A manual of ethics

Front matter

Class _J-1_

Book ,M v

COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT

Preface To The Fourth Edition

*S

The chief change in this edition consists in the addition of a chapter on the ' ' Authority of the Moral Standard " (Book II., Chapter VI.). This chapter includes an account of the Sanctions, which formerly appeared as a rote to Chapter VI. of Book III. I have also added a short note on the classification of the Virtues at the end of Chapter VI. of Book III. The other alterations in this edition are very slight.

I am glad to have this opportunity of acknowledging the kind expressions of appreciation that I have received from teachers of Philosophy in the United States and Canada. It is particularly gratifying to me to know that my book has been found useful in a part of the world from which so many of the most valuable and attractive Manuals of Philosophy have come. At a time when we are being m somewhat acutely reminded of the essential similarity of, 6ujf*pdfl;fi^J problems, it is perhaps specially fitting that Ve* srro\ifo* remember 1 bat we are still more profoundly. .un»ked cm, the larger problems of life and thought'.;'. T /:.. :«/ ' . ;

February, 190 1.

[THE LIB****

Copyright, i8qj, by W. B. Clive.

I Two Coft*s RfcCt - 2

jg^. 1 Copyright, 190 1, by Hinds & Noble.

I COPY 6.

Preface To The Third Edition

This handbook is intended primarily for the use of private students, and especially for those who are preparing for such examinations in Ethics as those conducted by the University of London. It is hoped, however, that it will be found useful also by other classes of readers. Its design is to give, in brief compass, an outline of the most important principles of ethical doctrine, so far as these can be understood without a knowledge of Metaphysics.

To do this satisfactorily is by no means easy ; and I can hardly hope that I have been successful in overcoming the difficulties. The theory of Ethics must, I believe, in the end rest on Metaphysics ; and what it is possible to do without Metaphysics can be little more than a clearing of the ground, and a leading up to the metaphysical principles that are involved in the subject. The system of metaphysical truth, however, is like a city with many gates ; and perhaps the student may enter it by the ethical gate as profitably as by any other. It has been my aim, at any rate, to conduct the student gradually inwards from the psychological outworks to the metaphysical foundation.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the metaphysical point of view adopted in this Manual is that of the school of Idealism — /. e. the school founded

v

VI PREFACE.

by Kant and developed by Hegel, Green, and others. In this respect the present Text-book is similar to two other treatises which appeared a little before it — ■ Dewey's Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics, and Muirhead's Elements of Ethics. 1 - If these books had been published before this one was arranged for, it is probable that it would never have been undertaken. As it is, I can only plead that the subject is handled in this work in a way slightly different from that in which it is taken up by either of the other two, and that it may consequently in some respects satisfy a want which neither of them fully meets. I hope, however, that readers of my book will, as far as possible, consult the other two also. Where there is a general harmony of point of view, a comparison of the methods of treatment adopted by different writers on points of detail is often of the greatest value to the student. I think it would be especially useful for readers of this book, who have time to spare, to compare it in this way with Muirhead's Elements of Ethics. The latter work is designed for a slightly different purpose ; and at many points it will be found to supply a very useful supplement to the present treatise by presenting the same general ideas in a somewhat different light. For the convenience of students who may use it in this way, I have inserted frequent references to Mr. Muirhead's book, and have indicated the main points of divergence.

1 Other two books which have since appeared — Professor James Seth-'s Study of Ethical Principles and Mr. C. F. D'Arcy's Short Study of Ethics — are also written from a point of view which is to a large extent similar. In both of these books there is a good deal of space devoted to the discussion of the metaphysical basis ; but in neither case does the discussion appear satisfactory. On the whole I have thought it best to leave such discussions to works that are expressly metaphysical in character.

PREFACE. Vll

My obligations to the leading exponents of the science are sufficiently obvious, and need not be specially acknowledged. In particular, how much I owe to Dr. Edward Caird will probably be evident to every one who is familiar with his writings and teaching. I must, however, make some more particular acknowledgment of the assistance I have received at various points from several friends and critics.

The proofs of this edition, as well as of the first, have been read by Mrs. Gilliland Husband, and I am indebted to her for many highly suggestive criticisms. Mr. James Welton also read all the proofs of the first edition, and Mr. Stout has read all the proofs of the present edition ; and from both of these gentlemen I have received valuable assistance. I am also indebted to Professor Alexander for some useful criticisms ; and, on smaller points, to Principal Lloyd Morgan, Professor Sully, Mr. W. T. Kenwood, Mr. J. A. Clarke, and others. The published criticisms by Dr. Bosanquet, Professor Ritchie, Mr. Muirhead, Miss E. E. C. Jones, and others have been very helpful. The index at the end of the first edition was prepared by Mr. H. Holman ; that at the end of the present edition is the work of Mr. W. F. Trotter, of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has also given me much help in verifying references.

In conclusion, for the sake of those who have been using the previous editions, it may be well to give some indication of the principal changes that have been made in the present one. An effort has been made, in the first place, to render the method of treatment more systematic. With a view to this, the work has been divided into five parts. Of these, Book III. is the part that has been most slightly altered. The only changes in this consist in vin

Preface

insignificant modifications of detail. The Concluding Chapter has to do duty for the last two chapters of the former editions, and has undergone considerable transformation. The references to Art have been almost entirely omitted, while the references to Metaphysics have been made a good deal more definite. In the Introduction some further remarks have been added on the divisions into which the treatment of Ethics naturally falls, and the statements about the relation of Ethics to practical life have been considerably modified. I have found that what I said on this subject has been a good deal misunderstood ; and the misunderstanding seemed to be due to want of clearness in my exposition, especially in the first chapter. I have, accordingly, added a good deal more in the way of explanation in this chapter, and have removed some passages about the general nature of moral law, which seemed specially liable to misinterpretation, and have inserted them in Book II., Chap. III., where they are perhaps more in place. I have also added a chapter at the end of Book II., dealing with the general subject of the bearing of Theory on Practice. I hope I may have succeeded in this way in removing the impression, which appears to have been created in some minds, that I thought it to be the business of ethical science to construct the moral life in vacuo. Nothing could well have been further from my intention; and, if I have overestimated the practical significance of philosophical reflection, I have at least not forgotten either the dictum of Hegel r

1 " Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. . . . When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by such painting it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades

PREFACE. IX

or the epigram of Bradley/ or the gibe of Schiller. 2 I do not hold, with Coleridge, that " the only kind of common sense worth having is that which is based on Metaphysics ; " but I do certainly believe that there is not much value in any kind of common sense that cannot be vindicated by philosophical reflection ; and I think that, when it is thus vindicated, it is at the same time enlightened.

The most considerable alterations, however, occur in Book I. I have thought it desirable to add a good deal of new material on the development of the moral life and of the moral judgment. It may be held that these subjects belong more properly to Sociology and Psychology than to Ethics in the stricter sense ; but I have found that their absence is a more serious defect than their presence. I have also added, at the beginning of Book II., a short historical account of the leading points of view in ethical theory.

University College, Cardiff, May, 1897. of night are gathering." Preface to the Rechtsphilosopkie. As a counterblast to this, it may be remarked, however, that several things seem to have been rejuvenated by Hegel himself.

1 " Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." Preface to Appearance and Reality. But are the reasons always " bad," and are they always " for " ? 2 " Doch weil, was ein Professor spricht, Nicht gleich zu Allen dringet, So iibt Natur die Mutterpnicht Und sorgt, dass nie die Kette bricht, Und dass der Reif nie springet.

Chapter I.— The Scope of Ethics. PAGE

§ 1. Definition : The Science of the Ideal in Conduct. — I 2. The Nature of Ethics. It is a Normative Science. — \ 3. Ethics not a Practical Science. — \ 4. Ethics not an Art. — \ 5. Is there an Art of Conduct ? How Conduct is distinguished from the Arts. ( i ) Virtue Exists only in Activity. ( 2 ) The Essence of Virtue lies in the Will. — § 6. Is there any Science of Conduct ? — \ 7. Summary I

Note on Positive and Normative Sciences 20

Chapter II. — The Relation of Ethics to Other Sciences

§ 1. General Statement. — \ 2. Physical Science and Ethics. — \ 3. Biology and Ethics. — \ 4. Psychology and Ethics.— g 5. Logic, ^Esthetics and Ethics.— \ 6. Metaphysics and Ethics. — \ 7. Ethics and Political Philosophy. — $8. Ethics and Economics. — g 9. Ethics and Psedagogics. — \ 10. Concluding Remarks. 23

Chapter III. — The Divisions of the Subject

\ 1. General Remarks. — \ 2. The Psychological Aspect of Ethics. — I 3. The Sociological Aspect of Ethics. — I 4. The Theories of the Moral Standard.— \ 5. The Concrete Moral Life. — \ 6. Plan of the Present

Work o 35

X

CONTENTS. XI

Chapter I. — Desire and Wili,. PAGB

Introductory Remarks — \ 2. General Nature of Desire. — \ 3. Want and Appetite. — \ 4. Appetite and De sire. — \ 5. Universe of Desire. — \ 6. Conflict of Desires. — \ 7. Desire and Wish. — \ 8. Wish and Will. —\ 9. Will and Act.— \ 10. The Meaning of Purpose. — \ 1 1 . Will and Character 43

Chapter II. — Motive and Intention

Preliminary Remarks. — § 2. The Meaning of Intention. — \ 3. The Meaning of Motive. — \ 4. Relation between Motives and Intentions. — \ 5. Is the Motive always Pleasure? — \ 6. Psychological Hedonism. — I 7. The Object of Desire. (1) The Paradox of Hedonism. — \ 8. The Object of Desire. (2) Wants prior to Satisfactions. — \ 9. The Object of Desire. (3) Pleasures and Pleasure. — $ 10. Can Reason Serve as a Motive ?— \ 1 1 . Is Reason the only Motive ?— \ 12. How Motives are Constituted 59

Note on Pleasure and Desire 79

Chapter III. — Character and Conduct

General Remarks. — \ 2. Character. — \ 3. Conduct. — I 4. Circumstance.— g 5. Habit. — \ 6. The Freedom of the Will . — \ 7 . Freedom Essential to Morals. — §8. Necessity Essential to Morals.— \ 9. The True Sense of Freedom. — \ 10. Animal Spontaneity. — §11. Human Liberty.— g 12. The Highest Freedom. — I 13. The Nature of Voluntary Action 83

Note on Responsibility 101

Xll CONTENTS.

Chapter IV.— The Evolution of Conduct. PAGB

? 1. Introductory Statement. — ? 2. Germs of Conduct in the Lower Animals. — ? 3. Conduct among Savages. — \ 4. The Guidance of Conduct by Custom.— § 5. The Guidance of Conduct by Taw. — ? 6. The Guidance of Conduct by Ideas. — \ 7. Action and Reflection. — \ 8. Moral Ideas and Ideas about Morality. — \ 9. The Development of the Moral Consciousness 104

Note on Sociology 113

Chapter V. — The Growth oe the Morae Judgment

1. The Earliest Forms of the Moral Judgment.— \ 2. The Tribal Self.— \ 3. The Origin of Conscience.— \ 4. Custom as the Moral Standard. — \ 5. Positive Law as the Moral Standard.— \ 6. The Moral Law.— \ 7. Moral Conflict. — ? 8. The Individual Conscience as Standard.—? 9. The Growth of the Reflective Judgment. — ? 10. Illustrations from Ancient Peoples. — \ 11. General Nature of Moral Development 114

Chapter "VI. — The Significance of the Morae Judgment.

1. The Nature of the Moral Judgment.—? 2. The Object of the Moral Judgment.—? 3. The Good Will.— \ 4. Judgment on Act and on Agent. — $ 5. Is the Moral Judgment concerned with Motives or with Intentions ? — § 6. The Moral Judgment is partly concerned with Motives. — \ 7. But the Judgment is really on Character.—? 8. The Subject of the Moral Judgment. — \ 9. The Moral Connoisseur. — \ 10. The Impartial Spectator. — \ 11. The Ideal Self 127

Note on the Meaning of Conscience 146

CONTENTS. Xlll

Chapter I. — The Development oe Ethicae Thought PAGH

I 1. Early Greek Ethics. — \ 2. The Sophists. — \ 3. Socrates.— g 4. The Schools of Ethical Thought.— I 5. Plato and Aristotle.— $ 6. Mediaeval Ethics. — \ 7. Schools of Ethics in Modern Times 147

Chapter II. — The Types oe Ethicae Theory

\ 1. General Survey. — \ 2. Reason and Passion. — \ 3. The Right and the Good. — \ 4. Duty, Happiness, Perfection. — \ 5. Mixed Theories 156

Chapter III. — The Standard as Law

Part I. The Generae Idea oe Morae Law. \ 1 . Introductory Remarks. — \ 2. The Meaning of Law in Ethics.— £ 3. Is, Must be, and Ought to be.— \ 4. The Categorical Imperative. — Part II. Various Conceptions oe the Morae Law.— \ 5. The Law of the Tribe.— \ 6. The Law of God.— \ 7. The Law of Nature.— g 8. The Moral Sense.— \ 9. The Law of Conscience. — \ 10. Intuitionism. — \ 11. The Law of Reason. — Part III. The Doctrine of Kant. \ 12. Kant's View of the Moral Reason.— $ 13. Criticism of Kant. (1) Formalism. — \ 14. Criticism of Kant. (2) Stringency. — \ 15. Real Significance of the Kantian Principle 162

Note on Kant 203

Chapter IV. — The Standard as Happiness

\ 1. Introductory Remarks. — $ 2. Higher and Lower Universes. — \ 3. Satisfaction of Desires. — \. 4. Varieties of Hedonism. — \ 5. Ethical Hedonism. — \ 6. Quantity of Pleasure. — \ 7. Egoistic Hedonism. —

XIV CONTENTS.

\ 8. Universalistic Hedonism. — \ 9. General Criticism of Hedonism, (a) Pleasure and Value, (b) Quality of Pleasures, (c) Kinds of Pleasures, (d) Pleasure inseparable from its Object, (e) Pleasures cannot be summed. (/) Matter without Form. \ 10. Relation of Happiness to the Self.— \ 11. Self-realisation as the End 207

Chapter V.— The Standard as Perfection

§ 1. Application of Evolution to Morals. — \ 2. Development of Life. — \ 3. Higher and Lower Views of Development. — \ 4. Explanation by Beginning. — \ 5. Mr. Herbert Spencer's View of Ethics.— g 6. Criticism of Mr. Spencer's View. — \ 7. Views of other Evolutionists. — \ 8. Natural Selection in Morals. — \ 9. Need of Teleology.— \ 10. Explanation by End. — \ 11. Green's View of Ethics.— \ 12. The True Self.— I 13. The real Meaning of Self-consistency. — § 14. The real Meaning of Happiness. — § 15. Transition to Applied Ethics 234

Chapter VI. — The Authority of the Moral Standard

§ 1. The General Problem of Authority.— § 2. Different Kinds of Authority. — § 3. Various Views of Moral Authority. — § 4. The Authority of Law. — § 5. The Sanctions of Morality. — § 6. The Authority of Conscience. — § 7. The Authority of Reason.— § 8. The Absoluteness of the Moral Authority 255

Chapter VII. — The Bearing of Theory on Practice

§ 1. Different Views.— § 2. Relation of Different Views to the Various Ethical Theories. — § 3. The Intuitionist View. — § 4. The Utilitarian View.— § 5. The Evolutionist View.— § 6. The Idealistic View.— § 7. Summary of Results.— § 8. Comparison between Ethics and Logic. — § 9. The Treatment of Applied Ethics 273

CONTENTS. XV

Chapter I.— The Social Unity. PAGE

§ 1. The Social Self.— § 2. Society a Unity.— § 3. Egoism and Altruism. — § 4. Mr. Spencer's Conciliation. — § 5. Self-realisation through Self-sacrifice. — § 6. Ethics a Part of Politics.— § 7. Plato's View of Ethics.— § 8. Aristotle's View of Ethics. — § 9. Cosmopolitism. — § 10. Christian Ethics. — § 11. The Social Universe. — § 12. Society an Organism. — § 13. Why is the Social Universe to be Preferred ?— § 14. Relation of Conscience to the Social Unity 291

Chapter II. — Moral Institutions

§ 1. The Social Imperative. — § 2. Justice. — § 3. Law and Public Opinion. — § 4. Rights and Obligations. — § 5. The Rights of Man. (a) Life, (b) Freedom. (V) Property. (d~) Contract. (e) Education.— § 6. Ultimate Meaning of Rights and Obligations. — § 7. Social Institutions, (a) The Family. (b) The Workshop, (c) The Civic Community, (d) The Church. 0) The State. (/) Friendship.— § 8. Social Progress. — § 9. Individualism and Socialism 309

Note on Justice ' .' 329

Chapter III. — The Duties

§ 1. Nature of Moral Laws.— § 2. Respect for Life.— § 3. Respect for Freedom. — § 4. Respect for Character. — § 5. Respect for Property. — § 6. Respect for Social Order. — § 7. Respect for Truth. — § 8. Respect for Progress. — § 9. Casuistry. — § 10. The Supreme Law. — § 11. Conventional Rules. — § 12. Duties of Perfect and Imperfect Obligation. — § 13. My Station and its Duties 332

Note on Rules of Conduct 349

XVI CONTENTS.

Chapter IV. — The Virtues. PAGE

§ 1. Relation of the Virtues to the Commandments. — § 2. Virtues relative to States of Society.— § 3. The Ethos of a People. — § 4. The Virtues relative to the Social Functions. — § 5. The Nature of Virtue.— § 6. The Cardinal Virtues.— § 7. Education of Character. — § 8. The Moral Syllogism... 352

Note on the Classification of the Virtues 372

Chapter V. — The Individual Life

§ 1. The Higher Individualism. — § 2. Conversion. — § 3. Conscientiousness. — § 4. Self-Examination. — § 5. The Study of the Ideal.— § 6. The Monastic Life.— § 7. Beautiful Souls. — § 8. Asceticism. — § 9. The Contemplative Life. — § 10. Relation of the Inner to the Outer Life.— § 11. The Virtuous Man and the World. — § 12. The Moral Reformer 374

Chapter VI. — Moral Pathology

§ 1. Moral Evil.— § 2. Vice.— § 3. Sin.— § 4. Crime.— § 5. Punishment. — § 6. Theories of Punishment. — § 7. Responsibility. — § 8. Remorse. — § 9. Reformation. — § 10. Forgiveness. — § 11. Social Corruption 393

Chapter VII.— Moral Progress

§ 1. Social Evolution.— § 2. The Moral Universe.— § 3. Inner Contradictions in our Universe. — § 4. Sense of Incompleteness. — § 5. Deepening of Spiritual Life. — § 6. New Obligations. — § 7. Moral Change and Change of Environment. — § 8. The Ideal Universe 413

Concluding Chapter.— Ethics and Metaphysics.

§ 1. General Remarks.— § 2. Validity of the Ideal.— § 3. Morality and Religion. — § 4. The Relation of Religion to Art. —

CONTENTS. xvil

PAGE

§ 5. The Necessity of Religion.— § 6. The Failure of Life.— § 7. The Failure of Society.— § 8. The Failure of Art.— § 9. The Demand for the Infinite. — § 10. The Two Infinites.— § 11. The First Religion.— § 12. The Second Religion. — § 13. The Third Religion. — § 14. Religion and Superstition. — § 15. The Essential Significance of Religion. —§16. The Ultimate Problems of Metaphysics 431

Appendix. Note on Ethical Literature 455

Index 459

INTRODUCTION.

Chapter I. The Scope Of Ethics

§ 1. Definition. The Science of the Ideal in Conduct. — Ethics is the science of Conduct. It considers the actions of human beings with reference to their Tightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or to evil. The name "Ethics" is derived from the Greek ra rjdud. This again comes from ?0o?, meaning character ; and this is connected with edo?, custom or habit. Similarly, the term " Moral Philosophy," which means the same thing as Ethics, is derived from the Latin mores, meaning habits or customs. Ethics, then, we may say, discusses men's habits and customs, or in other w T ords their characters, the principles on which they habitually act, and considers what it is that constitutes the Tightness or wrongness of these principles, the good or evil of these habits. These terms, however, ''Right" and "Good," seem to require a little explanation.

(a) Right. The term "Right" is derived from the

Latin rectus, meaning "straight'' or "according to

rule." The Greek word corresponding to it is dUaws,

which also meant originally "according to rule." Eth. i

When we say, then, that conduct is right, we mean primarily that it is according to rule. Rules, however, have reference to some result to be achieved by them ; and it is this fact that is indicated by the second term, "Good/'

(b) Good. The term " Good" is connected with the German gut, and contains the same root as the Greek &ya06$. A thing is generally said to be good when it is valuable for some end. Thus, particular kinds of medicine are said to be good for this or that complaint. Similarly, when we speak of conduct as good, we may mean that it is serviceable for the end we have in view. 1 It should be carefully observed, however, that the term "good" is also used (perhaps even more frequently) to signify not something which is a means to an end, but something which is itself taken as an end. Thus the summum bonum, or supreme good, means the supreme end at which we aim.

Thus, when we say that the science of Ethics is concerned with the Tightness or goodness of human conduct, we mean that it is concerned with the consideration of the serviceableness of our conduct for some end at which we aim, and with the rules by which our conduct is to be directed in order that this end may be attained. 2 But if we are to consider the serviceableness of our actions to an end, and the rules by which this end is to be attained, it is evident that we must have some understanding of the nature of the end itself. Now there are many ends to which our actions

i Cf. Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, p. 65. Also, Spencer's Data of Ethics, chap. iii.

2 This statement must be regarded as provisional, It is to some extent modified by the following paragraphs,

§ I.] THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 3

may be directed, e. g. the building of a house, the writing of a book, the passing of an examination, and so on. But since Ethics is the science of Conduct as a whole, and not of any particular kinds of Conduct, it is not any of these special ends that it sets itself to consider, but the supreme or ultimate end to which our whole lives are directed. This end is commonly referred to as the Sum-mum Bojium or Supreme Good. Now it is no doubt open to question at the outset, whether there can be said to be any one supreme end in human life. Men aim at various objects. Some desire wealth ; others, independence ; others, power. Some are eager for fame ; others, for knowledge ; others, for love ; and some again find their highest good in loving and serving others. J Some are fond of excitement ; others, of peace. Some fill their lives with many-sided interests — art and science, and the development of social and political institutions ; others are tempted to regard all these as vanity, and sometimes even, turning from them all in disgust, to believe that the best thing of all would be to die and be at rest ; 2 while others again fix their highest hopes on a life beyond death, to be perfected in a better world than this. But a little consideration serves to show that many of these ends cannot be regarded as ulti-

1 " This is shown by the delight that mothers take in loving ; for some give their children to others to rear, and love them since they know them, but do not look for love in return, if it be impossible to have both, being content to see their children doing well, and loving them, though they receive from them, in their ignorance, nothing of what is due to a mother." — Aristotle's Ethics, VIII. viii. 3.

2 See, for instance, Shakespeare's Sonnet LXVI,— " Tired with all these, for restful death I cry," &c, ? and cf, Byron and the modern Pessimists, pa$sim, mate. If, for instance, we were to question those who are seeking for wealth or independence or power, we should generally find that they would explain their desire for these objects by enumerating the advantages which the attainment of the desired objects would bring. The possibility of such an explanation proves that these objects are not regarded as ultimate ends by those who pursue them, but are desired for the sake of something else. Still, we hardly seem to be justified in starting with the assumption that there is any one ultimate end in human life. The question whether any such end can be discovered is rather one that must be discussed in the course of our study. What it is necessary for us to assume is simply that there is some ideal in life, i. e. that there is some standard of judgment by reference to which we are able to say that one form of conduct is better than another. What the nature of this ideal or standard is — whether it has reference to a single ultimate end, to a set of rules imposed upon us by some authority, to an ideal type of human life which we are somehow enabled to form for ourselves, or in what other possible way it is determined — we must endeavour to discover as we go on. In the meantime it seems sufficient to define Ethics as the science of the ideal involved in human life. 1

§ 2. The Nature of Ethics. // is a Normative Science. — The fact that Ethics is concerned with an end or ideal or standard serves at once to distinguish it from most other sciences. Most sciences are con-

1 On the general nature of the science of Ethics, the reader may consult Sidgwick's History of Ethics, Chap. I. ; Muirhead's Elements of Ethics, Book I. ; Dewey's Outlines of Ethics, Introduction ; and Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, Book I,, Chap. I, cerned with certain uniformities of our experience — with the ways in which certain classes of objects (such as rocks or plants) are found to exist, or with the ways in which certain classes of events (such as the phenomena of sound or electricity) are found to occur. Such sciences have no direct reference to any end that is to be achieved or to any ideal by reference to which the facts are judged. The knowledge which they communicate may, indeed, be useful for certain purposes. A knowledge about rocks is useful for those who wish to build houses or to sink mines. A knowledge about electricity is useful for those who wish to protect their buildings or to form telegraphic communications. But the truth of the sciences that deal with such subjects as these is in no way affected by the ends which they may thus be made to subserve. Knowledge about the nebulae is as much a part of the science of astronomy as knowledge about the solar system, though the latter can be directly turned to account in the art of navigation, while the former has no direct practical utility. The science of Ethics, then, is distinguished from the natural sciences, inasmuch as it has a direct reference to an end that men desire to attain, or a type to which they wish to approximate.

It is not by any means the only science, however, which has such a reference. On the contrary, there is a whole class of sciences of this character. These are commonly called the normative sciences — i. e. the sciences that lay down rules or laws or, more strictly, that seek to define a standard or ideal with reference to which rules or laws may be formulated. Of this kind are the science of medicine (?'. e. Hygienics), which deals with the nature of the distinction between health and disease, and with the rules to be observed for the attainment of health, or for the avoidance and removal of disease ; the science of architecture, which deals with the types to be aimed at and the rules to be observed in the construction of buildings, with a view to their stability, convenience, and beauty ; the science of navigation, which deals with the aims and principles involved in the management of ships ; the science of rhetoric, which deals with the principles of persuasiveness and beauty of style ; the science of logic, which deals with the conditions of correct thinking. Most of these sciences are of a mixed character, being partly concerned with the analysis of facts, and partly with the definition of ends or ideals and with the statement of rules to be observed for the attainment of them. Thus the science of medicine deals with the facts of disease as well as with the nature and conditions of health, and the science of architecture discusses the ways in which buildings have been constructed at various periods of man's history, as well as the ways in which it is most desirable that buildings should be constructed. Sometimes, indeed, these two sides of a science are so evenly balanced, that it is difficult to say whether it ought properly to be regarded as a natural or a normative science. This is notably the case with regard to political economy. But in all such cases it is possible to separate the two sides of the science, and to consider them as forming in reality two distinct, though closely connected, sciences.