a second edition necessary, he has it in contemplation to expand considerably that part of which treats on Moral Science, or rather to introduce additional topics and discussions ; and either to abridge the former part, or to add another volume, as circumstances and the advice of friends may seem to direct. In its present form he solicits for it the kind consideration of his friends, and the candid attention of an enlightened publico.

Blackburn Academy, 1828.

Introduction

PAGE AH philosophical inquiries relate to Matter or Mind — importance of a knowledge of the latter — its influence upon physical science, in Education, Poetry, Eloquence, Criticism, Moral Science, Theology, &c. — its tendency to strengthen the faculties, &c. &c. . .21

Chap. II

THE OBJECT OF INTELLECTUAL SCIENCE ; AND THE MODE IN WHICH OUR INQUIRIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

Inquiries limited to the phenomena of Mind — its essence unknown, but not material — its properties to be ascertained by observation alone — the only questions are, What are the elements of our Thoughts, &c. and the order of their occurrence — the nature of Causation, Mental Analysis, &c. ...... 28

Chap. III

THE TRUE NATURE OF THE POWERS AND SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF THE MIND EXPLAINED.

Thoughts, Ideas, Sensations, &c. are the Mind itself in particular states — Mental Powers, &.c. are capabilities of existing in these states — The nature of Physical Qualities, &c. .... 44

Chap. IV

THE MANNER IN WHICH OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MENTAL PHiE- NOMENA IS OBTAINED.

The nature of Consciousness— statements of Reid, Stewart, Welsh, Brown, &c. — not a distinct power, &c. 52

2*

CONTENTS.

Chap. V

THE ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF SELF, AND THE IDENTITY OF THE THINKING PRINCIPLE, & c - &c.

Difference between Stewart and Brown — The notion of Self, and the notion of Identity, not the same — the former intuitive, &c. . . 59

Chap. VI. Analysis And Arrangement Of The Mental Phenomena

The power of recognizing Resemblances the basis of classification — different principles on which it may be conducted — modes adopted by Reid, Stewart, and Brown — reasons for following the latter . 63

DIVISION I.

External affections

Order I. — Less definite]External Affections Order II. — Sensations.

76 82

GENERAL REMARKS CONCERNING SENSATION .'

First — All Sensation is in the Mind : . 83

Second — The term denotes those states of mind which directly result from a change in the state of the organ 87

Third — It is not confined to those which are decidedly pleasurable or painful 88

Fourth — The nature of the previous change in the state of the organ is unknown 89

Fifth — The connexion between Matter and Mind is unknown — attempts to account for it — the theories of Des Cartes, Dr. Briggs, Hartley — fallacy — no especial mystery here . . . .90

Sixth — External objects are known only relatively . . . . 97 Important difference between Reid and Brown on this subject — mistakes of Reid and Stewart in reference to Primary and Secondary Qualities and Perception — its true nature explained — Ancient theory of Perception by Images — Examined.

Seventh — To Sensation all our knowledge may be traced . .116

Statements of Locke, Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, Stewart, &,c. — Examined.

CLASSIFICATION OF OUR SENSATIONS.

Class I. — Sensations of Smell,

Considered in the following order: — The Organ — the Sensations — the Properties which produce them — the Knowledge derived from them, 123

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Class II. — Sensations of Taste; The same order 128

Class III. — Sensations of Hearing.

The same order 131

Class IV. — Sensations of Touch.

The same order — Our knowledge of things external is not derived from the sense of Touch, but from Muscular Sensations — by In- ""^ tuition — Statements of Reid, Brown, Welsh, &c 133

Class V. — Sensations of Sight.

The same order — The knowledge of Distance, Magnitude, &c. not gained by this Sense — Extension involved perhaps in our original perceptions — Opinions of Reid, Brown, &c 144

DIVISION II internal affections.

Proof of their existence — their nature — importance — Phrenology — must be analyzed and classified — caution necessary here — mistakes of Condillac, Reid, kc 154

Order I. — Intellectual States of Mind.

Class I. — Simple Suggestions,

Explained — the power by which they arise — the phrase, ' association of ideas,' improper — importance of the difference between Reid and Brown here — value of the faculty of Suggestion — Laws of Suggestion stated by Hume, Stewart, &c. — may be resolved into three : 166

First Law of Suggestion.

Resemblance.

Analagous as well as resembling objects are suggested — tendency to such suggestions gives existence to a Metaphor, Simile — enlarges the boundaries of the arts and sciences, &c. .... 174

Second Law of Suggestion.

Contrast 177

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Third Law of Suggestion.

CONTIGUITY.

Objects contiguous in place and in time are suggested — influence of this law in the study of Chronology, History, &.c. — circumstances which modify the influence of these laws — especially constitutional differences — original tendencies to different species of Suggestions, give birth to genius — its nature — the faculty of Suggestion powerfully stimulated by objects of Perception — Conceptions may co-exist 179

ATTENTION,

Not an original power — but Desire co-existing with some other mental affection : 186

CONCEPTION, MEMORY, IMAGINATION.

Statements of preceding writers — are not distinct powers — may be resolved into Suggestion — why they have been considered distinct — Reminiscence — mistakes in reference to Imagination — the separate parts of complex conceptions arise neither directly nor indirectly by volition — what takes place in the mind when Arguments and Images are said to be selected 192

Class II. — Conceptions of Relations.

Their nature explained — different from Simple Conceptions — and from Perceptions — imply the existence of a distinct Power . . 210

Species I. — Relations of Co-existence.

Position, Resemblance or difference, Proport ; on, Degree, Comprehension — the faculty of recognizing Resemblances the source of classification and of general terms — their nature explained — Nominalists and Realists — mistakes of both — proof that we have general Ideas — explanation of their nature 213

JUDGING, REASONING, &c.

General statements of Reid and Stewart — the power of recognizing relations accounts for the phenomena of Judging, &c. &c. — amental Judgment is the recognition of a Relation — when expressed in words, is a Proposition — Reasoning consists of a series of Propositions, each expressing a relation of Comprehension — explanations and illustrations — all series of such propositions do not constitute Reasoning — the particular connexion between each which is necessary — the manner in which they arise mentally in the required order — not by Sagacity, but Suggestion 220

ABSTRACTION.

. 231

Obscurity of some preceding writers — may be resolved into Sugg( tion — Abstract Notions — their nature — how formed .

Species II. — relations of succession.

Conceptions of the order of Events — Supply the place of History — Prophecy . ; 235

Order II. — Emotions.

Differ from intellectual States — must be analyzed and classified — do not admit of generic distinctions — examination of Cogan's statements — indefinite — self-contradictory — different modes of classifying them stated — Dr. Brown's arrangements — why adopted . 237

Class I. — Immediate Emotions.

Cheerfulness 247

SURPRISE, WONDER, AND ASTONISHMENT.

Called by Cogan, Introductory Emotions — his obscurity — are distinct

and original feelings — mistake of Adam Smith — their moral use . 251 Languor 256

BEAUTY,

An Emotion not a Sensation — of a pleasing kind — transferred to the object which excites it — which is hence called beautiful — is an affection of mind only — not an external Essence — inquiry whether any material objects originally awaken the Emotion — opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Payne Knight on one side, and of Messrs. Alison and Jeffery on the other — Reasons for considering Beauty as the result of association 257

SUBLIMITY.

The Emotion is transferred to the object — Beauty and Sublimity probably different emotions — Sublimity in material objects the result of Association — apparent inconsistency of Dr. Brown . .270

Deformity and Ludicrousness ...... 275

MORAL APPROBATION AND DISAPPROBATION.

The Mind formed to approve what is right, he. the moral Emotion follows the moral judgment — conceived mistake of Dr. Brown — importance of these Emotions ....... 276

PAGE LOVE AND HATRED.

Analysis of each — importance of both 280

SYMPATHY

Is felt with Pleasure as well as Pain— perhaps with the latter more powerfully — why so — may perhaps be resolved into Suggestion — displays the Divine goodness 284

PRIDE AND HUMILITY

Explained — are Emotions — their moral aspect .... 289 Class II. Retrospective Emotions . . . 291

ANGER.

Its nature explained — modifications — not evil per sc, but in danger of becoming so ibid.

GRATITUDE,

A modification of Love — kindled by a conception of the amiablene3s of the benefactor . . . ... . . • 293

REGRET AND GLADNESS

Contain the Emotion, and a conception of its cause — most events awaken both emotions — importance of a desire to trace their favorable consequences 295

REMORSE AND SELF-APPROBATION

Explained — distinct from Moral approbation and Disapprobation — constitute the power of Conscience — statements of different writers 296

Class III. — Prospective Emotions.

Desire and Fear explained and distinguished — the origin of Desire — statements of Drs. Price and Brown — Reasons for dissenting from them — different gradations of Desire expressed by the terms Wish, Hope, Expectation, Confidence, &c. — these not distinct Emotions — the nature of the Will — accounts of Mr. Locke, Dr. Reid, &c. mistakes — statements of Dr. Brown — Volition is Desire, arising in particular circumstances — cannot, therefore, be opposite to each other — application of the foregoing doctrine to Rom. vii. 15. — to the question of Liberty and Necessity — to the notion of the Self-determining Power of the Will, &c. — particular Desires . .299

THE DESIRE OF CONTINUED EXISTENCE.

One of the most universal of our desires — existence a good per se chiefly valuable as that which may be rendered happy — the Desire of Life not improper in itself— a principle of great practical importance 317

THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

Whether original — in what sense it is so 31S

THE DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Universality of the principle — manner in which it operates — Knowledge in itself delightful — desired consequently on its own account — chiefly for the sake of its consequences 319

THE DESIRE OF POWER.

Its origin — progress — may lead to the desire of knowledge — Eloquence — Rank, Station, &c — its moral character — the Desire of Wealth — how it arises — statements of Brown . . . .321

THE DESIRE OF THE ESTEEM AND LOVE OF OTHERS,

A distinct and original Emotion — its moral character . . . 327

THE DESIRE OF SUPERIORITY

Is an original principle. — Emulation not to be confounded with Envy — not evil in itself — whether lawful to appeal to it — affirmed . 328

THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE.

The difference between Capabilities of Thinking, Feeling, &c. and the Rectitude of particular Thoughts, Sic. — Mental Science inquires concerning the former, — Moral Science, the latter. — Inquiries concerning the Rectitude of actions suppose a moral rule, &,c. — important to ascertain what that is — first Inquiry . . - .331

WHAT IS RECTITUDE?

A quality in actions — an essential distinction between Right and Wrong — examination of various systems concerning the nature of Virtue 334

First. — The Sceptical System — on what grounded — the foundation insecure — the theory of Hobbes, that Law gives actions a moral character, shown to be false ibid.

PAGE

Secondly. — The system of those who place the foundation of virtue in the Will of God — distinction to be observed— actions are not right because commanded, but commanded because they are right 337

Thirdly. — The systems of those who represent Virtue as depending upon the constitution of the Mind — Theories of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Brown — each has common and peculiar difficulties to encounter — considered separately — Dr. Brown's at length — statement of his opinions on the subject of Morals — shown to be contrary to his own principles of Philosophy — Objections . . . 339

Fourthly. — The system of those who maintain that the consequences of actions impart to them their moral character — differences among the advocates of the general system — arguments in support of it — what may be conceded — arguments against it—the systems of private and Public Utility opposed — at variance with [the manner in which moral emotions arise — contrary to Scripture , . . 358

Fifthly. — Rectitude is the conformity of affections and actions with Relations — an account of the relations in which we stand to God and to each other — some of the relations arbitrary, others not — the obligations which grow out of them never so — the systems of Clarke, Price— obscurity and mistakes of the latter — neither our Perceptions nor our Emotions a perfect criterion of virtue — that criterion the perfect intellect of God guided in its decisions by his infinitely holy nature — the nature of God the ultimate foundation and criterion of Rectitude 370

WHAT IS .THE STANDARD OF RECTITUDE ?

This question resolves itself into an inquiry, what Revelation God has made of himself— the material Creation contains a Revelation of him — improper language sometimes used here — The Scriptures the most Perfect Revelation — the office of Reason — the only question is, What readest thou ? . . . . . . • 378

ELEMENTS

OF

MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE

Chap. I. Introduction

" The whole system of bodies in the universe," as it has been very justly stated, " may be called the Material world ; the whole system of minds, from the infinite Creator, to the meanest creature endowed with thought, may be called the Intellectual world."

Such being the case, the subject of all philosophical inquiries must be either Matter, or Mind. To investigate the properties of the former, is the object of Physical Science ; to develop the nature and operations of the latter, belongs to the department of Metaphysics, or Mental Philosophy.

It is true, that, as the mind is not thought or feeling, but that which thinks and feels, all our speculations with regard to mind belong to the general department of Physics. We do not, however, regret this arbitrary separation of the philosophy of Mind from that of Matter. It leads to a division of literary labor favorable to the advancement of both.

Confining our observation to this world, the mind of man must be allowed to be the noblest production of Almighty power ; it deserves, therefore, our closest study. It must, however, be admitted, that an investigation of the nature and properties of Mind, is not unattended with difficulty ; and that it may be conducted in a manner little calculated to yield much valuable fruit. To these two causes we may, perhaps, chiefly trace

2'2' INTROBUCTIONV

that absurd prejudice against all inquiries of this nature, which prevails — we lament the necessity of admitting — to a considerable extent, even in the present day. The prejudice is properly designated absurd, for Mr. Hume long ago observed, that "all the sciences have a relation to human nature." It is manifest, indeed, that the mind is the instrument which is employed in every disquisition into which we enter; the measure of success which attends our application of this instrument must accordingly depend, in some degree at any rate, upon thejperfection of our knowledge of its nature. The importance, however, of Mental Science is not a subject to be thus cursorily dismissed ? the subsequent part of this chapter will, therefore, be devoted to a more full development of that importance.

A writer of powerful talents* has endeavored to depreciate all investigations of this kind by statements of which the following is the substance. Matter and Mind present distinct phenomena, of which the former may be the subject of actual experiment, the latter only of observation. By experiments in physics, the nature of any substance may be so ascertained, as to enable us to manage it at pleasure. With regard to mind? the case, it is alledged, is different. Here we can do no more than observe the phsenomena ; their order and succession are beyond our control. We may examine them minutely ; we may describe them accurately ; but, as we cannot subject them to experiment, we obtain no more power over them. " In metaphysics certainly," he adds, " knowledge is not power ; mstead of producing new phsenomena to elucidate the old, by well-contrived and well-conducted experiments, the most diligent inquirer can do no more than register and arrange the appearances, which he can neither account for nor control."

Mr. Stewart admits the premises of this writer, without acquiescing in his conclusion ; because, as he states, " the difference between experiment and observation consists merely in the comparative rapidity with which they accomplish their discoveries ; or rather," he adds, " in the comparative command we possess over them, as instruments for the investigation of truth. The discoveries of both, when actually effected, are so precisely of the same kind, that it may safely be affirmed, there is not a single proposition true of the one, which will not be found to hold equally with respect to the other."|

A little consideration may, perhaps, serve to convince us, that Mr. Stewart has admitted more than he needed to have

* Vide Edinburgh Review,~vol. iii. p. 269. 1 Philosophical Essays, pp. 33, 34.

INTRODUCTION. 23

done, — that the distinction of the objector is a distinction without a difference : for the business of the philosopher is observation, and observation alone. He is to watch how the processes of nature (the term nature is used here to prevent circumlocution) are carried on in the departments both of matter and of mind. It is possible, indeed, to secure, by a little effort on our part, a more frequent recurrence of some of these processes than would otherwise take place. Instead of watching, for instance, for the accidental fall of a stone from a certain eminence, in order to ascertain at what rate the velocity of falling bodies is accelerated, we may cause it to be frequently thrown from that eminence, and thus gain, in considerably less time, the desired information ; but still there is nothing more than observation here. The stone is brought to the ground, in each case, by the laws of nature (to adopt popular phraseology ;) its motion is accelerated, in each case, by the same laws ; and we watch the process of descent, that we may ascertain the law of acceleration.