Psychology

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Preface

As the following publication proposes a system of mental philosophy in some degree new, a few words in regard to its origin may be due alike to the writer and the reader. In general, it owes its existence to the author's desire to promote the cause of truth and science. That cause he regards as identified with the happiness of his fellow-men and the glory of his God. At an early age, he was deeply impressed with the conviction, which no reflecting mind can fail to feel, that mental philosophy is properly the basis of all science, and that a correct acquaintance with the properties and operations of the mind, would not only facilitate our progress in the study of every department of truth, but, what to him was a matter of supreme importance, would also enable us to acquire a more correct view of the moral condition of the soul, and shed abundant light on some of the practical doctrines of Revelation. This latter consideration is mentioned here, because it was really the writer's principal motive for pursuing this subject, although he has by no means mingled religion with metaphysics in the following treatise ; on the contrary, his A 2

VI PREFACE.

investigations of the one were conducted altogether independently of the other. About sixteen years ago, having been called to take charge of a theological seminary, he felt it a duty to devote particular attention to his instructions in this department, and formed a resolution, which has doubtless had some influence on this system. He had considerable acquaintance with the patriarchs of British metaphysics, Locke, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, as well as with some few German authors ; but neither of them seemed to present an entirely natural and satisfactory exhibition of his own mental phenomena. He then resolved to study exclusively his own mind, and for ten years he read no book on this subject. During this period, he spent much of his time in the examination of his own mental phenomena, and having travelled over the whole ground, and employed the leisure of several additional years to review and mature his views, he now presents to the public the following outline of a system, as in all its parts the result of original, analytic induction. That he regards it as a more natural, faithful, and intelligible exhibition of the operations of his own mind than is contained in any other work which he has seen, he will not dissemble. Since the features of his own system have been settled, the writer has looked at various other works, and found much that is valuable, especially in the re-

PREFACE. Vll

cent publications of his own countrymen, Professors Upham, Day, Tappan, and others, yet nothing which seemed to invalidate his system, or render dubious the propriety of its publication.

As this work is designed, not only for intelligent popular readers, but also for use in colleges and academies, the author has abridged his manuscript, and made it sufficiently brief to leave ample room for the explanatory observations of the professors and teachers, as well as written exercises of the students. For an experience of more than twenty years in teaching has convinced him, that the most successful method of imparting a thorough knowledge of such subjects, is to combine with a brief text-book the explanations and illustrations of theinstructer, and, at the same time, to require the student to exercise his pen in preparing either essays on the most prominent topics, or an analysis, or a regular compend of the whole.

After frequent solicitation from those who heard the author's lectures, and from some other gentlemen of high literary and scientific rank who examined the manuscript, this work is at length submitted to the public, with an earnest solicitude that it may subserve the cause of truth and human happiness. The author does not flatter himself that his views on all the topics discussed, have reached entire accuracy ; he will thankfully receive and carefully

Vlll PREFACE.

weigh any suggestions which may be made, especially if presented in the spirit of benevolence or of literary comity. If the map of the human mind here presented is found to be more faithful and intelligible than those heretofore in use, if it tends to make perspicuous a subject hitherto proverbially abstruse and obscure, it will doubtless find friends, and the author will rejoice in the assurance that he has not toiled in vain. Of the salutary influence of the principles and results attained, on the grand interests of fundamental Christianity, he entertains no doubt.

The influence of the views here presented on logic, rhetoric, and a number of related sciences and topics, will be evident to the scientific scholar. Perhaps at a future day some of these relations may be prosecuted by the author, if his health and numerous other duties will permit. With these remarks the work is now commended to the blessing of God, and the favour of the friends of true philosophy and religion.

S. S. SCHMUCKER.

Theological Seminary, »

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. >

SECOND EDITION.

In preparing for the press this enlarged edition of his Mental Philosophy, the author faithfully availed himself of the suggestions of the principal reviews of the work which have met his eye. Among these, that in the American Biblical Repository, by the distinguished President of Pennsylvania College, exhibited the greatest familiarity with the subject and with the work, and presented the most numerous suggestions for its enlargement. To that gentleman, as well as to the reviewers in the Methodist Quarterly Review, and the New World, and others, the author takes pleasure thus publicly to acknowledge his obligations. In all cases he has carefully weighed their suggestions, and, in most instances, been led to make some farther illustrations or additions, which, he trusts, will contribute to the value of the work. He has been happy to find in these writers but little dissent from his general system. The principal topics on which he has made additions, amounting in all to about one third of the whole work, are the following : the classification of the different objects or entities in

PREFACE.

the universe ; the subject of mnemonics, or the art of improving and aiding the memory ; the processes of perception and sensation through the bodily organs, and the different theories for their explanation ; the different classes of feeling, especially the intellectual and moral emotions ; the nature of analytic reasoning, and laws of human belief; imagination ; and the operations of conscience.

The work is again commended to the blessing of God and the favour of the public. May, 1843.

Introduction

Page

On the Methodology of the Science, and the several Points of Difference between Mathematical and Metaphysical Reasoning 13

Definition. Sketch of the Different former Systems : the common division into nine faculties, referred by Reid to two classes, the Intellectual and Active Powers ; by Stewart to three classes, Intellectual, Active, and Social Powers ; and by' Brown to External and Internal States of the Mind . . 25

The German Division, into Sensibilities, Understanding, and Will, substantially adopted by Upham 26

Different System proposed in this Work, into, 1. Cognitive, or those Phenomena of the Mind which are Knowledge, our Cognitions, not including many Operations of the Intellect ; 2. Sentient Phenomena of Mind, including Sensations, Feelings, Emotions, and, in part, Passions ; and, 3. Active Operations, including not only the Will, but also a large part of what, in the other Systems, is embraced under the Intellect or Understanding 27

Chapter I

Of Objective Entities ; that is, of the Universe itself, and all the various Objects and Existences constituting it, in themselves considered — Their Objectivity ; that is, their Real Existence — Their Division into Classes 39

Chapter II

Of our Cognitive Ideas as Mental Representatives (not images) of all the different Objects or Existences known to us in the Universe — Exact Nature of these Ideas — Criteria for Distinguishing Ideas of the Cognitive Class — Nature and Sources of Error in our Cognitive Ideas or Knowledge — Ancient Realists and Nominalists— German Realism and Idealism — Transcendental Idealism of Kant — Division of these Ideas, 1. Into Individual and Relative Knowledge; 2. Into Retrospective (memory, voluntary and spontaneous— mnemonics), present (consciousness), and prospective knowledge (bases of the latter are, Analogy, Causation, and Revelation) . . 69

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III. Page

Organic Process by which we obtain these Ideas — Nervous Connexion between the different Organs of Sense and the Brain — Phrenology. 1. Sense of Vision. The Eye, description of— Of which Ideas the Eye is the Organ of Perception, and of which not — Of Colour, Shape, Extension, Direction, apparent and relative Size — Feelings accompanying these Perceptions. 2. Sense of Hearing. The Ear, description of — Conductors of Sound, or, rather, of Atmospheric Vibrations — Number of distinguishable Sounds — Relations of Sound, Concords, Discords — Their Nature— Difference between our Perceptions of Sound and the Feelings accompanying them. 3. Sense of Touch. The Organ itself— Of the Ideas acquired by Touch — Solidity or Fluidity, Shape, Extension, Smoothness or Roughness, Heat or Cold — Whether all resolvable into Resistance and Extension. Externity : Improvements of this Sense — Sanderson — Institutions for the Blind substitute the Sense of Touch for that of Vision. 4. Sense of Tasle. The Organ of Taste — The Wisdom of its Location— Perceptions of Flavour, and Feelings connected with them — Great Variety of Flavours — Mode of Distinguishing them in Language. 5 Sense of Smell. The Organ described — Our Knowledge of Odours — Great Variety — In what the Odour objectively consists — Feelings connected with the Perception of Odours —Improvement of the Senses generally — Cases of Mitchell, Dr. Moyse, &c.

Different Theories on the Mode of Reciprocal Influence of Body and Soul in general. Theory of Occasionalism — Of Leibnitz's Pre-established Harmony — Des Cartes's Theory — Newton's View — Dr. Hartley's Theory of Nervous Vibrations in particular. Result of the Whole 105

Part II. Of Sentient Ideas

Definition of Feelings — Criteria by which this class of Ideas is distinguished 146

Chapter I

Classification of Feelings, into Individual and Relative. The Individual class embraces, 1. Sensations, or those Feelings consequent on Perceptions by the Senses. 2. Some Emotions, intellectual, as Emotion of the Sublime, of the Beautiful, the Ludicrous, of Surprise, of Wonder, &c. — Moral Emotions, or those Feelings included in the Operations of Conscience. 3. Some of the Affections — Pleasant Affections, Painful Affections. 4. Feelings connected with our Bodily Appetites.

CONTENTS.

P»«e

Relative Feelings, including, 1. Benevolent Feelings — as Friendship, Benevolence, Gratitude, &c., Filial. Parental Love, Love to God. 2. Malevolent or Defensive Feelings — as Anger, Hatred, Ingratitude, Cruelty, &c. 3. Sympathetic Feelings — as Pity, Condolence, Compassion, and Sympathy of various kinds. 4. Antipathetic Feelings — as Envy, Jealousy, Horror, Disgust, Indignation, &c 149

Other less valuable Divisions of Feeling, into Sensuous, Intellectual, and Moral — into Present, Retrospective, and Prospective . . . . . . . . . . 150

Discussion of the different Branches of the above Classification 151

CHAPTER H.

Of the different Tendency of Entities, or the various Objects in the Universe, to excite Feeling 178

Chapter III

Susceptibility of the Mind for Feeling — its various Degrees, and the Laws of their Operation 185

Chapter I

Criteria by which the Active Operations are distinguished from all other Mental Phenomena. Materials on which our Active Operations are performed, are External Objects of the different classes, past Mental Phenomena of every class, and the Natural Signs by which these Ideas are expressed . . 199

Division and Discussion of the Five Active Operations :

I. Inspection. Its Nature, Objects, &c, includes the Active

Processes of Perception, Consciousness, Conception, Judgment, Recollection, Analytic Reasoning, and the Impulsive Element of Conscience— Act of Memorizing

explained 203

Fundamental Laws of Human Belief Enumerated . . 213

II. Arrangement. Definition of this Active Process.

The Purposes aimed at in Arrangement .... 218 Various Principles according to which the Process may be conducted. Arrangement embraces the Processes of Comparison, different Arithmetical Processes, Classification, Mental Associations based on any Natural Principle or Affinity, Composition of Music, and Synthetic Reasoning. Nature of Evidence Objectively and Subjectively considered — Syllogisms, the Nature of . . 222

III. Modification. Definition — Objects of this Process.

It embraces Abstraction, Generalization, Imagination,

Xll CONTENTS.

Fag*

Fancy ; its results are Geometrical Axioms, Metaphysical Axioms, Mathematical Truths, Moral general Truths or Principles (the fallacy of Kant and other writers, particularly in Germany, who regard these general truths as a priori knowledge), Works of Fiction in Writing, Painting, Sculpture, &c.

IV. Mental Direction of our Physical Agency described — Its

different Kinds — Its several Concomitants.

V. Intellectual Intercourse with other Minds. Philosophical

Nature of, described. 1. By Articulate Sounds — Nature of Oral Language— Connexion between Words and Ideas — How far Language is of Divine Origin. 2. By Gestures and Features of Countenance. 3. By Written Signs — Alphabet of Chinese, of the Cherokees — Arithmetic Figures — Musical Notes — The Complex Operation of Composition described.

Attention— why not a separate Power of the Soul.

CHAPTER II. Mode of Occurrence of the Five Active Operations is twofold

1. Voluntary— Proof of Man's Voluntary or Moral Agency :

Motives — The Will — Two Constitutional Inclinations of the Soul ; the first, to Obey the Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Fitness of Things, Conscience— The second, to pursue our Well-being or Pleasure— The latter Inclination stronger in Man since the Fall— Different Modifications of these Constitutional Inclinations : love of Life, of Property, of Power, &c. — Desires : their Difference from Feelings.

2. Spontaneous Occurrences of the Active Operations — Dif-

ference between Spontaneous and Voluntary Action — Laws of the Spontaneous Active Operations — Laws of Association — Why we are responsible also for our Spontaneous Action

Pragmatic View — Dreams 289

Recapitulation, for Reviews and Examinations . . 295

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

It has long been a subject of remark, that while the science of mathematics, which discusses the properties and relations of space and number, is accompanied by the most conclusive evidence, and bears conviction with it at every step of its progress, the philosophy of the mind still remains enveloped in comparative darkness and uncertainty, after the intellect of ages has been expended in its investigation. The question arises, Are not both similar in their nature, and alike susceptible of demonstrative discussion ? It seems evident, that they are not precisely alike, and yet much of the obscurity enveloping mental science, doubtless arises from the unphilosophical manner, in which its investigations have been conducted, and the inappro*- priate style in which the result of them has generally been recorded. The superior force of mathematical reasoning, arises from three sources. First, from an intrinsic difference in the nature of the subjects discussed. Secondly, from the more rigidly analytic method of investigation, pursued in the mathematics. And, thirdly, from a less elegant, indeed, but more precise and perspicuous method of conveying to others the knowledge we have acquired. B

14 INTRODUCTION.

A distinguished and popular writer* of the present day, alleges the difficulty of ascertaining with precision the operations of other minds, as a prominent cause of the uncertainty of mental science. But this appears to us to be an erroneous view. All minds are, in healthy subjects, constituted essentially alike ; and as every student of this science has access to the phenomena of his own mind, he can draw from this source abundant materials for the examination of any and of every aspect of the subject. We have, moreover, the candid testimony of a multitude of writers on these topics, each presenting the details of his own mind ; so that this science need not labour under obscurity for want of the experience of different and independent witnesses. The testimony of consciousness in regard to our individual mental operations separately considered, seems also to be distinct and satisfactory. And the testimony of others concerning the clearness of their consciousness, coincides with our own experience. But when we attempt to trace the unknown cause of these operations which lies behind them ; or to determine and systematize their relations to each other, which are often diversified and obscure, we encounter difficulties on every side. And these difficulties encumber the investigation of our own mental phenomena, as well as those of others.

It is indeed true, that in morbid mental action, the operations of different minds are very diverse, and the careful collation of these diversified phases

* Dr. Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, p. 15, 16, Harpers' ed.

METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCE. 15

of mental obliquity, is interesting to the student of mental science and essential to the physician ; but the true intellectual system must be deduced from the phenomena of mind in its ordinary, its healthy condition. We return therefore to the position, that the causes of superior lucidness awarded to mathematical science are chiefly three.

The first of these causes, namely the intrinsic difference between the subjects discussed in these sciences, is derived from the Author of our being. We are so constituted that the properties and especially the relations of space and number, are more clearly apprehended by us than those of mind. Yet this difference is not so great as might, at first view, be supposed. Much of it arises from the fact, that from our earliest years we are engaged every hour in perceiving and judging of space and number, while the phenomena of the mind are seldom thought of until we reach the years of maturity, and then generally at short periods as subjects of theoretical study. Our perceptions of the former are therefore improved in an incalculably higher degree than our views of the latter.

The second source of superior clearness has been stated to be a more rigidly analytic method of investigation. This has led to greater improvements in these sciences, and hence the evidence attending their discussion is also greater. The fact that a better method of philosophizing has usually been pursued in the mathematical sciences is not altogether adventitious. We believe it to be chiefly owing to the peculiar nature of the properties and

16 INTRODUCTION.

relations of space and number, and to the fixed and simple nature of mathematical language, which consists chiefly of a few figures and signs, and a small number of well-defined words, while it wholly rejects the flowers of rhetoric.

The same method of inductive investigation is the only one, by which real progress can be made in mental science, or in any other department of human knowledge. It will appear more clearly in the sequel, that all those of our ideas which are knowledge, are mental representatives of entities ; i. e., of things, and their relations, existing in nature ; and can be obtained, originally, in no other way than by the careful examination of entities themselves. Hence, however knowledge already acquired may afterward be combined and arranged, the only accurate method of obtaining its original elements is by patient successive examinations of those entities of which we wish to obtain a knowledge. After such a careful examination of all the facts in the case has been made, and we have thus obtained accurate mental representatives of them all ; then, and not until then, can we with certainty decide, whether or not any supposed property or law belongs to them all. That method of philosophizing, therefore, which affirms a general law after the examination of a few facts, must forever be insecure, and tend to obstruct the progress of any science.

The third source of the superior lucidness of mathematical discussions, is the simple, literal, concise style, in which they are recorded for the instruction of others, and the specific numeric no-

NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 17

tation of every item of knowledge obtained. It will hereafter appear more clearly, we trust, that one of the jaiost prolific sources of error in human knowledge, is the use of language which does not express our ideas with entire, specific exactness. But mathematical language, consisting of a few figures, letters, and signs, and a small stock of well-defined words, the same idea is almost universally designated by one and the same term. No attempt is made to avoid the repetition of the same word in the same sentence, however often the same idea may recur ; and the man would expose himself to ridicule, who should attempt to imbody the demonstrations of Euclid in profuse and florid language. Hence arises a degree of perspicuity of style never attained and rarely aimed at in the discussions of any other science. Nor is the precise separation of each item of knowledge from every other, and its numerical notation unimportant. It enables the reader to know exactly how far an author has succeeded in establishing the positions assumed, and of which of them the evidence is inconclusive. Thus, those positions, the demonstration of which appears conclusive to all, become a common stock of knowledge. On these others can build, assuming them as correct, and can then direct their attention to positions yet doubtful.

The same inflexible precision of style and the distinct separation of the items of our knowledge would doubtless tend in a high degree to advance the science of mental philosophy ; and ought, so far as the different nature of the subjects will admit, B2

18 INTRODUCTION.

certainly to be introduced. Yet, if even equal precision could be attained, the style of discussion in Mental Philosophy would still be far more copious and diversified, because the subjects of which it treats are incalculably more numerous and difficult. The question here arises, What is the exact nature of the demonstration and proof in mathematics, and what in mental science ? If a writer wishes to produce conviction, which of his ideas relating to the subject under discussion, should he exhibit to his readers in the language just recommended, and what active operation of mind must he perform ? — Geometry discusses the properties and relations of space. Demonstration in this science sometimes consists in bringing the several diagrams or figures, between which any relation is affirmed, or in supposing them to be brought into such local contiguity as will enable the eye to perceive the relation at a glance. Such is the nature, e. g., of the demonstration of the theorem of Euclid known as Prop. IV. of Book I., viz. : If two triangles have two sides, and the included angle of the one equal to two sides and the included angle of the other, they must be identical or equal in all respects. For it virtually consists in supposing one of the two figures to be placed upon the other, and then conducting the eye through the successive survey of its several parts ; and it is found that in this survey the mind intuitively perceives the coincidence of each. Sometimes the demonstration consists in reducing the diagram into such other elementary figures by additional lines, &c, as are intuitively discovered

MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION. 19

by the eye to possess the property in question, and which exemplify some of those self-evident cases termed axioms. Axioms in Geometry consist of generic affirmations of certain facts or properties of space which are intuitively perceived to be true in individual and specific familiar cases. E. g., the axiom — things equal to the same thing are equal to one another — is first learned from the observations of early life. We perceive in the familiar objects around us which we touch, see, and handle, that if any two of them are equal or like to a third, they are also, in the same respects, like each other. The observation is extended from one case to another, until, finding no exceptions to it, we set it down as a universal maxim, and confidently employ it as one of the instruments of reasoning. This is the case with other axioms. In arithmetic the same observation is intuitively made in reference to small numbers, and gradually extended to large ones, in regard to which the mind could not intuitively see its truth, but, after the preliminary process, confidently and safely assumes it.

When small numbers are added together, the mind can intuitively perceive the truth of the sum total. Thus, that 2 + 3=5, every one can perceive to be true. But when large numbers, extending to many figures, are added, the mind cannot see the truth of the sum total by comparing the entire numbers. We are certain of its accuracy only by successively going through the addition of each figure, and knowing that this operation has been accurately performed. So, also, when the multiplica

20 INTIIOBUCTIOX.

tion or division of small numbers is performed, the mind intuitively perceives the accuracy of the operation ; but in large numbers our perception is indistinct. Our confidence in these cases rests on our assurance of the accuracy of the rule or mode of operation, which assurance is acquired in the case of small numbers. The same is the case with the arithmetical proportions, e. gr., 1 : 3 : : 2 : 6, &c, The ocess of reasoning in mental science is entirely different. The items of proof and the subjects of discussion are all mental phenomena, of which each individual must judge for himself by the testimony of his own consciousness. The art of understanding the subject well, and of writing upon it lucidly and conclusively, consists in the habit of carefully studying the operations of our own minds, and of clothing the result of our observations in such perspicuous and appropriate language, as will most successfully conduct our readers or hearers through the same process on the points in question. Discussions on this subject are successful in producing conviction, just in proportion as they enable the reader to verify the writer's assertions in his own mind. The reader's own consciousness must respond at every step to the truth of the positions advanced ; and conviction terminates, as soon as the response is doubtful, or the reader cannot perceive, in the operations of his own mind, the truth of the author's assertions.

THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DIVISIONS

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Mental Philosophy may be defined to be that science which discusses the properties and operations of the human soul. Other objects, that is, entities, in the universe, are also the subject of investigation ; but only in as far as their influence on the phenomena of mind is concerned. Thus, in treating of some of our ideas, we find them to be mental representatives of external objects around us, and we are necessarily led to examine those objects or entities, to ascertain what we may and do know of them, and what is the process by which, through the bodily organs, we obtain this knowledge.

This science was formerly termed Metaphysics, a term barbarously derived from the Greek, in which its appropriate primitive metaphusike (jiera. (pvoLicog, .7}, -ov) is not found. It is supposed to have originated from the misapprehension of the inscription on a work, consisting of fourteen books, concerning which it is doubtful whether, at least in their present form, they belong to the productions of Aristotle, among which they are found. It is an ancient, though not perfectly substantiated opinion, that Andronicus of Rhodes, who arranged the works of Aristotle into classes, after he had thus assorted the books on logic, ethics, and physics, placed together several disconnected tracts on different subjects, and endorsed them " meta taphysica" (to be placed or read, after the works on physics). Subsequently the discussions contained in those books, were united into a science, which from the above inscription was termed Metaphysics ; because it succeeded, or because it went beyond physics.

The term Anthropology is used especially in Germany, to designate that science, which discusses the nature of man, as consisting of a body and mind, and especially the influence of the former on the latter. It is sometimes divided into Somatology and Psychology, the former embracing all those bodily peculiarities and circumstances, which are supposed by some writers to exert an influence on the mind. In this department much that is fanciful and ridiculous has been written.

By Psychology is meant everything, that appropriately belongs to the discussion of the nature, structure, and operations of the mind, exclusive of Logic, which is a more extended exhibition of the laws of the mind in one branch of psychology, namely, the process of reasoning. It is this latter science which we propose to discuss on the present occasion.

An important preliminary question here arises, What are the proper materials which ought to be embraced in this science ? These we maintain are, not so much the supposed faculties, of which we know nothing directly, but the known phenomena

DIVISIONS OF THE MIND. 23

of the mind, and all those other known entities or existences, which exert an influence upon these phenomena, or are concerned in their production. The proper basis for a division of mental phenomena is another important aspect of our subject. We suppose it evident that any correct classification of mental operations, must be based on those phenomena of mind, which are known to us, and not on unknown and supposed faculties or essence of the mind. The divisions adopted in the various systems extant are numerous. The first and most generally received in the English philosophical world, is that into about nine faculties of the mind. This division was in the main adopted by Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and the other principal metaphysicians in England and America, until the recent introduction of Dr. Brown's system, which has gained many admirers.

"We shall first specify some of these divisions and definitions which have heretofore been received. The mind has usually been divided into the following faculties :