Studies in theism

Preface

'T^HE following papers have been written long -*- enough for me to become somew^hat dissatisfied with them. But as I still agree with them for ** substance of doctrine/' and as I have not the time for a rewriting, I venture their publication. The Introduction is written for the sake of calling attention to several points which are rather obscurely stated in the work itself, and which are of great importance in estimating the value of the theistic argument. The title shows that the work does not claim to be a complete treatise on theism.

I have dwelt mainly upon the theoretical aspects of the question, and have aimed to expound principles rather than to give illustrations. No other method can be decisive. Illustrations can have little value until principles are settled ; and when they are settled, there is less need of illustration. At the same time I have not written for a philosophical audience. If I had had such readers in mind, both matter and form would have been modified. This, however, does not mean that I have misrepresented my own views, but only that many

IV PREFACE,

pdints of philosophic theory have been omitted, as they would have seemed to most readers to be needless, if not misleading, refinements. I hope at no very distant date to deal with these philosophic questions in a more thorough manner.

The ^* conflict of science and religion'* has not been referred to. This is partly due to a conviction that it is both an unjust, and a pernicious practice to gather all the friends of religion into one camp, and all the friends of science into another, and then to represent them as eternally hostile. Nothing could be more untrue to history, and it has a pernicious influence upon weak heads, which, unfortunately, are not wanting on either side. But the omission is mainly due to the fact, that what a thoughtful person wishes to know is, not what science teaches, nor what religion teaches, but what is proved, or made probable. Reason resents every attempt to intimidate it, in the name of authority, from whatever quarter. It decides by evidence, not by names. It accepts nothing, therefore, because it calls itself science, or because it calls itself religion, but because it has evidence in its favor. No more does reason reject any thing because it is science or because it is religion, but because of a lack of evidence. No attentive reader can have failed to observe that this simple principle has been largely ignored by both sides in the controversy.

PREFA CE, V

Many a view has been passionately rejected because it was thought to be irreligious ; and, conversely, the last few years have seen many a view passionately advocated whose chief recommendation was, that it trampled all moral and religious convictions under foot. It has taken a long time to learn that a theory is not proved by being religious ; a still longer time is needed to reach the conviction that it is also not proved by being irreligious.

A word about dogmatism. A writer*s statements are only his own opinions, and no vehemence of utterance can make them more. This being underjtood, one may be allowed to express his views in a dogmatic form. It saves both time and space, and is withal in better taste. When a discussion is between equals, professions of fallibility are both tiresome and needless, for the audience will surely take the fact for granted. If, then, some rather vivacious expressions of opinion occur in these papers, they are not to be taken as showing a belief in personal infallibility. Every rational author knows that his opinions are primarily only his opinions ; he publishes in the hope that they may be shared by others.

^* There are many echoes, but few voices.'' Like all works on this subject, this work is more an echo than a voice, though it may not be without some individuality of tone from the last reflecting sur-

VI PREFACE.

face. There is little new to be offered on either side ; and any thing which should be new in principle would almost certainly be a personal aberration. But it is necessary for each age to do its own thinking; and w4iile the truth maybe the same from age to age, the presentation will always vary. But while this work is an echo of what theistic thinkers have been saying from the beginning, I am not conscious of any specific obligation to other writers which demands recognition. I shall always be under general obligation to my friends and former instructors, Professor Ulrici, of Halle, aild Professor Lotze, of Gottingen.

B. P. B.

Boston, May 5, 1879.

Contents

Chafteb Faob

Introduction 3

I. Knowledge and Skepticism 9

Introduction

TN order to a correct estimate of the theistic argument, we must know its exact scope and purpose. Misconception on this point is very common, and injustice is done to theism. It is commonly assumed that the theist aims to demonstrate the existence of God. Of course a strict demonstration is impossible, and then theism is held to be overthrown. No notice is taken of the great fact and field of probable reasoning upon which both daily life and objective science are built. It is also urged that the theist assumes that all order is designed order, and thus begs the question; for the dispute is, whether the natural order be designed. Most criticisms of theism turn upon one of these objections. Either the argument is rejected as a failure, or it is called a begging of the question. Such criticisms, so far as they are made in good faith, rest upon a failure to distinguish between demonstrating a theorem and solving a problem. The demonstration of tteorems belongs entirely to the formal sciences; all the sciences which deal with reality aim only at the solution of problems. They find their problems in the observed facts, and then they raise the question how we must think of the back-lying cause or causes, or

4 INTRODUCTION.

antecedents, in order that the facts should be as they are. Every scientific hypothesis is an attempt to solve the problem presented by a certain class of facts; and the proof of the hypothesis always consists, not in its being impregnably deduced according to the canons of formal logic, but in its furnishing the only adequate solution of the facts. The geologist finds traces of fire in the rocks, and he explains them by assuming that the earth was once molten. Now even allowing this conclusion to be just, he would not pretend that he had demonstrated the original fluidity of the earth, but only that he had given a rational solution of the problem contained in certain geological facts. So with the nebular, the atomic, the ether, the evolution theories, etc.; they are all solutions of problems, and our faith in them is based entirely upon their adequacy to the facts.

The theistic theory is of the same kind; it has the same aim, and is judged by the same canon. The theist does not claim to demonstrate the existence of God, but only that the problem of the world and life cannot be solved without God. He does not assume that all order is designed order, but he insists that the actual order, which of course includes man, cannot be understood, except as the outcome of design. To the objection that he assumes that nature can be understood, he replies, that all science is based on the same assumption, and is but an attempt to comprehend the facts of experience. To the claim that what is necessary to an understanding of nature is not, therefore, necessarily a fact of

INTRODUCTION. 5

nature, lie replies, that so far as this lies against theism, it is equally valid against any and every scientific hypothesis. Atoms, ethers, and a certain order of past events are necessary to an understanding of the present facts; but if we choose to be skeptical, we can say that this necessity does not prove their reality; and we can say it in this case with as much justice as in the case of theism.

Another point to be borne in mind is, that every theory must be judged, not only by its power of making grimaces at opposing theories, but also and chiefly by its own positive adequacy to the facts. This simple rule of criticism has been so generally ignored in judging theism tjiat it is necessary to insist ujDon it. Every one acquainted with atheistic treatises will recognize that their chief force has been in picking flaws in the theistic argument. There has been comparatively little effort to show any positive sufliciency of atheism to give any rational account of the facts. On the contrary, the failure of theism to exclude all possibility of doubt has been oddly enough mistaken for a proof of atheism. It never occurs to the atheist to ask whether the difficulties and improbabilities of his own system be not infinitely greater than those of theism. In this respect he is like a disciple of the Ptolemaic astronomy, who, finding difficulties in Copernicus and Newton, should conclude that, therefore, the Ptolemaic system is true. A rational judgment can be reached only as the theistic theory, with all its difficulties, is placed be-

6 INTRODUCTIOK side the atheistic theory, with all its difficulties. When this is done, the theist will have no cause to be ashamed of his faith. In neither case is it a matter of demonstration, but of rational probability. This point is generally kept out of sight in atheistic discussions; all the more, then, must the theist call attention to it.

Still another point must be mentioned. The nature of reality is never a matter of perception, but solely of / inference from the phenomena. At this point crude common sense often lends aid and comfort to atheism and materialism. Matter as noumenon and as cause is supposed to be given in immediate perception; and as God and the soul are not perceived, but inferred, the impression spreads that atheism and materialism have fact on their side, while the opposing views are only subjective theories. Of all crudities in thinking, this is certainly one of the worst; it is in philosophy what Jasperism is in astronomy. It will be remembered that Brother Jasper, of Richmond, Va., has reached the conclusion that the sun moves ; for he "hab seen de sun on one side ob de house in de mornin', and on de odder side ob de house in de afternoon; and as de house hab not moved, derefo' de sun he do move." This is very clear and convincing. Brother Jasper thought that a resting sun could not be seen on both sides of the house, and hence he mistook the astronomical truth for a denial of the phenomenon. The philosophical Jaspers make the same blunder. They mistake inferences from the phenomena for tlieir denial. Hence when

IXTRODUCTIOK 7

they hear that nature may be but the manifestation of a spiritual power working under the forms of space and time, they fancy tliat visible and tangible phenomena have been denied; and they think it sufficient to stamp on the ground or to kick a stone in disproof. It is pitiable in the extreme to find even distinguished editors of distinguished periodicals advancing such ghastly irrelevances. No one dreams of denying any of the phenomena of inner or outer experience. Brother Jasper, of course, has a very clear idea of matter; but the physicist finds himself forced to go behind material phenomena — not to deny, but to explain. At once he finds himself in a supersensible world, which can be entered only by thought, and whose reality can be assured only by thought. But the results reached are never to be mistaken for denials of phenomena, but as conclusions from them. The astronomical heavens do not deny the visible heavens, but are based upon them. It is oversight of this fact which accounts for the popular impression that philosophy leads to skepticism; and which, on the other hand, accounts for the popular skepticism of philosophical results. The question of all speculation is not whether there is reality, but what it is, and what. its nature may be; and science and philosophy alike recognize that this question cannot be solved by immediate perception, but only by consistent thinking upon the phenomena. The most of the factors of physical science belong entirely to a thought- world, and can only be reached by thought. And even the Jaspers

8 INTRODUCTION.

of speculation themselves partly recognize tliis fact. When they are told of dynamic atoms, and solid ethers, and omnipresent forces, they are charmingly acquiescent; but when the theist, by the same method and from the same data, concludes to an omnipresent force which is also intelligent, then, instead of examining his logic, they think it sufficient to call his view an unheard-of absurdity, and an inversion of common sense. Custom explains many beliefs; it also explains many unbeliefs. The customary is clear, and clear because customary. Nevertheless, we insist upon the point. When it is seen that the complex and unintelligible theories of the atheist and materialist are not facts of observation, but only their way of explaining the facts, those theories will not be long in appearing in their innate irrationality.

STUDIES IN THEISM.

Chapter I. Knowledge And Skepticism

rpWO questions, quite distinct, are often confused : 1. Is knowledge possible? 2. How is knowledge possible ? The former question is plainly the more fundamental, and the skeptic's reply is, that knowledge is not possible. Thus, at the outset of our studies in Theistic Philosophy, "No thoroughfare" stares us in the face. Before going on we must have a word with the skeptic. Of course it cannot be our intention to prove that knowledge is possible ; this would be the Don Quixotism of philosophy. Our plan is to examine the skeptic's objections, in order to see if there be any thing in them to shake the mind's trust in its own power to know. If the objections fail, knowledge will not be proved ; but skepticism will appear groundless and irrational.

But this question is a purely philosophic one, and why discuss it in an essay on Theism ? Skepticism of our cognitive faculties in general tells as much against one department of knowledge as against another, and universal skepticism is none. Because it doubts every thing, it, in effect, doubts nothing. Being impartially distributed over all the faculties, it leaves tlioii* relative position and rank undisturbed, and decides nothing. The only significant skepticism is that which discredits the higher faculties in the name of the lower; and brings discord into the mind. A skepticism whicli exalts the senses and the animal, and thus seeks to throw doubt upon the rational and moral nature, is the only dangerous one. The theist is quite content to let the skeptic vapor as he will about the general uncertainty of knowledge, so long as it can be made out that reason, such as it is, supports theism. Reason may be ver^^ feeble, and the facts may be very imperfectly known, but if they unite in pointing to theism as the only sufficient explanation of the world, the theist is satisfied. Why, then, burden ourselves with difficulties which are common to every theory of knowledge, and thus run the risk of failing in our gratuitously-assumed task ?

Theoretically, these objections are well taken ; but, practically, another course is more promising. Philosophic skepticism is impotent, except in moral and religious discussion. Elsewhere daily contact with reality and the imperative needs of life make real skepticism practically impossible. Busy men turn their backs on it, and answer it by walking away. But it is both wonderful and instructive how the objections are brought out when discussion touches on moral or religious quee-- tions. Points, which in daily life would seem pedantic or foolish, are made with the emphasis of conviction and the zeal of a new discovery. After swallowing the camel, the gnat is carefully .strained out; and, once in awhile, even conscience is invoked against the impiety of ready belief. In an age of dogmatism religion is impossible, because we know too much. According to the dogmatist, there is nothing but matter and force in the universe, with no room for God or ghosts. In an age of skepticism religion is impossible, because we know too little. The reason is unimportant, if only the conclusion be reached. No matter what form the ravings of speculators may take, religion is sure to be beaten. No matter what the speech treats of, it is apt to end with — " Carthage must be destroyed." Theism, then, has a practical interest in examining the skeptic's arguments, such as none of the sciences have. We further reply to the objections of the preceding paragraph, that our purpose is not so much to solve the general difficulties of knowledge, as to show that they are general. Volition cannot be argued with; but it is worth while to show a candid objector that the difficulties at which he hesitates, are no greater than others which he accepts. The lack of logical and philosophical training frequently results in the imagination that metaphysical difficulties are found only in Natural Theology. It is of service to such a one to show that these 'difficulties underlie all the sciences, and even logic itself. We reply finally to the objector, that it is not our purpose to give an exhaustive theory of knowledge, but only to clear up the subject a little by some criticisms and definitions. The chief difficulty of the question lies in the fog which envelopes it.

The prevailing agnosticism is not speculative, but

practical. It does not arise from any psychological 2 study, but solely from the necessity of avoiding certain disagreeable conclusions. It prevails especially in scientific quarters. Physics is pushed up to the verge of atheism and materialism, and then a halt is called. To save trouble, agnosticism is adopted as a compromise.. Hence the dualism of agnostic treatises. They give us atheism and materialism for subject and predicate, but omit the copula. The evilly-inclined reader supplies the omission. Along with the atheism go divers expressions of awe at the all-pervading wonder, and the mystery of the molecule. These men are not to be blamed. Their inconsistency is based on the need they feel for supplying some foundation for morals and religion. One must admire the motive, even in criticising the outcome. But the dualism is apparent, and its worthlessness is equally plain. Moreover, their agnosticism appeals only upon occasion. It is when dealing with an opponent's views that it becomes prominent. We have made a careful study of the works of leading agnostics, and have never detected the slightest indication of conscious ignorance. On the contrary, the zeal of conviction and the dogmatism of infallibility, are every-where apparent. They publish long theories of things, and appear to have great confidence in them," although things are declared unknowable. They invest the fundamental reality with various attributes, after declaring any attribution unallowable. This fact makes tlie study of their works vanity and vexation of spirit. 1lic results of compromise, their works have all the liodgc-podge character of compromises in general. We must not ('liar<;r the writers with the unparalleled inso-

KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. I '^

hrfiee of assuming that their opponents only are incapable of knowledge; we must rather refer their views to the logic of the situation. There was need of a reconciliation between science and religion; accordingly they destroyed both, and called it peace. Meanwhile, if ])ressed by hard questions, they have but to wave the wand of the unknowable, and the difficulties disappear into chaos and impenetrable night. This convenience is an additional argument. The theoretical foundation is the weak part. We know only phenomena is the magic word. But what is it to know? What is a phenomenon, and what is its relation to its noumenal ground? Can one phenomenon know another phenomenon ? If not, can a group of phenomena know another group? Or is there knowing only, w^ithout a knower and a thing known ? These are interesting questions, and a little light on them would be a boon to the student. Unfortunately the average agnostic seems never to have dreamed of them. This vexatious state of the argument comports so ill with their confident declarations, that we must assume that here, as elsewhere, wisdom is justified only of her children. To attempt to get any exact meaning from the current expositions of agnosticism would only lead us to the conclusion that the doctrine itself is the true unknowable. We attempt, then, to examine the skeptic's argument for ourselves.

Unless wx know what knowledge is, how can we tell whether we have it ? Plainly a definition is called for, and we give it as follows: knowledge is the certainty that our concept ionts correspond to reality or to truth. By reality, we mean any matter of fact, whether of the outer or inner world. By truth, we mean rational principles. By certainty, it is plain that we cannot mean any thoughtless assurance, but only tliat which results from the necessity of the admission. Rational truth is seen to be valid every-where and always; and as the result of this insight, it is said to be necessary and universal. Both of these terms are misleading. Necessity is often interpreted as if it repre> sented only a habit of the mind, or, at best, the outcome of the mental constitution. In this way color is given to the notion that, by altering the mental constitution, truth itself would be altered. This notion is without any warrant in experience. There is nothing to indicate that truth depends on any arbitrary make of the faculties which recognize it, instead of on its own clearness and self-evidence. Universality, again, is often understood to mean consciously present in every mind. This mistake has kept the empiricists at work ever since the time of Locke, hunting in the minds of babies and savag(5S for failing cases of universal truths. The self-evidence of the truth is its fundamental sup- ])ort. The test of necessity has only the negative value of ])revonting us from deceiving ourselves as to what is self-evident. When we go carelessly to work, we may easily mistake the customary for the unquestionable; and then we can right ourselves only by setting up the contradictory of the proposition. In this way we detect the influence of habit, and remedy the results of loose analysis. The universality, means only that rational truth is not conditiom^d by space or time, or aught else. Our knowledge of it may be conditioned by ignorance and stupidity ; but the mind does not make, it recognizes, the truth. When the mind has this clear insight into a principle, so that it is seen to be self-evident, and its untruth is impossible, we call the result knowledge.

Our knowledge of things consists, (1) in the certainty that they exist, and (2) that they have certain attributes or ways of working, and certain relations among themselves. When we reach any such certainty about a thing, we have a knowledge of the thing to that extent. » This knowledge may be more or less, but its extent is indifferent to the definition. It is conceivable that other beings should have deeper insight into the nature of things than we have, but in such case their knowledge would not be more real, but more exhaustive, than ours. But even their knowledge w^ould come under the same definition — the certainty that things exist and have certain properties and powers. A large part of the skeptic's argument consists in referring to the vastness of the unknown in comparison with the known. He points out that we do not know the inner nature of things, nor how things are made. We grant all this, but insist that we know sundry truths about things after they are made. The scientist does not pretend to know how the elements are made, but he claims to know something about their ways of working. Our knowledge of the soul does not consist in any insight into the soul's being, but only in the certainty that souls exist, and have peculiar assignable powers. Neither science nor philosophy has, or is likely to have,

1 6 STUDIES IN TITETSM.

any recipe for creation. The utmost the finite can ever hope to do, is, not to create things, but to understand them after they are created. When reality has been comprehended under the forms of thought, science and philosophy have finished their work; and the remit we call knowledge, as far as it goes. If this is not knowledge, what is? References to the mystery of being, and the vastness of the unknown, are quite irrelevant in discussing the reality of knowledge.

The statement that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent, deserves further emphasis. It has been strangely enough assumed by both believer and skeptic, that the reality of knowledge can be maintained only by proving that all perceptive beings must see all things alike. Of course such a proof is forever impossible, and the skeptic wins an easy triumph. But this question, also, must be ruled out as irrelevant. The point is not whether other beings see things as we do, but whether the powers and relations which we find in them are really there, independent of our thought. Touch is not contradicted by vision, though each gives some elements which are impossible to the other. The question whether angels or animals see things as we do, is a perfectly idle one. Sextus Empiricus based a skeptical argument on the fact that cat's eyes have oblong pupils, while men's eyes have round pupils. It will pro})ably be impossible for us to tell how cats view things until cats become able to think or speak, or until we become cats without losing our human faculties. l>()th events seem quite unlikely, and the advance of knowledge in that direction is barred. The attempt to find how angels, or some hypothetical beings, may regard things, appears equally hopeless. Be it far from us to say what such beings might see and think. All such suggestions are irrelevant, unless it be claimed that their knowings contradict ours; and. in that case we should ask what ground there is (1) for assuijiing that these hypothetical beings are real ; (2) for saying that their knowledge contradicts ours; and (8) for assuming that, in case of contradiction, these imaginary beings must be in the right? The last assumption is plainly gratuitous, for they would not contradict us any more than we should contradict them; and hence, after all, we should have to decide the question by appealing to our own reason. Although this fashion of appealing to imaginary beings, in the interests of skepticism, has the support of Descartes, it must nevertheless be regarded as unworthy a rational being, because it is both gratuitous and indecisive.

The fact that the reality of knowledge is independent of its extent also contains an explanation of the pretended antithesis of absolute and relative knowledge. This antithesis has no meaning from the side of the subject. For the knower, there is either certainty or uncertainty concerning a fact or proposition; and he may either know it to be true or false, or he may believe it to be true or false, or he may be in doubt con- <;eming it. These are the possible mental states of the ^ knower, and for him the distinction of relative and absolute has no assignable meaning. We must, then, seek the meaning of the distinction in the object; and here we come upon the following fact: We know things only in relations either to ourselves or to other things. This perfectly true statement is, then, illicitly transformed into another which is entirely different, namely, that we know only relations. When something is known to exist as this or that, relations may also be known to exists between it and other equally known things; but that we should know the relations of essentially unknown objects is a contradiction in psychology. Knowledge may go deeper and deeper, but so long as the word represents any thing intelligible, it will always consist, not in being the thing known, but in forming conceptions about the thing. Such a deepening of knowledge would not displace what we know, but only extend it. Even in the realm of rational principles, it is possible that our knowledge does not reach the ultimate.

They lie in our mind as mutually independent data. The law of identity, or of causation, carries with it no necessity that the mind should also have an intuition of space. The understanding is conceivable apart from the moral nature. This mutual independence in our experience leads the mind to surmise that in the ultimate ground of being there may be an interdependence of these principles, so that all may flow from one root. German philosophy has made great efforts to show such a relation, but the success has not been great. But if such a relation existed, it would not in any way affect the validity of rational principles: we should only have a deeper knowledge. Theoretical mechanics has advanced through successive generalizations until tlie whole science is reduced to an interpretation of a single principle; but no knowledge is disturbed by the advance. In like manner, if space were found to be only a form of manifestation, our knowledge of space would remain just as it is. The science of space relations would continue to be valid: we should only discover that there is something deeper than space, and not that space is delusion. The current thought that the ideality of space implies that space is merely a human delusion, is one of the many misunderstandings found in the popular speculations. That doctrine denies that God is limited in any way by space, as if space were a thing like other things, but it does not deny him a knowledge of space relations, as if something in the world of the thinkable were unknown and unknowable to the Source of all thought and knowledge.