The politics of utility: the technology of happiness-applied; being book III of "The economy of happiness,"

Front matter

Class

Book GotyrightN?

f

Introduction

As the present work is but the sequel to a larger one, an adequate comprehension of it requires a brief summary of the substance of the preceding books. There are two of these; the first entitled " The Principles of Common Sense," the second " The Technology of Happiness — Theoretical." The third book is here published separately, because of its greater popular interest, the hope being that by this procedure it may reach a wider circle of readers than would care to read the larger work.

In the introduction to that work the claim is made that the omnipresent problem of happiness is solvable by common sense and by common sense alone. Hence as a preliminary to the solution of that problem it is necessary to discover the principles of common sense, and these may only be revealed, by revealing first the nature of intelligibility, second the nature of truth, and third the nature of utility.

As the object of our undertaking is to establish rules for the guidance of society it is at the outset essential that we shall know what society is, or ought to be, trying to do. Until we know definitely the goal of human effort any attempt to say how that goal is to be reached must be forever futile. Now there is but one thing for society to do in order to attain its goal and that is to do right. Hence the first task of common sense is to elucidate the meaning of the word right. He who attempts to do this, however, will shortly discover that certain preliminary investigations are necessary, and the first of these is an examination into the meaning of the word meaning itself. This constitutes the problem of the nature of intelligibility, and with it the first chapter of Book I is concerned.

But the elucidation of the nature of intelligibility is not the only preliminary required. When a man or a community of men does anything — performs any voluntary act — it is obvious that the object or end for the accomplishment of which the act is performed must be a future object or end, since the past is beyond the possibility of alteration by any act whatever. An viii [NTRODDCTION

which has any deliberate must bo ono which con-

templates a futu \ and without knowledge of how efl

illy relat without Borne meth<

the future — it is in • to adapt the means of a man

community of men to their ends. As men are not omnia they can oever be certain of t! ijieir act-, and are

ending upon probabilities or presumptions. E< econd preliminary investigation must

e into the meaning of the word presumption. This consti- - ili«' problem of the nature of truth, and the second chapter cerned with Buch an investigation. It is in that ter maintained that only one successful method of establishing presumptions — of forecasting the future — has ever

rered, namely the inductive^ or scientific method, and that its principles are identical with those of common -

Having established the theory of probabilities in the second chapter, the nexi Btep is to apply it to human conduct and in the third chapter, resulting in the theory of utility. It would only be confusing in the shorl space of this introduction to attempt a condensation of the principle* intelligibility, of truth, and of utility. lie who is inter in their exposition may find it in the work already referred to. sufficient here to give the meaning of the word right and of its correlative wrong to which the investigation of I principles leads us; to wit: .1 right act is that act an at any ' - Ible whos* s of hap\

maximum. A wrong act is any alternative of a right act rence to the definition of utility in the appended will show that a right acl is simply the most useful act.

The assertion I iety ought t<> d<> right, and the defini-

tion <>r ; ; right in the terms specified, is equivalent t<>

rtion that the object or goal of Bociety ought to be the mum production of happim It is a matter <A' supreme importance t<> « : whether

ion thus laid down can he successfully denied, and iscuss ! in Chapter <*». r><><>k 11. [t is there such a denial lead- inevitably to a dilemma, which I ha [the Dili mma of Intuitu \i horn of

>nd a verbal emasculation. • 3 mon, if not universal, is the error which

in this dilemma thai a brief consideration of its

Ml lint 1, ( . out of place hero.

T nd mutually in< at methods are at

eni in use by the human race for distinguishing between truth

INTRODUCTION ix

and untruth, and right and wrong. The first is the method of common sense; the second the method of intuitionism. Common sense assumes certain universal postulates (five in number) as extrinsic criteria, by means of them discovers what is true and what is right, and fixes its definitions accordingly. Intuitionism assumes that men can discover what is true by discovering what they believe, and what is right by discovering what they approve. The first makes truth and righteousness the guides to belief and approval. The second makes belief and approval the guides to truth and righteousness. Intuitionism, indeed, is common sense reversed, or inverted, all existing modes of judgment opposed to common sense constituting but one kind of intuitionism or another, the apparent variations being, in reality, merely verbal. The assertion that rivers flow down hill is the assertion of a truth. We add nothing to the truth of this assertion by believing it, and we subtract nothing from its truth by disbelieving it. Similarly, to practise charity and good will toward all sentient beings is to practise righteousness, and we add nothing to the righteousness of such practices by approving them, and subtract nothing from their righteousness by disapproving them.

It is shown in Book II, Chapter 6, that our convictions, whether of what is true or what is right, are often, if not generally, determined, not by common sense, but by various more or less accidental influences to which our minds happen to have been subjected while plastic, and that consequently mere conviction, however strong, is not a safe guide either to what is true or to what is right, and hence that conscience instead of being our guide to righteousness, itself requires righteousness as a guide. The hanging of witches and the burning of heretics by the theological intuitionists of former times were conscientious acts, but not for that reason right acts. Yet if it be admitted, as it generally will be, that many conscientious acts are wrong, then it is clear that the test of right must be independent of conscience. Consequently moral codes, constituting as they do the guides to conscience, cannot themselves be tested by conscience, since that would only be an indirect method of guiding conscience by itself, tvhich is equivalent to not guiding it at all.

Nor can the difficulty inherent in intuitionism be escaped by falling back upon some supernatural authority as a guide. A Mohammedan accepts the authority of the Mohammedan code of morals because he approves of accepting it. He rejects the authority of the Christian code because he approves of rejecting it, and the Christian reverses this procedure because he approves x INTRODUCTION

of reversing it In other words men will only accept the authority of God when they approve of accepting it. Hence their own approval is the real criterion, and instead of avoiding the principle of intuitionism by an appeal to supernatural authority they merely change its phraseology. Neither is any other mode of dired i! ience by conscience of any sen ice, Conscientious-

ie nol righteousness. The conduct of the man who acts upon his impulses of approval or disapproval as they ari neither knowing nor caring whether it conforms to any moral standard is jusl as likely to be righteous as that of the moralist who erects a code of morals upon intuitionism. The only difference between the two is that the moralist classifies his approbations and disapprobations, and the other man does not.

[gnoring all arbitrary attitudes, it may be said that he who ms our definition of right can be discredited by intuitionism must take one of two positions. IIo must maintain either: (1) That any definition which is disapproved by anyone is discredited, Or (2) That any definition which he himself disapproves is discredited, [f he lakes the first position he maintains that the word right can have no meaning, since no definition proposable would be approved by all persons. If he taki second p

tien he maintains that the meaning of the word was unknowable in the period before he was horn, since the test of his approval was not at that period available. r>oth these positions are absurd. Hence we must conclude that a definition of right cannot ho redited by anyone's disapproval of it. This, however, necessitates the conclusion that it cannot be sustained by anyone's approval of it. Therefore, a definition which would escape the charge of absurdity must be independent of the approval or disapproval <>f any man or community of men. The definition to which we are led by an analysis of common sense fulfils this requirement, since, with intuitionism eliminated, the elementary sensations designated by the terms pleasure and pain are the only one- which have the slightest interesl to sentienl beings — they are the only ones which retain their importance independent of all variation in men's approval and disapproval — ami to the formulation of a criterion of conduct which recognizes this

unique independence the first hook of "The Economy of HappiyotecL Saving in Book T established our criterion of right ^o firmly

that its denial leaves only a choice between absurdities our m task Lb to employ it as a practical guide to conduct. Having dis-

what the goal of BOCiety OUghl to he we miM ne\t dis-

COVer how to attain it, and this constitutes the problem of the

INTRODUCTION xi

technology of happiness; for if society would successfully adapt the means of happiness afforded by terrestrial conditions to its end it must follow the methods of technology or applied common sense. To learn how the problem of happiness should be formulated then, let us consider an analogous problem in steam engineering technology.

Should a steam engineer have presented to him the problem of producing as great a quantity of steam as possible from a given domain affording coal and water he would discover that three factors of steam generation require consideration. First, the steam producing mechanism or boiler within which steam is to be generated. Second, the adjustment or adaptation of said boiler to the conditions of steam generation imposed by chemical and thermal laws, and by the resources in fuel and water available. Third, the number of boilers required to consume the available coal output with maximum efficiency of adaptation per boiler. The happiness engineer has presented to him a similar problem. He is required to produce the maximum quantity of happiness which it is possible to produce from the potentialities of happiness inherent in terrestrial conditions, and similarly must consider three factors. First, the happiness producing mechanism, or sentient organism in whose sensorium happiness is to be generated. Second, the adjustment or adaptation of said organism to the conditions of happiness generation imposed by the laws of nature and human nature, and by the natural resources available. Third, the number of organisms required to consume the available resources with maximum efficiency of adaptation per capita.

In Book II each of these factors of happiness is discussed separately. In the second chapter (Chapter 6 of " The Economy of Happiness") are discussed what qualities or characteristics of men will meet the conditions required for a high efficiency of conversion (See Glossary), and the means afforded by nature for acquiring them. These means may be divided into (1) Those afforded by inheritance, and (2) Those afforded by education, and to a discussion of the fundamentals of these two topics the chapter on the first factor of happiness is mainly devoted. The subject of intuitionism vs. common sense is treated in this chapter rather than in Book I because it is the most important of educational questions.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the consideration of the adjustment required between men and their environment in order that maximum efficiency of adaptation per capita may be attained, and thus more than any other part of the work treats of economic questions. In order to shift the standpoint of criticism from xii INTRODUCTION

that of commercialisii) to thai of utilitarianism a new nomenclature is required and supplied, and the theoretically economic relations between the two main classes of useful acts (consumption and production) are developed.

In Chapter 8 are considered the conditions imposed by the laws of nature and of human nature which determine the population required to maintain the maximum efficiency of adaptation with given oatural resources, and a given average efficiency of conversion; and the chapter closes by formulating from the principles developed in the discussion of the three factors, eight proximate criteria — called the clement* of happiness — by means of which the adaptation of any social system or mechanism to the end of utility may be tested. Thus a just social system should fulfil the following eight requirements:

(1) It should promote the development of a high quality of sentient agent, the characteristics required being intelligence. altruism and will.

(2) It should promote the adjustability and health of agent.

(3) It should husband natural resources while the efficiency of consumption is low.

(1) It should promote the employment of machinery in production as a substitute for men.

(5) It should stimulate the skill and interest applied to the employment of said machinery.

(<*)) It should promote the equality of distribution of wealth and leisure.

(*! ) It should tend lo maintain the indicative ratio at the point of maximum efficiency y^v capita.

(8) It should lend to maintain the population at the point of beneficent equilibrium.

It is the criteria thus enumerated that arc systematically applied in the essay to follow as tests of the social Bystem.

Book II closes with a discussion of the nature of liberty and its relation io utility. In this discussion an additional criterion leveloped — the adaptive principle — which as an auxiliary t«» ti I forth above is useful as a test of social systems.

isting or proposed.

Any social system capable of meeting the tests imposed by the eighl elements of happiness will of necessity possess two characteristics: First, its means will he those determined by the method of Bcience or common sense. Second, its end will be that ^\' utility. I desire to comment briefly upon each of these characteristics; and to contrast them with their antitheses.

INTRODUCTION xiii

First as to the means. The method of science is to be distinguished from that of intuitionism by its acknowledgment of fallibility. The moral dicta of intuitionism profess to be immutable — incapable of improvement. They are characterized by a finality only to be expected in omniscience. The dicta of science, on the other hand, are provisional, capable of development or growth. They do not profess to carry with them an authority greater than that which attaches to the mature judgment of fallible beings. The moral codes of intuitionism claim to be products of revelation, or inspiration, embodying the final word that can be spoken on the subject. To change them is to destroy them. The moral code of science claims to be the product of human experience, capable of expanding as experience expands, and growing with the growth of science. To change it in conformity with the new truths which research may reveal is to improve it. The advancement, of knowledge* leaves the precepts of intuitionism unaffected, because they are the products of ignorance. It continually improves the adaptation of the precepts of science to their end, because they are the products of knowledge. Intuitionism furnishes the mediceval criteria of truth and of righteousness. Science or common sense furnishes the modem criteria. The first embodies the method of the past. The second the method of the future.

Second as to the end. The politics of utility, which is but the application of the utilitarian or common sense standard of morals to political conduct, seeks, of course, the end of utility, but owing to a widespread misunderstanding of the term utilitarianism this end is commonly misapprehended, and is supposed to be a purely material or worldly one. Such a supposition exactly reverses the truth. Those subject to the misapprehension have in mind, not utilitarianism, but commercialism, whose ends are purely material and — considered as ultimate ends — completely valueless. The only interests of sentient beings recognized by the theory of utility are those involved in the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The so-called material interests of mankind with which commercialism is alone concerned are worth attention only as they may bear a causal relation to pleasure and pain. Commercialism would sacrifice everything — including happiness — to the attainment of wealth. Utilitarianism would sacrifice everything — including wealth — to the attainment of happiness. Thus are the politics of commerce which characterize our day to be fundamentally distinguished from the politics of utility which will characterize that of our posterity.

GLOSSARY

The terms comprised in the following list include those occurring in this essay in an unfamiliar or special meaning. Many of them cannot be adequately explained without extensive exposition, and for their complete understanding it will be necessary to consult the larger work; but the brief explanations here given will probably suffice for the comprehension of the present essay. The associated numbers refer to the pages in " The Economy of Happiness " where the subject referred to is treated.

Accelerative operation or policy. One which produces such changes in the system operated upon as to modify the effects of its continued operation. It is beneficent, if yielding a progressively better result: maleficent, if yielding a progressively worse result. 180.

Adaptive principle. The principle employed in controlling the conduct of men by appeal to their self-interest. It is positive, when the control is through a promise of pleasure: negative, when the control is through a promise of pain. The principle underlying the efficacy of law. 341.

Adjustability. That quality of a sentient being which determines the amount of happiness that he may experience under given external conditions. Specifically, the capacity of a sentient being to adapt his tastes and needs to the available means of satisfying them. 197.

Avocality. Absence of meaning. 31.

Belief -judgment. See Peithosyllogism.

Beneficent equilibrium. The state of a population whose numbers are so related to its means of happiness that a condition of maximum efficiency of adaptation per capita is maintained among them. 322.

Certainty. (1) An expectation the contradictory of which is unexpectable, or incapable of being admitted as true. (2) The contradiction of a contradiction. 44.

Chresyllogism. Use-judgment. The mental operation by which the utility of acts or alternatives is tested. The expression of such an operation. , 131-140.

xvi GLOSSARY

Common sense. The modes of judgment having their origin in universal experience, independent of localization in -pare or time: those employed by science: and by normal human beh in their common affairs. 7—184.

Consuming ratio. The proportional part of any life interval -pent in consumption. 21 1.

Consumption. One of the two primary classes of useful acts, prodm Hon being the other. Acts whose immediate or direct etl'eet is designed to be: (1) An increase of happiness — r ■- consumption. (2) A decrease of onhappiness — negative eonsumption. Acts whose immediate end is ultimate. 268.

Consumptive capacity or power. The amount of happiness achievable by an individual or assemblage thereof by the consumption of a given amount of wealth in a given time. 399.

Desideratum. Any means other than an act which may be employed to achieve a Burplus of pleasure or avoid a surplus of pain. 269.

Efficiency of adaptation. The ratio of the amount of happiness yielded by the reaction of a given environment upon an individual or community, of given efficiency of conversion,

to the amount which might he yielded. The measure of the

tve of success in adjusting the environment of a community to its need- and tastes. It is a function of the efficiency and capacity of production and of consumption, and also of the indicative ratio. The theoretical relation between these five magnitudes required to attain the maximum value o( this rati" developed in Chapter 7. 191, 31 l.

Efficiency of consumption. The ratio of the amount of happiness produced by the consumption of a given amount of wealth to the amount of production required to create it. 299.

Efficiency of conversion. The ability or capacity p by a Bentient being or assemblage of beings for converting the potentiality of happiness provided by a given environment into actual happiness. 191, 196-199.

Efficiency of production* The ratio of a given amount of production to its labor cost. 279.

Egotism. The theory or practice of so directing the conduct of an individual afl to Berve his own interests alone. L42.

Error. Deviation from common sense, or the result of Buch deviation. It< primary division is into (1) Abnormal deviation, or insanity, and (2) Normal deviation, the three classes <^f which an- logomania, proteromania, and pathomania. 160-184.

GLOSSARY xrii

Fatalism. (1) The theory which maintains that a condition of inactivity may not be classed among voluntary acts. (2) The theory which identifies inactivity with usefulness. 155-157.

Happiness, Amount, Quantity, or Surplus of. Amount of pleasure or pain: being positive when referring to a surplus of pleasure, negative when referring to a surplus of pain. 117. See Pleasure.

Harmfulness. The quality common to acts whose degree of utility is negative when alternatives having a positive degree of utility are selectable. 145.

Heclon. A unit of intensity of pleasure. 117.

Hedon-minute or hour. A unit of quantity of pleasure. 117.

Humanitarianism. The theory or practice of so directing the conduct of an individual as to serve the interests of his own race — the human race — alone. 142.

Indicative ratio. The ratio of the consuming to the producing ratio. If fixed by the principles of utility, it is the measure of an individual's or a community's opportunity for positive consumption. 315.

Intuitionism. (See Introduction.) The theory that belief is the test of truth, disbelief the test of untruth; and that approval is the test of right and disapproval the test of wrong. The assumption underlying all modes of judgment opposed to common sense. 104, 162, 243-265.

Labor cost. The quantity of pain represented by a given amount of production. 278.

Liberty, (1) Legal. A magnitude inversely proportional to the number of alternatives prohibited by law. The reciprocal of legal restraint. 341. (2) Nominal. A magnitude proportional to the number of useful alternatives selectable per unit of time. (3) Real. A magnitude proportional to opportunity for happiness per unit of time. 335.

Logomania. Word-madness. The type of normal deviation from common sense arising from the substitution of the symbols of impressions or ideas required in the exercise of judgment for impressions or ideas themselves. 160.

Machine. Any means of production, exclusive of the materials thereof, the human body and faculties, the earth, and the forces of nature. 284.

Mean surplus. The product of the probability of a contingency into its probable surplus. The probable quantity of happiness — positive or negative — attributable to a given contingency from the selection of an alternative including that contingency. 133.

-vrfli GLOSSARY

Non-sentient factor of production* A non-sentient productive agency. Specifically, a machine which engages in production, 288.

CEciotism* The theory or practice of so directing the conduct of an individual as to Berve the interests of his own family

alone. L42.

Oyerconsumption, Zone of. The diagrammatiG representation of a condition of Bociety in which the margin of self-support La negative because of too great a producing ratio. 308.

Pain. An indefinable, but exemplifiable, Bimple perception common to experiences designated painful 105. Intensity of. An indefinable, but exemplifiable, mode of variation of pain. 107, 112. Amount or Quantity of. The product of an intensity of pain into a duration. .1 1 1.

Pathoniania. Sensibility-madness. The type n\' norma] deviation from common sense arising from the substitution of emotion, or feeling, for reasonableness as a test of probability or utility. 1G3.

Pathon. A unit of intensity of pain. 111.

Pathon-minute or hour. A unit of quantity of pain. 11 1.

Patriotism. The theory or practice of so directing the conduct of an individual as to serve the interests of his own country alone. 142.

Peithosyllogism. i Belief-judgment The mental operation by which the probability of expectations or beliefs is tested. The expression of such an operation. 79.

Phyliotism. The theory or practice of so directing the conduct of an individual as to serve the interests of his own tribe, party, or elan alone. l 12.

Pleasure. An indefinable, bul exemplifiable, simple percept ion common to experiences designated pleasurable. 105. Intensity <>f. An indefinable, but exemplifiable, mode of variation of pleasure. 107. Amount or Quantity of. The product of an intensify of pleasure into a duration. 1 14.

Practomania. Production-madness. The type of deviation from common sense which consists in mistaking the object of production; deeming it the end of, instead of the means to, consumption. Systematized into a science it constitutes the orthodox theory of political economy, the application of which

i This term It not a fortunate one. i raggest as ■ substitute the term ettetjfffaytow

(Gr. ti*4r as probability : ovXXoytouAc = Judgment)! or probability-judgment, such a terminology i» more consistent with the term chrcsyiiogism % designating a use of DtUlty-Jndgment; since probability ooonples ■ position in logical theory analogous to

that of utility Ifl ethical theory.

GLOSSARY xix

to political conduct results in the prevailing commercialism. It is a local and derivative variety of mania having its origin in logomania and proteromania. 176.

Presumption of happiness. The presumable amount of happiness which will result from selecting an alternative. The algebraic sum of the mean surpluses of the several contingencies of an alternative. 135.

Probability, (1) The measure of the frequency of fulfilment of an expectation, as determined by a belief-judgment. The numerical value of such a judgment. 63. (2) The common quality of expectations having a probability (1) greater than one-half. Truth. 79.

Probable surplus. The quantity of happiness — positive or negative — which will probably result from the occurrence of a given contingency. 133.

Producing 1 ratio. The proportional part of any life interval spent in production. 271.

Production. One of the two primary classes of useful acts, consumption being the other. Acts whose mediate or indirect effect is designed to be: (1) An increase of happiness — positive production. (2) A decrease of unhappiness — negative production. Acts whose immediate end is proximate. 268. Individualistic. Such as is confined to one individual. Involving no division of labor or essential co-operation between individuals. 285. Socialistic. Such as is shared in by several individuals. Involving division of labor and essential co-operation between individuals. 286. Amount of. The labor cost of altering a system from a specified initial to a specified final condition under given conditions of efficiency of conversion and of the productive arts. 279.

Production-madness. See Practomania.

Productive capacity or power. The amount of production achievable by an individual or assemblage thereof in a given time. 279.

Proteromania. Priority-madness. The type of normal deviation from common sense arising from the substitution of priority of lodgment in the mind for reasonableness as a test of probability or utility. 162.

Right. Having the quality of Tightness. 143.

Rightness. (See Introduction.) Eighteousness. The quality common to acts or alternatives of maximum utility. 143.

Self-sufficiency. The condition obtaining when a productive and consumptive agency — e.g., an individual or family — * produces the equivalent of what it consumes. 310,

XX

GLOSSARY

Self-rapport. (1) The conditioo obtaining when the surplus of pleasure achieved, or Burplus of pain avoided, by tl • sumption of given erata {i.e., their consumptr is

equivalenl t«», or greater than, the surplus of pain represented in

eir production. (2) The condition common to any assem- • of aii- whose surplus of happiness is neutral or posil Margin of- ( 1 | The Burplus of happiness resulting from the production and consumption of given desiderata. (2) The Burplus of happiness resulting from any assemblag It

is positive if the Burplus is one of pleasure, negative if it is one of pain. 273. Zone of. The diagrammatic representation of a condition of society in which production is bo related to consumption as to result in a positive margin of self-support

Sentient factor <>f production. A sentient productive . Specifically, a human being who engages in production.

Truth. (1) Idio common quality of expectations having a probability greater than one-half. (2) A proposition expressive of an expectation having a high degree of probability. 64, 69.

Utilitarianism. (See Introduction.) The theory or practice of BO directing the conduct of an individual as to serve the interests of nil sentient beings, irrespective of the relations, peiv Bonal, political, social, racial, or otherwise, borne by said beings to himself. The theory which makes the greatest totality of happiness the aim of human effort. 1 12.

Utility. (1 ) The measure of the amount of happiness which will resull from the selection of an alternative, as determined by a use-judgment. The numerical value of the presumption of happiness of an alternative a- bo determined. 1 1<>. ( 2 I Useful] The common quality of acts or alternatives whose utility (1 » is