Organon of science : three books in one volume

Front matter

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CHAPTER I. Highest Generalization and First Division

In every endeavor to prosecute science, we start by dividing off and classifying those entities, which are familiar to us, and which are to be the subjects of our consideration. One class of philosophers, for the purposes which they have in yjew, divide the objects of earth into the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms • and under each of. these cjasses they make numerous subclassifications. The natural philosopher, technically so called, whose object is to ascertain the effects of material masses upon each other, the laws which govern them, and the changes which tlfey undergo without affecting their internal constitutions, commences by classifying matter into solids, fluids and gasses. The astronomer, the chemist, the philologist and historian, have each of them their subjects, objects and classifications. And the necessity of a proper classification, in order to reduce any subject to a science, will readily be perceived from the following consideration : Suppose a certain field to contain several specimens of each of the classes of animals and a eertain person to enter it for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, if his mind should not generalize and classify, though he might multiply observations for half a life time he must leave the field eventually without having gained any scientific knowledge. In order to succeed, therefore, th« naturalist commences to classify; and his field of observation being animate nature, he seeks for the highest generalization, which his mind . can make, and which may embrace in one class, all the objects of his regard. Bach subject beforo him, he perceives, has something in common with every other one, to-wit, animation : and to this highest generalization, he gives the name of animal to distinguish his whole field of research from other things. He then seeks

12 tor other less extensive generalizations, and soon perceives vertebrata, articulata, radiata and molusca. Thus the naturalist proceeds, and by classification alone, he is able to gain a scientific knowledge of the relations existing among animals. In like manner a proper classification of those things about which the laws of mind are concerned in reasoning, is indispensable to the clear understanding of the process employed in acquiring knowledge by reason ing: without a classification as a basis, all before us will be chaos.

But how shall the metaphysician and logician classify? The object, at which he must aim, is*to obtain the knowledge of the relations, or rather the knowledge of the results of relations actually existing between -the mind itself and all other things, which can be made by the mind the subjects of its cognitions. ISTow every subject of the mind's cognitions must bear some relation to the mind itself or no result whatever could be produced. And in order to contradistinguish the objects between which the relations ^xist, from which intellectual results are evolved, the mind itself may be called tlVe ego and all other things the non-ego. The word non-ego, however, in this case is not a negative term in meaning, but a ptsitive name for any and everything excepting the ego, ©r mind itself. The German metaphsicians distinguish the mind itself by "Das Ich," and the French by "Le moi"; and Sir Wm. Hamilton has brought the ego and nOn-egp into vogue in the English nomenclature. Most persons will know that ego is the Latin personal pronoun corresponding to our personal pronoun I of the first pe*«on ; ego is more convenient to be used as a noun than our pronoun I, a single lettu* of the alphabet and therefore it is used. And we consider these contradistinguishing terms to be apt and useful ; for, between the ego and the non-ego, we are to look for the relations and results in question. But yet, how shall we classify the objects of our cognitions in a manner which will evolve and clearly set before us these relations and their results. We cannot clearly set before us these relations by a classification of the various objects comprehended in the non-ego, according to some peculiarities existing inter se, for this does hot in a sufficiently apparent manner, involve the ego* and unless both the eg i and non-ego be involved there can be no relations existing between them, and no results can be produced. * The classification necessary, as a basis of reasoning, must, doubtless, start with the highest generalization; for to plunge 'in medias res,' and classify certain objects, as plantigrade, and others as degitigrade, only points out the comparative anatomy and relations of these objects inter se; and to classify the faculties of the mind into memory, will, imagination, etc., only brings out the relations existing between these faculties. The mind itself, or ego, is not involved in the^classlfication ; and consequently the results, springing from the relations of all other things to the mind itself, with their connections on the one hand with the ego, and on the other with the non-ego, can not be appreciated without finding a generalization, which shall comprehend them all.

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We must, therefore, seek the highest generalization of both the ego and non-ego that can be made, and taking this for our starting point, descend, divide and classify, in a manner very similar to that pursued by the naturalist.

Now the highest generalization that our mind can make of both the ego and non-ego is existence. Existence is a term that may with propriety be applied to any and everything of which we can have any knowledge; each and every shade of thought and feeling, the active principle itself or ego; matter, space, time and the Deity, may each of them, be called an existence; that which can be, and is, is an existence: and this is the highest generalization which we1 can make of things; it includes the ego and all of the non-ego, the mind itself and everything else, of which we can have cognitions. Now the results about which we are concerned for logical purposes, are evolved from the relations between one existence, our mind itself, and all ©ther existences. The first division, therefore, of existences, in order to keep the relations^ the mind to other things in view, must be into the ego and nen-ego ; these are the two classes of things from whose relations our intellectual results are produced. The highest generalization itself of all things jitbout which we can have any knowledge, can not, indeed, be properly considered a class of things ; for, the term existence does not distinguish things inter se, but it merely distinguishes, as it were, things from no things, and sets up a state of being. But the classification of things into the ego and non-ego certainly puts before our mind, and exhibits to us distinctly the mind of the thinker himself, and all other things which can be the subjects of the thinker's cognitions.

And in order to make this classification more clear, we may consider it a little further. We, all o( us, believe there are such existences as trees, rocks, water and air, in short, that there is such a thing as matter ; we have gained a knowledge of such things in some manner ; and we believe that these things are not our mind, but that they exist outside of it, and are what we denominate the non-ego. Ws believe, also, that there are such things as notions, thoughts, conceptions, feelings, motiuns, etc., and although these are intimately connected with the ego, and could not exist without it, yet they are not the mind itself, but they are of the'non-ego. There is a wide difference between the thoughts, feeling etc., produced, and the active principle, let it be wha^it may, which is engaged, in sonje manner in their production. Many of the thoughts of Shakespeare can be found in a book: the active principle, his mind itself, can not be found on paper; his works are the productions of his mind, not his mind itself. But again, we believe our own minds to exist, and that other men have minds. Now m^mind is to me the ego, but all other minds in reference to my mind belong to the non-ego; for every person must make his own mind alone the point from which and to which he must make all his bearings in gaining knowledge. But again we believe that there is space, time, eternity and that there is a God; and all these things are non-ego.; my mind itself only for me and your mind only for you are the ego; all other things belong to the non-ego.

Now for further classifications, we haye to deal only with the non ego: for the ego being, a single existence is incapable of division and subQlassification ; but the non-ego is capable of division ad infinitum, and therefore, we may nake numerous subclassifications of it. The non-ego, however, must always be subclassified with reference to the ego and not merely with reference to the constituents of the non-ego- inter se. The ego and non-ego merge in existence and this must be borne in mind; for, whatever relations, if any, may exist between the earth and the moon, t£ey never could be anything to us unless each of these objects sustain some relation or relations to the ego, my mind for me and your mind for you. That which bears no relation to the ego can not be the subject of our cognitions and it must be to us as though it had no existence; it is only by means of the relations of objects to our minds that we can gain any knowledge of the relations existing between the objects themselves. In our classifications, therefore, it is impor - tant to keep in view and take the ego, my mind for me and your mind for you, as the point from which to run to every object of the non-ego.

CHAPTER II. Pacts and Truths

Having in the previous chapter divided existences into two classes in such manner that the relations between ttoem will always involve the mind as one of the things related, we come now to the classification of the non-ego with reference to the ego. And a very obvious division of the non-ego with reference to the ego w@uld be into existences of the past, of the present and ot the future. Most of us, no doubt, have had friends whose phj sicalforms have passed away; their forms were existences in the past, out in the present they do not exist; and to-morrow is but a present thought concernng the future. But we must observe that, tlfese divisions only bring out the relations between points of time, in one of which points the ego is now situatBd; nevertheless, as the ego and non-ego are existences bearing towards each other the relations of time, these divisions, according to the points of time occupied by each, do bring to view the relations between the ego occupying the present point, and! those existences of the non-ego occupying the same and different points. But 'all the existences comprehended in the non-ego may be thrown into another classification, which shall involve the relations existing between the ego and non-ego in other respects than that of time and or that as well.

The first sub-classification, therefore, of the existences ot the non -ego, which we will make, will be into pacts and truths. And in order that we may understand this division, it is necessary to consider the relations of the ego merely as an existence among other existences. That which has had a beginning, must have been brought into existence by some anterior existence or existences. We will not stop to argue this point now, for we do not think it will be doubted. And if our minds have not always existed, their very beginnings of existence must be dependencies; and dependent existences come and remain as existences by the influence of that upon which they depend. And when other existences like itself with respect to dependence, surround the ego, the ego and these other existences must be so related to each other that they may act and re act upon each other, if each be affected by the other: and each is either affected by the other directly or indirectly,, or the one only is effected by the other, or neither the one nor the other is aftected by the circumstance of their both being existences. Now between material objects, it is declared to be a universal law of nature, that action and re-action are always equal and in opposite directions. Whether this law be extended to the relations between mind and mind, and between mind and matter, it is not necessary now fo# us to inquire. But of one thing we must feel assured, that the external non-ego, when its existence is the immediate subject of our cognitions, acts directly or indirectly on the ego. For a tree either acts upon and affects the mind, or to change the expression, the mind is affected by it in some manner, or the mind can have no cognitions of the existence of a tree, and it would be to the mind as though it were not. The mind had a beginning and therefore it is a dependent existence; and an existence, whose coming to be an ezistence is dependent, must ab initio be passive : and ils activity and pasivity both, must have been either given»to it simultaneously, or the former must have been developed from the later. For, the acting power of a dependent existence can not exist of itself independent of other things, but another or other existences are presupposed to generate it. And if the ego be dependent, its dependence must be upon the external non-ego, .otherwise it Would be independent; and dependence implies the reception of action. The dependent mind, therefore, independent for its existence upon the action of that part of the non-ego, from wrhich its existence came, and for its knowledge upon the action oi that part of the ex^rnal n©n-ego, of whose existence it gains knowledge.

Now at the first with respect to knowledge, other existences act upon the mind without its inherent energy being exerted. That we are boin without any knowledge, will not be doubted by any well informed student since the days of Locke. The mind must exist for a certain period in its inception without consciousness: for to be conscious at all, it must be Conscious of something : to be conscious of nothing is to be without consciousness : if consciousness can be contained in mere pasivity then a rock can be conscious. But activity is necesssary*to consciousness: and mental activity must be developed from the mind's passivity by the action of that part of the non-ego, upon which the mind's dependence in this respect consists. For the power to receive an action must "be contemporaneous with the mind's existence: but the mind must exist in the wrorld before it can be acted upon.by any power, other than that which created its being before it wTas really a mind. When, therefore, the ego first comes into the relations of that part of the non-ego, from which its existence was not derived, it must first be acted upon aiad act in response before it can be conscious of that part of the non-ego. And when we reflec that the external non-ego affects the mind only through the senses, and that in the foetal state, all these senses, even that of touch in a great measure at least, are secured against external impressions, wTe can not doubt that the mind at first is unconscious of an external worhj. And the only other things ©f which it could be conscious, are the action or actions of the power w,hieh caused it to exist, aod of its own existence. Now the action of that existence or of those existences which created the mind, must still continue to be exerted, or the ego becomes either an* independent existence or a non-entity. But we have shown the mind t© be dependent, if it had a beginning; and therefore we may with mature faculties appeal to our consciousness respecting the action of that creating power, and all persons will say that they are entirely unconscious of the action of that power which prolongs our existence. It is, however, commonly said that we are conscious of our own- existence, i. e., that the ego is conscious of itself per se; but we regard this as an error. For unless the mind act, it can not be conscious at all : and when it does act, it is conscious of Its acts, states and. feelings; but of itself per se it is not conscious. Each person can test the truth of this by his own consciousness. And if the mind at first be unconscious of the action of the external world through the senses, and also unconsciousness of the powers which prolong our existence and unconsciousness too of its own existence per se, it must at first be without consciousness. The mind, indeed, can be conscious of its own acts and feelings ; but independently of the action of other existences upon it, it can not begin to act or to feel.

Now we find that a material body made up of bones, muscjes, cartilage, men?branes, nerves etc., all of which belong to to the non-ego, contains the mind. This body is related both to other existences without and to the mind within: it is a medium between the mind and existences external to itself *And the first effect produced upon the ego by or through this body gives the mind merely that state of activity which we call intensified pasiyity. The mind does %ot yet notice; but it possesses more than mere passivity: it does not yet put forth its energy in any definite direction/but it possesses energy. But in a little time after birth, by being continually acted upon by the external world through the senses, the- mind's intensification is increased, and its energies start in definite directions, and then it notices. But it merely notices. By the eye, the ear and the other senses, It notices existences: but the where,

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the when, the what, or the why, it does not know. But in a little more time, the mind begins to discriminate and then it begins to know and to have knowledge.

Without the power to discriminate, we <could know nothing, although we might notice some things : and the possibility of discriminating lies in the relations between the non-ego and the ego. Now the only relations, which can exist with reference to the ego, between the existences among which the ego is placed* and with which the ego itself must be contemplated are those between the ego and external non-ego directly, those between one external object and an other of the non-ego indirectly through the ego, those between one external and one internal object of the non-ego through the 3go, and those between one internal object and another of the non-ego. From each of these relations and from them only can we discriminate and gain knowledge. - From the relations existing between the ego and the external non-ego directly, we have the action of the non-ego upon the ego, and the response of the mind itself in a directly opposite direction to the one received. This is the mere noticing of an object by the mind and it constitutes a fact. But if in the noticing of an external object of the non-ego, which is a fact, the mind also notices its own act, which, we think, is the case, here is another thing noticed, a fact different from the former, and these two facts may be compared. And let the same process be repeated with the same external object of the non-eg®, and we have a relation between two acts of the mind itself, between two internal objects of the non-ego; and also a relation between each act of the mind and the external object. And hence among these relations, three cpmparisons may be made, viz., between each act of the mind and the external object, and between the two mental acts inter se: and from either of these comparisons, the mind can gain knowledge. From the comparison between the action of an external object of the non-ego upon the ego and the act of the mind itself in return, we gain the knowledge, that the act of* the mind itself and the action of the external object are separate existences : and from the comparison between two aots of the mind itself, we can also discriminate and gain the knowledge of separate existences. For two acts of the mind in the same direction can not be simultaneous: and the interval of time, however small, forms a relation by which the mind can . discriminate and separate internal existences. Separate existences hereafter we will call heteka. (Greek— heteros, a, on— others). We use the neuter plural of the Greek adjective as a noun, meaning other things — separate existences. And hence the evolution of hetera by the mind is the inception of human knowledge^ By the mere noticing of an object, the mind indeed acts, but can know nothing, because one object per se can not be compared and discriminated. But if the mind notices its own acts in noticing external influences and compares them with that of the thing noticed, from the rela-

18 tion existing between the two, the mind can evolve the knowledge of hetera. And "we must here remark again, that the mind does not and can not notice itself. Its acts, states and feelings, it can notice : but the knowledge of its own existence, as a potential mind per se, is gained only by comparison.

Now things merely noticed by the mind we call facts: the knowledge gained by the comparison of noticed existences, we call truth: and this is our first classification of the existences of the non-ego. Facts then, are existences, each ©ne of which is noticed by a singfle act of the mind and •without comparison: truths are the results of comparisons made by the mind between facts and also between truths themselves. Now pacts are all comprehended in the non-ego, and of them we may make two classes : the one class having their where without and- the other having their where within the ego. The first of these classes we will call perceptional and the second selfconsctonal facts. And although neither of these terms are in common use in, our language, we think we have the right to adapt terms to our own purposes. From the Latin fractio, we have Traction, from which the adjective fractional is constructed : and from perceptio, we have perception, from which in like manner perceptional may be made in harmony with the principles of our language. And thus, also, we may deal with conscio and prefix self.

And each of theses classes of facts may again be divided into five subclasses. Perceptional facts are naturally subclassified into the five classes, viz. : visual and auricular facts, facts of touch, of taste and of scent. And hence one external aggregate existence— and by aggregate existence we mean an existence to which we can apply our organs of touch, of taste, of smell, of sight and hearing— may contain five perceptional facts or external noticeable existences. Such an existence as red, or an existence to which we can apply but one specific organ of sense, we call a simple existence and not an aggregate one. But two aggregate existences, then, will contain ten perceptional facts. And if each fact of the same aggregate existence, be compared with the others, there will be ten comparisons of facts inter se of the same aggregate existence. And if we compare each fact in an aggregate existence with each fact in another aggregate existence, we w7ill have twenty-five comparisons. And hence two aggregate existences contain ten facts and afford forty-five comparisons, from all of which truths can be gained.

Chapter III. Conscious Truths

lb the preceeding chapter we explained what we mean by facts and endeavored to show to what existences we apply that term. We showed that those existences which w6 call .facts; in and by themselves separately considered, make no part of our knowledge; but that they are the foundations

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and pre-exislent substrata upon which all our knowledge stands and from which it springs. All knowledge lies in relations, and the mind evolves it by comparisons. Were a person so brought into life that he could .see the sun, i. e., notice this perceptional fact, but notice nothing else, i. e., have no selT consclonal fact, he could not know that the sun exists. We can not say that the sun exists without having the knowledge of existence. For, the phrase "The sun exists," or "The sun is," is equivalent to this, viz.: the sun is an existence. And unless we first have the knowledge of existence, we can not know the sun to be one: not a single fact but pacts must come to the mind before knowledge begins. And when the mind first notices a perceptional fact, there is also always lodged in it a self-conscional one; these facts, the one perceptional and the other self-conscional alway enter the mind in a binary manner. For, as we have already said, the ego unconscious of itself per se, takes its place among other existences to be acted upon and to act in return. And these perceptional and self-conscional facts keep com ins: in a binary manner repeatedly before the mind compares them at all: but when it does once make the comparison, the knowledge of separate existence is evolved. This knowledge we call conscious truth. And hence we say that we are conscious of an existence though the knowledge of an existence be not a fact to us, but a truth evolved from the relation of facts : the fact of an existence per se is noticed but not known by us.

The relation of perceptional and self-conscional facts is necessary to the beginning of consciousness. For, as already said, to be conscious implies to be conscious of something, and to be conscious of nothing is to be without consciousness; and the human mind had' a beginning of existence and it is a dependent being. And although, indeed, we can not tell by the proofs which nature offers, but that the materia mentis, so to speak, may haYe always existed, and that at the first it may have been inclosed within a human body and afterwards handed down from generation to generation ; yet that there was a time when our consciousness did not exist, is clear. For, the -materia mentis, let it be what it may, could noty per se, by its own inherent power separated and independent of all things else in the universe, be conscious of anything except itself per se. And although the mind be conscious of its acts, states and feelings, yet that it is not conscious of itself, i. e., not con- u scious of the fact of a materia mentis, our own consciousness teaches us. And if the mind be not conscious of ftie fact of its existence, or to use a phraseology more tangible to some minds, if the mind can not feel itself per se, it must be a dependent being, and its dependence must be a dependence in every respect at least except existence alone. And that the materia mentis in such relations as entitle it to be called a human mind had a beginning can not be denied : and hence its conciousness in those relations must have had a beginning also. And as the human mind is inclosed within a body, were

20 this body impervious to the action of all external things, the mind must continue unconscious. And although it is often said that consciousness is the very thing that distinguishes animate life: yet the lack of actual consciousness does not establish the lack of potential consciousness or the nonentity of mind. Consciousness is not the mind itself: the materia mentis must first exist before consciousness can. And if, as we have shown, the mind in order to be conscious, must be conscious of something, that something of which it is conscious, must be brought to the mind itself by the external non-ego : otherwise the human mind could rear a structure of know4edge from out of itself aad independently of all things else'in the universe. Consciousness, therefore, as it can not exist without a minci to contain it, so likewise it can not exist in the human mind independent of all things except the mind: without the non-ego the.eg&.could not be conscious.

Now there is in man a meteria mentis, or an immaterial substance, or it you please and as some suppose an arrangement of physical organs in some manner go that the arrangement aftords the conditions necessaryn to become conscious when. acted upon: we start no question respecting either of those or of any theories. What may be the essence of mind, we do not know, but whatever it may be, we find it, in a. proper organization, to be capable of knowledge; and our inquiry here is- with reference to this knowledge. And the first knowledge, which the mind gains, is conscious truth. And if consciousness depend upon the relations of facts, L e., upon existences which are inter se hetera, it must spring from those relations. We may say, that the mind has knowledge of something. This sentence contains the*mention of three existences viz. : mind, knowledge -and thing. We may say that the mind is conscious ot something; and this sentence contains mind, eonciousness and thing. And if, as we have shown, the mind notices its acts, but not itself, and consciousness be dependent for its existence, then, if the later sentence be true, consciousness must have been evolved from the relation of the action.ot the 14JND, and that of the thing. An object of the non-ego affects the materia mentis, the mind acts; and from the relation of the effect produced upon the materia mentis, and the returned action of the inind, spring consciousness or the knowledge of existence. Consciousness is the result of relations and it*js envolved from facts. When we say that we know that stove is not an act of our minds, because we are conscious of this, we state what is not true. We become conscious of the existence of an act of mind and of a stove, and the judgment then discriminates between the two by comparison. Conciousness is merely the knowledge of existence; and the thing or existence of which we are conscious, we call a conscious truth.