England and Russia

Front matter

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

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ENGLAND & RUSSIA

Introduction

PREFIXED TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISLODGING RUSSIA FROM THE DARDANELLES.

A late Royal Duke very fond of whist, was also very fond of winning at whist. It often occurred to him, in arranging his hand, to mistake his best suit for trumps. His Royal Highness finding seven clubs in his hands, and forgeting that the three of diamonds had been turned, would exclaim — " Clubs are trumps, I believe," and consequently clubs were trumps.

It would seem that Russia has taken the hint from this distinguished personage, and has got others with whom she plays to follow the example of his kind and amicable associates — Russia always plays trumps, or at least tells us that her cards are trumps, and consequently she turns the tricks and lifts the money.

Russia not only induces us to permit her to do what she wishes to do — not only makes us assist her, when she requires our help, but she makes us

B believe whatever she wants us to believe. She ehuses that we should believe that she has occupied Constantinople, and that she voluntarily retired — and we do believe it. She also wishes us to believe that the occupation of Constantinople having been in her power, has been abandoned through her spirit of moderation, and through her enlightened conviction that that acquisition would weaken her power, so that while we believe that we have it not in our power to prevent the occupation, we believe that we have it in our power to drive her out of it if she were once there.

The facts stand thus. She did not occcupy Constantinople. She could not then, and she cannot yet occupy Constantinople. We can most easily prevent her occupying Constantinople, but when she has brought things to that point where she can occupy, it will be impossible for us to expel her, unless by such an effort as we made to overthrow Napoleon, and by means of some new discovery which, like the steam engine at that period, will now again give us the power of making such an effort. Anticipating neither of these circumstances, we say it will be impossible for us to expel her.

We might enlarge on the first point, but we will content ourselves with quoting a passage from a periodical work which, in a few words, sets at rest the question of the previous occupation, and shows by what means a real occupation is to be

Ill brought about, and is now bringing about. We shall then offer some considerations to shew the effects of that occupation on the internal state of England — effects which will disincline England from acting, even if Russia remained as vulnerable as at present, and which we think will put it entirely out of the question to think of repairing a disaster which will have rendered Russia unapproachable.

" Russia, had she had it in her power when her troops were encamped on the Bosphorus, never would have retired ; then it was impossible for her to have retained possession; she encamped at the distance of sixteen miles from the capital, with the Bosphorus between, the Channel was commanded by thirteen Russian line of battle ships ; the troops occupied the Giant's Mountain, in Asia, their tents so placed as to make the greatest possible display ; sentries on every side forbade approach ; their numbers represented as double their real amount ; every precaution, in fact, was taken to guard against attack, collision, or contact. On the moment of embarkation, a breeze that had been blowing from the south suddenly failed ; the most intense anxiety was the result, not only to the chiefs, but to the whole expedition. Fortunately, a light air sprung up, and carried them out of the channel. What service did not this breath of air render to the fortunes of Russia. But for it, Nicholas would not have to boast of the glory of iv

occupying Constantinople ! or the greater glory of quitting it ! !

J " The troops that Russia can suddenly and at once transport to the capital must be sacrificed if a single pistol is fired, or a drop of blood drawn; she, therefore, dare not— can not attempt to occupy until she is invited ; that invitation she is now labouring to bring about by three causes, or rather sets of causes ; — Istly, General rumours of war — of occupation spread and repeated throughout every province with a pertinacity and a similarity most remarkable, producing a feeling of insecurity and alarm, arresting commerce and industry, and disturbing the action of government, and the idea of permanency. 2ndly, By the use she makes of her influence over the government, driving it into acts, and even crimes, that makes it despised and hated — detaching it from the other powers, and introducing administrative measures that place it in opposition to the people, their prejudices, rights, and opinions. 3rdly, Through the schism in the empire, and all the consequences of the hostile position of Mehemet Ali. These causes all acting together are now pushing Turkey forward with fearful rapidity to that point where all bonds of respect and government are dissolved, and revolution in the provinces, or revolt in the capital, or invasion from Egypt, or all these cases combined, will thoroughly disgust the Turks and their tributaries, with the government, and the Sultan ; and

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Russia will be called in to support the government : - — to protect the Sultan — to shield the people — to prevent convulsion — to arrest bloodshed. Then her intervention will be hailed by civilized Europe as an act of charitable humanity ; and those who may dread the consequences will be little inclined to interfere in favour of a people that licks the hand of its betrayer and oppressor. For this peace, that is, the progress of causes in action, and the accumulation of the results of the treaty of protection are necessary. Russia cannot enter till she enters as a friend ; and though this will soon be — the time is not yet come ; and until it comes, collision is fatal to her projects. " #

Now let us suppose Russia occupying Constantinople, entrenched behind the then impregnable Dardanelles, and possessing a hundred sail of men-of-war in the channel. f Will England then be

* See " Diplomacy of Russia," in No. 1, European Review, p. 131.

t " Few persons are aware of the maritime force that will instantaneously be placed at the disposal of Russia, by the occupation of Constantinople. Russia, at the close of 1834, had fifty-two men-of-war in the Black Sea ; of which sixteen were line-of-battle ships: twenty-five new vessels are in construction. She will find at Constantinople forty men-of-war, of which nine are line-of-battle ships and four three-deckers, the day after occupation. She will have, therefore, at her disposal in the channel ninety- two men-of-war, with a flotilla of small armed craft, at least as numerous ; and such is the activity that reigns in all the arsenals of the Black Sea, that in less than two years, one-half of the vessels commenced in autumn last, vi disposed to make an attempt to expel Russia ? — will it be in her power to do so? — and what means would be requisite for succeeding in such an attempt ?

will be ready for sea. Thus in a few months she will be ready to muster one hundred sail, twenty-five being line-of-battle, within the impregnable Dardanelles ; securing her acquisition, having time to organise them — having the seas of Marmora and the Euxine to exercise in ; having unlimited supplies of all materials within herself, ready to her hand, and at a trifling cost. She has at present 30,000 men employed on board her vessels, or in her arsenals ; she will obtain a certain number of seamen from the Black Sea and from Constantinople itself ; but her great resource will be the Greek sailors ; the seamen of Hydra, Ipezia, Psara, reduced by the peace, and the stagnation of Greek commerce, will flock by thousands, spurred not only by their necessities, but by a spirit of enthusiasm, to hail the symbols of the Greek Church reared above the Crescent. A single mass, chaunted in Saint Sophia, will collect every Greek seaman from far and near. This is no dream of the imagination ; these materials are not to be created — they do exist, ready to be employed, and available at a moment's warning. The slightest degree of energy — the commonest feeling of self-preservation — will, in a month's time, combine these elements for securing her conquest, and with one squadron anchored in the Golden Horn, and another under the castle of the Dardanelles, who, that knows any thing of the topography of Constantinople, of the spirit of eastern populations, will be hardy enough to talk even of resistance from within, or of attack from without ?

*' If it be asked, whence the pecuniary means are to come, we answer that the expenditure will, to her, be insignificant : such an acquisition would be cheaply bought at the expense of twenty campaigns ; and the expenditure will, perhaps, not exceed the sum she lays out in a single year on the Caucasus. Is Russia unprepared for such a contingency ? Besides, is it to be supposed that the

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The occupation will take place as we have above stated — as the means of arresting convulsion and bloodshed. This state of things can only be brought about by the acts of the Government itself. Russia stepping in to restore tranquillity, has it in her power — is placed under the necessity of changing the course of internal policy that has led to convulsion. Even before convulsion has taken plaee could she ostensibly assume the protectorate of Turkey she would conciliate to herself the goodwill of all classes, by putting an end to those abuses into which she herself has led or pushed the Turkish Govornment. Occupation, therefore, by the causes that lead to it, destroys every interest for Turkey in England, deprives England

treasury of the Seraglio is empty ? Will Constantinople be a less rich prize than Algiers ? Are there not many means by which a conquering power can obtain money ? And is it not clear that she will be able to borrow hundreds of millions of piastres from the merchants of all classes, and from the Armenian bankers, who, if they do not lend with the zeal of enthusiasm, as many will, will contribute from other motives, which Russia knows how to inspire ? Will not, moreover, every place of 'Change in Europe offer her resources on such a contingency ? While we affect to believe the occupation of Constantinople impossible, because of the expense it would entail upon her, she, better informed, knows, as who that has given the subject a moment's consideration does not ? that, independently of all political gains, she at once lays her hand on an enormous treasure, which in itself, if she acquired nothing else, might justify all the expenditure she now incurs in furtherance of the scheme that is to give her possession of it."

" European Review" No. 1, p. 126.

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of every support in Turkey, and of every means of acting either on the people or the Government (if it be allowed to subsist), and by its consequences attaches the Turkish population (the other populations are of course hers body and soul) to the Russian sway. The whole Ottoman empire passes at once from us to her, then our open foe. The force, the arms, the frontiers, the fortresses, the treasures, and the ships of Turkey now placed against Russia, will be placed against us — disciplined, combined, and directed by her. , Besides this accession of wealth, strength, and ■J defences, Russia, by making this stride in advance, covers by the occupation of a single passage, a frontier of her own of nearly 2000 miles in extent, and consequently she can assemble on this point the whole force actually engaged in watching this line, and in preventing combinations, which in its present exposed and precarious state, occupies a full half of the disposable forces of the empire. Russia can therefore immediately assemble, if need be, a couple of hundred thousand men, to be supported at the expense of Turkey, on the shores of the Mediterranean; which, strong by the nature of the country, by the divisions of the population and strength of the fortresses, by the fleet, by the moral supremacy she will have assumed, by the capital*, and perhaps the Sultan as her

* Constantinople offers no place of assemblage that can be used against a garrisoning force ; it is cut into three parts by the Chanix

hostage, will render her unattackable, save by a body of men not less numerous.

It may be said that at least six months will be requisite for this combination ; but let us suppose that until six months after occupation she is vulnerable, will we be prepared in less time to strike ? Clearly before a messenger can carry the news to London, she will be prepared against every possible contingency.

Russia chooses her own time ; she prepares the %/ events, she has them all under her own control. She sees on all sides at once ; she cannot miscalculate on such a moment as this. Her whole mind,

nel. The Russian men-of-war will occupy it and intercept all communication. By the hilly situation of the place, it is every where exposed to the guns of vessels in the harbour, or below the seraglio. The subsistences and the water will be in the power of the garrison. The seraglio will be occupied, and the Seraskier's palace, so that a position is secured in the centre of the Turkish quarter, connected with the beach. The land side is commanded, and the communications intercepted by the positions of Daoud Pasha and Ramis Cheflic, where strong defensible barracks, which can easily contain 20,000 men, have been recently erected, and were occupied by the Sultan during the alarms of the Russian war. These positions secure as effectively the western approach, as the Channel does the others. It has been said that such details enlighten Russia on k the state of Turkey —the English press enlighten Russia ! It is singular that the knowledge of these very details being collected by Russian agents 30 years ago, urged Selim to hasten his attempt at destroying the Janissaries, and was subsequently put forward by the Turkish Government, as its justification for cutting off a body which, in the face of such danger, prevented even precautionary measures.

X energies, and resources, are concentrated on it. She will be perfectly certain of success before she makes the move ; and there is no reason whatever for her making the move before she is certain. — Match with her knowledge, decision, secrecy, rapidity, and proximity, our ignorance, uncertainty, changeableness, absence of disposable force, and distance, and then say if Russia has any thing to apprehend from the awakened interests or aroused indignation of England — at least until she has had time to fortify herself within the Dardanelles, and to concentrate at the point of attack her armies and her navies ?

But let us turn to another subject — the effect of the occupation of Constantinople on England itself.

Can England at this moment permit the subjugation of Persia ? She certainly cannot ; the practical necessity she feels in supporting that country* is evident in the constant attention given to that country both by the Government and the East India Company, and the expenditure of nearly three millions sterling, in subsidies, &c. — Persia is gone the moment the Dardanelles are occupied. At this moment Persia is a virtual dependency of Russia; she only allows it the appearance of independence, not to awaken England until the Darda-

* England feels practically the necessity of supporting Persia, in consequence of the weakness of Persia; when we allow the strength of Turkey to be undermined, then, too, will we feel the practical necessity of supporting Turkey.

xi nelles are occupied. Already has Persia ventured to tell us that she could not suffer British agents to be placed where there were Russian agents : " she would not be placed between the upper and I the nether millstone, that if unsupported by England, she must not irritate Russia." With the moral effect of the loss of Turkey, will come home to us the loss of Persia and the accession of both to the power of Russia — the consummation of that which, without perceiving more than a small portion of the consequences, we have been labouring to prevent for 150 years. And this will be immediately felt. It will discourage, not exasperate; if it did exasperate, what material means, ready created, have we to make that exasperation effective ? But Persia is important, as it involves in its own existence the security of India.

We have hitherto looked on Persia merely as a / body which it is necessary to place between our Indian possessions and Russia, as a space of two thousand miles in traversing which her influence (we talk not of armies) was weakened and lost. What must that influence become after the conquest of the centre of Islamism, of the capital of the East, of the maritime key of all the countries that touch or communicate with the Euxine. What the effect — not indeed of the subjugation of Persia — but of the instantaneous transmission of the power and capabilities of Persia into the hands of Russia. That neutral space is wiped out of the xii

map. It is converted into a source of imposing and aggressive force ; it bears a numerous, patient, and warlike people, to be disciplined and moved by Russia without inconvenience or expense. Amongst whom, too, an Indian expedition is popular byits present attractions, by traditionary associations and experience. If a camp of 50,000 men only be assembled at Herat, let those who know India judge of the consequences !

The efforts of England for many years, and her money, have accustomed the Persians to European discipline ; the first, the most important obstacles among Eastern nations have been overcome ; many thousands are to a certain degree disciplined, — they are, by the universal testimony of all those who have had to handle them, the finest materials for troops, — docile, intelligent, patient, and active, — therefore a very few months w r ould suffice to collect such a body of troops on the eastern frontier, there to discipline them. These consequences will be immediately felt in London on the occupation of the Dardanelles ; — indeed these consequences are already anticipated ; they are even now certainties in the eyes of those who should best understand their meaning.

Suppose the loss of India is nothing to England, — will England submit, can she submit, to the precariousness of tenure, to the menace of assault ? — she cannot. The considerations above mentioned will come home to her with irresistible force, the xiii moment Constantinople is lost ; she will feel immediately the necessity of anticipating the disturbing influences about to be excited against India, by sending a reinforcement of British troops, which, having to pass round the Cape of Good Hope, may take up in their passage the time that may suffice for Russia organizing a new Persian army. Suppose we commence with sending only 10,000 men, at the expense of 100/. a man, or with such a necessity hanging over us — will we be inclined to send another expedition, not a precautionary one, but an aggressive one ? Evidently our whole disposable means w T ill be required for India ; all the financial sacrifices we will be inclined to make, will be absorbed by preparation in that quarter. This will be the case if no real danger exists. The uncertainty produced by distance alone, will paralyze our European policy, and put it wholly out of our power to employ our resources in any European contest, however trivial, far less in one where our maritime power cannot be brought to bear, where an army at least equal to that engaged at Waterloo must be transported to a distant field of action as the first step, for which 10,000,000/. will have to be voted, and 200,000 tons of shipping to be taken up.

If to-day England cannot be brought to take measures to prevent the catastrophe, how will she then be induced to decide on repairing it? If in 1833 she tamely submitted to the apparent occuxiv

pation of Constantinople, will she be prepared to eject Russia, when she really occupies in 1837 ; — when all she looks to now as worth having shall have been lost,— when her anxious solicitude will be turned to India, — when the question will no longer be a maritime, but a land question, — and when her whole amount of actual force will be insufficient? If to-day England, with the moral strength of the world at her disposal, cannot be brought to take up any position in opposition to Russia, — will she then, when the strength of Russia is doubled, when Russia has only one point to defend, assume the aggressive ?

But these are not the only effects which the oc- J cupation of the Dardanelles will have on England. If she does not assume the aggressive, she must stand on the defensive, — there is no middle course. In what state then is Malta and the Ionian Islands? Must they not be strengthened, — must not our maritime force in the Mediterranean be placed on the footing of war ? If we are on the defensive, — where is our European influence ? In what state are our finances ?

Our internal resources must be exhausted by an armed and expensive observation in India, the Levant, and elsewhere, which must go on increasing, without benefit, without hope. The question will present itself in this form : Shall we expel Russia, or withdraw within ourselves ? The first will be hopeless ; the second but a declaration of

XV the consequences to England of the occupation of the Dardanelles. England cannot exist without her foreign influence, commerce, and dominion ; and when we are reduced to practical measures of defence, by a peaceable and practical alteration of the balance of power, it is clear that they have passed away from us.

But these are not the only effects of the occupa-^ tion of Constantinople ; — not only the opening prospects of commerce, but that which actually exists with the Levant, with Turkey, with the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, with Southern Russia, with central Asia, and with Persia, is at once annihilated, and the 60 or 70,000 tons of shipping so occupied thrown out of employment. It is sufficiently well known that Russia, even at a great money sacrifice, labours at present to exclude our commerce from every country under her control, or subject to her influence. She has arrested the transit trade through Georgia to Persia — she blockades permanently the eastern coast of the Black Sea — she has forced regulations injurious to us on the Turkish Government — she has done her best to prevent the introduction of our manufactures into the Provinces — she prohibits in her own rapidly extending dominions almost every article of British manufacture, except yarn, which soon also will be prohibited, and uses that which she at present imports in working up into stuffs to exclude our commerce from central Asia xvi

— to that end Moscow cottons, made of English yarn, are sold at Teheran cheaper than they can be bought at Manchester; so that while we appear to have no commercial interests in that quarter, we believe we have a good customer in Russia. Poland, by her annexation to the Russian tariff, becomes impervious to English commerce. So will the Dardanelles, and throughout Turkey and the Levant commercial regulations, motived perhaps on the commercial injustice of England, will be promulgated by her authority, cutting us off at once from between four and five millions of exports and from an equal amount of raw imports necessary for the preparation of our exports to Germany, America, India, China, &c. — but Germany, will it not be then entirely subject to the Prussian system ? France is already our commercial antagonist. Let free trade be destroyed in Turkey — let the Dardanelles be closed to us — and at once our European commerce is reduced to the precarious chances that the political state of the two Peninsulas may offer — < and all this will be effected in peace, as retribution for the commercial restrictiveness of England, so that we shall neither have an opportunity for retaliation nor a ground for remonstrance. Will such a state, with such prospects for our commercial prosperity, counteract the depression produced by our political prostration ? Will it increase our means or our spirit for undertaking a hopeless war, which will clearly be beyond our means— in xvii

which, judging by what we see around us, we will obtain no foreign support — and in which we will be not only without a force sufficient to attack our enemy, but without force sufficient to contain (we speak not of defending) our colonial empire ?

To support a struggling friend still on his feet, worsted but erect, injured but self-possessed, is an easy, a natural, an exciting thing ; but to raise up one prostrate, to draw upon oneself the undivided hostility, whatever it may be, of his successful antagonist, to breathe the breath of hope and courage into nostrils from which vitality has departed, to prop up the body from which life is fled — is a wild, a hopeless enterprise, not an object to animate and exasperate, but a sight to sadden and depress — such precisely was on England, however little admitted, the effect of the conviction that a body of troops equipped suddenly in the arsenals of Russia, transported in her vessels, landed on the Bosphorus, admitted by the Turks, received as deliverers by the Sultan, arresting invasion, and after restoring peace, preserving the throne and saving the empire — voluntarily retiring. Was not this the general impression left by that event, and by the mode in which Russia succeeded in having it believed ? is not such the impression very generally at this day ? The natural consequence of that impression is it not that Turkey has been, and is at the mercy of Russia, and that she continues to exist merely by the sufferance of

c xviii the Emperor ? Who therefore can dream of supporting Turkey against its master ! against its disinterested protector ! who can credit the existence of strength in Turkey — of weakness in Russia ? Who can admit or comprehend destructive and disorganizing influence used on Turkey by her proprietor and defender ? who can admit designs on the part of Russia? So much has Russia worked out from the mere topography* of her encampment on the Giant's Mountain.

We trust what we have said is sufficient to show the objects Russia has in view, in making us believe that she has occupied Constantinople, and that we can expel her should she be so imprudent as to occupy it.

% This recalls forcibly to our recollection a conversation with a man high in office in the Ottoman empire. " The progress of Russia/' he observed, " is chiefly owing to a body of engineers which she has, and which no other nation has." We expressed our surprise at this assertion, and our belief that on this point Russia was greatly inferior to the other powers. " You have a great deal of fine words and science," he answered, "but you never know what ground is under your feet. Russia has a body of geographers who understand the map of Europe, which no other Government does/' How much is not Europe indebted, we will not say, to the simple sense and singleness of opinion — but to the ignorance of the Turks. Had Constantinople been the capital, not of a minor State, but of Austria, or even France, might not the Dardanelles have been Russian long ago!

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The demand for a fifth edition of this essay in so short a space of time, furnishes the writer with an occasion, which he seizes with extreme satisfaction, of expressing his gratification at the progress this question has made. It is not many months since he who talked of Russian designs was treated as a visionary — since he who talked of elements of regeneration in Turkey was set down as an enthusiast — since Russian aggression was considered a question of European political principles — since Turkey was considered as of no weight in the balance of power. These fallacies have separately vanished, or at least find no supporters — the contrary convictions have separately sprung up. — Russia's designs are no longer considered visionary — Turkey's power of regeneration is established — Russian aggression is considered a distinct question from legitimate and constitutional principles — Turkey is felt to be important for the preservation of that which exists, and the disposal of that Empire is considered by all as decisive of that which is to be. These distinct convictions, when combined, must lead to the practical conclusions, That Turkey \ must be saved for the preservation of peace, and xxii in contradiction with the majority, if not with the totality of writers on Turkey. Of course opposite opinions must be contradictory ; the objection proves no more — and of contradictory opinions one must be right and one wrong ; as no attempt has been made to shew that they are wrong, no further proof of their truth is required than the silence of those who have promulgated the reverse. Knowledge is to be arrived at only by study, truth by enquiry — study and enquiry imply means adapted to the subject-matter. An enquiry into the institutions of Turkey requires time, connexion, a previous knowledge of languages, intimacies, and labour on extensive and remote fields, as conditions necessary, and yet not fulfilled by the majority of those travellers who have furnished the materials on which the opinions of this country have been formed. The non-fulfilment of these conditions leads to the presupposition of error. The very boldness of the assertions that have been so generally hazarded on the state of Turkish society, warrants the suspicion of their being unfounded. So true is this that those who have more or less inquired into this question, so vast, so disheartening by its difficulties, so encouraging by its novelty, are more or less diffident — and the more so in proportion to their information, in expressing their opinions or in hazarding conclusions. Still the views here stated are not those of one but of several individuals, formed distinctly — having examined different parts of the question — having been occupied on fields remote from each other — and whose coincidence can only be accounted for by truth.