First principles of faith

Preface

Since the substance of the following treatise was written, some remarkably able works, handling many of the topics here discussed, have appeared, notably A Study of Origins, by Dr. Pressense ; The Philosophy of Theism, by Dr. Ward ; The Philosophical Basis of Theism, by Dr. Harris ; Physical and Moral Law, by Rev. W. Arthur, MA. ; and The Unity of Nature, by the Duke of Argyll. This fact led me to consider whether these productions met the want I had aimed at supplying, and thus rendered the publication of my manuscript superfluous. The result was a conviction that, notwithstanding the rare excellence of these works, there was still need for such a book as I had attempted to provide. I therefore issue this production in the hope that it may, in some degree, take part in promoting the cause of truth and human well-being. Unbelief continues to project its shot and shell into the lines of Christian Theism ; and, though its former attacks have been well met, it must not be left to repeat them unresisted. The- present volume only aspires to be one of many contributions, made in vindication of those great principles which underlie the experience and practice of true religion.

Marshall Randles.

Leeds, August, 1884.

CON TENTS.

Introduction

PAGB

i

Part I. — Various Kinds of Theistic Evidence

I. Intuitive; 2. Traditive ; 3. General Consent ; 4. Ontological ; 5. Moral ; 6. Cosmological ; 7. Teleological ; 8. Argument of this Treatise, chiefly Etiological .....

Part II. — The Doctrine of Causality

1. Primary Truths — Their Meaning — Criteria — Examples — Rea-

sonableness of taking them for granted — Confirmed by Experience .......... 25

2. Essential Principle of Causality — Theory of Hume and Brown

(1) Based on our Ignorance, (2) Involves Possibility of Self-origination, (3) Condemned by Consciousness, (4) Does not accord with Prevalence of the Idea of Causation, (5) Its Advocates betray the Presence of the Idea in their Consciousness, (6) An Unsatisfactory Explanation of Events . . 29

4. Cause belongs to Substance . 45

5. Cause Proportionate to Effect . . . . . . • 47

6. More than Second Causes ........ 50

7. No Infinite Series . ...... 5 1

8. Precedence of "Cause . . . . .. . . , 52

IO. Final Causes ....... . . 60

VI CONTENTS.

Part III. — Theistic Evidence. PAGE

Proposition I, The Present Universe is the Effect of a FIRST CAUSE. (i) Chance? (2) Necessity? (3) Self-caused? (4) Infinite Series ? (i.) No Real Efficiency ; (ii.) Absurd ; (iii.) Inconceivable. (5) Substratum of Matter the Cause of all ? (i.) An Assumption ; (ii.) Matter not One, but Many ; (iii.) Matter changes ; (iv.) Insufficient ; (v.) Matter Inert , (vi.) Eternity of Matter Assumed. (6) All resolved into Change ? (i.) This and the previous Theory of Mill cannot both be true ; (ii.) Assumes Infinite Series. (7) Force? (8) Matter and Force? (9) Theistic Solution . . . . . . . 65

Proposition 2, The First Cause is Eternal . . . '85

Proposition 3, The First Cause is Self-existent and Necessary 86 Proposition 4, The First Cause is Intelligent, (i) Mind Producible by Mind only ; (2) Intelligence proved by Co-ordination of Nature, (3) by Final Causes, (i.) Explanations ; (ii.)

Proofs 87

Proposition 5, The First Cause is a Moral Being. (1) Facts, (i.) Moral Qualities ; (ii.) Moral Judgments ; (iii.) Freedom ; (iv.) Praise and Blame ; (v.) Responsibility ; (vi.) Society ; (vii.) Moral Order of Nature. (2) Inferences, (i.) None but Moral Cause Adequate ; (ii.) Moral Government implies a Moral Governor ; (a) Moral Judgments ; (/>) Moral Purpose ; (c) Moral Relations ; (d) Providential Government. (3) Good Moral Character of God. (i.) Conscience ; (ii.) Results of Right and Wrong ; (iii.) Benevolence. (4) Objections, (i.) Pessimism ; (ii.) Moral Order from Evolution . . .115

Proposition 6, The First Cause is a Personal Being . . .130

Proposition 7, The First Cause is One and Simple, (i) Law of Parsimony ; (2) Original Cause not Complex ; (3) Unity of Plan 133

Proposition 8, The First Cause is Infinite, (i) Definitions ; (2) Infinity not proved by Finite Effect ; (3) Alleged Gulf between the Infinite and our Thought ; (4) Reasons for believing God is Infinite (i.) Suggested by Greatness of the Universe, (ii.) by the Interests of the Universe ; (iii.) Infinite Duration already proved ; (iv.) No Limit from within or without ; (v.) Ontological Proof 136

CONTENTS. Vil

Part IV. — How the Theistic Argument is affected by the Advances of Science and Philosophy. PAGE

Question not to be confounded with Spread of Theism or Anti- Theism — Atheistic Boasting 149

1. Theistic Evidences strengthened by Advances of Science and

Philosophy l S I

2. Evolution, (i) Truth of its Essential Features no Disproof of

Theism, (i.) The Universe still to be accounted for as a Whole ; (ii.) also its Parts ; (iii.) Final Causes still hold good ; (iv.) Atheism not logically necessary to the Theory of Evolution. (2) Some Elements non-essential to the Theory, (i.) Spontaneous Generation ; (ii.) Transmutation of Species ; (iii.) Continuity in a Sense ; (iv.) Life minus Protoplasm ; (v.) Materiality of Mind ; (vi.) Evolved Morality . . . .160

3. The Philosophy of the Infinite— History— Bearing on our Ques-

tion — Definitions. (1) The Infinite alleged to be Inconceivable, (i.) Answer to the Contention that Conceivability involves Pantheism, (ii.) and that it involves Self-contradictions ; (iii.) Conceivability implied in Belief oi the Infinite ; (iv.) Attested by Consciousness. (2) The Infinite alleged to be unknowable — Answer, (i.) Relativity of Knowledge no Bar to Knowledge of the Infinite ; (ii.) Knowledge necessary to Belief. (3.) The Infinite Ascertainable ; (4) The Negative Philosophy adverse to Devotion ; (5) Discredits Reason. Mr. Spencer's " Reconciliation " 189

4. Connection of Natural Effects with their First Cause — Various

Theories : — (1) Divine Sustenance of Natural Being and Causation ; (2) No Causation but the Direct Energy of God; (3) Plastic Nature ; (4) Pre-established Harmony ; (5) Occasionalism ; (6) Mechanical Theory associated with (i.) Theism ; (ii.) Pantheism ; (iii.) Atheistic Materialism. First Cause in Matter, in Law, in Force — Fortuitous Combination — Atheism impotent to explain Life, Mind, Morals, Religion . . .231

Part V. — Relation of Natural to Revealed Theology. Value of the Foregoing Argument from Nature— Meaning of

Revealed Theology 273

Vin CONTENTS.

PAGE

I. Natural Theology as a Postulate of Revealed . . . .281 2 Natural Theology as a Confirmation of Revealed . . . 284.

3. Natural Theology Inadequate. (1) Divine Attributes ; (2) Tri-

unity of God ; (3) Genesis of the Finite ; (4) Providence ; (5) Moral Government ; (6) Redemption ; (7) The Person of Christ; (8) Worship; (9) Man's Chief Good. . . .288

4. Reaction of Revealed on Natural Theology . , . . 298

INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is sometimes the boast of scepticism that Theism is founded in sentiment, and shrinks from the test of reason. Speaking of the teleological argument, Dr. L. Buchner says : " Modern natural science has pretty well emancipated itself from such empty notions, and abandons these innocent studies to such as delight in contemplating nature, rather with the eyes of the feelings than with those of the intellect." 1 Another Atheist intimates that before the production of his book, 2 neither Theists nor anti-Theists dealt with the subject from the standpoint of pure reason. So far as the reproach is just, it certainly belongs not to Theism alone. If the indifference desiderated be that which would examine the subject without an earnest wish that Theism may be proved true, and a reverent sympathy with the Theistic side of the question, the desire is unreasonable. In one whc deems the certainty of God's existence an inestimable boon, such an indifferent state of mind were more faulty than it would be in an heir investigating his disputed title to his patrimony.

By no means would I undervalue some Theistic arguments which are based on the facts of feeling.

1 Force and Matter, p. 89.

A Ca?idid Examination of Theism % by Physicus.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

For example, the heart of man craves for a God of infinite power and wisdom, of perfect righteousness and benevolence, to whom it may render loving homage, and in whom it may confide for deliverance, protection, and happiness. Even " unbelievers," as Calvin observes, " flee from God, and yet seek Him through some kind of involuntary impulse." Reason, not feeling, may well infer that there is probably a reality corresponding to this deep natural want ; and when the response to that feeling comes in the idea of a God of these perfections, reason and feeling unite in accepting Him as the truest and greatest reality, and the answer to man's deepest need.

Again, I am not prepared to condemn as worthless the inference from man's interest in the existence of God. If it be true that Atheism extinguishes all hope for the world to come, annihilates the basal principles of morality and all the blessedness of religion in this life, thus leading down to the Avernus of pessimism, and if Theism be the only means of enlivening humanity with love, and joy, and hope, it is impossible that honest men should not ardently long for Theism to be true. But we may conclude that as the appetites of the body have their complements in nature, so this deepest mental appetency — this equally natural hunger of the soul — must have its counterpart in a Divine reality. When we betray a predilection for Theism because, from the very constitution of man, his noblest ends and interests are bound up with it, who has a right to condemn this predilection as irrational, or as not a just presumption in favour of Theism ?

So to encourage faith is not to assume that " whatever is desirable is true." But the need of a God, being

INTRODUCTION. 5 constitutively universally and often intensely felt, that is to say, being of our very nature, analogy favours the presumption that this natural need has somewhere its complement in a Divine Being.

Taken in this order, prior to other reasons, the fact just mentioned affords a presumptive ground for belief in God; taken after those reasons, it amounts to a strong confirmation.

It is objected that to trace this longing for God to any but physical causes violates the law of parsimony, which requires as few causes as possible. But physical causes alone do not account for it, and the law of the fewest possible allows of our seeking an immaterial and Divine cause.

Man's emotional nature and his instinctive desire for happiness, in proportion as they are enlightened and pure, declare for the existence of God. Nor need we stultify their voice.

But I hold that reason, our special faculty for distinguishing truth from falsehood, when rightly questioned, pronounces quite as emphatically as feeling and interest on the same side. Atheism appeals from the court of feeling to that of intellect. Theism accepts the challenge, confident that the issue will be a decisive verdict in its favour.

Apologists have sometimes appeared too ready to surrender the sanction and prestige of reason to infidelity, and to retreat behind the bulwarks of conscious advantage and sacred emotion. Being firmly of opinion that the approval of reason belongs to Theism, and not to anti-Theism, and that the more thoroughly the question is investigated, the more reasonable will belief in God appear, I propose to show,

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

by the Atheist's acknowledged standard, that Natural Theology and intelligence are not enemies, but inseparable allies, or rather that Theism is essentially founded in reason.

That reason is fallible, and liable to be prejudiced by sinister influences in both believers and unbelievers, goes without saying. Nevertheless, within the sphere of nature, it is the best faculty we possess for the pursuit of truth. Abandon it, and we become the victims of superstition and ignorant passion, exposing us defenceless on all sides to every wind of doctrine.

It cannot be denied that in the present age anti- Theism is especially bold and aggressive. Much of our literature is tinctured by it. Its stock objections and contemptuous sneers have found their way into both higher and lower grades of society. Prominent men in. science and politics are said to be destitute of religious faith. The same state of mind is attributed to many of the working classes, and to many, especially on the continent of Europe, who retain a formal connection with the profession of religion, Christian or Jewish. The avowed and organized forms of infidelity, with its champions on the platform and in the press, are in contact with the masses. Widespread indifference to religion is to some extent spiced with a sceptical spirit. How far the air of infidelity is merely assumed to be cast off as soon as the king of terrors approaches,. or how far the evil has rooted itself in men's convictions ;. how far the estimate of its victories is exaggerated as to individuals or communities ; and how far the wish is father of the unbelief, it is impossible to say. But that it is abroad, and spreads its blighting influence through the nations, to the injury of many minds and the hin-

INTRODUCTION.

drance of Christianity, must be patent to all who study the signs of the times. Prebendary Row spoke with insight when in his Bampton Lecture of 1877 he remarked that " in the higher regions of thought we are undoubtedly approaching a great crisis between the principles of Atheism and Pantheism on the one side and those of Theism on the other."

Opinions differ as to the best way of treating the evil. Some would ignore its presence. But that would not check, much less stop, its progress, nor would it meet the case of those who are entangled in its meshes, or in danger of becoming so. Nor can it be met by mere denunciation. Others would devote all the energies of the Christian Church to its overthrow, which would be neglect of the Church's edification. Different methods, must be employed in due proportion. And prominent amongst these must be the use of the press, exposing the fallacy of all anti-Theistic teaching, and presenting the broad firm bases on which faith in God rests. History tells of the powerful service rendered to the cause of truth by means of Christian literature against pagan and mediaeval opposition to Christianity, against. English Deism, and latterly against German Rationalism.

Apologists have need not only to continue the defence of the truth, but to face about from time to time in order to confront new aspects of unbelief as they arise. Whatever may be the exact magnitude of present-day anti-Theism, to leave it to work its way unopposed were ecreant to the cause of truth and righteousness, and an injury to practical religion. To the war which Christianity is waging against unbelief the following chapters are intended as a contribution, however small its relative value.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

The progress of the controversy has necessarily involved many complex and metaphysical questions, raised either in attack or defence. Moreover, the field is deemed remote from the enjoyment and practice of godliness. Consequently the subject may not greatly attract, or even appear of great importance to some Christian believers, whose faith was never perturbed by the assaults of infidelity. But those who are thus happily exempt, and delight in the security of the citadel of Christian faith far away from the strokes of the enemy, ought not to be unconcerned about brethren more exposed, or forget that unless the outposts are well defended, the citadel itself will not be long unassailed. Abandon apologetics, and the saving doctrines of Christian experience must soon share a similar fate.

Whatever other means may be employed for the same end, the author is one of those who hold it incumbent on the adherents of the Christian cause to defend it against the incessant attacks nowadays made on the fundamental principles of faith in God, and to set forth its paramount claim on the credence of mankind. For their own safety many may stand in no need of such help as this treatise seeks to afford ; but probably there is a considerable class to whom it might be of service did the writer's performance equal, or even approximate to his ideal. If religious verity is to make headway against all attempts to bring it into discredit, it will not be by indolently repeating the proverb, " Truth is great, and will prevail," but, at any rate in part, by earnest vindication of its claims, and exposure of the teaching which misrepresents it to the view of public opinion.

Part I. Various Kinds Of Theistic Evidence

PART I.

VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE.

NATURAL THEOLOGY is rich in the variety, as well as in the strength of its supports. As men's minds differ in their susceptibility of impression by different kinds of evidence, the supply corresponds to the demand. A system of proof which compels the entire assent of one class of thinkers hardly makes an impression on another. Some are more familiar with one groove of ratiocination than another. One implicitly accepts what is handed down to him by his trustworthy predecessors ; another scrutinizes every tier of proof, and cannot be content until he has laid bare the very foundations. One takes the unquestioning firmness of his own conviction as indigenous and constitutive, without caring to pursue any psychological analysis of its origin ; while another insists on resolving the conviction into its ultimate elements. One is charmed with the idea of deducing Theism a priori, after the style of irresistible mathematics ; while another prefers the solid a posteriori steps so familiar in daily life, by which he ascends from the known to the unknown, from the effect to the First Cause. One rests mainly on the accuracy of his own reasoning, while another seeks support in the common consent of mankind. And yet another builds up his faith on most or all of these foundations, securely confiding in their united strength.

It does not follow, however, that the several grounds of Theistic belief are of equal cogency and value. One may be available only to the few who have the taste, ability, and opportunity to soar into the loftiest regions of metaphysics; while another may be adapted to produce the deepest and most widespread conviction among the many. It is an interesting exercise, and a fitting preparation for our sequel, to glance at the nature and worth of the principal lines of argument comprehended in Theistic evidence.

I. The Intuitive. Respecting the intuitive certainty of Theism, which with many good and able men is the chief evidence, I am obliged to confess my scepticism, and to agree with Dr. E. R. Conder that if the knowledge of God were intuitive, it would leave neither need nor room for any other ground in the shape of Theistic proof. 1 Belief in God would then be necessary from the laws of thought, nay, would be itself a law of thought, and would preclude the moral character of belief now based on the voluntariness of honestly seeking, weighing, and using evidence. As there is no moral quality in believing two and two are equal to four, neither could there be in believing in the existence and attributes of God if that, like the other, were a necessity of thought. We should also have to conclude that all who avow their disbelief in God belie their immediate consciousness of His existence. Moreover, many of us who firmly believe in God on other grounds, after the closest analysis of consciousness are unable to detect

1 The Basis of Faith, p. too.

such intuitive belief. We are not content to be merely accredited with honesty in this fruitless search : we claim credit for as much accuracy in the process as we yield to our friends who arrive at an opposite conclusion. But the fact that each side has a considerable number of honest and careful adherents tells against the position that belief in God is intuitive, for if intuitive, it would be necessary, and consequently universal.

Again, intuitive truth is ultimate, and therefore admits not of further proof or evidential support from still more ultimate truth. It would not be ultimate were there any truth beyond it to which we could appeal in its support ; that is to s-*y, we can assign no reason for a necessary judgment. It is self-evident. But it sometimes happens that the advocates of intuitive Theism seek to back it up by reasons and arguments, as if they were not altogether sure of the self-evidencing force of the intuition.

Further, God is a complex, not a simple idea. Do we intuitively perceive all we know of Him ? or His existence only, and not His attributes? or some of His attributes, and not others? and if so, which of them? and why those and not others ? Should it be affirmed, in reply, that all are intuitively known, that would mean that His being, self-existence, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, eternity, righteousness, and benevolence are all necessary and universal beliefs, which would be very hard to reconcile with fact.

Professor Calderwood's mode of vindicating Theism boldly asserts that the belief in the existence of " one Infinite Being " " is a necessary part of our own nature." and " belongs essentially to the nature of

I4 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH.

man ; " that " our natural belief arises to bear testimony to the existence of the Unchangeable Originator of all finite being ; " that " we rest exclusively on the authority of faith for the simple testimony of the Divine existence." He speaks of " that fundamental conviction on which we rest for the assurance of the being and glory of the Deity." 1 Dr. Calderwood's intuitionalism, though a good argumentum ad hominem in reply to Sir W. HamiTton and Dean Mansel, is not necessary to a refutation of their agnosticism. The infinity of God, ascertained in any other way than by intuition, is sufficient for the purpose. The force of his reply is not in the alleged intuition of the Divine existence, but in our certainty of that truth, by whatever means

attained.

If we were bound, as we are not, to account for the affirmation of those who say they know God by intuition, we should not need to impugn their sincerity. There is such a state as " unconscious reasoning ; " that is, reasoning without perceiving that we are doing so. The facility and rapidity of drawing an inference may lead to the mistake that the thought inferred is not inferred at all, but is the starting point of the mental process. Thus an honest and able man may infer the existence of God so naturally, quickly, and confidently as to suppose he has made no inference. In others the impression may be vivid and habitual, dating back from the dawn of reason, and confirmed by the experience of years, so that by the "inveteracy of our experience" it becomes easy to conceive of it as if it were constitutive and ineradicable. The manifold reasons on

Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 42, 313, 315, 317.

which it is based come to be regarded as supplementary, rather than fundamental to the belief. The mistake may be encouraged by the readiness with which the enlightened and devout mind responds to the welcome idea of God, so perfect in might and goodness. The quick, firm, satisfied grasp of the idea may easily be mistaken for a first and necessary principle of the mind.

It is a very different thing to say Theistic belief is based upon intuitive truth. That is more or less true of all reasoned truth. To say Theism is inferred under the guidance of the intuitive principle of causality makes intuition the starting point and rational ground of Theism. To say Theism itself is intuitive is to make the idea of God an object of immediate vision, and, by letting go the safeguard of rational evidence, incurs the danger of a most objectionable form of mysticism.

2. The traditive argument is that which regards the knowledge of God as an inheritance vouchsafed to mankind in its early days by special revelation, and handed down by successive generations to the present day, though often beclouded by ignorance, or mutilated by erroneous doctrine. On this kind of testimony Christians of the apostolic age connected the world with its Creator. They declared, " Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

It must be admitted to be historically true that as a rule the peoples of the earth have descended into ignorance in proportion as they have been removed from the light of those heavenly communications which eventually found their embodiment in the Holy

Scriptures. It is also certain, so far as history informs us, that apart from such help men never on any large scale attained to worthy conceptions of God by the light of nature. A probability is thus created that heathen as well as Christian nations owe their ideas of God more or less to tradition.

It is difficult, however, to estimate the extent of this obligation ; and it would be rash to affirm that all Theistic ideas have been thus derived ; nor have we any warrant for saying it is impossible to reason from nature to nature's God. To whatever extent tradition may have contributed to our Theistic conceptions, it cannot be justly accepted as the sole pillar of Theism.

3. The ethnological argument is from the general consent of mankind (consensu gentium). It cannot be denied that individuals, surrounded by the highest forms of Theism, have come to renounce all faith in God's existence, though they could not by any effort obliterate the idea of God from their minds. But the assertion that whole nations or tribes have been found utterly destitute of all ideas of a Divine Being has never yet been proved, nor is it likely to be. In many the ideas are crude and abject enough, not rising above the conception of invisible finite powers lurking or roaming among the objects of nature, or a being passing into dormancy or nothingness like Gotama. Still ideas of Divinity have obtained always among all nations so far as we know. Here, if anywhere, the maxim holds, What is always everywhere and by all believed must be true.

If there be no God, the universal and perpetual idea of God is utterly unaccountable. The extent to which it holds possession of men's minds renders Atheism

VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. \J incredible. But while the fact of general consent creates a probability in favour of Theism, it also sets our thoughts on seeking the basis of the fact in reason. For unless the idea be intuitive, it must rest on evidence, which it behoves the investigator to trace in order to fortify his belief in the truth of the idea. Nothing could be more scientific than to ascertain how an idea so pervasive of human nature, so influential, and so closely identified with man's well-being, is founded in evidence. I cannot but think that evidence consists largely of tradition, and the manifestation of Divine workmanship in nature.

4. The ontological proof argues from the fact of our possessing ideas of infinity, eternity, and perfection, that there must be a reality of which they are the attributes. Those who, like Kant, reject this argument are nevertheless obliged to admit the presence of the ideas. Denying their implication of a corresponding reality, they regard the ideas as only " regulative" conceptions necessary to our explaining the universe. Kant concedes that such a Being may and must be admitted in order to explain the universe, but only as

an idea}

We are to assume the ideas in order to account for the facts of the actual world. But why assume them if they be not true as attributes of something ? How can ideas having no counterpart in reality be necessary to explain reality ? It is more reasonable to say that as we can neither rid ourselves of the ideas, nor account for the universe without them, there must be a reality to which they correspond. This argument, however,

1 Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 426-7.

though felt to have considerable force by those who can appreciate its exposition in the hands of such metaphysical writers as Dr. Samuel Clarke, does not seem well fitted to play a great part in convincing ordinary minds.

To this class belongs The Argument A Priori for the Being and the Attributes of the Lord God, the Absolute One and First Cause, by Mr. W. H. Gillespie, which claims to be an irrefragable demonstration. It is argued that infinite space and infinite duration exist because we cannot but conceive of them ; that as they exist, they must be substances, or else modes of substance ; that as they cannot be the former, they are the latter ; that there can be only one infinite substance ; that it must be Intelligent, Free, Happy, True, Faithful, Good, Just, All-loving, Ineffably Pure, Holy, and Perfect.

This chain of reasoning is of limited application, inasmuch as, after the first, each proposition is entirely dependent on its predecessor ; and to perceive and remember the soundness of every stage in the process is a task not likely to be performed by the majority of minds.

Then again, the whole weight of the argument rests on a particular theory of duration and space, namely, that they are attributes or modes of a substance. But with all who hold, as Kant and Sir' William Hamilton did, that space is nothing but " an a priori or native form of thought," or adopt any view of time and space other than that of the ontologists, the "argument" falls to pieces from want of a sure foundation.