Elements of psychology

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Chapter I. Psychology And Education

Art and Science. — The doing of anything presupposes some knowledge, for every action is the employment of certain agencies which stand in the relation of means to our particular end or object of desire ; and we could not select and make use of these means unless we knew beforehand that they were fitted to bring about the fulfillment of our desire. This is evident even in the case of simple actions. Thus, if after sitting reading for some time and becoming cold I go out and take a brisk walk, it is because I know that by so doing I am certain to recover warmth. And it is still more manifest in the case of complex actions. The action of an engineer, of a surgeon, or of a statesman, involves a quantity of knowledge of various kinds.

The knowledge which is thus serviceable for doing things or for practice is of two sorts. Thus, the knowledge implied in the above example, that muscular exercise promotes bodily warmth, may be knowledge that I have gathered from my own experience aided by what others have told me ; or it may have been obtained from a study of the bodily organism and its functions, and of the effects of muscular activity on the circulation, etc. The first kind of knowledge, being derived from what may be called unrevised experience and observation, is called empirical ; the second kind, being the outcome of those processes of revision and extension of every-day empirical knowledge which make up the work of science, is named scientific.

The chief differences between empirical and scientific knowledge are the following: (i) The former is based on a narrow range of observation, and on observation which is apt to be loose and inexact ; the latter, on a wide survey of facts and on accurate processes of observation and experiment. (2) The former consists of propositions which have only a limited scope, and are never, strictly speaking, universally true ; the latter is made up of propositions of wide comprehensiveness, and of universal validity, known as principles or laws. (3) As a result of this the conclusions deduced from empirical knowledge are precarious, whereas the conclusions properly drawn from scientific principles are perfectly trustworthy.

We call any department of practice an art when the actions involved are of sufficient complexity and difficulty to demand special study, and to offer scope for individual skill. Thus, we talk now of an art of cooking, because with our advanced civilization the preparation of food has become so elaborate a process as to call for special preparation or training.

Every art requires a certain amount and variety of knowledge. In the early stages of development the various arts were carried on by help of empirical knowledge. Thus, in agriculture men sowed certain crops rather than others in given soils, because they and their predecessors had found out from experience that these were the best fitted. Similarly in medicine, men resorted at first to particular remedies in particular diseases, because their practical experience had taught them the utility of so doing.

Such guidance from empirical sources was found to be insufficient. Workers in the various departments of art asked for a deeper knowledge of the agencies they em-

ART AND SCIENCE. 3

ployed and the processes they carried out, and so they had recourse to science. Thus the art of agriculture has profited from the sciences of chemistry and botany, and the art of medicine from the sciences of anatomy and physiology. Indeed, the demand for a fuller and more exact knowledge on the part of practical workers has been an important stimulus to the development of the sciences.

The reason of this is plain from what has been said above. The characteristic imperfections of empirical knowledge become more and more manifest as an art develops. And these defects are the more conspicuous in the case of the more complex arts, and particularly those which have to do with living things. This is clearly illustrated in the case of medicine. The organic processes going on in the human body are so numerous and complicated, there are so many variable circumstances which help to modify a disease in different cases, and so to interfere with a simple uniform effect of any given remedial agency, that the generalizations based on practical experience are continually proving themselves to be inadequate and precarious. The great modern improvements in the art of healing have been the direct outcome of the growth of the sciences underlying the art.

Hence we have come to employ in the case of all the more complex and intricate departments of practice the expression *' science and art." Thus we talk of the science and art of engineering, of agriculture, and even of politics. To this pair of correlated terms there corresponds the equally familiar couple, " theory and practice." For the term theory in this connection refers more particularly to the principles or truths of a scientific rank which stand at the foundation of the art.

It is important to understand the precise place and function of these scientific principles in their relation to practice. First of all, then, they do not take the place of empirical generalizations. These are at first, as already remarked, the only knowledge by which an art can guide itself ; and they always continue to form a valuable part of every theory of a practical subject. Science alone would never have taught men the best way to till the ground, to obtain metal from the soil, or to carry out any other set of industrial operations. The function of scientific principles is to supplement, interpret, and, where necessary, correct empirical knowledge. In this way the teaching of practical experience is rendered more precise and certain.

But science renders to art a yet greater service than this. It greatly enlarges the range of practical discovery. When once we have our scientific principles we can deduce practical conclusions from these, and thus anticipate the slow and uncertain progress of empirical discovery. Thus, in the art of surgery, the modern method of treating wounds is largely the direct outcome of scientific reflection on the nature of wounds and of the natural process of healing. Such deductions must, of course, be verified by actual experiment before they can take their place among the assured body of knowledge making up the theory of the subject. So that here, too, the theory of a practical operation is constituted by two factors — an empirical and a scientific. The only difference between this case and the first is that here the work of science precedes instead of following the work of experience, and, in place of having to supplement and interpret this, has to be supplemented and verified by it.

Art and Science of Education.— The above remarks may help us to understand the fact that the art of education is now seeking to ground itself on scientific truths or principles.

As an art, education aims at the realization of a particular end. This end must, of course, be assumed to be clearly defined before we can repair to science to ascertain what agencies we can best employ in order to compass it.

ART AND SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. 5

At first sight, however, it might seem that this condition is not satisfied. Writers have discussed at length what the true end of education is, and they have proposed very different definitions of the matter.

The reason of this uncertainty is apparent. Education, unlike such an art as cookery, has a large and comprehensive object, viz., to help to mold and fashion in certain definite ways no less complex a thing than a human being, with his various physical, intellectual, and moral capabilities, so as to fit him to fulfill his highest function and destiny. And to ascertain what the rightly fashioned man is like, and wherein consists his true work and service, is a problem of much difficulty. In truth, we can only satisfactorily settle this when we have determined the supreme ends of human action — in other words, the highest good of man. It is the province of the great practical science of ethics to ascertain this for us ; and the teachers of this science have from ancient times been divided into opposed schools.

We need not, however, wait for the resolution of these grave and difficult problems. Men are to a large extent practically agreed as to what is right and wrong, though they have not settled the theoretic basis of these distinctions. In like manner educators are practically at one as to the' objects they aim at. In spite of ethical and theological differences, we agree to say that education seeks, by social stimulus, guidance, and control, to develop the natural powers of the child, so as to render him able and disposed to lead a healthy, happy, and morally worthy life.

This is offered only as a rough approximation to a definition which may be generally accepted. In filling out this idea, different thinkers would no doubt diverge considerably, according to their conception of man's nature and destiny. Thus, to the firm believer in the Christian doctrine of a future life it must appear of the first consequence to develop those religious faculties and emotions the exercise of which constitutes man's highest function and the direct preparation for the larger and enduring after-life. But, while fully recognizing the truth that religious belief must throughout profoundly color a man's conception of the scope of education and the relative value of its several parts, one may assume that in practice educators of widely unlike theological views agree as to the main lines of education in its distinctly human aspects.

A word or two as to the scope of our definition. In the first place, we take education as aiming at the formation of faculty, rather than at the giving of information or the communication of knowledge. In other words, education, as the etymology of the word tells us (Lat., educere), has to do with drawing out, i. e., developing the mind and its various activities, and not merely with putting something into the mind. This distinction is often spoken of as that between education and instruction. But the word instruction (Lat., instruere) implies the orderly putting together of the materials of knowledge so as to form a structure. And, taken in this sense, there is no fundamental opposition between the two. The faculties of the intelligence can only be called forth and strengthened in the processes of gaining knowledge, and thus " education attains its end through instruction." The teacher may, however, fix his mind more on the educative result of his processes, viz., the ability to observe and reason about facts in the future, or on the immediate gain of school exercises in the shape of useful knowledge. And this difference in the teacher's point of view will deeply affect his ideas as to proper subjects to be taught, and even as to the best method of teaching them.

Finally, it is to be noted that our definition does not stop short at the intellectual side of the mind, but includes the other sides as well. The supposition that education is only concerned with the intellectual faculties probably has its source in the common error that the educator and the schoolmaster are synonymous terms, whereas in reality the latter is only one among many educators. And even the schoolmaster will err if he thinks his business ends with a mere intellectual discipline of his pupils.

But, while our definition is thus a wide one, it is less wide than that of some thinkers, e. g., J. S. Mill, who included under education the influence of external circumstances generally. Education is to us essentially the action of other human beings on the child, and this only so far as it is conscious and designed. Moreover, in its higher forms, education implies a systematic application of external forces and agencies according to a definite plan and an orderly method.*

* On the difference between education and instruction, see Prof. Payne's " Lectures on the Science and Art of Education," Lecture I,

ART AND SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. y

As soon as we approximate to a definition of education, as in the above, we see that merely empirical knowledge will carry us but a little way in realizing our object. For the human nature which it is our special business to develop is plainly the most complex of all living things. It is at once something material and something mental ; and this mental part, again, is exceedingly composite in its constitution, being made up of a number of intellectual and moral capabilities and dispositions. Nor is this all ; we find that these several physical and mental powers are joined together and interact upon one another in a very intricate and puzzling manner. Closely connected with this peculiar complexity of the child's nature, we have its great variability, showing itself in the unique constitution or idiosyncrasy of each individual child. Owing to these circumstances, mere experience could never have led men far on the right educational path. And as a matter of history we know that the older methods of educating the young were faulty, and in some respects radically wrong, just because they were not arrived at by aid of a profound and scientific study of child-nature. Thus, to take an obvious instance, the cardinal error of making so much of intellectual instruction dry and unpalatable arose out of ignorance of the elementary truth of human nature, that the intellectual faculties are only fully aroused to activity under the stimulus of feeling in the shape of interest. That this was the real source of the blunder is proved by the fact that the modern educational reformers, who have set themselves to correct this and other defects of the older system, were guided to these reforms by a deeper study of children's minds. This remark applies alike to the ideas of practical workers, as Pestalozzi, and of pure theorists, as Locke.*

p. i3, etc. On some alternative definitions of education, see Dr. Bain's " Education as a Science," chap. i.

* On the effects of an ignorance of psychology in rendering con-

What is really wanted as the groundwork of education is a body of well-ascertained truths respecting the fundamental properties of the human being, from which the right and sound methods of training the young may be seen to follow as conclusions. This theoretic basis will consist of facts and laws relating to the child's physical and mental organization, its various susceptibilities, its ways of reacting on external agents and influences, and the manner in which it develops. And these universal truths must be supplied by some science or sciences.

Divisions of Educational Science. — These principles are derived in the main from two sciences : physiology, or the science which treats of the bodily organism, its several structures and functions, and psychology, or mental science which deals with the mind, its several faculties and their mode of operation. The former principles, including certain applications of physiological science known as hygiene, underlie what is now called physical education, the training of the bodily powers and the furtherance of health. The latter form the basis of mental — i. e., intellectual and moral — training.

Within the limits of mental education we have certain subdivisions. Popularly we distinguish between intellectual and moral education ; but this twofold division is inadequate. As we shall see by and by, the mind presents three well-marked and fundamental departments — viz., the intellect, the emotions, and the will. The development of it on any one of these three sides is to a certain extent a separate work, calling for its own particular mode of exercise, and, one may add, its own peculiar fitness in the teacher. These three directions of training are distinguishable as intellectual, aesthetic, and moral education. They correspond to the three great ends: (i) the logical end of truth, (2) the aesthetic end of beauty, and (3) the

temporary educational practices faulty and even vicious, see Herbert Spencer, " Education," chap, i, p. 24, and following.

DIVISIONS OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE. 9

ethical end of virtue. The first aims at building up the fabric of knowledge, and developing the faculties by which knowledge is reached ; the second, at such a cultivation of the feelings as will best subserve the end of a pleasurable existence, and in particular the appreciation and enjoyment of beauty in nature and art ; and the third, at developing the will and forming the character.

In giving this assistance to education, psychology is supplemented by three sciences which are not purely theoretical like it, but have a more practical character, since they have as their special province to regulate the activity of the mind on each of these three sides. These are logic, which regulates our intellectual operations by supplying us with rules for correct reasoning ; aesthetics, which aims at giving us a standard of beauty and criteria by which we may judge of its existence in any instance ; and ethics, which fixes the ultimate standard of right and wrong, and determines what are the several duties and virtues.

The scientific groundwork of the art of education may be made clear by the following diagram :

Physical.

n

Physiolo^

together with

Hygiene.

Fig. I.

Education.

Mental.

n

Psychologytogether with Logic, ^Esthetics, and Ethics.

lO PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION.

Psychology and Education. — Of the sciences that contribute principles to education, psychology is plainly the most important. The teacher is most directly concerned with the development of the child's mind, and considers his bodily organism mainly in its connection with mental efficiency. / / Again, since the teacher is commonly supposed to have as his principal object the exercise of certain of the intellectual faculties — viz., those employed in the acquisition and retention of knowledge — it is clear that some portions of psychology will be of special value to him. Thus the laws governing the processes of acquiring and reproducing knowledge will have a peculiarly direct bearing on the teacher's work. Such truths of mental science would seem to be specially fitted to supply principles of education.

At the same time, it is clearly impracticable to select certain portions of psychology as exclusively applying to education. For, first of all, even allowing that education need busy itself only with instruction, or the communication of so much useful knowledge, it may be said that the teacher still needs to study other faculties than the acquisitive ; for psychology teaches us that no power of the mind works in perfect isolation. Thus, it has come to be recognized that, in order that a child should gain clear knowledge through words, his observing faculties must have undergone a certain discipline, so that his mind may have been stored with distinct and easily reproducible images of objects in his actual surroundings. Hence, one reason for including the training of the senses in modern systems of education. More than this, it will be found that there can be no adequate exercise of the intellect which does not take account of the feelings, in the shape of interest and a love of learning.

It follows, then, that the teacher needs some general

//acquaintance with the principles of psychology, even

though he is aiming merely at the most rapid and effect-

ADVANTAGE TO THE TEACHER. n

ive method of storing the mind with knowledge. But it may be assumed that few teachers now limit their efforts to this object. Education, in its true sense, is commonly aimed at by intelligent teachers in the process of instruction itself, which thus becomes, in a measure at least, a means to an end beyond itself. And some attention is paid, as time allows and opportunity suggests, to the cultivation of the feelings and the formation of good moral dispositions and habits. And this being so, a clear apprehension of the different sides of mind, and of the way in which they interact one on another, may be said to be of immediate utiUty to the teacher. In other words, the principles of education must be derived from the elementary truths of psychology taken as a whole.

It follows, from what was said above concerning the relation of science to art, that there are two principal uses of mental science to the teacher : (i) An accurate acquaintance with the mental faculties, which are the material that the educator has to operate on and mold into shape, will supply him with a criterion or touchstone by which he may test the soundness of existing rules and practices in education. (2) the knowledge so gained may be made to directly suggest better educational rules than those in vogue, and so to promote the further development of the art.

No doubt we may expect too much from a study of mental science. We may err by supposing that scientific knowledge will render practical or empirical knowledge superfluous, instead of merely supplementing and correcting it. And it may be well to remember, therefore, that, as a sciencej^psychology can only tell us what are the general characters of mind, and point out the best way of dealing with it in its general features and broad outlines ; it can not acquaint us with the manifold diversities of intelligence and disposition, or suggest the right modifications of our educational processes to suit these variations.

Accordingly, the educator will always need to supplement his general study of mind by a careful observation of the individual minds which he is called upon to deal with, so as to properly vary and adapt his methods of teaching and disciplining.

Even here, however, the student of psychology will find his scientific knowledge useful. For the work of getting to know an individual child is one not only of observation but of interpretation. And in the performance of this a general acquaintance with mind will materially assist. It is evident, indeed, that we never understand an individual thing thoroughly except in the light of general knowledge. A botanist only comprehends a new plant when he classifies it — i. e., refers it to a general description or head, and accounts for it by help of general botanical principles. Similarly we only understand a particular child when we bring to bear on it a previous general knowledge of child and human nature. And while psychological knowledge thus aids us in reading the individual characters of children, it assists us further in determining the proper modifications of our educational methods to suit these variations^ Experience is without doubt our main guide here. Wh>at kind of punishment, for example, will be most efficacious and salutary for boys of a particular temperament, etc., is a problem which must be solved to a large extent by the results of actual trial. Still, our scientific principles are a valuable supplementary aid here also, not only by helping us to understand the different results of our educational treatment in different cases, but also by assisting us in lighting upon the required

modifications.

Appendix

On the scope and aim of education and its special relation to psychology, the student may consult : Prof. Payne's " Lectures on the Science and Art of Education," Lectures I and II ; Dr. Bain's " Education as a Science," chap, i ; Th. Waitz's " Allgemeine Padagogik," Einleitung, § I.

Chapter II. Scope And Method Of Psychology

Psychology, or mental science, may be defined as our general knowledge of mind, and more particularly the human mind, reduced to an exact and systematic form. In order to understand this definition, we must try to give precision to the term mind.

Scientific Conception of Mind. — We commonly distinguish between a mind as a unity or substance and the several manifestations or phenomena of this substance. In every-day discourse, indeed, we talk of our own and others' minds as the subjects of various feelings, ideas, etc. Psychology as a science does not inquire into the nature of mind in itself, or as a substance, but confines itself to the study of its several states or operations. It is the different forms of activity of mind that we can observe in our actual mental experience or mental life that constitute the proper subject-matter of our science. And it is plain that this knowledge of the mind in actual operation, and of the various ways in which it manifests itself and works, is what we need for practical guidance, whether of our own or of others' minds.

How, now, shall we mark off these mental facts from other phenomena which form the subject-matter of the physical sciences.'* We can not define such states of mind by resolving them into something simpler. They have nothing in common beyond the fact of being mental states.

SCOPE AND METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Hence, we can only use some equivalent phrase, as when we say that a mental phenomenon is a fact of our conscious experience or conscious life. Or, again, we may enumerate the chief varieties of these mental phenomena, and say that mind is the sum of our processes of knowing, our feelings of pleasure and pain, and our voluntary doings. Popularly, mind is apt to be identified with knowing or intelligence. A man of mind is a man of intellect. But though intelligence is perhaps the most important part of mind, it is not the whole. In mental science we must reckon the sensation of pain arising from a bruise as a fact of mind. Or, finally, we may set mind in antithesis to what is not mind. Mind is non-material, has no existence in space as material bodies have. We can not touch a thought or a feeling, and one feeling does not lie outside of another in space. These phenomena occur in time only. Hindis thus the inner smaller world (mikrokosm) as distinguished from the external and larger world (makrokosm). Mind and Body. — While it is important thus to set mind in strong opposition to material things, we must keep in view the close connection between the two. What we call a human being is made up of a bodily organism and a mind. Our personality or " self " is a mind connected with or embodied in a material framework. As we shall see presently, all mental processes or operations are connected with actions of the nervous system. The most abstract thought is accompanied by some mode of activity in the brain-centers. Hence, while we must be careful not to confuse the mental and the material, the psychical and the physical, as though they were of the same kind (homogeneous), we can not exclude the latter from view in dealing with mind. We must always think of mind as attended by, and, in some inexplicable way, related to, the living organism, and more particularly the nervous system and its. actions. And this recognition of this close and constant companionship with body is a matter of great

HOW WE OBSERVE AND STUDY MIND, 15

practical moment in seeking to train and , develop the mind.

The Subjective Method.— There are two distinct ways of knowing mind. The first is the direct, internal, or subjective way.* By this method we direct attention to what is going on in our own mind at the time of its occurrence, or afterward. We have the power of turning the attention inward on the phenomena of mind. Thus we can attend to a particular feeling, say emulation or sympathy, in order to see what its nature is, of what elementary parts it consists, and how it is affected by the circumstances of the moment. This method of internal or subjective observation is known as introspection (" looking within ").

The Objective Method.~In the second place, we may study mental phenomena not only in our own individual mind, but as they present themselves externally in other minds. This is the indirect, external, or objective way of studying mental phenomena. Thus we note the manifestations of others' feelings in looks, gestures, etc. We arrive at a knowledge of their thoughts by their speech, and observe their inclinations and motives by noting their actions.

This objective observation embraces not only the mental phenomena of the individuals who are personally known to us, old and young, but those of others of whom we hear or read in biography, etc. Also it includes the study of minds in masses or aggregates, as they present themselves in national sentiments and actions, and in the events of history. It includes too a comparative study of mind by observing its agreements and differences among

* "Subject" means the mind as knowing something, or as affected (pleasurably or painfully) by a thing. "Object" is that which is known, or which affects the mind in a certain way. The house I see, the flower I admire, are objects to me, who am the subject that sees and admires them.

different races, and even among different grades of animal life. The study of the simpler phases of mind in the child, in backward and uncivilized races, and in the lower animals, is especially valuable for understanding the growth of the mature or fully developed human mind.

Both Methods must be combined. — Scientific knowledge is characterized by certainty, exactness, and generality. We must observe carefully so as to make sure of our facts, and to note precisely what is present. And we must go on from a knowledge of the particular to a knowledge of the general. From this rough definition of what is meant by scientific knowledge we may easily see that neither the internal nor the external method is complete without the other. To begin with : since we only directly observe what is passing in our own individual mind, some amount of introspection is the first condition of all certain and accurate knowledge of mental states. To try to discover mental phenomena and their laws solely by watching the external signs and effects of others' thoughts, feelings, and volitions, would plainly be absurd. For these external manifestations are in themselves as empty of meaning as words in an unknown tongue, and only receive their meaning by a reference to what we ourselves have thought and felt. On the other hand, an exclusive attention to the contents of our individual mind would never give us a general knowledge of mind. In order to eliminate the effects of individuality, we must at every step compare our own modes of thinking and feeling with those of other minds ; and the wider the area included in our comparison, the sounder are our generalizations likely to be.