Characteristics of the Duke of Wellington

Introduction

It may be thought, and not unreasonably, that another work relating to the illustrious Duke of Wellington is unnecessary ; more especially from one who had no pronal or private connexion with him ; because all the events of his public career, and, indeed, most things connected with his private life, have been already collected and laid before the world.

The press has teemed with his Memoirs in every uise and in every form, and they have been published t a cost calculated to bring them within the reach of lmost the poorest reader ; and if the following sheets professed to be merely a general memoir of his military and political life, or a scries of anecdotes, however interesting and well-authenticated, they would, indeed, be superfluous.

But it has appeared to the writer that it would be an act of justice to the memory of that great man, and might be of service to his surviving fellow-countrymen, to put together in a more condensed form some observations upon his private feelings and principles, as forming a beautiful and touching part of his character, apart from his public and professional position, winch is already before the world.

Z INTRODUCTION.

It may be fairly said, that no man's character was ever subjected to so severe an ordeal during his life as the Duke of Wellington's.

The actions of many former great men have been published during their lives ; but it has been left to after ages and subsequent elucidations to explain the motives which led to them. Many a hero has received the plaudits of his contemporaries, whose glory was perhaps accidental, or whose success arose from unforeseen and fortuitous circumstances, which were untold at the time, and the concealment of which might have been dictated by sound and honest policy.

But here every deed, and the ground upon which it was founded, are shown at the same time.

Nothing but the most entire confidence in the honesty and integrity of every public act of his life, could ever have made a man consent to the exposition and publication of all his motives, feelings, views, and wishes, which are laid open in the wonderful collection of these Dispatches.- He had that confidence. He knew that not one word would be found in them of which he need to feel ashamed ; and from them alone, sanctioned as they have been by his own supervision, every argument and every deduction in the following pages will be drawn.

Brought forward in early life into a position of eminence, and invested with an extent of authority during all his Indian campaigns which would have been apt to turn the head of most men, he seems, as we find by all his correspondence of that period, to have shown the same equanimity, the same patience under disappointment, and the same forbearance towards those whose faults or failings had a tendency to thwart his own more enlarged and energetic views, which we find him to preserve to the end of his glorious career.

[NTRODUCTION 3

It was. in fact, fl remarkable feature in his remarkable life. Gifted by nature, as lie Beems to have been, beyond the ordinary run of mankind, with forethought, and a power of looking, not merely at the events passing under his eyes at the moment, but at almost every possible contiii2:encv which mi^ht befall him, he never seems to testify impatience at finding that others were not equally apt and ready ; or, at least, he never suffered hi> consciousness of it to affect his conduct towards them.

Another striking feature was his remarkable placability. Those who saw him only at a distance, deemed him cold and austere. He has been called the " Iron Duke," whom nothing could move; and it was said that, though he acquired the esteem and respect of all, he gained the affection of few. To a certain extent, as regards the world at large, this might be true. He was, no doubt, too cautious a man to lay himself open in ordinary con- \ i nation to every one who might wish to engage his attention, and afterwards to boast that he had been "in the confidence of the Duke;" and his habit of forming his own opinions, and acting upon them, without consulting others in the early stages, or divulging his intentions in the more advanced parts of his undertakings, no doubt gave an idea to casual observers that it was not in it urc to have friendly and confidential intercourse with any one.

It is true, therefore, that he had few intimates, but all who did enjoy that happiness entertained the warmest feelings of affection and regard towards him.

He was, no doubt, stern and inflexible in the performance of his own duty, and in exacting from others the due performance of what belonged to them. Unfortunately, he often had too much cause for apparent severity. The British army had never been assembled in such numbers, and, in fact, had never seen service upon such a scale ; and no doubt there were many individuals of all ranks utterly unfit for the duties now imposed upon them. Numberless instances may be selected in the pages of his correspondence, of conduct which, in any other military nation, would have been followed by severe punishment, or instant expulsion .from the service, which he, in the kindest and most forbearing manner, notices with merely expressing a hope that the honour, the good sense (?), and the gentlemanly feelings of the delinquent will prevent a repetition ! In his confirmation of the sentences of courts-martial, or in his comments upon the proceedings of the court, and in his answers to letters (which we do not see, but the nature of which we may fairly conjecture from the tone of his reply), his language is always firm and unyielding ; but we find many in which, though his sense of duty compels him to give a reprimand, or to convey an unpleasant communication, it is obvious that he does it with reluctance, and with an anxious wish to hurt the private feelings of the person as little as possible.

The caution and apparent coldness to which allusion has already been made, was an essential part of his character ; and, perhaps, it is not too much to say that the eminent success of some of his great military measures may be mainly attributed to it. Secrecy — absolute secrecy — in the midst of thousands, including, of course, many who must be personally engaged, was not to be looked for : but he preserved a nearer approach to it than any other man. His officers might deem him close, and some of them might feel that he did not show them the confidence to which they might think they were

INTRODUCTION.

entitled; but he acted upon principle. He knew by experience that every gossiping letter from the army to friends in England was very speedily communicated to the newspapers, who made use of this limited information as best suited their own political objects, and generally distorted the facts. He might occasionally feel nettled at the malignant and violent party-feelings so displayed, or the unjust and ungenerous comments passed upon himself (though that was the part respecting which he felt the least anxiety) ; but he knew that during many years of the war. the principal part (indeed, at times, the whole) of the information respecting the strength and disposition of his force was conveyed to the French army, solelv by the circuitous channel of the English newspapers.

His forgiveness of positive injustice to himself is also a remarkable feature in his character. We do not allude to the noble disregard which he showed to the ignorance, the vanity, and the presumption of many individuals at home, in different high assemblies, whether in the Houses of Parliament, or the Common Council of the City of London : that was the natural and instinctive disregard which the magnanimous Newfoundland shows t<> tin- snarling cur; and he might have a fair reliance upon the returning sense of justice from the majority of hi- fellow-countrymen when the first effect was passed. But we allude more especially to the way in which he overlook.- the nnceasing attempts of so many members both of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, to injure him in the estimation of their respective nations, which he had no means of repelling or explaining; which creating hourly dangers to the gallant men under • mmand ; and which, with a weaker-minded or more petulant man, must have inevitably made him throw up the cause for which he was making such marked and extraordinary efforts.

The buoyancy of his hopes and expectations was another most remarkable characteristic. Oppressed as he was (more especially during the first years of the Peninsular war) by the consideration of questions which belonged to the Statesman, the Financier, and the Diplomatist, rather than to the General, and to which we will venture to say no general was ever before subjected ; thwarted as he was, in all the more enlarged views which he took of the means by which difficulties were to be averted or overcome, he never flagged, he never gave way ! If we were to be guided merely by his official dispatches, published in the Gazette of the day, or such parts of them as the Government at home thought themselves justified in making public, we might never have ascertained his own opinions. The reference would have been to the past, and not to the future. We know that men in such situations, whatever may be their real feelings of doubt, or even despondency, must conceal them from the world at large. It is impossible to deny that there were times, at home, when the public were almost without a hope of ultimate success. His withdrawal at that moment, although it would no doubt have been the cause of much obloquy to himself, and of triumph to those who had constantly predicted failure, would in all probability have been felt by the nation as unavoidable j and he had difficulties to contend with that must have weighed with the Government and the public if he had recommended such a step. A sense of his own arduous responsibility, a sense of duty to those under whom he was acting, would compel him in his " private " communications to make known his private apprehensions, if he had them.

How do we find this m his case, where every secret thought and every private feeling is laid open to us? No ignorance of the difficulties, no insensibility to the dangers, no unconsciousness of what (to most men) would have caused almost a hopelessness of success ! but, with a full sense of all this, there is a self-confidence, a belief, that as he was conscientiously acting for the best, the result would ultimately turn out for the best, which shows itself in every confidential communication.

Another very observable point in his character was the openness and candour with which he admitted any error which he might feel convinced at a later period that he had committed. Xo man has probably passed through life (not so eventful, or pregnant with deeds so essentially affecting the interest of thousands, as his was) who has not felt, that, if certain events were to occur again, the conduct adopted would have been different. But most men would wish, and would probably attempt to make it appear, that they had done right. He, no doubt, intended to do right, and thought at the time that be had done so. But his sense of truth was such, hm integrity was so great, that if at a later period he believed that failure had resulted from mistake or miscalculation of his own, he had the honest, open, fearlessto avow it.

His disregard of everything that could savour of selfrank, or pecuniary advantage, is most striking. We do not Bay that men whose lives arc daily in peril, and whose whole worldly interests are embarked in the profession they follow, are to be called grasping becaux- they do their beal to nun their position to advantage; but we believe that few instances can be adduced of a man starting in his profession with nothingbey on d a younger brother's portion (whatever that might be) who so nobly and disinterestedly refused the allowances and pay offered to him by the foreign nations in whose service he was employed, and to which he was fully entitled from the military rank which he held in their armies, but which he knew the finances of their country could ill afford.

The rewards afterwards bestowed upon him by the Parliament of his own country were, of course, to be regarded in a different light. He accepted them with gratitude, as proud proofs of his country's approval !

Ambition, avowed honourable desire of distinction, no doubt formed part of his character. Nothing of this shows itself in his conduct ; no artificial struggle for elevation, no effort to place himself above those with whom he was acting : but we cannot believe that he was devoid of it.

Disappointment at being deprived of what he conceived would have led to such distinction in his profession, is observable only once in his long career. His letters upon what he felt to be superseding him in India, when troops were sent from that country to Egypt, are the only indication that he ever gave of such feelings. And, of course, his mortification was connected with the expectation of the professional reputation which he should have gained by it.

We must all feel how wisely and inscrutably Providence dispenses its arrangements ! Colonel Wellesley, commanding a comparatively small body of troops from India, which did not arrive in Egypt till too late for any display of military prowess or distinction, might have been cut off by disease or accident, and the world

[NTRODUCTION. V

might then have been deprived of the greatest military genius of our own or any other age ! !

This, however, is beside our subject, except as a further illustration of the command of temper, and of the high sense of duty, which distinguished him thus early in life, and which shone with increased lustre in proportion to the brilliancy of his subsequent career. The innate, natural, and honourable feeling of ambition did not desert him ; the disappointment of what he felt to be well-founded expectation did not induce him to retire in disgust ; and the age and the country which he adorned have reason to be thankful for that frame of mind which induced him to continue his proion.

Without, therefore, any attempt to repeat the oftentold but never weaning tale of our great Duke's etcpUnts t or to give a repetition of the events of his life, we ly wish here to bring before his fellow-countrymen proofs of his feelings and principles under various circumstances, as important characteristic points, and as showing. —

1st. 1 1 is confidence in himself, and buoyancy under personal responsibility.

2d. His forbearance and forgiveness of injustice.

3d. His firmness under home and foreign annoyances.

1th. 1 1 i -^ natural feelings of secrecy and caution.

5th. His disinterestedness as to money or rank, and his raJ candour and simplicity of character.

6th. His placability aa to the faults and failings of others, evinced by his feelings connected with subordination and courts-martial.

Those various points we shall establish by reference to his dispatches written at the time, under the impulse of the moment, and often under circumstances which might have caused the bravest mind to quail, or the coolest head to be excited; and showing in its native colors what, we believe we may venture to assert, was one of the most noble, great, and glorious spirits that ever existed in man.

BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

An attentive perusal of the private inward feelings laid open before us in these Dispatches will prove to the reader that the caution, and what his political or other opponents called his Fabian policy (which they, and indeed many rash and wrong-headed men, in his own army, at times almost considered as timidity), was combined with a buoyancy of hope, and a glimpse, even under the darkest cloud, of brighter though distant gleams, which few men possessed.

The circumstances under which he was frequently placed were, indeed, enough to have oppressed the most cheerful mind, and at some moments the least prospect of success might have been looked upon as chimerical : but /lis spirit did bear up, and his hopes were eventually realised. They were not founded upon the careless expectation or belief, which persons so often entertain, that "tilings will all turn out for the best," or that " when things are at the worst they must mend," and which are the only resource or consolation of weak minds ; but, with the hope, he always gives In- ground for entertaining it.

He had no doubt a xevy strong feeling of self-confidence. II'' did not allow that feeling to precipitate him into any unnecessary ri>k ; and his natural caution led him to weigh and Consider well before he decided.

lie had too many instances amongst the Spanish ,L r ciior;ils

12 BUOYANCY OE SPIRIT,

of the total failure which mast follow such displays of arrogance, vanity, and presumption as they continually exhibited, and indeed boasted of, as instances of national courage and glory : and if at any time his own elastic spirit quailed, it was when those vain -glorious men destroyed whole armies, and wasted every resource, in spite of his utmost efforts to prevent them.

But when the smallest prospect of success presented itself, his spirit seized and took advantage of it ; and we believe most firmly, that on more than one occasion he was almost the only man in his army who did entertain the feeling.

At an early period, and when, it is true, that the circumstances were not of such a pressing nature, we find him possessed of the firmness to take, and the fearlessness to act upon his own views, and to carry out what he believed to be right.

Troops were assembled at the Island of Ceylon with a view to certain expeditions, which were afterwards given up, in order to send a force to Egypt. Colonel Wellesley, for reasons which he gives in detail, decided upon sailing with those troops to Bombay, on their way to the Red Sea, instead of remaining at Trincomalee to await further orders.

This did not meet with the approbation of the Hon. Frederick North, the Governor of Ceylon, and Colonel Wellesley writes to him : —

" The existence of your public letter upon the records of your government increases considerably my responsibility on this occasion. However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay, and the urgency of the measure, so great, that I persist ; and still hope that it will meet with your approbation, and that of General Macdowall." (i. 71.)

AM) SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 1 3

The expedition under General Baird sailed to the Red Sea from Bombay, and Colonel Wellesley returned to Seringapatam. He was made a Major-general ; and in L808 was appointed to command a portion of an army destined to act against the Mahrattas.

He was invested by the Governor-general with considerable extra powers, and appointed to the chief command (subject only to General Stuart and General Lake) of all tlie British troops, as well as to the general direction and control of all the political and military officers within certain limits.

These orders were communicated to the Government of Bombay ; and in virtue of them, General Wellesley opened a communication with that government respecting some of the troops stationed in the Gnickwar territory, within that presidency. He wrote again, more than once, to complain that certain measures had not been taken, and it is obvious that he had no great confidence in the judgment of that government.

In a letter to the Secretary of Government, with 'lice to certain disposition of the troops there, he Bays : —

" I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our

small forces in that quarter. If the Governor in Council thinks

r to adopt the suggestions of .Major Walker^ they must

ried into execution; and I hope that I shall not be con-

tnsible for the consequences." (i. 328.)

In a letter very soon after to the Private Secretary of Governor-general at Calcutta, he says, —

" I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan (the Governor of Bombay) for the organization of the troops and the general detVnce of Giizerat : but although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with hu little prejudices, and F see plainly it. will

never be carried into execution as it ought, ruder these circumstances I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor-general, to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat ; but I have refrained, and shall persevere as long as I can." (i. 336.)

Again he writes to the Governor of Bombay : —

" I learn by your letter that you disapprove of my plan, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service : but I should be presumptuous if, after your opinion, I were to persist; and I should deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might arise/' (i. 342.)

In a letter to Colonel Murray, adverting to Mr. Duncan's letters, he says : —

" After having objected to my plau, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. / am not afraid of responsibility, God knows ! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service : but under such circumstances I should be mad if I w T ere to order this plan to be carried into execution." (i. 343.)

And again he writes to Major Shawe • —

" I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the defence of those territories, he has written to say that acquiescence is not approbation : but that if I choose to be responsible for the consequences it shall be carried into execution. I should have no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded, and I should incur blame when I should not deserve it." (i. 348.)

And yet, with all these well-founded grounds for distrust, and conduct which had tended to break off friendly and confidential intercourse, we find that when

AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 15

his final departure from the army approached, considering Mr. Duncan as a public servant, whose authority must be supported, such was his general disposition to t and forgive, that he would permit no angry feelings to prevail, and the following is the conclusion of his official correspondence : —

11 Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command, and jiicntly giving up the immediate communication which I have held with your government, allow me once more to return you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, favour, and kindness. Although at a distance, I shall ever be anxious for the honour and prosperity of your government, and I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in your service." (ii. 307.)

He left that country on the 24th of June, 1804, and went to Calcutta. He was again sent to Seringapatam in the expectation of more service, but ultimately left India, and arrived in England in September 1805.

A considerable time elapsed without his being again in any situation that required correspondence upon pro- ;ial subjects j but at last, in June 1808, he was appointed to the command of that detachment of British troops which opened the Peninsular war. His success upon landing was brilliant ; but the arrival of more troops, with senior officers, deprived him of the command, and he returned to England. Before his departure we have a proof, however, of the continued buoyant of his ardent mind. Writing to Mr. Stuart, at ( tporto, in Septeffib r 1st, he Bays : —

u \ do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, or l- instructed to do: but if I were in his situation I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month." (iv. 121.)

He returned to England in October, and the inquiry into the Convention of ('intra took place in November.

1G BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT,

In March, 1809, he was again sent to command in Portugal, where lie arrived on the 2 2d of April. His military movements to Oporto were prompt and successful ; when he turned his attention to the Spanish frontier, and writes home with his usual cheerful anticipation of success to Lord Castlereagh, —

" I think it probable that Cuesta and I shall be more than a match for the French army on the Guadiana, and that we shall force them to retreat. My instructions will then be important, and unless they are altered I shall be obliged to halt at the moment when my advance might be most important to the cause of the Spaniards. I wish the king's ministers to give me a latitude to continue my operations in Spain, if I consider them consistent with the safety of Portugal."

His communications, personal or by letter, were always cheering to those under his command. Major-general Mackenzie had been left in charge of a small corps of observation upon the frontier near the Tagus, during Sir Arthur's expedition with the main body of the army to Oporto, and had apparently been led to expect an attack from the French upon his small force. Sir Arthur writes to him, giving his reasons why he does not think the attack probable, and having in his former letters to him taken all contingencies into his calculation, concludes with a short inspiring postscript : —

" Look at your instructions, my dear Mackenzie, — act boldly upon them, and I will be responsible for all the arrangements." (iv. 323.)

In June it was believed that the British Minister at Lisbon, the Honourable John Villiers, was about to retire. Sir Arthur writes to him, to express his regrets, and thanking him for the assistance which he had received. He announces the expected arrival of reinforcements, and the extension of his own authority, to advance if he

AND SENSE or PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 17

(bought proper, and still retaining his characteristic tone of cheerfulness, concludes with these words: — ■

■• So that the ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have Btrength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money." (iv. 384.) *

He afterwards did advance, at the request of General Cuesta, though evidently with a conviction that the movements proposed were not the most advisable; and he found it impossible to act cordially with him. The battle of Talavera took place, but with little benefit, in quence of Cuesta's retreat, which compelled Sir Arthur to do the same. He was naturally much mortified, as he felt that if Cuesta would have complied with his >ns the prospect of success was good.

But, in spite of all. his hopes do not desert him ; and rites thus in his private letter to Lord Castlereagh,

\ gust 1st : —

'' My public letters will give you some idea of our situation. • 1 1 1 c embarrassment, but of which I think I shall (jet the better; I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, which would cripple us so much as to render all our efforts 38. I certainly should get the belter of everything if I could manage General Cuesta ; but his temper and disposition are so bad that that i> impossible." (iv. 52-j.)

Lord Wellesley had been appointed to succeed Mr. i the British minister with the Central Junta, and

Srst letter to him from Sir Arthur, .after his arrival

.:• Seville, is one in which his buoyant spirit seems ii to be breaking down : —

W I wish I could see you, or send somebody to you; but I

cannot. I think, therefore, thai the best thing you can do Is to

send somebody to me as soon as you can; thai is to say, if I

i, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing : but a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and their spirit ; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as the men ; and with an army which a fortnight ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a French corps of half their strength." (v. 15.)

A fortnight after we find, by a letter to Marshal Beresford, that he had quitted Spain : —

" I think the circumstances in which the world, and this peninsula in particular, will be placed in a short time, call upon you to report at an early period the actual progress which has been made, and the prospects which exist of forming an army in Portugal. We owe this to the Government, in order to enable them to determine how far they will go in expense, and how much they will risk in an army to maintain Portugal.