An inquiry into the nature, foundation, and extent of moral obligation, involving the nature of duty, of holiness, and of sin. Being a introduction to the study of moral science in all its branches

Front matter

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Chapter I. The Necessary Law Of Reasoning

Preliminary statements. — First principles. — The moral constitution of the universe. — Definition of the term moral, as applied to acts, obligation, relation, agent, law, influence, government, and character pages 15-27

Chapter II

The antagonism of holiness and sin, as moral opposites, resulting in their corresponding natural opposites, happiness and misery. — Holiness and sin distinguished from every object of thought but the acts of moi-al agents. — Acts distinguished from effects. — Amoral agent must be a rational, sentient, and voluntary being, that he may act Avith responsibility in view of motives. — Motive, its various modifications, as subjective and objective. — A moral agent, as distinguished from all other agents, must have intellect, reason, conscience, sensibility, and will. — Moral acts distinguished from exercises of the intellect and sensibility, — from all other acts of moral agents, and shown to consist in choice or acts of will 27-36

Chapter III

Constitutional endowments not moral character. — Intellect, sensibility, and will described as embracing all the faculties of the mind. — Conscience a complex faculty, being both intelligent and sentient. — All the operations of the mind, therefore, of necessity, included in three classes, — thoughts, feelings, and volitions, or acts of will. — No moral quality predicable of mere exercises of the intellect, nor of the sensibility, nor of external acts in themselves, nor of mere executive volitions. — Evils of an incorrect mental analysis. — The evidence summed up that no moral quality pertains to the exercises of the intellect or sensibility, but only to the acts of the will. — In what sense external acts and executive volitions have moral character. — Points previously established, recapitulated. — Authors quoted who hold that moral quality pertains only to the phenomena of will. — Dr. Thomas Rcitl, Dr. Thomas Chalmers, A * (V)

VI CONTENTS.

Sir James Mackintosh, Dr. Nathaniel Wm. Taylor, Dr. Nathaniel Emmons, Bishop Joseph Butler, D. D,, Dr. Jonathan Edwards, Dr. Stephen West, J. J. Burlamaqui, Counsellor of State and Prof, of Natural and Civil Law at Geneva, Pres. Jonathan Edwards, Bishop Richard Cumberland, D. D., Hugo Grotius, Baron Puffendorf, and Sir Wm. Blackstone

37-51 CHAPTER IV.

The turning- point between fatalism and free agency. — Concerning the nature and objects of choice and its relation to motives, subjective and objective : no choice without both, nor without power to the contrary. — Desire of happiness comprehending all possible subjective motive. — Happiness constitutes all possible, ultimate, objective motive. — Objections : that there is a desire of right as an ultimate object ; that there is a desire of " spirit-worthiness " as an ultimate object ; that there is a sense of right. — Views of Dr. Edvrards and President Edwards. — Recapitulation of the main points reached in the argument . . . 52-70

Chapter V

The objects of choice stated. — The general idea of good, or goodness. — Absolute and ultimate good identical with happiness. — All good, and of course all objects of choice, included in happiness and the means of happiness, and in beings capable of happiness, confirming the point that desire of happiness comprehends all subjective motive, and that happiness is the ultimate object of all possible choice. — All good besides happiness is relative good, including holiness. — Therefore all objects of choice, all good included in absolute and relative good, in happiness, and its means 70-83

Chapter VI

Happiness not the only good. — Natural, incidental, and moral goodness distinguished. — Moral goodness in the concrete and in the abstract. — Why tendency to happiness may have been supposed not an element of virtuousness. — Natural and moral goodness include all good . 84-93

Chapter VII

Different kinds of good classed. — Natural and moi-al, ultimate, absolute, and relative. — Natural and moral evil. — Absolute and relative evil. — Reasons for calling moral goodness moral excellence. — Two objections removed : 1, that it is derogatory to holiness to regard it as means to an ulterior end — as mere relative good ; 2, that holiness is a nobler, higher good than happiness. — The comparative value of holiness as relative good, and that of happiness as absolute and ultimate good. — In what sense virtuousness, and in what sense happiness, can be said to be highest good. — A further and different classification of the different kinds of good. — The supreme good. — Neither highest holiness nor highest happiness can be sacrificed for any other thing 93-105

CONTENTS. Vll

Chapter VIII

Right and -wi-ong acts distinguished. — Obligation the requisiteness to promote happiness by design, founded in power rationally to promote happiness, and measured by that power. — What power to promote happiness implies. — Holiness obedience to, and sin transgression of, known law. — Man under the absolute natural necessity of seeking his own happiness. — Self-love, selfishness, and benevolence distinguished. — Man's moral relation to his own and the universal happiness ; his obligation to seek both, and in the exercise of impartial benevolence. — The arguments in proof summarily stated. — Butler and Edwards cited in confirmation

105-128 CHAPTER IX.

Benevolence more particularly defined, — The elements or qualities which constitute its virtuousness, and the reasons why. — The first element of benevolence. — Its first quality or element being dictated by intelligence.

— To be benevolent, an act must be in accordance with one's best light, judgment, or knowledge. — Capacity to know our duty essential to moral agency. — Views of Drs. Edwards, Emmons, and Reid. — The happiness of the agent the ultimate subjective object, the general happiness the ultimate objective object. — Desire of happiness an essential element in the ultimate foundation of moral obligation 129-147

Chapter X

Elements of benevolent acts continued. — The second element of benevolence, tendency to the agent's happiness ; third element, tendency to the general happiness, — Views of Dr. Edwards and Dr. Emmons. — The objection obviated, that the nature of virtue is entirely distinct from all its tendencies, especially from its tendency to the agent's happiness.

— There must be a subjective as well as an objective object of a benevo- ^ lent act, while the happiness of others in the nature of the case cannot

be a subjective object. — Views of Dr. Edwards, Pres. Edwards, Drs. Paley and Reid. — Tendency to highest happiness inseparable from virtuous action ; found in no other moral action 148-175

Chapter XI

Elements of virtuous acts continued. — Fourth element, voluntariness. — Benevolent love supreme, impartial, universal. — Former position as to the two tendencies of virtue, 1st, to individual, and 2d, to universal happiness, confirmed. — Reasons why duty must be measured by ability, as ability is the foundation of obligation. — Objection, that utility, or useful tendency, requires so much calculation as to make virtue impracticable.

— Benevolent love, a purpose to promote highest holiness, as well as highest happiness 176-190

VllI CONTENTS,

Chapter XII

Holiness, that operation of the will Avhich would secure the harmonious cooperation of the intellect, reason, conscience, sensibility, and will. — Universally prevailing, it would be the harmonious cooperation of all the moral powers in the universe. — Then there would be no sin to lament, and none to be punished, and no punishment to be suffered, and nothing to prevent heaven from being boundless as the universe, and as holy and happy as God, with the cooperation of all rational beings, could make it. — Views of Pres. Edwards. — Holiness and sin viewed in the light of the previous development of their nature. — As holiness is the source of harmony and bliss, so sin is the source of discord, contention, war, and desolation, and of condemnation in the mind of each transgressor, he being at war with himself and all the universe besides

191-204 CHAPTER XIII.

Benevolence, being identical and coextensive with holiness in the concrete, includes all the specific virtues. — The objects of benevolent love and of benevolent hatred, divided into three corresponding classes of each. — Desire of happiness, the primary source of obligation. — Happiness, the ultimate object of benevolent love. — All benevolent love comprehended in three general forms corresponding to the objects of that love. — Love to these three classes of objects implies benevolent hatred to the opposite objects. — The love of highest happiness shown to be benevolence in its simplest form, and the generic source the one vital principle of benevolence in all its forms and modes. — Reasons why benevolence must have this relation to happiness. — Gratitude as a virtue. — Reasons why we ought to love one being more than another. — Veracity as a virtue distinguished from selfish truthfulness 205-218

Chapter XIV

The terms merit, demerit, ill-desert, and guilt explained. — General justice « identical with general benevolence, and with distributive justice. — Pounded in the public good. — Exercised in governmental justice, or that which is peculiar to a perfect moral governor, in the administration of law by the necessary sanctions of rewards and penalties for the support of authority, including atoning and forgiving justice . . 219-228

Chapter XV

Righteous moral government. — Its object. — Qualifications of a perfect moral governor. — His laws must accord with the principle of eternal right, and be sustained by the moral influence of adequate sanctions, rewards, and penalties. — Moral and pliysical power and influence distinguished. — What justice requires of a moral governor: that his laws should be so framed as to require nothing but benevolence, and so ad-

CONTENTS. IX

ministered as to promote, in the highest degree, and in the best possible way, the general happiness, and that of individuals. — Justice, grace, and mercy, their identity : their distinctions and relations to each other. — Benevolent and right action identical. — The difference between right as a quality of law, and as a quality of action 228-239

Chapter XVI

The import of the statement, that virtue is founded in utility. — Benevolent usefulness, its essence consisting in its intelligent intent and tendency to promote highest happiness. — Reason why this doctrine has so strong a hold on the public mind. — Proof that benevolence has an inseparable, effectual tendency to promote the highest happiness in the agent's power. — Erom the nature of the subject, it must be such an intent as will tend to highest happiness 239-245

Chapter XVII

The general objection that the doctrine of benevolent utility is inconsistent with the structure of language, answered in this and in the two following chapters. — That this doctrine of utility is inconsistent with the meaning of the terms rights, rectitude, etc. — Another objection, that it substitutes the effect for the cause 245-254

Chapter XVIII

Objections continued. — Tbat, according to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue is too nearly synonymous with interest, advantage, with usefulness, utility, and tendency to promote happiness. — That it leaves no room to distinguish between virtue and beauty, virtue and sublimity, etc. — That virtue is too nearly synonymous with calcu.lation of consequences. — That there is too little difference between calculation and approbation, between intellectual and virtuous wisdom, between prudence and virtue, between expediency and right action 254-264

Chapter XIX

Objections continued. — That the doctrine of benevolent utility takes away from conscience its appropriate office, and from the word conscience its time meaning. — The meaning of a good, tender, a guilty or evil, a seared and hardened conscience. — How to be sure that conscience will guide us right. — That in the whole theory of utility, the foundation principle of right is not contained 264-269

Chapter XX

The different tendencies of benevolence described, and divided into three corresponding classes : 1, its tendency to the happiness of those who

X CONTENTS.

approve it ; 2, of those who are the objects of it ; and 3, of those who practice it. — The separation of these tendencies from virtue, its annihilation 270-274

CHAPTTilR XXI.

Eeasons why certain acts of the will are right, and why others are wrong.

— The certainty that benevolent design will promote higher happiness than any other action or thing in its place 275-280

Chapter XXII

Concerning the objection to the doctrine of benevolent utility, that the idea of right is a simple idea. — Reasons to show that it is not a simple idea.

— Reasons considered, which have been adduced to show that right is a simple idea 281-293

Chapter XXIII

Recapitulation of the foregoing delineation of virtue, considering whether it excludes every tiling which does not belong to its true nature, and whether it includes every thing that does belong to it. — The inquiry examined, whether other theories of the nature of virtue can be reconciled, on the ground of benevolent rectitude and utility, so far as those theories are founded in truth. — The relation of this doctrine of holiness to the will and glory of God, to the end of our being, and to the tenet that " sin is the necessary means of the greatest good." — The advantage of clear, correct, and definite views of moral law, and its application to duty . 294-306

Chapter XXIV

The diiferent natures and tendencies of holiness and sin compared and contrasted. — One the highest wisdom, the other the greatest folly. — Their tendencies in a degree may be thwarted, but cannot be changed.

— The certainty of their different results. — The comparative value of those results 306-316

Chapter XXV

The doctrine of benevolent rectitude tested by human consciousness, and by an appeal to the Bible. — Motives of the Bible addressed to the desire of happiness. — Desire of happiness, implying also a dread of mis ery, the only motive that can be addressed, to promote highest happiness being the only rational ultimate object. — How to form rules of moral conduct. — How to determine one's own moral character . . 316-327

Conclusion

Two ways and conditions through which moral beings may stand with acceptance before God. — How a sinner may forsake sin, comply with the conditions of salvation, and secure the end of his being. — Closing invocation 328-334

CONTENTS. XI

Appendix

A.

A specimen of Socratic reasoning on the efficiency of Divine Providence. — An anecdote in point 335-339

B.

Section I

Certain doctrines inconsistent with free responsible agency, and tending to fatalism, refuted : 1. That actions of the will are not voluntary. 2. That sin consists in constitutional, innate, involuntary dispositions, inclinations, affections, and propensities, previous to all voluntary action. 3. The doctrine of moral necessity and moral ability, which amounts only to natural necessity. 4. That man has no power to originate his own volitions. These four doctrines implying an irresistible necessity. 5. A view of natural and moral ability and moral inability, wliich implies a natural inability. 6. That ability, in regard to acts of will, is not commensurate with duty. 7. A direct denial that man has the power of contrary choice. — These seven doctrines, each of them shown to be a virtual denial of the self-evident principle, that what ought to be done can be done. — Fatalism defined. — These seven doctrines proved severally and unitedly to result in fatalism 340-353

Section II

The American Theological Eeview on the power of contrary choice. — Power to the contrary essential to the scheme of free agency, — This scheme gaining currency. — A call by the Am. Theol. Eeview for argument in its defence. — The call answered by referring to the object of this book, and by an argument from the Bible, and one from the Am. Theol. Review itself.' — Power to the contrary explained. — These two positions, that certainty of action is inconsistent with freedom of action, and no power to the contrary, because never exerted, refuted, — Distinction between natural and moral ability and inability. — Ability, the basis ofobhgation. — All sin voluntary 353-361

Prof, Pinney's views on moral government, on the ground and condition of obligation. — Pres. Mahan's views compared with Prof. Pinney's on utility and the ultimate end of morally right action . . . 361-364

D.

The Princeton Eeview and the Am. Theol. Eeview on the dogma, " Sin the necessary means of the greatest good " 364-368

XIl CONTENTS.

E.

SECTION I.

Two anti-utilitarian theories, the spiritual- worthiness theory and the Bibliothecan, examined. — Objections arising from these theories: 1. That holiness is a good in itself. 2. That the doctrine of utility leads to selfishness. 3. That virtue is not a means, but an end. 4. That it is not right, merely because it is useful. 5. That holiness would be greatest good, if it did not tend to happiness. 6, Various forms of statement, implying that virtue is independent, absolute good. 7. That the idea of virtue is a simple and absolute idea. 8. Some of Dr. Emmons's views compared with some of his other views 368-391

SECTION II.

Consideration of the Kantial or rightarian doctrine, as held by M. Victor Cousin (pronounced by some in America Coo-zan), in which it is maintained that virtuous action cannot be performed from the motives of interest, advantage, utility, or from any desire of happiness . . 391-408

Dependent and independent, or rightarian morality. — The utilitarian and the anti-utilitarian theories contrasted, and shown to be irreconcilable ; their difference pointed out. — The views of Aristotle, Prof. Joseph Haven, and Emanuel Kant considered 441-448

SECTION VI. Strictures on the Essay on Intuitive Morals 448-458

F.

Strictures on Dr. Joseph Harvey's Letters to Dr. Bennct Tyler. — Review of a sermon on ability and inability to fulfil obligation . . . 458-472

Views of M'Cosh on liberty, causation, and virtue, examined . 473-480

TO THE READER.

Instead of merely referring the reader to various authors for consultation, we have chosen rather to make liberal quotations, supposing that most of our readers might not have access to them and that many might not even have the time to consult them, and if they had, it would be a saving of time and labor to know definitely what particular statements we rely upon as the most important.

As the reader ponders the following pages, we ask him to consider, whether the principles thereon inculcated, carried to their legitimate results, would not abolish every tyrannical, arbitrary, and oppressive law throughout the world, and eradicate from the minds of the people and from the creeds of various churches many false doctrines now taught throughout Christendom. We have been repeatedly inquired of if our treatise is sectarian. We have not designed it to be so at all, but to be an investigation entirely independent of any sect and of all sects, and to be only such an investigation as the nature of the subject, viewed in the light of reason and of revelation, imperatively demands. If the truth affects one review, author, or denomination more unfavorably than others, so much the worse for all who are thus affected, till they bring their interests to accord with the interests of truth. Then the truth will make them free, so as to be free indeed, and thus the knowledge of the truth will result in their benefit.

If these principles tend to such results, it would be impossible to estimate how great the advantage would be, to have them early, intelligently, and distinctly estabhshed in the minds and hearts of our youth generally, to say nothing of people more advanced in life.

It may facilitate the understanding of our method, to notice that in some instances the answer to one question is contained in the answers 1 (1)

2 TO THE READER.

of a greater or less number of the succeeding questions, the whole treatise being an answer to the Inquiry into the Nature, Foundation, and Extent of Moral Obligation, together with the removal of objections to the doctrines laid down in the investigation.

We crave of the reader that he should have patience with our repetitions. Our apology for them is, the necessity of repeating the same thoughts, in order to show their bearing upon different parts of the subject, especially upon objections, that in this way the reader may have the evidence, in support of each important and separate point, clearly and distinctly before his mind, so that he may with more accuracy and certainty decide what is truth.

We have judged it best to make thorough work in removing objections wherever found, and by whomsoever maintained, in order that the reader may have oj)portunity and the means more fully to understand the principles inculcated, and to see and feel their power to cut a wide, straight, and plain path, in which the lover of truth and virtue may walk through abounding errors, to their final results in wisdom and knowledge and obedience to the truth, as revealed in the reason of man and in the Word of God.

We have also considered it important to remove particular objections in connection with the arguments by which they have been supported by their respective authors. This has occasioned an amount of repetition which we would gladly have avoided, if we could without loss.

K those readers who approve of the main points and arguments of this treatise will endeavor to extend a knowledge of them, either by promoting a circulation of the book, or by forming companies or classes for the study of its principles and general teachings, or in such other ways as they may deem expedient, ideas may be developed which will secure extensive and valuable results in the present and future ages, in this world and in that which is to come.

The reader is requested to notice that where words in this treatise are italicized in quotations, and the italicizing is preceded by a single bracket and not inclosed by another, the italicizing is done by the writer who quotes, and not by the original author.

A WORD TO REVIEWERS.

Gentlemen of the Quill, — If any of your honorable, highly useful and important profession should deign to notice our humble work,

TO THE EEADER. 3

and should judge that it deserves to be opposed, before you enter upon the work of opposing it, we have a right to hope that you will undertake the task of correctly understanding the true meaning we have intended to express in the doctrines laid down ; and that you will also take a thorough and careful survey of the extent to which these doctrines have been sustained by the ablest minds in past ages.

We are aware that great and good men hold and teach opinions diiFerent from some of those expressed in the following treatise. If any one should discover any of our statements to be untrue, inaccurate, or inconsistent, and therefore of hurtful tendency, and will point out their defects, and set forth in clear and certain light the opposite truth, in the friendly and fraternal spirit of true benevolence, we will thank him beforehand ; or perchance any shall choose to point out our errors in an opposite spirit, we say to him in advance, " Fas est et ab Jioste doceri" or in plain English, we have a right to be taught even by an enemy. But let him who objects remember that it is a far easier task to find fault with the statements of other men, than, on difficult points, to make faultless statements ourselves.

If we can be convinced of important, substantial error, we will retract and sustain the opposite truth, as we have abiUty and opportunity. Mere dogmatism, or the ipse dixit of any one, we will not hold ourselves bound to notice or regard.

So great is our confidence that our doctrine is mainly true, that if the above suggestions should be complied with, in the exercise of a candid spirit searching for the truth, we think the doctrine of Benevolent Utility will be admitted as true by a vast majority of those who obtain a fair understanding of it. Nor can we say as an eminent author once said, that ' he did not expect his arguments to be more convincing to others, than theirs had been to him.'

It is our firm belief that, according to reason and the Holy Scriptures, the doctrine of Benevolent Utility, properly understood and explained, is the chief corner-stone of moral science in all its branches, legal, theological, and governmental ; and that if the moral, political, religious, and theological teaching of the United States should be so modified as to be consistent with this doctrine, or even with the fundamental fact set forth and defended in this treatise, namely, that duty lies within the limits of possibility, it would more than double the value of that teaching and its efficacy to bless the nation and the world. We hope that those reviewers who admit the

4 TO THE READER.

truth of tliese points will lend their influence to establish them as firmly and as extensively as possible in the public mind.

Of those reviewers who think our teaching fundamentally erroneous, we have no favors to ask, only that they will as thoroughly as possible expose our errors and point out the truth, not forgetting their responsibility to explain the true nature, foundation, and extent of moral obligation. We trust that no honorable man will intimate that our teaching is erroneous, without pointing out the particular error into which he thinks we have fallen, and offering something better as a substitute, and which, being supported by better evidence, in his own judgment at least, accords with the truth. If the appropriate truth should be substituted for any of our errors, it would be a gain for which we should have occasion to rejoice. We hope the doctrine of Benevolent UtiHty will be discussed until the question of its truth shall be settled in the public mind throughout Christendom.

If the teaching of this treatise should be proved to have inaccuracies and inconsistencies to any supposable amount, and in consequence thereof, these imperfections, by some able hand, should be removed, and the exact truth should be brought into clear light and so become permanently established; or if an approximation to this should be made, our labor will not have been in vain.

Preface

I KNOW that I am, and that something else is — that there is a world in which I am. In me and in the world around me, there is evidence which proves dependence upon a designing cause. From this, the inference is inevitable that there is an intelligent, personal God. I have learned from the teaching of God in my reason and in his revealed word, that I am to exist through the endless duration of eternity, — that my existence is to endure as long as the existence of God endures. And besides myself, I have learned that there are myriads of intelhgent, rational beings destined also to live forever.

I am conscious of a desire of happiness, resulting from the very constitution of my being, — a pleasing hope, — a longing after blessedness and immortality. I learn that my fellow-beings have desires similar to that of my own.

Now, therefore, I want to know what I can do to secure my own highest blessedness for the whole duration of my existence. And I desire also, to know what I can do to promote the highest amount, the greatest sum total, of happiness in the universe of intelligent beings, for the whole duration of their existence. I want to know how to secure for myself, and as far as I can for my fellow-beings, this one needful thing — this eternal well-being — the end for which we were made.

1* (5)

6 PKEFACE.

I want also to know, and I desire that my fellow-men should know, what each and all intelligent beings can do to promote the most valuable amount of happiness, both in kind and degree, for each and all rational beings in the universe, for the whole duration of eternity. In short, to this end, I want to know and to make known the true nature, foundation, and extent of moral obligation, — the true nature of holiness and sin, as they are distinguished from each other, and from every other object of thought. To supply this want is the object of the following investigation.

The investigation of this subject in past ages, has occupied many of the ablest and best minds in the world. And the number of those who apply their best powers to this inquiry is still increasing. That the public mind feels a deep and growing interest in the nature of moral obligation, is made manifest, among other things, by the frequent discussion of the subject in our ablest periodicals, and in the works of the ablest authors, as well as by the attention paid to it in our colleges and theological seminaries.

This continual discussion in published works evinces also, that the subject has never been fully and satisfactorily explained, or that, if such explanation as ought to satisfy was ever made, it has been lost, or not duly appreciated.

The more fully the fundamental principles of moral obligation are understood, and the more familiar they are made in the public mind, the greater will their power become, to control the public morals, and to secure the general well-being.

In the following discussion we have endeavored to obtain and to give such a definition of holiness and sin, as will clearly distinguish them from each other and from every other conceivable thing. We have had it in view to find and make manifest the

" j»0M sto " — the place whereon to rest the moral lever, by which a sinful world is to be raised from its moral degradation and debasement. Our attempt mainly has been to define holiness and sin in the concrete, i. e. as they exist in holy and sinful acts, so as to distinguish virtuous acts from all acts of the soul which are not virtuous, especially from sinful acts, and to show that moral obligation is that, which requires rational beings to aim at the promotion of the highest general good and well-being, — that holiness is the necessary and most excellent means of the most excellent happiness, and is therefore a utility, — that holiness and universal, impartial benevolence are one and the same thing, precisely identical, and that all sin is selfishness, and that all selfishness is sin, — that sin is the most efficacious cause of misery, and is therefore a detriment. If holiness and sin can be defined correctly, as they exist — in the concrete — in holy and sinful acts, since they are performed and actually can exist only in the concrete, and never in the abstract, the remaining question. What is holiness in the abstract ? would appear to be of minor consideration. The importance of this latter question apparently lies chiefly, if not entirely, in its bearing on the question. What are virtuous acts ? Therefore, if we can know fully and adequately what moral obligation is, and what are virtuous acts, we can afford, without any great and essential loss, to leave the abstract question to those who are fond of mere abstractions. There is a common and truthful proverb, that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. It is equally true, that a question skilfully framed goes far in suggesting the right answer. Questions correctly presented have a great advantage in exciting the attention, and in fixing the mind on the precise point of inquiry and investigation. They excite, encourage, and enable the mind to use more successfully its own powers to discover the truth sought, and to know it with greater certainty. Such questions awaken inquiry, and put the mind on the right track in the pursuit of truth.