The philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Being an examination of the first principles of his system

Front matter

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Contents

Chaptke Pa.«b

I. What is Evolution ? 9

II. Laws of the Unknowable 24

Chapter I. What Is Evolution?

NO one longer holds with the ancient skeptic, that all things remain as they were since the beginning. All alike admit that the universe, as we know it, has had a beginning in time, and the problem which all alike propose is, to account for its origin and history. There was a time in the eternal duration when the present order did not exist, and a time when it began to be. How ? This is the question which both science and religion attempt to answer.

Until within a few years Theism has been accustomed to conceive of creation as an instantaneous work. "The Creator spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." In a moment, as the lightning flashes out of the dark night, so the worlds were "won from the void and formless infinite," and each one started on its way, perfect after its kind. By the word of the Lord were the heavens made. At his command the light kindled, and the oceans filled, and the whole earth swarmed with life. But it is claimed that the long times of

IO Review of Herbert Spencer.

natural history and geology, and the gradual introduction of higher forms, have thrown doubt upon this conception. It is said that the law which holds for all present development is true for creation also : First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. Creation was not a single but a successive work ; and, instead of being finished once for all, its vast and mysterious operations are still going on. Even yet the creative plan is not completed ; and, so far from being at a distance, we are in the very midst of creation's week.

It is hardly necessary to point out that evolution in this general form is perfectly compatible with Theism. All that Theism cares to know is, that Mind is the primal cause and the eternal ruler of the universe. Whether it hastens on to its purpose, or whether it lingers upon its way, is a matter of comparative indifference. When was it that the Spirit of God brooded over nature to bring forth the living from the lifeless ? Set up the date six thousand years ago, or carry it back to that nebulous time when the earth was without form and void, and darkness hung over the face of the deep ; one cannot see that it makes any difference. When was it that the seeds of life and mind were sown ? Was it after our earth had taken on its final form ? or were they scattered upon that desert mist from which the world has sprung ? How long was nature in fulfilling the Divine command — a week or an age ? Has it accomplished the work, or is it yet toiling at the task ? Were the lower forms of life created with the power of evolving the higher or not ? Is organic existence complex in essence, or is its variety but a harmonious variation upon a single string ? It is no degradation to the individual to be born ; why should it be any more degrading to species to be born ? If it is not degrading to teach that the individual reaches distinctive manhood only through the darkness and weakness of the birth-process and of unfolding infancy, I know not why it should be thought degrading to teach that species, too, struggle up through lower forms to their distinctive characteristics. I cannot feel that Theism, or even Christianity, is at all concerned with the answer to any of these questions. One view makes creation single, the other makes it successive. One concentrates the creative act upon a point of time, the other spreads it over unknown years. One makes nature instantaneously obedient ; the other keeps it toiling for ages at the Divine command. Either view might be worthily held, and each has many elements of peculiar sublimity and grandeur. Religion cares only to insist that in the beginning a Divine sower went forth to sow.

But there is another form of the evolution theory. The thorough-going evolutionist, availing himself of the doctrine of the unity of the forces, paces with firm step through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and finally brings all things home to the parentage of matter and force. He drives back beyond all life, beyond all form, beyond even the present material elements, back to the raw and faint beginnings of matter and force themselves. At that distant point there are no such myths as life and mind ; these are unimaginable ages down the future. There is nothing there but little lumps of good, hard matter. These are the fountain-head of existence, and only need to be left alone long enough to transform chaos into creation. Mind is not the beginning and primal cause of things, but is the final outcome of nature — the highest point to which the whirling atoms climb. This is what purports to be the scientific book of Genesis. This is evolution as it is held by the New School of Philosophy, of which Mr. Spencer is one of the chief apostles.

Now let us note the true nature of the problem which the New Philosophy attempts to solve. It often happens that a few vague and general analogies are allowed to blind the reason to the infinite complexity of the problem, and it may even be questioned whether many of the evolutionists themselves properly appreciate the task they have to perform. Their proposition, in plain words, is this : All things have come, by a rigid mechanical sequence, from the condensation of that primeval mist. Not merely the forms and disposition of matter, but life, and mind, and their various manifestations, have all been evolved by necessary physical causation.

At first sight it would appear that thought and emotion have nothing in common with the buzzing of atoms ; but, in truth, these little lumps need only to be properly combined to become self-conscious, and think, and feel, and hope, and aspire ; and, if they have come forward under the proper conditions, they may even pray and worship. Whatever of nobility, of heroism, and of high manhood there may have been in the past, it was only a material combination, and had an exact physical equivalent. So completely is mind the result of organization, that it is even held that if a brain could be made exactly like that of Socrates, the owner would have the memory, the thought, the consciousness of Socrates. Two brains which are physically equivalent are also mentally equivalent. Construct, to-day, the brain of Plato as it was in his old age, and that brain would remember its early association with Socrates, the scenes at his trial and in the prison, the composition of the dialogues, and all that the real Plato actually experienced. Manufacture Crom - well's brain, and it could give you an exact account, from its own consciousness, of the battle at Naseby and the triumph at Marston Moor. It could tell of the Long Parliament, the condemnation of the King, and the Lord-Protectorship. Any man's thought, memory, consciousness, could be completely recovered by reconstructing his brain. If there had been a spectator who could detect the position of

14 Review of Herbert Spence?.

the forces in that nebulous mass, he could have reasoned mechanically and mathematically, to orbital rings and solid globes, to man and his works, to Homer and the Iliad, to Newton and the Principia, to Milton and the Paradise Lost, to Shakspeare and Hamlet. By simple deductive reasoning, that spectator could have foreseen all our art, our science, our civilization, and could have prophesied all that is yet to come. He could have foretold all the folly and suffering and sin of men, and could have written human history, while yet the race was unborn. There is not a mote that trembles in the sunbeam, nor a leaf that is driven in the wind, whose existence and exact position he could not have foretold. The problem would, indeed, have been a complex one, and would have outrun the resources of our mathematics, but still it would have been a purely mechanical question. There is not a thought that ever toiled, or that ever shall toil, in a human brain, there is not an ache that ever wrung a human heart, that was not potentially there. The physical combinations that represent truth and honor, piety and affection, were all latent there. Our longings for knowledge were there ; and when we inquire after the origin of things our thoughts but return to their early home. Mr. Spencer, and his philosophy, and the criticisms upon it, were there. The dancing atoms whirled and whirled, until they became self-conscious, and thought, and reflected, and wrote their autobiography in the philosophy of Mr. Spencer. I am not misrepresenting the theory. Prof. Tyndall says of it : " Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not only the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself — emo tion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena — were once latent in a fiery cloud." * In this evolution there has been no guiding Mind, but only the working of ' physical force. Mr. Spencer demands no purpose, but only a power. One aim of his philosophy is to show that an intelligent Creator is needless. He is impatient of the doctrine that creation is the work of wisdom, and calls it the " carpenter theory." If we consider the fact and function of reproduction, which run through all organic nature, it would seem that here is overwhelming proof of a purpose to preserve the species ; but we are not allowed to think so, on pain of being charged with "fetichism." If we think of the eye or ear as it forms in the womb, it would seem that the power at work must understand the laws of acoustics and optics, to form these organs in such exact and complex accordance with them. It would seem, too, that the formation of these organs before they are needed indicates a knowledge of future wants, and a purpose of supply-

* "Fragments of Science," p. 159.

ing them ; but this belief also lies under the ban of fetichism. We can hardly help believing that the several organs were intended to perform those functions which they actually do perform ; but this thought is only a species of the primitive fetichism. The eyes are used to see with, but they were not intended for seeing. The ears hear, but they were not designed for hearing. We see and hear because we have eyes and ears ; but we are forbidden to say that eyes and ears exist in order that we may see. The organs of reproduction serve to preserve the species, but ^hey were tiot made for any such end. They were evolved and used for this purpose. "Every thing, no matter how complex and purposeike in its adaptations, represents the working of a power ; nothing whatever exhibits the fulfillment of a purpose. "The transformation of an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity into a definite, coherent heterogeneity, which goes on every-where until it brings about a reverse transformation, is consequent upon certain simple laws of force."* Such is the theory. To many it will seem to break down from pure excess of absurdity. At present I make no decision ; but I do insist that every one who is fond of talking magniloquently about evolution should know precisely what he has to prove.

Yet, strange as it may seem, Mr. Spencer denies that his system is atheistic. The ground of the

* " First Principles," p. 495.

denial is his doctrine of an unknowable. But, upon inquiry, it turns out that this unknowable is merely the substance which underlies phenomena. It has neither sense, intelligence, nor will. To attribute these to it is a species of fetichism. Yet Mr. Spencer dreams that he saves his system from atheism by calling this thing God. We will not quarrel about names. That which we know as matter is set up as the cause of all things. This matter, working according to mechanical laws, without intelligence or purpose, has produced the order of the world about us. All spontaneous action is distinctly repudiated. This is the doctrine ; and this is essential atheism.

Mr. Spencer further denies that his system is materialistic. The New Philosophy plumes itself upon rising above the contest between the spiritualist and materialist, and pronounces the question to be a war of words. The claim is the emptiest pretense. " That no idea or feeling arises save as a result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science ; and ,vhoever duly weighs the evidence will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory can explain its non-acceptance." * That mental force is but transformed physical force, is the primary assumption. The mind itself is a " series of states of consciousness ;" and a state of conscious-

* " First Principles," p. 2S0.

ness is a transformed nerve-current. Now note the result. Without a nervous system there can be no nerve-currents ; without nerve-currents there can be no states of consciousness ; and without states of consciousness there can be no mind. The mind comes into existence with the organism, and both perisli together. During its existence, it is absolutely determined by external conditions ; for Mr. Spencer denies volitional freedom in the most explicit terms, and on the admitted ground that if freedom be a fact it is fatal to his system. Now, it is rather instructive, after such teaching, to be told that " the explanations here given are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic." It is evident, however, from the frequency and earnestness with which Mr. Spencer makes this claim, that he really thinks his petty word-distinctions save his system from materialism. Yet, if the system which makes the soul a product of organization that must, of course, perish with the organism is not materialistic, it would be hard to say what materialism is. Indeed, this is the doctrine which most of the leaders of the New Philosophy now openly avow, whether from keener logical perception or from greater causes ] cannot decide.

One more general criticism must be offered before proceeding to a specific examination of this philosophy. Every system of evolution which is not guided by intelligence is merely a new edition of the time-honored theory of chance. In every mechanical system, all the results depend upon the first impulse, and between that primal motion and its effects there is room for nothing but necessity. However wide-spreading its effects may be, they were all necessarily contained in that first motion. Now, since to-day is determined by yesterday, it follows that all days were determined by the first day ; and before this philosophy can assume to be an explanation at all, it must account for that first day. The implicit assumption of its disciples is, that by the time we have reached the nebula, we have come to a simple and unorganized form of matter which needs no explanation. But here it must be borne in mind that complexity and organization do not cease where we fail to trace them. Upon this point Prof. Tyndall speaks as follows :

" It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that between the microscopic limit and the molecular limit there is room for infinite permutations and combinations. It is in this region that the poles of the atoms are arranged, that tendency is given to their powers, so that when these poles and powers have free action and proper stimulus in a suitable environment, they determine first the germ and afterward the complete organism. The first marshaling of the atoms, upon which all subsequent action depends, baffles a keener power than that of the microscope. Through pure excess of complexity, and long before observation can have any voice in the matter the most highly-trained intellect, the most refined and disciplined imagination, retires in bewilderment from the contemplation of the problem. We are struck dumb by an astonishment which no microscope can relieve, doubting not only the power of our instrument, but even whether we ourselves possess the intellectual elements which will enable us to grapple with the ultimate structural energies of nature." * Prof. Tyndall here calls attention to a fact which biologists and physiologists constantly overlook — the almost infinite complexity of what the microscope sees as simple. Nothing is more common than to hear physiologists, Mr. Spencer among the rest, speak of germs as perfectly homogeneous, because the microscope detects no trace of organization ; and, indeed, atheistic reasoning derives much of its plausibility from this false assumption. If the complex animal can be derived from the homogeneous germ, it is not incredible that the complexity of creation should be derived from the homogeneous nebula. But Prof. Tyndall has taught us that homogeneity is only in seeming ; that under the most homogeneous surface there are structural energies of such complexity, that we must question whether we have the mental elements which will enable us to grapple with them. It was in that realm, inaccessible to every thing but mind, that the wonders of creation

* " Fragments of Science," p. 153.

were wrought out The atheist's attempt to escape into simplicity is fruitless. His very assumptions forbid it. Because of the necessity which connects cause and effect in every mechanical scheme, we must conclude that all which exists now, existed in its causes at any given time in the past. The nebulous period really manifested no less intelligence and purpose than the present does ; the only difference is, that what is explicit now was implicit then. Going back to that nebulous time, we find tendencies and laws and powers so balanced that time alone is needed to give birth to the present order. No matter how far back we go ; if we assume that that nebula was the ruins of an earlier system, which had in turn been born from an antecedent nebula, still, at the earliest time, we find the exact and complex adjustment of tendencies and powers which must in time give birth to to-day. Looking around upon that earliest nebula, we find that the present was there ; and again we ask, What determined that first day ? what procured that primal balance of poles and powers, which made it impossible that any thing but the existing order should be born? Here lies the mystery of creation; nothing is explained until this question is answered. It must be either the work of wisdom or of chance; and if the work of chance, then all that has sprung from it is the work of chance also. Mr. Spencer denies that intelligence has any thing to do with evolution ; it follows, then, that chance is the architect of the universe. The vaporings about law and order do indeed serve to give an aspect of freshness to the threadbare arguments ; but they in no wise alter the underlying philosophy. When we get tc the naked form of Mr. Spencer's teaching, it is that a cloud of atoms only need to be shaken together long enough to hit upon the present order and harmony of the universe. The New Philosophy is not so new after all ; for, except in terminology, this is precisely the doctrine which Democritus and Lucretius taught two thousand years ago. The only thing which gives the new heresy greater plausibility than the old, is the greater extension of the universe in time. Who knows what might happen in eternity ? To be sure, we do not find the atoms playing any such fricks now ; but who knows what might not have happened back yonder in the dark ? Time works wonders ; and so the evolutionist becomes confused and giddy from the long cycles with which he deals, and talks of "untold ages," as if time could certainly correlate with intelligence. Because the work of intelligence is not stolen outright, but by piecemeal, the theft is allowed to escape notice. It is the error of the old mythology over again. The evolutionist gets the world upon the turtle's back ; and then either he forgets to supply any footing for the turtle, or else his faith becomes robust enough to venture to stand alone.

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Wc are now able to determine the true nature of the Spencerian doctrine of evolution. Whatever Mr. Spencer's personal views may be, the doctrine of his books is fatalism, materialism, atheism. These words are not used as terms of opprobrium at all, but as exactly descriptive of the system. There is no personal God ; there is no immortal soul. There is nothing but necessity without, and necessity within. To be sure, this philosophy is fond of speaking of progress, and talks, almost like a prophet, of the new heaven and the new earth. But, nevertheless, the progress ends in annihilation ; and all the wealth of manhood and affection which has made history rich and reverend, has dropped into darkness and perished. It is most instructive to hear materialism boasting of the high destiny which awaits the race.

But it is not for the critic to get frightened at results, but to ask for the credentials of the doctrine. It does not follow that the theory is false because it is materialistic and atheistic. We should indeed feel saddened and degraded if it were established, but that is no argument against it. If the reasoning is just, and the assumptions are well-founded, the doctrine must stand, with all its dreadful consequences These are the questions which we have now to consider.

Chapter II. Laws Of The Unknowable

A/TR. SPENCER introduced his philosophy «*-*A about ten years ago by the publication of his "First Principles." The volume is divided into two parts : the " Laws of the Unknowable," and the "Laws of the Knowable." Part I aims to determine the true sphere of all rational investigation, and, by so doing, to save the speculative mind from wasting its strength upon barren and essentially insoluble problems. The conclusion reached is that we can know nothing but phenomena, and their relations of coexistence and succession. Reality lies beyond the reach of our faculties, and is essentially unknowable.

When this work first appeared it was received with considerable applause, even by religious thinkers. Mr. Spencer admitted the reality of religion, and insisted upon the existence of God. To be sure, God, as the essential reality of the universe, must be unknowable ; but still, as such reality, Mr. Spencer insisted upon the Divine existence as the most fundamental datum of science, as well as of religion. In this respect the work was an a^ree-

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able change upon the open war, and scarcely undisguised atheism, of such men as Comte. It had, too, an aspect of humility. It set a limit to many extravagant speculations by declaring the limited nature of our faculties. These things moved many theologians to look upon the work as a flag of truce sent out from a hitherto hostile camp ; and they failed to see that the concessions to religion amounted to absolutely nothing, while the demands from it were such as to render true piety impossible. Mr. Spencer's "reconciliation" was effected by the destruction of one of the parties, and his peace was that of death. A God who must always remain x for thought and conscience has no more religious value than a centaur or a sea-serpent. Not that Mr. Spencer intended this result when he introduced this Trojan horse ; but such is, nevertheless, the outcome of the doctrine. In its religious aspects this theory of nescience is as pernicious as any in all speculation ; more so, even, than the hardy, old-fashioned atheism, because it is more decorous in appearance, and more specious in argument, while the two are identical in the final result. The first is a precipice, bold and naked, over which one may plunge if he chooses, but not unconsciously ; the second is the same precipice covered over with snow, not strong enough to save one from the abysses, but powerful by its seeming safety to lure one to destruction.

In passing to an examination vi Mr. Spencer's reasoning I must bespeak the readers' patience. The discussion will lead us into many metaphysical recesses ; and the country through which we take our way is surely as dry as Sahara, if, indeed, it be not full as barren.

This know-nothing doctrine is as old as philosophy, but the philosophy of the doctrine has changed with time. Formerly the difficulty was external, now it is internal. "We cannot know any thing," the old skeptics used to say, "because as much, and as good, evidence can be brought against any proposition or belief as for it ; and hence the mind must remain in eternal balance between two opinions." Rut the fault was in the evidence, not in the mind. If there were any reality to know, the mind was clearly competent to apprehend it ; but is there any reality to know ? This was the question with them ; and they held that in every case the contradictions of the testimony so embarrassed the jury as to render necessary the Scotch verdict — not proven.

Now, all this has changed. The difficulty is no longer external, but internal. The criticism of fact has been exchanged for the criticism of faculty. The nescientist no longer inquires whether reality exists, but contents himself with the humbler question, whether we have any faculties for knowing - it, supposing it to exist? As the result of his

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•riven tory, mental limits have been discovered, and all knowledge of the real is said to be beyond them. The grounds of nescience are much more fundamental than the old know-nothings dreamed. By the constitution of the mind itself we are forever prohibited from reaching reality. Phenomena are all we know ; and these, when analyzed to the bottom, can never give us things as they are, or "things in themselves." Between appearances, or things as we know them, and the hidden reality behind them, an impassable gulf is fixed.

This form of nescience began with Kant. He taught that there are forms of thought and sensibility in the mind which determine the form of our knowledge, something as a mold gives shape to a casting. The matter of any thing, as an iron ball, is one thing ; the form is quite another. So the content, or matter of our knowledge, is given by the thing ; but the form, which is entirely different, is given by the mind itself. And as the same matter can be molded into a thousand different forms, can be round, square, triangular, etc. : so the same external reality can take on different shapes, according as it is cast in different mental molds. Hence all our knowledge is a composite, of which the two factors are, the external thing, and the internal form. What the thing is apart from this form, or what it is M in itself/' is, and must be — to use the established phrase — " unknown and unknowable." Moreover, as it is conceivable that other orders of intelligence should differ from the human, we can never be sure that our knowledge has universal validity. We think things in the relation of cause and effect, of substance and attribute, etc. ; but these relations are only forms of our thought, and correspond to no reality in the thing. We cannot help assenting to the so-called intuitions, not because they represent the universal truths of the universe, but because they constitute the skeleton of the mind itself. They uphold the mind and give law to its tendencies ; but so far from revealing reality to us, they rather lead us away from it. Their very necessity stamps them as mental forms, and their utterances become untrustworthy in proportion as they are sure. Hence our knowledge is of phenomena only, and is true only for us ; at least, we can never be sure that it is true for other orders of being. The windows of the human mind are of stained glass, and the inhabitant within is forever cut off from the white light of reality beyond. These are the essential features of the Kantian theory; and the doctrine of relativity, upon which Mr. Spencer relies for the support of his view, is but a degraded form of the same. This later form of the doctrine, as it appears in the works of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer, has far less logical and metaphysical value than the earlier form as taught by Kant. In Kant's works, one commonly finds both good sense, and good logic. The arguments are not mere-

:y logical, but real. We may not admit their validity, but at the same time we feel that they have a genuine momentum, and are not a logical play on words. Indeed, if Kant could have saved his system from Idealism, it would have been well-nigh impregnable. But in passing to the relativity philosophy, one is sensible of a marked change in this respect. There seems to be a kind of intellectual shuffling going on ; a playing fast and loose with words, as the "absolute," " infinite," " conditioned," " unconditioned," etc. There is an air of jugglery and thimble-rigging over the whole. This makes one regard many ot the conclusions as he does the celebrated one, that each cat has three tails, or that the minute-hand of a watch can never overtake the hour-hand ; to disprove them may be difficult, but to believe them is impossible. We certainly see the ghost according to programme ; but we cannot rid ourselves of the conviction that concave mirrors and magic lanterns are at the bottom of the show. Kant shows us real existences fighting, the relativist shows us shadows These indulge in the most dazzling fence, and cleave each other through and through ; but no blood is drawn, and nobody is hurt.