The economy of happiness

Preface

The philosophy of common sense had its origin in ancient Greece, its most conspicuous expositor during antiquity being Aristotle. In modern times its development has been due almost entirely to the English philosophers of the 17th and 18th cen¬ turies, of whom Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Bentham are the chief representatives, the so-called “ common sense ” metaphysic of Reid and Hamilton embodying a doctrine less worthy of such a designation than that of their profounder prede¬ cessors, Berkeley and Hume. The present work aims to be a contribution to the English school of philosophy.

The industrial renaissance which began with the 19th century initiated a critical period in the political philosophy of the western world. Two divergent avenues of development had been proposed in the latter part of the 18th century — one by Adam Smith in “The Wealth of Nations,” which appeared in 1776 — the other by Jeremy Bentham in “The Principles of Morals and Legislation,” which appeared in 1789. The first led to commercialism — the second to utilitarianism. At this critical period arose the dominant political thinker of the 19th century- John Stuart Mill. It was for him to determine the trend of political thought of the century. He determined it Failing to appreciate Bentham’s discovery of the nature of intuitionism, Mill evolved an

tirely incapable of application. Thus deflected from the path of common sense, and influenced, no doubt, by the ideals of his ao-e Mill followed Adam Smith into commercialism and per petuated the separation of politics and morality.

In this manner it has -come about that the prevailing sc 100 of political philosophy has but one God — I reduction, and ,

L its prophet. He who seeks the overthrow of our present political paganism therefore must deal with the arch-offender himself and hence in the following work Mill appears as the spokesman of his school. It is easy to destroy the dogmas of commercialism, but not easy to. construct a practical substitu e

V1U

PREFACE therefor; yet nothing less is required of him who would guide the practices of society by the theory of utility. In submitting to criticism the system herein expounded, therefore, I deem myself entitled to a judgment which will weigh the difficulties of the attempt in the same scale with its defects.

Cambridge, Mass., March 10, 1906.

James MacKaye.

Table Of Contents

PAGE

Problem of Happiness. Solvable by common sense. Scope of com¬ mon sense. Suggested order of reading book . 1

Chapter I

Utility of undertaking. Right and wrong — unintelligibility of. Meaning of meaning. 'Requirements of intelligibility. Origin of lano-ua^e. Meaning — how ascertained. Terms — concrete and ab¬ stract. ” Table of elementary experiences. Definable and indefinable terms. Co-ordinates of experience. Nature of definition. Real and verbai definition. First requirement of intelligibility. Second requirement of intelligibility. Sufficient intelligibility. Third requirement of intelligibility. Summary .

Chapter II

Nature of relation. Expectation. Extension of its meaning. Conjunctions — only expectables. Expression of expectation. Kinds of propositions. Valid and invalid expectations. The scientific method! Sources of knowledge. Nature of inference Deduction.

The principle of contradiction. Nature of certainty Inference by conversion. Inference by opposition Inference by syl lo^ism _ Rules of the syllogism. Induction. Observation Assumption of existence. Similarity of relation. Principle of the uniformity of nature The law of causation. Canons of induction. Degree of expectation. Probability. Expression of probability. Direct prob¬ ability. Inverse probability. Assumption of a fair sample.. Form¬ ula of Laplace. Extension of Laplace s. formula Empirical an derivative laws. The inductive syllogism. Probable deduction. Combination of evidence. The peithosyllogism or belief-.) udgment Sure 0 a “Ion for a belief, ' etc. Difficulties in application .of the theory of probabilities. First cause. Nature of hypothesis. Verification. Utility of understanding logic. Nature of reality or existence Misunderstanding thereof due to . unintelligibility of terms Similar misunderstanding of nature of right and wrong . . 33

ix

X

Chapter III Page

Voluntary acts — classification of. Diversity of meaning of right and wrong. Intuitional and utilitarian meanings. Nature of pleas¬ ure and pain. Modes of variation of pleasure and pain. Determi¬ nants of preference. Pain as a determinant. Unit of intensity of pain. Quantity of pain. Pleasure as a determinant. Unit of in¬ tensity of pleasure. Quantity of pleasure. Relation of pleasure and pain as determinants. Correct and incorrect preference. Prin¬ ciple of preference. Curve of happiness. Composition of happiness curves. Absolute right and wrong. The chresyllogism or use-judg¬ ment. Nature of a reason for an act, etc. Definition of right and wrong. Utility of understanding the theory of utility. Nature of utility. Distribution of happiness. Dilemma of distribution. Re¬ lation of means to ends. Confusion of means and ends. Free will. Fatalism. Nature of common sense . 101

CHAPTER IY

Nature of error. Abnormal and normal error. Logomania. Ver¬ bal emasculation. Proteromania. Pathomania. Variation of moral standards — inconsistency of. Disguises for custom. Stand¬ ard of inalienable rights of individuals — disguise for custom. In¬ consistency with common sense. Standard of natural law. Incon¬ sistency with common sense. Disguise for custom. Economic standard. Inconsistency with common sense. Practomania or pro¬ duction-madness. Disguise for custom. Standard of conservatism. Nature of caution. Inconsistency of standard with common sense. Accelerative policies. No substitute for common sense. End or object of utility . 160

Chapter V The Factors Of Happiness

Application of common sense. End of utility to be sought by employment of means available. Justice. Analogy of politics with steam engineering technology. Three factors of economy in steam generation. Three factors of economy in happiness generation.

End of utility attained by successive approximations. Technology of happiness expressible only in general rules . . , . , . 187 xi

Chapter VI The First Factor Of Happiness

PAGE

Man as a happiness producing mechanism. In primary and sec¬ ondary capacity. Health. Adjustability. Intelligence. Will. Al¬ truism. Determinants of foregoing characteristics. Inheritance. Racial improvement by selection — -effectiveness of. Transmissibility of mental and moral characteristics. Racial improvement by education. Acquired characters. Question of their inheritability. Injuries and functional variations. Effects of germinal ex¬ perience. Acquired characters not inheritable. Confusion of effects of education with those of inheritance. Racial deterioration — not through education, but through selection. Deteriorating effect of civilization. Education. Means of individual improvement. Ob¬ jects of. Academic education. Dogmatic influences affecting it. Technical education. Freedom from dogmatism. Education of will. Education in altruism. Function of the church. Theological foundation of morality. Dogmatism — theological and political. Comparison of common sense and other judgments. Origin of dog¬ matism. Universal distinction between common1 sense and dogma¬ tism. Origin of conscience. Function of conscience. Dilemma of Intuitionism. Influence of intuitionism on morals. Cause of sur¬ vival of medievalism. Educational importance of comprehension of significance of dilemma of intuitionism. Danger of dogmatism. Antidote therefor. Advantages of dogmatism — not to be overesti¬ mated . 1^6

Chapter VII The Second Factor Of Happiness

Possibility of the adjustment of external conditions. Nomencla¬ ture of subject. Productive and consumptive acts. Their varieties. Desiderata. Their varieties. Producing and consuming ratio. Law of self-support. Modes of increasing the margin of self-support. Production. Unpleasantness of average labor. Labor cost. Meas¬ urement of production. Efficiency of production. Law of fatigue of production. Law of diminishing returns of labor. Law of in¬ creasing returns of labor. Machinery. Origin of. Definition of a machine. Preparatory and final development. Individualistic and socialistic production. Efficiency of socialistic production. Ef¬ fect on skill and interest of laborers. Labor-saving machinery. Sentient and non-sentient factors of production. Possible modes of utilizing machinery. Consumption. Effect of production-madness. Law of fatigue of consumption. Fallacies connected therewith. Capacity of man for pain greater than for pleasure. Effects of retrospection and anticipation. Efficiency of consumption. Average individual. Self-supporting life. Law of diminishing returns of happiness. Ideal and actual in technology. Curve A — utility of. Curve B. Distribution of production and consumption. Nature of self-sufficiency. Curve C. Mode of calculating daily or yearly

Xll

PAGE

happiness output of an average individual. The indicative ratio. Bearing of law of diminishing returns of happiness on question of its distribution . ^66

Chapter VIII The Third Factor Of Happiness

Defective economy of consumption of industrial states. Remedy therefor. Essential increase in efficiency of production. Effect of increase and decrease of population on labor cost. Effect on hap¬ piness output of a community. Beneficent equilibrium. Determi¬ nation of just number of population. Effect of change in efficiencies of production and consumption on point of beneficent equilibrium. Efficiency of conversion. Luxurious tastes — low economy of. Sim¬ ple tastes — high economy of. Variety of taste. Effect of increase in efficiency of conversion on population. Analysis of the factors of happiness. Primary and secondary adjustments. The elements of happiness. Tests of the social system . 318

Chapter IX

Confusion of terms. Nominal liberty. Opportunity. Real lib* erty. The co-essentials of liberty. Objections. Universal human motives. Law — ■ mode of operation of. The adaptive principle. Legal liberty. Paternalism. Relation of legal to real liberty. Theory of laissez faire — fallacy of. Rule of utility. Relation of liberty to production and consumption. No necessary relation be¬ tween utility and inaction. Custom. Property — useful and not useful. Common sense in law. Legal and moral right. Function1 of government. Nature of society . 333

Chapter X The Social Mechanism

Object of utility attainable only through appropriate social mech¬ anism. Anarchy. Oligarchy. Democracy. Difficulties of democ¬ racy. Direct and indirect democracy. Rights of posterity. Char¬ acteristics of modern nations. Four forms of democratic mechan¬ ism . . . . . . 355 xin

Chapter XI Page

Nature of competition. Individualism and anti-individualism.

The capitalistic system — characteristics of. Four classes of op¬ posed interests under the capitalistic system. The labor problem. Proposed remedies. Effect of competition on the first element of happiness. Natural selection in nature. In society. Confusion of the goal of man with that of nature. Law of the survival of the incompetent. Competition and education. Effect of competi¬ tion on the second element of happiness. Resignation not desirable. Dissatisfaction of laborers. Dissatisfaction of capitalists. Com¬ petition and health. The third element of happiness. Effect of competition on the fourth element of happiness. Stimulus to devel¬ opment of machinery. To development of inferior products and impositions. The morals of trade. Effect of competition on the fifth element of happiness. Difference between effect upon directive and executive laborers. Labor organizations. Limitation of out¬ put. Labor disturbances. Effect of competition on the sixth element of happiness. Distribution of wealth in the United States. Un¬ equal distribution a universal symptom of competition. Cause of. Effect of competition on the seventh element of happiness. Nominal and real wages. Tendency of wages to a minimum and labor time to a maximum. Loss of leisure. Objections — not valid. Army of unemployed. Tendency of indicative ratio' to a minimum. Crises. Need of foreign markets. Effect of competition on the eighth ele¬ ment of happiness. The Law of Malthus. Offset to the Law of Malthus. Laws of migration. Popular fallacy concerning popula¬ tion. Happiness of average man. New York as an example. Methods of testing its happiness output. Negative output generally conceded. Conclusion therefrom. Attractions of city. Ideal of a large population. Natural equilibrium. Proposed, method of avert¬ ing0 Effects of unrestricted competition. Operation of law of in¬ creasing returns alone cannot avert natural equilibrium. India as an example. Possibilities of increase of population in the United States Increase of population in the United States and the prin¬ cipal countries of Europe 1800-1900. Population and natural re¬ sources. Consistent practomania vs. consistent common sense. Comparison of competition with a just social system. Complete failure of competition to meet the tests furnished by the elements of happiness .

Chapter XII Private And Public Monopoly

Evolution of competition into monopoly. Pools.. Trusts. Hold¬ ing companies. Artificial competition. Pseudo-socialism — difficul¬ ties of Socialism. Nature and object of. Socialism and. corrup¬ tion Socialism and political power. Socialism and efficiency of production. Efficiency of government management. Public utili-

XIV

PACK

ties. Popular misunderstanding of socialism. Confusion with an¬ archism. Confusion with communism. Confusion of socialism in production with socialism in consumption. Misunderstanding of morals of socialism. Insufficiency of remedies for competition . . 409

Chapter XIII

First essential of an economic social system. Profit — functions of. Substitute for profit. Constructibility of happiness engine — guarantee of. Divisions of pantocracy. Public ownership. Regu¬ lation of output. Regulation of distribution. Labor exchange. Adaptation of supply of and demand for labor. Means of. Bureau of inspection. Organization of commodity producing industries. Disposition of funds. Disposition of personnel. Function of wage earners and wage system. Conditional compensation. Function of directors. Sample industry. Six possible conditions of an in¬ dustry. Supplied and overstimulated industries. Change in pro¬ ducing time. Industrial coefficient. Calculation of standard num¬ ber of commodities and standard time. Calculation of required increase in personnel. Calculation of prices. Rise in prices — causes of. Simultaneous benefit to producer and consumer in operation of overstimulated industries. Magnitude of effects. Supplied and unstimulated industries. Supplied and understimu¬ lated industries. Calculation of prices in. Fall of wages in. Automatic adjustment of. Fluctuating industries. Unsupplied and overstimulated industries. Existence of, implies abolition of poverty. Automatic adjustment of. Improvement of conditions in backward industries. Unsupplied and unstimulated and under¬ stimulated industries. Division of working time. Means of in¬ suring invariable adjustment of supply to demand. Provision for expansion of industry. Mode of selecting directors of industry. Mode of determining industrial coefficient" Application to insur¬ ance. Foundation of improvement in the arts. Stupidity of present system. Department of industrial improvement. Organi¬ zation of research. Medical and psychical research. Organization of invention. Board of improvement. Functions of. Universal insurance. National education — importance of. Amount of educa¬ tion determined by efficiency of production. Stimulus to study. Academic education. Instruction in common sense. Objections to. Technical education. Reaction upon the advance of science. Ef¬ fect of pantocracy on the first element of happiness. Suspension of the law of the survival of the incompetent. Influence on educa¬ tion. Effect of pantocracy on the second element of happiness. Hopefulness in labor. Discouragement to pursuit of wealth. In¬ fluence on health. The third element of happiness. Effect of pantocracy on the fourth element of happiness. Stimulus to improvement in the arts. Comparison with competition. Ade¬ quacy of conditional compensation. Superiority of pantocracy. Effect of pantocracy on the fifth element of happiness. Identity of t PAGE

interests of those engaged in industry. Disappearance of the labor problem. Stimulus to zeal in work. Comparison1 with capitalism. Effect of pantocraey on the sixth element of happiness. Large fortunes impossible under pantocraey. Perfect equality in distri¬ bution of wealth not sought. Effect of pantocraey on the seventh element of happiness. Emancipation of society from toil. Growth of the humanities and the refinements of life universal. Compari¬ son with effect of competition. Effect of pantocraey on the eighth element of happiness. Suspension of the Law of Malthus. Cure of poverty. Husbandry and economic development of natural re¬ sources. Contrast of pantocraey and competition. Possible modes of escaping pain produced by society. Necessity of changing the social system. Delusions of practomania. Commercialism vs. utilitarianism . 429

CHAPTER XIY

Danger of conservatism. Contrast with common sense. Pro¬ visional test of pantocraey. Conditions requisite for its success in the United States. Immigration problem. Delusion respecting effects of blending races. Application of common sense to the im¬ migration problem. Effect on posterity. Opportunity of America. Immigration and the Law of Malthus. Protection. Influence on standard of living in America. Improvement in arts no protection. Effect of restriction on dissipation of natural resources. Initiation of pantocraey. Qualifications required in initial stages. Care in extension of the system. Means of transforming private into public monopoly. Confiscation. Destructive competition. Purchase. Ac¬ quisition by issue of non-inheritable bonds. Necessity of restriction on the right of bequest. Acquisition by payment of diminishing interest. Centralization safe with direct legislation. Extension of the Golden Rule. Inconsistency of asceticism. Patriotism vs. humanitarianism. Laisses faire theory of free trade. Utilitarian theory of free trade. Comparison of their effects upon output of happiness. Foreign trade unnecessary for the United States. Effect of utilitarian theory of free trade on immigration. Injustice of fatalism and sentimentalism. Abolition of war. Humanitarianism. Primitiveness of present treatise. Principles of criticism. Test of practicability. Shallowness of current criticism. Science to solve the problem of happiness .

THE

ECONOMY OF HAPPINESS

Human intelligence from the time of its origin has been en¬ gaged in the attempt to solve one great problem — the prob¬ lem of happiness — and it has failed to solve it. Throughout history the activities of nature and of man have combined to develop the world’s potentiality for pain and to leave undevel¬ oped the world’s potentiality for pleasure. However hopeful for a happier end, men’s acts have not been adapted to its at¬ tainment. Hence the great problems of every age, thougli manifold in form, are one in substance. To-day as always, the omnipresent problem is how to avoid unhappiness and achieve happiness. The being for whom this problem has no interest is not sentient.

If men have failed to solve the problem of happiness it is because they do not know how to solve it. It is not because they lack the will, but because they lack the knowledge. The numerous abortive attempts to cure the ills common to mortal¬ ity have disposed many persons to the belief that they are in¬ curable — that what has so long been sought in vain must be in its nature so elusive as to be unattainable, and he who pre¬ sumes to make a frontal attack on the great problem and offer a general solution of it is viewed with suspicion. He is re¬ garded as a dreamer, crank, or nostrum-monger, whose cure-all may safely be spurned as the product of shallowness and pre¬ sumption. I have no disposition to question the justice of this common judgment, nor to ignore the experience on which it is founded — yet whatever odium attaches to him who attempts a general solution of the problem of happiness I cannot con¬ sistently avoid, for in the work to follow I attempt to formu¬ late precisely such a cure-all, precisely such a universal pana¬ cea, as critics delight to deride, and in submitting it to the

l public, do so with complete consciousness of the risk such a course involves. The panacea I propose is common sense , and I claim that it will cure all the ills which can be cured by any means whatever, and that it offers a complete solution of the problem of happiness. Moreover I claim that there is no other solution, and that the many substitutes which have been pro¬ posed and practised will prove in the future, as they have in the past, to be delusions.

But perhaps it may be suspected that in offering common sense as a universal panacea, I am seeking to avoid the re¬ sponsibility of an ambitious claim by perpetrating a platitude. Anything may be labeled common sense — the name is free to whomsoever cares to employ it, and it is as easy for a sophist to prate of common sense as for a corruptionist to prate of patriotism. Before the solution proposed can be taken se¬ riously then, it must be ascertained what we are really talking about — whether about a word or something more than a word. It is only reasonable to challenge such a claim as I have made by the direct question: Just what do you mean by common sense? To judge from the mode in which the term is most often applied, it appears to mean that kind of sense the absence of which men frequently notice in others, but never notice in themselves. Is this the variety of sense to which 1 have reference? No — it is not; for though this variety of sense is common, it is not common sense.

By the term common sense I refer to a kind of sense sus¬ ceptible of tests which are independent of the convictions of any man or assemblage of men. Its rigorous application re¬ moves any problem from the realm of opinion, though not from that of probability. It is my purpose in Book I to offer an analysis of common sense which will, in the measure required by the design of this work, disclose the tests specified.

When we ask a question beginning with the word why, that for which we inquire is a reason, and reasons are of two classes, and only two. (1) Reasons for beliefs or expectations. (2) Reasons for acts or policies. To ask a question beginning with the word why , is to ask either “Why do you believe or expect”? or “Why do you do?” Common sense postulates that reasons are the tests of beliefs or acts, and that beliefs or acts are not the tests of reasons. Hence the primary concern of common sense is with the nature of a reason. The common quality of reasonable beliefs is truth. The common quality of reason¬ able acts is utility. Hence it is with the nature of truth and utility that common sense is primarily concerned. Could the nature of utility be independently comprehended, a compre¬ hension of the nature of truth would be superfluous, for the ultimate object of common sense is identical with that of util¬ ity. But utility, as will subsequently be shown, is indetermi¬ nate in the absence of truth. Truth, however, may be com¬ municated or expressed only by means of symbols, verbal or otherwise ; and these symbols may or may not be adapted to their purpose. The common quality of symbols adapted to the expression of truth is intelligibility , and it is a quality as often replaced by unintelligibility in speech, as truth and utility are replaced by untruth and inutility in beliefs and acts respec¬ tively. A comprehension of its nature is essential to a com¬ prehension of the nature of a reason. Common sense then is concerned first with the nature of intelligibility , second with the nature of truth , and third with the nature of utility, and to the discussion of each of these subjects I shall devote a sep¬ arate chapter. Having ascertained what common sense is in Book I, I shall in Books II and III seek to apply it; not indeed to the problem of happiness in its totality — that would be to discuss every subject of human interest — but to that phase of the problem which concerns the fundamental policies of society.

Before making this attempt, however, it is only fair to warn the reader that I shall not discuss the subjects of greatest popu¬ lar interest — the concrete applications of common sense — until Book III is reached. It has been my effort to make the earlier parts of the work as interesting and intelligible as the nature of the subject would permit, but despite the best inten¬ tions, I fear Book I will prove dry — some portions of it very dry — to the general reader. Book II is better, though the ex¬ position of the Law of Diminishing Returns of Happiness is perhaps rather irksome. As this work seeks to reach, and if possible interest, the class of general readers, or rather such portions thereof as may concern themselves with the great social problems of the present age, I deem it no impropriety to offer some advice to those who are more interested in the applica¬ tions than the abstractions of philosophy. If apprehensive of being bored by a discussion of logical or ethical theory, I sug¬ gest "that they first read, or at least peruse, Book III. If what is there expressed appears to lack common sense, I recommend that they read Book II in which are developed the principles applied in Book III. If common sense seems still to be con-

.4 spicuously absent. Book I, which seeks to develop the phi¬ losophy of common sense from the constitution of the mind itself, should be read. If it appears that the principles there¬ in expounded, or any of them, are departed from in Books II and III, I recommend that the reader specifically locate the point of departure, for if common sense has been departed from at all, it must be at some particular point. If such a point is discoverable, then our solution of the problem of happiness is to that extent invalidated. If not, then either common sense has not been departed from, or its nature has been misappre¬ hended. Should the reader come to the latter conclusion, it might be well for him to satisfy himself just where the misap¬ prehension has occurred. This can be done by comparing the principles of common sense as I have expounded them with the principles as they are, and noticing the point or points of di¬ vergence. This in turn requires a knowledge of the principles as they are — a knowledge not to be acquired “ by intuition.”

Should criticism show that the following analysis does not embody the true principles of common sense, I shall be com¬ pelled to acknowledge the defeat of my primary purpose in offering it; but even should it do no more than stimulate the search for those principles, it will, in that degreee, have con¬ tributed to the solution of the problem of happiness.

Chapter I

It is customary for those whose purpose it is to expound, to commence their task with a demonstration that the exposition they have in mind is one which it is useful to undertake. Such a demonstration on the part of the present expounder would be one of peculiar difficulty, since as his purpose is an examina¬ tion into the nature of usefulness and the formulation of pre¬ cepts sanctioned by that examination, an attempt by him to con¬ form to custom would necessitate the demonstration that a knowledge of the nature of usefulness is useful. But fortu¬ nately that which makes the task difficult makes it superfluous, since those who admit the proposition will require no demon¬ stration, and those who deny it, admit by their denial that they speak without meaning.

For a thing to be useful it must be a means to some end and the end must be a good or desirable one. Hence the quality of usefulness in a means implies a quality of goodness or de¬ sirability in the end. But means are employed for the attain¬ ment of ends only by intelligent _ beings and the employment of a means to an end by an intelligent being is called a vol un¬ try act. Usefulness then is a quality present or absent in vol¬ untary acts, and as usefulness in a means requires goodness in an end we are led to inquire what kinds of acts \v dl lead to good ends. This is clearly the old question as to what con¬ stitutes the difference between right and wrong — a question as

old as philosophy. „ , , . , , ,,

Kant tells us that the object of philosophy is to supply the answer to three questions : What can I know ? What ought I to do ? and For what may I hope ? Three questions which every phi¬ losopher attempts to answer, but so far without success in secur¬ in'1- the acquiescence of the world. It ere we aide to supply an answer to the second query there would be no further question as to the difference between right and wrong, for it is univer¬ sally conceded that we ought to do right and ought not to do wrong. To many persons it may seem strange that at this late date in the world’s history we are still inquiring as to the difference between right and wrong. Surely that must have been settled long ago. At any rate, we hear men of intelligence, clergymen, statesmen, publicists, predicating rightness, useful¬ ness, or desirability of this act or policy, and wrongness, useless¬ ness, or undesirability of that one, with an assurance which, it would seem, must be born of an intimate knowledge of just what the qualities are which are so confidently predicated. And yet a little examination forces upon us the suspicion that, after all, their knowledge cannot be so complete as the confidence they express in their convictions might lead us to believe; for we find that from a consideration of the same data different men come to different conclusions as to what is right and what is wrong. Can any given act or policy be both right and wrong ? From what we see and hear around us it would seem so. If we ask the next educated man we meet to explain this apparent anomaly, he will probably inform us that these differences in opinion depend upon different “ points of view ” ; and by the delivery of this judgment will doubtless feel assured that the mystery is at once cleared up. Judging bv_my_own experiencemen believe that any paradox may be explained by saying that ii all depends upon the point of view. But with all deference to The poiehco of the phrase, we are constrained to inquire: Does ten times one make ten, or does it depend upon the point of view? If it does, then we see at once what is meant by the phrase. It merely refers to the fact that whether ten times one is ten or not, depends upon the meaning of the words — some¬ thing that a child might have told us. If it does not, then clearly a knowledge of right and wrong does not rest on a foundation so universally conceded to be sound as does a knowl¬ edge of the multiplication table. If it did, there would be no more controversy about the one than there is about the other. The fact is that just what men predicate of acts or policies when they predicate rightness or wrongness of them, is practi¬ cally always unknown even to those making the predication. This may appear an astonishing assertion, yet the fact must be, and generally has been, admitted by everyone who examines the subject.