Naval researches; or, a candid inquiry into the conduct of admirals Byron, Graves, Hood, and Rodney, in the actions off Grenada, Chesapeak, St. Christopher's and of the ninth and twelfth of April, 1782, being a refutation of the plans and statements of Mr. Clerk, rear admiral Ekins, and others

Front matter

Qass.

Book.

NAVAL RESEARCHES;

Appendix to ditto 65

List of the Fleets 71

Explanation of the Plate 72

Hood's Actions at St. Christopher's 75

List of the British Fleet 92*

-French Fleet 93*

Rodney's Actions of the 9th and 12th of April, 1782 95

Line of Battle 128

Supplement to Rodney's Actions 131

List of the French fleet under Comte de Grasse. ... .... 134

Ditto under Mons. Bougainville 135

Explanation of the four Plates .... 336

PREFACE,

It cannot but be desirable that every work which professes to afford instruction on a subject so important to a maritime nation as that of Naval Evolutions, should be as little liable, as the nature of such a work will admit, to leave its readers under false impressions with regard to the movements which it undertakes to describe, and which form the basis of its deductions. Looking with this view at the Publication of the late Mr. Clerk, of Etdin, I cannot in the first place, withhold a cordial coincidence with the deservedly general estimation in which it is held, (particularly with respect to the Tactical part of that work) and, from this feeling, I have long been anxious that a work of such high authority should be free from the few errors into which the Author was led most probably from a want of practical experience in the subject on which he treats; but I have of late felt this anxiety increased in consequence of the additional importance attached to those errors, by the wider circulation and the higher

B

10 PREFACF.

sanction they derive from being incorporated into the more recent work on Naval Battles published by Rear Admiral Ekins.

Having devoted a considerable portion of the leisure which it has been the lot of many a Sailor on shore to enjoy, to keeping alive in my own mind an interest in the pursuits of the Profession to which I find the attachment which bound me to it in childhood, still unabated, I am desirous that others also should cherish at least an equal interest in studies of such vital importance to their country ; and, with this view, I have endeavoured to divest the generally received opinions on certain Naval Movements, of the intricacies and contradictions which have hitherto enveloped them, and which, if suffered to remain, would tend to disgust the young Naval Student by their perplexing obscurity, and to damp the ardour he might otherwise feel in preparing himself for the momentous duties of his profession.

In the pursuit of this object it has been an additional source of gratification, to discover, as I proceeded, stronger grounds for assuming that the names of several of our Naval Commanders had been treated with much greater severity than they deserved, and that many of the operations of our Navy, which the violence of party spirit, or the obliquity of opposing interests, had represented in an unfavorable light, required only the persevering industry of calm and impartial research, to place

PREFACE. 11

them in a point of view in which they may still be regarded with pride and gratitude.

I trust that the pretensions thus advanced will not be considered presumptuous when I add, that the documents on which they are grounded are of a nature widely different from those of which either of the above named writers availed himself. While the plans given by Mr. Clerk are derived merely from his own conception of the Movements as described by the Admirals engaged, and while Rear Admiral Ekins has adopted the plans thus originating with Mr. Clerk, the data on which I have principally founded my Remarks on these movements are partly the result of my own personal observations, matured by reflection and experience, and partly the Plans and Statements drawn by Captain Matthews on the spot, and immediately recorded after the Engagements.

Trusting that these sources of information will give to the following observations a claim to a degree of authenticity to which the before mentioned works cannot aspire, I have only to request that the indulgence of my readers may be extended to the style in which those observations are conveyed. Having entered the Navy before I had completed mv eleventh year, I may perhaps be excused if I should appear to have devoted more attention to the facts I relate than to the manner in which they are related : I will at least endeavour to be as perspicuous as the nature of my undertaking will allow, and nothing

12 PREFACE,

shall induce me intentionally to distort or misrepresent any transaction which may be narrated in the following pages. Having no wish but to arrange the facts I may be enabled to collect, and to make what I trust will form useful deductions from them, I need scarcely disclaim the slightest feeling of disrespect whenever I find myself under the necessity of differing from the writers who have already steered the course which I am about to pursue.

ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION.

ADMIRAL BYRON'S ACTION,

OFF GRENADA.

Before I enter upon the details of this engagement, I would state a few circumstances connected with the early proceedings of the squadron, which may have biassed the public mind in forming an opinion upon the merits of its Admiral, who, though undeserving of censure, was so unhappy as to have the effects of the visitations of Providence attributed to his want or skill in his profession, or to a want of energy in his character.

Previous to any declaration of war, or even any avowed intention of hostility on the part of France towards this country, a squadron of twelve sail of the line, and some frigates, had been equipped for service at the port of Toulon, with that degree of secrecy which usually characterized the operations of the then French government ; and notwithstanding his Majesty's ministers had received intelligence that such an armament was in course of preparation, and although they must have been aware of the object of its equipment, yet they were so infatuated, that no measures were pursued to counteract, or anticipate, those insidious attempts of France in aid of the cause of rebellion in that quarter of the globe, except to send a frigate to cruize at the entrance of the Strait of Gibraltar, to ascertain when the hostile squadron might pass through, and to endeavour to discover its probable destination.

Captain Sutton of the Proserpine, who was entrusted with this important mission, descried the French squadron on the 16th of May, and, as soon as he could form a conjecture of its course, he returned to England with the intelligence, and arrived in Plymouth Sound on the 5th of June.

It was afterwards ascertained that this squadron had left Toulon on the 12th of April, 1778,* under the command of that distinquished officer the the Comte d' Estaing.

Admiral Byron left Plymouth Sound on the 9th of June, with twelve ships of the line, a frigate, and a sloop of war, with orders to proceed to North America, the supposed destination of Mons. d' Estaing.

Admiral Byron unfortunately attempted to prosecute his passage on a western, instead of pursuing a more southern course, which experience has since shown to be the safest and the most expeditious. In consequence of this, four and twenty days were expended in making a hundred and twenty leagues, at the expiration of which time, he encountered a tremendous gale of wind, which dispersed his squadron. The Admiral was left to prosecute the voyage alone in the Princess Royal, while some of his ships were obliged to return to England, and the remainder reached such ports in North America as their shattered condition would allow them to make.

If Admiral Byron had been ordered to proceed to Gibraltar early in the month of May, instead of waiting in Plymouth Sound for the return of the Proserpine, much benefit might have resulted from it; and possibly many of the disasters which this squadron experienced might have been avoided. At all events Lord Howe's gallant little squadron, had it been reinforced in time, as it might, had the above arrangement been adopted, would have been

* It is somewhat singular that on that day four years the French Navy sustained a defeat from which they never recovered during the war.

able to have acted on the offensive, and to have rendered ineffectual the co-operation of the French squadron with their new allies the Americans — if it had not led to its defeat, or capture. But it was not to be, and zVdmiral Byron never collected more than ten out of the thirteen ships of the line which sailed with him from England : nor did he effect his junction with them until the 26th of September.

After his arrival in the West Indies from North America, he often tried to bring the French squadron to action, but without success, owing to their superiority in sailing. Admiral Byron had therefore no fair opportunity of removing the general prejudice entertained against him.

While he was escorting the homeward bound trade to a certain latitude, the French took the opportunity to cap= ture the Island of St. Vincent. This they effected with only four small vessels and four hundred troops ; owing to the culpable negligence of the Governor, and the military commanding officers, who had taken no step whatever to put the island in a state of defence.

When Admiral Byron returned to St. Lucia from the northward he found that the above occurrence had taken place during his absence. He accordingly concerted measures with General Grant to attempt the re-capture of the island.

During his absence Mons. de la Motte Piquet with seven sail of the line had, on the 27th of June, arrived at Martinique. Owing to some extraordinary oversight, the arrival of this squadron was not communicated to the Admiral on his return.* Previous to sailing on his intended expedition, he sent a small vessel to reconnoitre Fort Royal harbour, Martinique. The officer on his return reported, that he saw there thirteen large ships, which he supposed to be ships of war; that he was confirmed in this opinion, by observing, that one of the ships carried a flag at the foretop-mast-head ; and that he was prevented from reconnoitring them so close as he intended, by a frigate and some small craft being sent in chase of him. This intelligence deceived Admiral Byron very much, by leading him to conjecture, that M. d' Estaing had not been joined by his expected re-inforcements from Europe. In the afternoon of the 4th of July, the Admiral received information from St. Vincent, that on the 1st instant, a French fleet of more than thirty ships of war* had passed by that island; and that it was reported, that M. de la Motte Piquet had joined M. d' Estaing about a week before that time. In consequence of this intelligence, the fleet bore up for the Island of Grenada. On the 5th he was joined by two schooners from Grenada. By the accounts which they gave, the invasion of the island was put beyond a doubt; but as to the strength of the enemy's fleet, their reports were very contradictory.*

Stedman in his history of the American war, when speaking of these vessels having met Admiral Byron, says, "Two vessels which had made their escape, after the arrival of the Count d' Estaing at Grenada, met the British fleet ; and from the intelligence brought by them, the Admiral was led to believe that the naval force at Grenada, under the Count d' Estaing, was inferior to his own.f

The above circumstances are important, as they enable the reader to form a more correct judgment of the proceedings of Admiral Byron in the action about to be narrated.

It will now perhaps be a proper opportunity to lay before the reader what Mr. Clerk's opinion was with respect to Admiral Byron's mode of conducting his fleet on that

* The French force amounted to thirty-five ships of war on the day of the engagement.

* Beatson's Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 464, 465.

t Stedman's History of the War, vol.2, p. 96. All these circumstances are not only kept out of sight by the author of ''Naval Battles Critically Reviewed and Illustrated/' but in addition thereto, those parts of Admiral Byron's Letter which make any reference to them are carefully expunged from his extract of it.

occasion. "The similarity," says Mr. Clerk, "of this battle with that of Mr. Byng, already described, is so great that, whether the mode in which the British made the attack, or the mode in which the French avoided it, shall be considered, we have no doubt of showing, that the circumstances in either case are equally effected by the principles laid down (section iv.) ; &c. &c." Nor may it be improper, at the same time to present the reader with Rear Admiral Ekins's opinion of it, couched in the form of an " Observation," viz. : "With an inferiority of force (21 to 26 or 27 ships of the line) it was certainly indiscreet in the British Admiral, to attempt to bring on a general action by endeavouring to stop the van of the enemy."

We will now endeavour to discover how far these reflections on the conduct of Admiral Byron can with justice be maintained.

Early on the morning of the 6th, Vice Admiral Byron with a fleet of twenty-one ships of the line,* and a convoy of transports, arrived off the N.W. part of the Island of Grenada, in order to attempt its relief. At 4 a.m. the Enemy's look-out frigates announced the approach of the British fleet.

At day-light Admiral Byron perceiving that the Enemy's ships were getting under way, made the signal for a General Chase in the S.W. quarter, as their outer ships bore at that time about S. by W. from the Princess Royal. Soon after, the signal was made for the fleet to form into line a-head, for their mutual support, according to their respective rate of sailing. In consequence of the French fleet being in a cluster, while attempting to get out of the bay,

* One of them, the Medway, carrying 60 guns, was only 1204 tons, and was twenty-four years old.

Admiral Byron conceived that their force did not exceed fourteen or fifteen ships of the line. The signal was then made for the Suffolk and Vigilant to quit the convoy, leaving it in charge of the Monmouth. Rear Admiral Rowley, with the above ships, had been ordered to stay by the transports for the purpose of superintending the landing of the troops, unless otherwise directed by signal.

At six o'clock the signal was made for the ships to engage as they could get up, without attending to the established order of battle. The British were then running down in column, steering about S. by W., with the wind at E.N.E., or on the Larboard Quarter. Upon the breeze reaching the French fleet their ships endeavoured to draw out into line as fast as possible ; the van ships laying up north, or along the land 4 with the starboard tacks on board.

When the breeze had enabled the enemy's fleet to draw out into line, Admiral Byron was convinced that he had been misinformed with respect to their number and force, by the masters of the two vessels he had spoken on the previous day : for he then discovered that they had twenty-six or twenty-seven sail of two-decked ships. "However," says the Admiral, in his public letter, " I determined to make the attack." And in this resolution he was probably strengthened, by having observed, as he ran along the land, that the French flag was flying at every signal station upon the Island ; he therefore had no alternative but to risk the chances of a battle.

Before he made the above discovery, Admiral Byron appears to have had a double object in view; if he saw the British flag still flying at St. George's, he was pursuing t the course that would have led him to that place ; should it be in the possession of the enemy, the course he steered would lead him down upon the rear of their fleet ; so that he was prepared to adopt either measure, according to circumstances.

As the two fleets were thus obliquely approaching each other, from opposite directions, the weathermost of the enemy's advanced ships fired at the British van ; no. doubt with the hope of drawing them off from their evidently intended attack upon their rear, which was yet unformed. But the gallant Barrington was not to be allured or intimidated from steadily pursuing his purpose, and continued to steer towards their sternmost ships : nor did he deign to return their fire, until he had got sufficiently near to them, which he accomplished at half past seven, A. m. when he opened his fire on their centre and rear in crossing.

At eight o'clock, the Sultan, the leading ship, had passed the sternmost ship of the enemy, and wore round under her stern; this compelled the French ship to bear up also to avoid being raked. In consequence of this, the Sultan was carried so far to leeward that she lost the proud station of leading the fleet, an honor which now devolved on the Prince of Wales, Vice Admiral Barrington, who wore round, and gradually hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, to follow up the enemy. Admiral Byron then made the signal for the fleet to ware in succession and to chase N.W. ;* then for eight of the headmost ships to form into line for their mutual support, without attending to the prescribed order of battle, and to engage close.

While the van was thus waring and forming astern of Vice Admiral Barrington, the sternmost ships that were coming up, under Bear Admiral Hyde Parker, were engaged with the enemy while crossing each other from op-

* The only compass signals of that day were limited to four, viz. the N E , N W,, S.E., and S.W. quarters ; therefore, although the signal was made to cha?e in the N.W. quarter, it was not meant thereby that the fleet was to steer N.W. Mr. Clerk from not having understood the full import of this signal, very naturally fell into the error he did respecting it — this misconception led to the erroneous theory which he attempted to establish respecting this engagement : this ought to have been known to all Naval Officers of an}' standing in the service.

posite directions. Among these ships the Cornwall and Lion, from being nearer to the enemy than those about them, (for the rear division had not then formed into line) drew upon themselves almost the whole of the enemy's fire. In this attack, says Captain Matthews, the above ships were much disabled, as was the Grafton, which was a-head of them but equally near to the enemy in crossing.

In order to confirm what I have before advanced — that Admiral Byron began the action by an attack upon the enemy's rear, — and not their van, as was supposed by Mr. Clerk, which supposition has been adopted by Rear Admiral Ekins, I shall present the reader with the following extract from Matthews's account of the engagement taken at lhe time. " By eight, the British van had passed the rear of the enemy, and immediately veered after them, raking them with such effect, that two of the enemy's line of battle ships bore away before the wind.* The rear continued closely engaged with the enemy till about half past eight, the whole having then passed, the signal was made to veer and chase to the N.W and for seven of the headmost ships to draw into line. In this attack the Cornwall, Grafton, and Lion were much disabled, particularly the latter.f At nine the signal was made to engage as close as possible.

Rear Admiral Rowley from having been attached to the convoy of transports, until called in by signal, was among the sternmost ships, endeavouring to get into his station; but on perceiving his gallant friend Vice Admiral Barrington advancing towards him at the head of the British line,

* These ships I apprehend were driven from their position hy the Sultan, and Albion, which were the two leading ships, as they formed astern or the Prince of Wale?, when that ship hauled to the wind on the starboard tack.

t Captain Matthews did not specify the position of the above three ships, in his account of the engagement, because his second plate points out their exact situation, as well as that of every individual ship ; except those of the Suffolk, Vigilant, and Monmouth, which had not then joined, which plate will be given herewith.

and closely engaged with the enemy, he waited his nearer approach, when he wore round without signal, and placed himself a-head of the Prince of Wales, then, as well as the ships a-stern of her, under a crowd of sail to get up with the van of the enemy.

In this situation the Suffolk continued until she got a-breast of the fourth ship in the enemy's line (from the van) when they by making sail, prevented her getting up with their leading ship. This gave their unoccupied ships an opportunity of firing occasionally at her.

The British van thus advancing, afforded some relief to the Cornwall and Lion, by passing between them and their opponents, and took up a station a-stern of Admiral Byron the moment that they found an opening to enable them to, do so. The precise place in the line which those ships then took, I have not been able to discover, but it must have been a-stern of the Commander in Chief, and not a-head of him, as represented in Mr. Clerk's plates of this action.

The whole of the rear division wore in succession and took a station as they could get up, in the wake of the Commander in Chief; forming a north and south line, and not a N.W. and S.E. as it is represented to have done in the plates published by Mr. Clerk and Rear Admiral Ekins.

About ten o'clock the Fame, Cornwall, Grafton, and Lion, were so completely cut to pieces, that they were obliged to quit the line and drop a-stern in order to repair their damages; yet Admiral Byron persevered in his attack, although he then had only seventeen to twenty-six or twenty-seven ships of the enemy.

This having been observed by Captain Fanshawe, and that the British Van was closely engaged with and opposed to superior numbers, he, in the most gallant manner, bore down to the support of the former without signal, and placed the Monmouth, the ship he commanded, a-head of the Suffolk, Rear-Admiral Rowley, and a-breast of the third ship of the enemy's line. This gallant proceeding Admiral Byron in his official letter, unfortunately describes as having been done for the purpose of stopping the van of the enemy, (a favorite expression of the day) which never couid have been Captain Fanshawe's intention, as he placed the Monmouth, as before remarked, a-breast of the third ship in the French line,* and not in the French leading ship's line of course, — the only mode of stopping a ship.

The action was continued until one p. m., notwithstanding the disparity of force, when the French van bore up and crowded sail away.f An anonymous commentator, who frequently appears behind the scenes in the work entitled " Naval Battles," very sarcastically says on this, that "with British intrepidity it might have ended gloriously ;"$ but unfortunately the gallant, and no doubt experienced commentator, forgot to subjoin the plan he would have adopted, in a similar situation, to have achieved so brilliant and so hazardous an exploit. To be sure he lays down some common place axioms for the conduct of a fleet, but they do not happen to apply to the case now under consideration.

Notwithstanding the injury the enemy's ships sustained was not so apparent as that experienced by the British, yet their great loss of men could not have occurred without some of their ships having received material damage : for according to the lowest estimate that could be obtained of their killed and wounded, the former were said to

* This part of Admiral Byron's letter appears to have entirely misled Mr. Clerk in his view of this battle.

t Matthews, page 6.

% In the account given by Rear Admiral Ekins of the gallant defence made by Admiral Barrington at St. Lucia, against almost double his force, the same commentator, at least I should, by his style, presume him to be the same individual, says, " While the British deseive every credit for their skill and gallantly, I cannot but think the failure of the attack was owing more to the lack of both on the part of the enemy." This appears a strange way of paying a compliment to British valour, and to British nautical skill.

amount to one thousand two hundred, and the latter to one thousand jive hundred',* while in our fleet, only one hundred and eighty-three were killed, and three hundred and forty-six wounded. In one of the French ships, the captain, and five lieutenants, were killed.f

Having thus I trust shown that Admiral Byron conducted his fleet into action in a manner wholly different from that which is generally reported, and having thus justified the manoeuvres he was under the necessity of adopting, 1 would en passant, advert to the method by which the misrepresentations relative to this engagement have been attempted to be supported. Had the whole of the Admiral's letter been allowed to appear in the work of Rear Admiral Ekins, the battle would have worn a very different appearance; but then it would have overturned the System of Tactics of which the gallant author and his Magnus Apollo, Mr. Clerk, appear to be so fond. It is right however that Admiral Byron should be permitted to speak fully for himself, not only to vindicate his conduct in the engagement under consideration, but also with a view of pointing out the injury likely to be inflicted by such curtailments on the Service in general.

In order to place the subject fairly before the reader, I will subjoin those parts of Admiral Byron's public letter which have been so unceremoniously abridged, distinguishing those passages which Rear Admiral Ekins has omitted, by printing them between brackets thus [ ].

EXTRACTS, WITH OBSERVATIONS THEREON.

" The signal was made for a General Chace [in that quarter, % — as well as for Rear Admiral Rowley to leave the convoy ;] and [as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the enemy s ships appeared to be of the Line, from the position

* Beatsoif s Memoirs, vol. iv. p. 469. t Ibid.

X The S.W. quarter doubtless.

C they were in, the signal was made] to form and engage as they could get up."*

The enemy appearing not to exceed, at that time, fourteen or fifteen ships of the line, I cannot but think that the signals to chase, to form as convenient, and to engage as the ships could get up with the enemy, were decidedly the most judicious that could liave been made, under the above circumstances ; even if it had been the Commander-in-chiefs intention to attack the enemy's van — which it was not; — but which both Mr. Clerk and Rear Admiral Ekins seem determined to maintain as an incontrovertible fact,f or else, why was the above passage rejected by the latter writer ?

EXTRACT.

" But the enemy getting the breeze [of wind about that time,%\ drew out their line [from the cluster they were in,] by bearing away and forming to leeward on the starboard tack, [which shelved their strength to be very different from our Grenada intelligence ;§ for] it was plainly discovered they had thirty-four ships of war, [twenty-six or twenty-seven of which were of the Line, and many of these appeared of great force. However] the general chase was continued, and the signal was made for close engagement ; [but our utmost efforts could not effect that ;] the enemy in-

* Clerk's Tactics.

t See the first " Observation" in page 78 of " Naval fatties."

J The time alluded to was when the weather ships of the enemy's fleet began to fire at the Sultan, Prince of Wales, and Boyne ; the Three Ships that led into action.

§ This intelligence, as before described, was communicated by the two schooners that escaped from Grenada on the approach of the French fleet; which intelligence at the time they left the island might have been correct, as the vessel sent to reconnoitre Fort Royal Bay, Martinique, on the \*t or 2nd of July, reported to Admiral Byron that thirteen large ships were seen there, with a flag at the fore on board one of them; no doubt to deceive. These ships might have been De la Motte Piquet's squadron, who had only arrived there three days before D'Estaing sailed for Grenada, and might have remained for a day or two after.

dustriously avoided it, hj always bearing up when our ships got near them ; [and I was sorry to observe, that their superiority over us in sailing, gave them the option of distance, which they availed themselves of, so as to prevent our rear from ever getting into action."*]

As the importance or non-importance of the omitted passages given above speak for themselves, they stand in need of no observation to strengthen their claim to the reader's attention, except to notice the gallant, though proscribed " however."

EXTRACT.

"The ships that suffered most were the ships the action began with,f [and] the Grafton, Capt. Collingwood, Cornwall, Capt. Edwards, and Lion, Capt Cornwallis. The spirited example of Vice Admiral Barrington [with the former Three] exposed them to a severe fire in making the attack; [and the latter three happening to be to leeward, sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it passed on the starboard tmk"% ]