Ethica. An outline of moral science, for students and reflecting men

Preface

Moral science is yet in its infancy. It has not at all kept pace with the progress in other branches of learning. And though many learned and ingenious authors have appeared, many of its elementary principles are as yet in doubt. To obtaiu a knowledge of truth has been my object in investigating for myself. Hoping to throw some light into the minds of my fellow men ; I offer this little outline to be investigated by the public. If what I have written be true, it appears to me mankind will be benefitted by perusing it. If, however, it should be found that I have fallen into error, it will not, I hope, excite prejudice in the minds of men against others who may be more successful in bringing into clear view the truths of this most noble science. Time and the candid examination of intelligent minds will test it.

The Author.

New York City, June 1, 1860.

OUTLINE OF MORAL SCIENCE.

Chapter I. Ethics

Moral Philosophy is that science, whose object is to explain the laws of the human mind, so far as morality depends upon them ; and to seek after and illustrate the will of Deity respecting human actions.

Every law is an expression of the will of an intelligence. "Municipal law is a rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a state," L e. it expresses the will of the legislature ; physical law is an expression of the will of Deity respecting matter ; mental law is an expression of the will of Providence respecting the condition and operation of the mind ; and moral law is an expression of the will of God respecting the actions of created intelligences.

Now if we take a view of mankind, and compare him with other animate beings, with which we are 2 familiar, we will perceive that, he not only surpasses other animals in intellectual strength, but that, he differs widely from them in other respects.

Man is everywhere a worshiper ; a being who has notions of right and wrong, and of justice, and who lays down certain principles for himself and follows them ; not because he is unavoidably compelled to do so, nor because, in this world, it is always his interest, but because he says, It is right, and I ought to do it. Men have been brought to the stake, and asked to renounce certain principles which they had adopted, but they said, We cannot retract, we prefer to suffer torture.

Now to explain the laws of mind, upon which these phenomena depend, is our object in the first part of this work.

In moral science, it is taken for granted that, there is an intelligent author of the universe, and that, all things were created by design. And hence, when we discover that, each particle of matter attracts and is attracted by every other particle, we know that, this law of the material universe was established by the wiJl of Deity. And when two balls of matter are made to impinge against each other, action and reaction being found equal and in opposite directions, we learn another law of matter established by the Deity. And all the laws in physics are but exhibitions of the will of the Creator respecting matter.

In mental philosophy also, we are made acquainted

Ethics. 7

with certain laws, which show us the will of the Creator respecting our mental constitutions. We see, how the judgment compares ideas and traces consequences ; how the memory recalls ideas for reflection, and how the imagination pictures to us scenes, from which we are far removed. These things are but expressions of the will of Deity respecting the mind. And in every department of science, wherever there is knowledge, we may perceive the will of the Creator. Now, in physics, we see that, all matter invariably obeys the laws of which it is the subject, i. e. from necessity conforms to the will of the Creator. Beasts, also, instinctively lead that mode of life which the Creator intended for them. But man is a creature capable of conceiving and executing a great variety of actions. And it is evidently the will of Deity that man should not execute every action of which his' mind may conceive. For instance, it was evidently the will of Deity that, man should live in the world and increase in number. Were it not so, He would not have made male and female, and placed them on the earth. Had the progenitors of our race, therefore, committed suicide, we cannot doubt that they would have acted contrary to the Creator's will. To seek after and illustrate the will of Deity respecting human actions, is our object in the second part of this work.

Ethica.

Chapter II. Idea Of The Existence Of Deity

The idea of the existence of Deity is very ancient among men. If we receive the Mosaic account of creation, our first parents had it. Or, laying aside the account by Moses, and supposing this idea to be innate, we may then be assured that each individual has had it, and that the first man possessed it. But if we suppose, with Mr. Locke, that man has no innate ideas, (and this opinion is well established among metaphysicians,) it is still evident that, the idea of the existence of Deity was among men anterior to the fabled existence of any, of the gods of the ancients. For, the ancients either originally received this idea from those gods, or they had it before those gods were heard of among them. If we adopt the latter hyphothesis, then this idea was more ancient than the progenitors of Jupiter. But if the former supposition be received, then we must admit that, those mythological gods had a real existence. For, a man cannot receive the idea of the existence of a chess-board from a chess-board, if there really did no chess-board exist. Neither could the ancients originally have received the idea of divinity from any one of those fabulous deities, when there really was no such divinity in existence. There-

Idea of the Existence of Deity. 9

fore, men must have originally derived the idea of Deity from some other source than the existence of fabulous gods, and consequently this idea is more ancient than the existence of such gods in the minds of men.

Now, the history of the world testifies that every nation and tribe, whose mind has been in any degree above the brute, have had the idea of the existence of Deity. And taking it for granted that this idea is not innate, it may be interesting to inquire, very briefly, in what way mankind first obtained it. If we receive the Mosaic account, God made himself known to Adam ; and hence this idea might have been traditionary among his children.

Again : God talked with Noah, commanding him to build an ark. And certainly, a matter of so great importance and interest would be frequently spoken of by Noah, and again by his children. But in a very few generations from Noah, we find that the majority of the world's inhabitants had lost the true idea of the Deity's character, and worshiped the sun, moon, and imaginary gods. This, perhaps, may be accounted for from the fact that traditionary ideas of character might easily be lost by people depending entirely upon memory for their perpetuity. The truths of mathematics and philosophy, if lost, may be again discovered by man's ingenuity ; but traditionary facts, if once lost, are gone forever, unless nature furnish the data from which a posteriori reasoning may be able to lead us back to them. And in those days when science had not yet shed her light in the mind, men could not read the book of nature and from it discover the character of nature's author.

But traditionary ideas of the existence of Deity would not be so easily lost. For, man has an emotional nature, and he is surrounded in the world by many things which call forth these emotions. And if the traditionary idea of the existence of Deity were once among men, the phenomena of nature would be continually calling it up in the mind, and causing them to speak of it.

Again : Following the Bible account, the Deity has had direct communication with various prophets, who have not only taught the people his existence and character, but have also made known many of his designs. And that the Deity should thus reveal himself to man, has been received as probable by the world's inhabitants. For, almost every people on earth have had prophets, and by them received genuine or suppositious revelations. But again : If we believe with many of the ancients, that man appeared upon the earth, at the first, a mute animal, without any knowledge of his origin or destiny, and by gradually progressing he attained to all the knowledge which he now possesses, the following hypotheses may be worthy of consideration.

Socrates endeavored to prove to Aristodemus the existence of a Creator from the marks of design ex-

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hibited in creation. This argument from design had been thought of before the time of Socrates, and in recent times it has been clearly and fully illustrated by Paley. And it is possible that mankind might have thus derived the idea of the Deity's existence. In all nature we perceive the finest mechanism ; one thing made with an exact adaptation to another.

But it is evident, that before this argument was discovered or appreciated, men must have had considerable intellectual cultivation ; while the idea of Deity's existence, most probably, commenced in a very rude and ignorant age. And even though a few masterminds should have obtained this idea, it is not very probable that the mass of mankind could have been made to appreciate the argument, or to believe the philosophers.

But again ; in this world, men frequently see their best laid plans frustrated, their expectations blasted, and their brightest hopes extinguished. And in the history of the dead and among the living, we find many men attributing their misfortunes to inexorable fate. In such a mood of mind it might be natural for men to suppose that there was a superior intelligence operating against them.

But again ; if we study human nature we wiJl find that it is the constitutional bent of man to attribute animation to natural phenomena, which are not understood, and which appear strange and exciting. The ancient Greeks supposed the electricity excited in amber to be animation ; and this tendency of mind may be noticed in all ignorant nations. And as we go back in the world's history, we find that the farther we go back the stronger were the emotions raised in men's minds by natural objects. This may be learned by a perusal of the writings of the ancients, which have come down to us. The minds of the ancient Hebrew and Greek poets were undoubtedly impressed more strongly than the most sensitive intellect of later times. For, in their writings we find the greatest number of instances, and the finest specimens of the sublime. And in those ancient days before science had explained the causes of things, men must have been continually excited in the highest degree. Eclipses of the sun and moon, hurricanes, thunder and lightning, earthquakes, etc., must have terribly excited them. And in such cases, nothing could be more natural than to suppose these phenomena to be animated beings possessed of superior intelligence and power. And so far as we can learn from profane history, the most ancient worship was that of natural phenomena, to wit, of the sun and moon. And when knowledge had increased, it would be a natural and easy transition of mind, to suppose these phenomena to be merely agents of the will of a ruling intelligence. For our purpose, however , ? it matters not in what manner men obtained the idea of Deity's existence. All we need is, that his existence be admitted, and that the idea of a divine existence be among men.

Chapter III. Human Action

Human action is an effect produced by the exertion of man. And as all exertion which man can put forth originates in the mind, let us examine the mind so far as may be necessary to understand in what manner actions are brought about.

The mind has two capacities ; the one active and the other passive. In its passive capacity, it receives impressions ; and these impressions produce effects, according to the laws which the Deity has established. Thus : if rays of light reflected from an object, enter the eye and form an image upon the retina, and the optic nerve be perfect, the mind receives an impression ; and the effect produced by this impression is the consequent ideas of form or color. And if any sensation whatever affect the body, the mind in its passive capacity receives the impression, and a consequent effect is the result. Again ; the mind in its passive capacity receives impressions from mere ideas, and the legitimate effects follow. Thus : by listening to a witty discourse we are made merry, and by reading a pathetic tale we become sad. Let us next point out a few things concerning the active capacity of the mind. And first — of conception. By conception we mean that power which the mind possesses of viewing actions, circumstances, relations, etc., in idea. Thus : if a man desire to fell a tree, the mind has the power of viewing that action in idea, before it has been accomplished.

Second — of the judgment. The power of judgment is exercised in two ways. After tlfe mind has a conception of a color, a solid, grass, tree, etc., it has the power of telling whether any two of these things agree or disagree. Again ; from certain known laws, the mind has the power of telling what consequent will follow a given antecedent. Thus : a man wiio sets fire to a barn, can easily foretell, from the known laws of combustion, its consequent destruction.

Third — of the will. When a man has a conception of an action, the mind has the power of determining to do, or to refrain from it. And this power of the mind is called the will. These remarks, I apprehend, will be sufficient to enable us to trace all human actions from their origin in the mind of the actor to their final accomplishment.

Now, human actions, with reference to the mind of the actor, may be divided into three classes, viz : intentional, accidental and experimental actions. And First — of intentional actions. First, a conception of a given action must be formed in the mind of the actor ; second, the will must be determined to accomplish it ; then, a sufficient knowledge of the nature of things to adopt those means whose inherent qualities, if properly directed, will accomplish the will's determination ; and sufficient skill in directing these qualities must be possessed, or the action cannot be brought about. Thus : if a person propose to shoot a deer, a rifle, gunpowder and lead, are his means. Of the nature of these he must have sufficient knowledge, and he must also Have sufficient skill in directing them.

Now, the knowledge of the nature of things, is gained by reflecting upon the impressions received by the mind in its passive capacity, i. e., by experience.

Skill, is the making things square with sound judgment. And the squaring by the judgment constitutes intention, i. e., the adapting means to accomplish an end ; as, I am cutting timber with the intention of building a house.

Now, whenever an intentional action has been accomplished, the knowledge of the nature of things has previously been obtained. Hence, the conception, the determination of the will, and the intention, bring about all intentional actions.

Second — of accidental actions. These are brought about by a man's aiming to produce an intentional action ; but from ignorance of the nature of the means employed, from unskillfulness in directing the means, or from the unperceived intervention of some object, an effect is produced different from the one designed. Thus : if a man aim a rifle at a deer, but by the ball's touching a tree, it glances and kills a person ; this is a case of the unperceived intervention of an object. Again ; if a physician endeavor to restore a sick man to health, but through ignorance of the disease, or of the properties of the medicines, he administers that which will have a contrary effect ; this is a case of the ignorance of the means. We need not illustrate further.

Third — of experimental actions. And these are brought about when a man puts forth exertion to accomplish an intentional action, which he designs to be an antecedent to some consequent one, of which, as yet, he has no conception. The effects produced by experiments in chemistry are actions of this kind, to the first discoverer. Thus : an experimenter may put together two or more different gases to see what will be the result. Now, he has already obtained the gases ; and the putting them together is an action which he understands ; and he accomplishes this intentional action, designing it as an antecedent to some consequent effect, with which he desires to become acquainted.

Having said this much concerning actions, with reference to the mind of the actor, let us now consider them with reference to the objects upon which they are produced.

Now, with reference to the objects, actions may be divided into two classes, viz : effects produced upon mind, and upon matter. And when any effect is to be produced upon mind or matter, it must obviously be brought about in conformity to fixed laws. The laws of mind are treated of in works upon mental philosophy ; those of matter in works upon physics. These laws of mind and of matter are understood to some extent by the unlettered. At the present state of science they are not fully understood by any body.

But, I apprehend that every person's observation will have made him sufficiently acquainted with these laws, to understand the manner in which actions are brought about upon objects.

Let us, first, examine in what manner a man may produce effects — actions, upon his own mind ; second, how he may produce actions upon the minds of others ; and third, in what manner actions upon matter are brought about.

If a person, without the aid of instructors or books, investigate a subject and convince himself of certain facts or conclusions, of which he was ignorant before, he has produced an effect upon his own mind ;• he has accomplished a human action upon his mind. Every discoverer, in this manner, produces effects upon his mind. But a man may produce effects upon his own mind in other ways. It is found that every object in the universe, when it impresses the mind, produces effects of some kind or other. Mere ideas, as we remarked above, produce their legitimate effects. Beauty, deformity, superiority, intelligence, stupidity, &c , each affect the mind in a certain manner. If then, a man desire to produce a certain effect upon his own mind, he need but repeatedly present the object adapted to 3 produce this effect, and the action will follow. For, by the laws of our Constitution, a man can no more present to his mind, even in idea, any object without experiencing the mental effect which the object is adapted to produce, than he can hold alive coal of fire in his hand, without experiencing the physical effect it is adapted to produce. A man, however, may be master of himself and present most frequently to his mind whatsoever objects or ideas he may choose, and consequently produce most frequently those effects which he may desire. Every one knows that man has passions, and that there are objects calculated to excite them. The devout man may become more devout by reflecting upon divinity ; the wicked man may become more wicked by reflecting upon crime, and happily, the latter, by checking his mind and reflecting upon noble objects, may produce opposite effects, and change his own character.

Hence, a man may bring any object to produce sensation upon his body, or he may hold before his mind ideas of real or imaginary objects, and by so doing produce effects upon his own mind. The active capacity of the mind may, therefore, be brought to bear upon its passive capacity, and thus produce effects upon itself.

Let us next examine in what manner a man may produce effects upon the minds of others. And as all exertion originates in the mind, when this exertion makes to accomplish an action externally upon mind or matter, the first effect is the putting the corporeal faculties of the actor in motion. Hence the corporeal faculties of an actor are active media, while those of the recipient are passive media, in all human actions produced by one mind upon another. And for producing actions upon the minds of others, the means made use of are oral conversation and instruction, signs and motions of the hands and face, as used by the deaf; written signs, as algebraic formulas and the diagrams in several of the sciences ; experiments exhibited to the senses ; and written language. By the use of these means, men may produce on the minds of others almost every effect which the human mind is capable of receiving. One man may, viva voce, teach science to others ; another may lead the minds of his fellow men into error ; passions may be inflamed by oral or written compositions ; prejudices may be awakened or eradicated by books ; and aversions may be produced even by jesture. Since the invention of the printing press, the facility for producing effects upon mind has been astonishingly increased.

A single thought conveyed by language written upon paper, will frequently produce effects upon millions of minds.

Let us next consider actions upon matter. All exertion originates in the mind ; the first effect produced upon matter by this exertion is the putting the body in motion. Thus, if a man desire to pick up a stick, the exertion of mind first moves and directs the arms and hands, and these then move the stick. And it is obvious, that if the human mind were not thus mysteriously connected with a material mechanism, whose forces it can employ, it could produce no effect whatever upon external objects. Hence, from what we have said, it will be easy to understand in what manner all human actions upon matter are brought about. The exertion of the mind puts into operation the mechanical forces of the body, and directs them to a given object ; this object possesses inherent qualities which the forces of the body direct, and so on until the final action has been accomplished.

Hence, all human actions upon matter are brought about by the powers of qualities of objects, and by powers obtained from mechanical arrangements of materials, which powers are put in force and directed bv the exertion of the human mind.

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Chapter IV. Of Right And Wrong

Right and wrong are ideas. They are not affections, emotions or impulses. And like all ideas, they are derived in some manner. Let us inquire then, in what manner these ideas are obtained. Take a particular case. Two boys bring their slates with a certain arithmetical question upon them to the teacher, who, after examining them, pronounces the first boy's work to be right, and the other's to be wrong. Now, what does right and wrong mean here ? I apprehend any person who reflects upon the question, will say, that the teacher pronounced the first boy's work to be right because it conformed to the established rules of arithmetic ; and the other's wrong, because it did not conform to these rules. Right, then, in this case, is conformity to the rules of arithmetic ; and wrong, nonconformity. Take another. Two pupils endeavor to play a piece of music upon the piano, the teacher looking on, says to the first, you play it right, and to the second, you play it wrong. In this case, it is evident that right and wrong are determined by the conformity or nonconformity to the rules of music. Take an other case. Two men start from Philadelphia, to go to Reading ; the one travels on the Reading turnpike, but the other steers his course through New Jersey* After travelling a few hours, the first inquires if he be on the right road, and is told that he is ; the second also inquires, and is told that he is wrong. Here right and wrong are conformity or nonconformity to geographical lines. And we might produce thousands of cases, and we would always find that right is conformity to some established rule, law, or demarkation. And it is plain that, there are a great many kinds of right ; each differing from others, as the conformity is to different rules, laws or demarkations. There is physical right, i. e. conformity to the laws of physics, mental right, geographical right, mathematical right, mechanical right, &c. And each of these rights has its corresponding wrong. And Blackstone divides the wrongs, of which municipal law takes cognizance, into mala per se and mala prohibita ; the first being a violation of the laws of God, and the latter, of the laws of man. Let us now consider what we mean by moral right and wrong. And moral right and wrong I apprehend, are determined in the same manner that all other rights and wrongs are ; the conformity or nonconformity being to the will of Deity. And whether any action be morally right or wrong, can be ascertained only by comparing it with this standard. Now I apprehend, it will be admitted by every person who reflects, that the will of Deity, if known, is a sure rule in all cases. And no person will presume to judge the Almighty in any case. The will of Deity, then, is

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conclusive and ultimative. And that all men do obtain their ideas of moral right and wrong in this manner is abundantly proved by facts. Do not all Christains search the scriptures to discover God's revealed will, that they may know whether certain actions be morally right or wrong ? And is not the difference of opinion respecting the Deity's will, the very thing that makes one denomination act in a manner different from another? Is not the Baptist immersed, and the Episcopalian confirmed by a bishop because each thinks he is acting in conformity to the will of God, and therefore it is morally right? Do not all men throughout the world shape their actions, when they act in view of moral obligation, to the will or to what they suppose to be the will of Deity? And if we observe a child, I apprehend we must discover, that it will imitate any action which it sees others do ; and though it may be restrained by fear, it will not refrain from that action on moral principle until there is instilled into its mind, that there is a good man or Deity who ever sees it, and frowns upon such actions. And I apprehend, we have many ideas which are derived by a process precisely similar to that of right and wrong. For instance, how do we derive the idea of difference ? We evidently think of one thing and then another, and compare the one with the other. And if the mind did not use this process, we could have no idea of difference. So also of resemblance of conformity, of contingency, and many others. And in this manner, I apprehend, we derive the ideas of all kinds of right and wrong. And from this, it follows, that if men cannot agree respecting the will of Deity concerning a given action, they never can agree respecting the moral quality of that action. And hence the fact, that what is regarded as evidently morally right by one set of men, is regarded as evidently morally wrong by another, is easily accounted for. This contrariety of opinion always has existed, and always must exist, until the real will of Deity shall be made evident to the minds of all men. And this, I apprehend, explains all the phenomena of moral right and wrong which exist in the world.

It will be perceived, that the human mind might derive ideas of all kinds of right except moral right, were there no idea of the existence of the Deity in the world. But were all ideas of Deity blotted from the mind, moral right and wrong would be swept away with them. And as the Deity is the creator of all things, moral law, which expresses the Deity's will respecting human actions, cannot clash with any mental or physical law. And so far as men would obey the mental and physical laws of their constitution, ttius far but no farther, they would obey moral law. But we must notice some of the objections to what we have said. Examples from ancient Greece and Rome are brought forward to show that men do not derive their notions of moral right from the Deity.

11 The paganism of the ancient world produced, in-

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deed, abominable gods, who on earth would have been shunned or punished as monsters ; and who offered as a picture of supreme happiness, only crimes to commit and passions to satiate. But vice armed with this sacred authority descended in vain from the eternal abode ; she found in the heart of man a moral instinct to repel her. The continence of Xenocrates was admired by those who celebrated the debaucheries of Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored the unchaste Venus. The most intrepid Roman sacrificed to fear. He invoked the god who dethroned his father, and died without a murmur by the hand of his own. The most contemptible divinities were served by the greatest men. The holy voice of nature stronger than that of the gods, made itself heard and respected and obeyed on earth, and seemed to banish to the confines of heaven, guilt and the guilty."* This argument seems to show that men do not derive the ideas of moral right and wrong from what is, or what they suppose to be, the will of Deity, but that these ideas are derived from our constitution. It must be recollected, however, that the idea of Deity was among men long before the existence of the gods spoken of by Rosseau.