The problem of Asia and its effect upon international policies

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Works by Capt. A. T. Mahan

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY. 1660-1783.

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EM- PIRE. Two volumes.

THE LIFE OF NELSON. Two volumes.

THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER.

LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND OTHER ARTICLES.

THE PROBLEM OF ASIA.

The

Problem of Asia

and

Its EiFect upon International Policies

/ BY

A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

M

Author of "The Interest of America in Sea Power," "Lessons of the

War with Spain and Other Articles," "The Influence of Sea

Power upon History, 1660-1783," "The Influence of Sea

Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,"

" The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the

Sea Power of Great Britain," etc.

BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY i' V • .rtr KtCLtveo

Cepyrighl entry

StCONO COPY.

OHiv«rfld tt

OROtR 0(VISX)N,

MOV 21 l^UU

Copyright, igoo.

By Harper and Brothers

(The State Trust Company, Trustee)

.Vx-i,

Copyright, igoo, By The North American Review Publishing Company

Copyright, igoo.

By a. T. Mahan

All rights reserved

Preface

^ I ^HE onward movement of the world is -'- largely determined, both in rate and in direction, by geographical and physical conditions. Add to them racial characteristics, and we probably have the chief constituents of the raw material, which, under varying impulses from within and without, is gradually worked up into history.

The process of the manufacture is seen in the course of events ; but these, whether in current history or in the wholly past, embrace a great mass of details, which, by the various and conflicting directions of their action, not only perplex the inquirer with a sense of utter confusion, but also cover, and to a first glance effectually conceal, the determinative conditions. Such conditions, however, there always are ; and these vi Preface

shape and govern the whole range of incidents, often in themselves apparently chaotic in combination, and devoid of guidance by any adequate controlling forces.

In history entirely past, where an issue has been reached sufficiently definite to show that one period has ended and another begun, it is possible for a careful observer to detect, and with some precision to formulate, the leading causes, and to trace the interaction which has produced the result. It is obviously much less easy to discover the character and to fix the inter-relation of the elements acting in the present; still more to indicate the direction of their individual movement, from which conjecture may form some conception as to what shall issue as the resultant of forces. There is here all the difference between history and prophecy.

Nevertheless, although the one study is more certain, the other is more urgent. Past history contains indeed lessons which, well digested, are most valuable for future guidance ; but, when the attempt is made to utilize their teachings, con-

Preface vii

temporary conditions are found to differ so much from those preceding them that application becomes a matter of no slight difficulty, requiring judgment and conjecture rather than imparting certainty. Positiveness in such matters, indeed, is the doubtful privilege of the doctrinaire^ and commonly unfortunate in the result. The instruction derived from the past must be supplemented by a particularized study of the indications of the future.

Although assuredness of conclusion is denied to this process, we can still be confident that under all surface conditions, present as past, there must lie permanent facts, and factors, the detection and specification of which ascertains at least the existence and character of certain determinative features, and the relations subsisting between them. Even so much is gain ; and gain it will remain for the guidance of nations and of mankind, even though it be not possible to forecast the precise combination into which, through the operation of unforeseen events, these various factors will ultimately fall.

viii Preface

The determination of these distinct factors, in a present question of great moment, and, so far as may be, the investigation of their mutual relations, are the objects of the present study. The first paper — The Problem of Asia — aims at the selection and exposition of the great permanent features. It was nearly completed, in its three chapters, by the first of the current year — 1900; and therefore antedates entirely the recent outbreaks in China, although the causes of these were doubtless operative some time before. The second paper, — Effect of Asiatic Conditions upon World Policies, — written in August, attempts to trace the influences that will be exerted by the permanent features, previously noted, upon the passing political conditions, under \vhich present policies have to take shape.

The insertion of the third paper — Merits of the Transvaal Dispute — has been an afterthought. Having had occasion in the other articles to reaffirm more than once my conviction of the essential righteousness of the British cause in South Africa, it has seemed to me pertinent to add

Preface ix

thereto, in justification of this belief, a summary of the facts and arguments by which it was reached.

It remains to express my thanks to the proprietors of " Harper's New Monthly Magazine " and of the " North American Review," for their kind permission to reproduce the articles in book form.

A. T. MAHAN.

September, igoo.

Contents

I. THE PROBLEM OF ASIA

From Harper's New Monthly Magazine

Chapter I. — March, 1900 Page

The paradox of long and short views i

Applicable to both personal and corporate life ... i

Specially illustrated in world movements 2

World conditions in constant flux 3

Consequent effect upon actions of governments ... 3

The Present the guardian of the Future 3

Impulse in United States towards expansion .... 4

Closely related to like movements in Europe .... 4

Illustrations 4

Effects upon international relations 5

Long and short view illustrated in recent American

history 5

Development of the idea of expansion 6

Stopped short once at Hawaii 7

To that point the idea essentially defensive .... 7

Sudden precipitation of Philippine question .... 8 Time needed to settle firmly new conditions of national

responsibility 9

Necessary nevertheless to consider at once the future to

which they point 9

Such consideration facilitates decision in sudden emergencies 10 xii Contents

Chapter I. — March, 1900 — continued Ymx

Presence of mind dependent upon preparation ... 10

Our war with Spain not a disconnected incident ... 11 Rapid change in attitude of Japan towards United States

concerning Hawaii 11

Scope of Monroe Doctrine defined 13

Illustrates a general maxim of statesmanship . . . . 14

Is not applicable to Asia 15

Force of tradition upon popular conception of Monroe

Doctrine 16

Principle permanent, application variable 16

Increased importance of European conditions to American interests 17

Consequent necessity of appreciating European international politics 17

The interest of the world centring upon Asia . . . . 18 Conditions and circumstances of the question should be

studied 18

Primary importance of geographical features . . . . 18

Political problems closely analogous to military ... 19

Importance of " communications " to both . . . . 19

Facility of transmission the attribute of sea power . . 20

Geographical analysis of Asian Continent 20

Climatic conditions. Monsoons ....... 20

Important middle belt, between 30° and 40° North . . 21

Unstable political conditions in this belt 22

In Asia, division is east and west, movement north and

south 22

Necessary to study characteristics of movement , . . 22 In political study, impossible to dissociate Eastern Asia

from Western . 23

Present distribution of stable political forces .... 24

Continuous mass of Russian territory 24

Contents xiil

Chapter I. — March, i 900 — continued Vp.g^

Military advantages of Russian position 25

Its points of military weakness 26

The geographical position of Great Britain in Asia . . 27

Characteristics of British military strength 27

Relation of India to military power of British Empire . 27

Intrinsic advantages of India as a base In Asia . . . 28 Effect of British and Russian tenures in Asia upon the

policy of the two empires 29

Self-preservation the first natural law of states .... 29

Scope to grow essential to self-preservation 30

Growth, like evolution, gives rise to conflict . . . . 30

Nations are trustees for posterity 30

Recourse to arbitration conditioned by trusteeship . . 31 The need and right to grow, factors In the Problem of

Asia 31

Growth depends on vigor of organization and freedom of

intercourse 31

Internal organization a national, not an International question 32

Interchange necessarily Involves other peoples . . . . 32 Freedom of Interchange In Asia, an Interest common to

all commercial states 33

Consequent jealousy of Inimical military Influences . . 33

Movements of acquisition already begun 34

Commercial possibilities of Asia great, but still Indefinite 35

The question one of scale rather than proportion . . . 35

Bearing of external communications upon the problem . 36

Communications twofold: by sea and by land . . . 36 Suggests the multiform struggle between land and sea

power 37

Sea and land power exemplified In Great Britain and

Russia 37 xiv Contents

Chapter I. — March, iqoo — cotitinued „

^ Page

Superior copiousness and cheapness of water communications 38

Their consequent preponderance in development of Asia 38 Control of communications a question of naval power . 3 8 Mutual influence of land and sea power, when in contact 39

Importance of the Yang-tse-kiang to sea power ... 41

Interest of commerce in the maintenance of peace . . 42

Military force essential to secure peace 42

Incapacity of navies to threaten liberty 4a

Dependence of Russia upon land communications . . 42

This condition not susceptible of much modification . . 43 Consequent disadvantage of Russia for the pursuits of

commerce 43

Resultant inevitable tendency to acquire maritime positions 44

Effect upon the policy of other states 45

Obligations of other states to their own people and to

the peoples of Asia 45

Complexity and imminence of the Problem of Asia . . 46

Chapter II. — April, 1900 Russia's predominant land power in Asia 47

Counterbalance by indirect pressure ....... 47

Military meaning of " diversion" 48

Relative mutual effect of flanks and centre of a line . . 48

Advantages of pressure, or of attack, on a flank . . . 48

Factors essential to durable peace in Asia 49

International uneasiness concerning Asia 49

Danger of failure to weigh conditions, and forecast future 49

Peace within Europe, how preserved at present . . . 50

Analogy in Asia 50

Indirect pressure by control of sea and of commerce . . 51

Contents xv

Chapter II. — April, i 900 — continued

Political danger of granting immunity to so-called " private property" at sea 52

Goods in commercial transit are not "private" property 53

Russia's advance in Asia is by the flanks 55

Its objects, threefold access to the sea 56

Interests and opportunities of other states 57

Objectives of policy in Asia 58

Turkey in Asia and Persia — topographic features . . 58

Present internal and political conditions 58

Advance from such conditions in the past, how effected . 60

Instances — India and Egypt 61

Application to future of Western Asia and of China . . 61

Twofold characteristics of movements now in progress . 62

1. Upon both flanks.

2. Antagonism of sea power and land power.

Artificial relation of France to Russia 63

Solidarity of interest in sea powers 63

Particular conditions of each sea power 63

Relative military situations on either flank 64

Importance of Yang-tse to sea power 65

Military situations condition policy 65

Influence of position of Chinese capital 66

Political and military conditions in Western Asia and

the Levant 67

Conflicting interests of France and Italy in the Mediterranean 67

French ambitions in the Mediterranean 67

Effects upon security of Suez route 67

Indirect interest of the United States and Japan . . . 68

Military dangers of the Suez route 69

Its decisive military superiority to that by Cape of Good

Hope 70

XV i Contents

Chapter II. — April, 1900- „ —

Egypt and Asiatic Turkey by position control Suez

route 70

Consequent necessity and effect of political development 70

Development there can begin only from without . . . 72 Its character will depend upon that of the external

influence 73

No analogue to the Yang-tse in Levantine Turkey . . 75 Political effect of railroad from Mediterranean to Persian Gulf 76

Importance of harmony among sea powers 76

Relative commercial value to the world of Eastern and

Western Asia 77

Superior military consequence of Western Asia . . . 77

French preponderance in West"Srn Mediterranean . . . 78

Conditions change east of Sicily 78

Present difficulties of sea powers maintaining naval force

in the Levant -78

To be met only by establishing local political influence . 79

Inalienable strategic importance of Egypt 79

Its central position, and double line of communications . 80

Twofold obligation of Great Britain to hold it ... 80

1 . Duty to continue work of regeneration.

2. Essential to integrity of British Empire.

Inexpediency of abandoning Suez route 81

Napoleon's saying — "War cannot be made without

running risks" 82

True solution of military dilemmas of Suez route . . . 82

Historical importance of Eastern Mediterranean . . . 82

The world's progress east and west, not north and south 83

Significance of Isthmuses of Suez and Panama .... 84

Situation at Suez more critical than at Panama . . . 84

Effect of these considerations upon political traditions . 85

Contents xvii

Chapter II. — April, i goo — continued „

^ Page

Diminished importance of South Africa, and of America

south of valley of the Amazon 86

Modifying effect upon Monroe Doctrine 86

Necessity of concentrating national effort by excluding

minor issues ; .... 86

The future of Asiatic peoples 86

Their general stolid conservatism 87

Effect of external influences 87

Grave possibilities of the Chinese masses 88

Consequent importance of the direction imparted by external impulse 88

Necessity for serious study and prevision 89

The result, the introduction of Eastern peoples into the

European commonwealth 90

Racial characteristics must remain 91

Parallel in the assimilation of Roman civilization by

Teutonic races 91

The Roman law and the imperial idea 91

Inherited by the centralized Christian Church . . . . 91 The Christian tradition the unifying thread of European

civilization 92

The grounds for hope 93

Superior political vitality of a community of states over

a consolidated empire 94

Chapter III. — May, 1900 Present imminent condition of Asiatic problem

Rivalries of external nations

Consideration due to native populations .

Not necessarily due to existing native governments

Present uneasiness result of inefficient government

97 97 98 xviii Contents

Chapter III. — May, 1900 — continued y^g^

Necessity for action laid upon foreign states .... 99

Alternative methods of action 99

Conditions of an efficacious solution 100

I. Political equilibrium among external powers, a. Material and spiritual progress of native inhabitants.

Results to be expected 101

Results attained in Japan loi

Difference in conditions between Japan and China . . 102 Best development through diversified influences by differing race-types 102

Advantage of strong oppositions in international polity . 103 Equilibrium represented by land and sea power in opposing scales 104

Special interest of Teutonic powers 104

Necessity of co-operation 104

Special difficulties attendant upon co-operation of states 104

Need to convince citizens of free states 104

Simplicity of Russian political organization . . . . 104

French alliance with Russia 105

Resultant divergence of interests among Latin states . 1 05

France imperfectly Latin in type 105

Consequent defective influence of Latin states in Asiatic

problem 106

Slavonic and Teutonic the chief European influences . 106

Peculiar relation of Japan to the Asiatic problem . . 106

Japan essentially a sea power 106

Limitations upon the scope of her action 106

1. Because of limited area and wealth.

2. Because of restrlctedly local character of her

interests.

Similarity of interests in Japan and the Teutonic states . 107

Contents xix

Chapter III. — May, i qoo — continued

Page

Essential differences of European civilization, as now

found in both io8

Japan racially Asiatic, adoptively European . . . , io8

Advantage of this factor to the Asiatic future . . . 109

Misunderstandings natural between differing race-types no

How best to be obviated in

Unanimity the aim, rather than uniformity . . . . in

Necessity of mutual respect between races . . . . in

The Problem of Asia to be approached in this spirit . 113

Conservative inertia of Asiatic peoples 114

Japan the sole exception 114

Antagonism of type in Slav and Teuton 114

Conflict between their interests ..115

Opposition must be recognized in order to conciliation . 115

Land power the prerogative of Slavs 116

Sea power that of the Teuton states 116

These conditions, being essential, cannot be reversed . 116

They may, however, be modified 116

Racial and national interests demand such modification . 117

Russia's need of freer access to the sea 117

Opposing exigencies of the Teuton situation . . . . 117 Direction in which the claim of Russia should be cordially conceded 120

Essential necessity of Yang-tse valley to the sea powers ' 120

Their secure access to it to be cordially conceded . . lao

Co-operation between naval states imperative . . . . 121

Land power more menacing to China than sea power . 121

Reasons 121

Commerce essentially tends to peace 122

The future of Asia dependent upon military considerations 124

The question of communications 125

XX Contents

Chapter III. — May, 1900 — continued Page

Communications dominate war 125

The sea the chief medium of world communications . 125 Consequent influence of sea power upon Asian problem 126

Sea power exerts its eff"ect by indirect pressure, — by

diversion 126

Right to control maritime commerce is therefore essential to it, and not to be surrendered 126

The three Teutonic states — Germany, Great Britain,

and the United States 127

Only Germany and Great Britain directly interested in

Levant 127

Requirements to the establishing of their position there . 127

Peculiar interest of Great Britain . 128

Interest of the United States, indirect but real . . . 129

Indifference of American citizens to external questions . 130

Urgent necessity to amend this defect 131

Pacific Ocean and Eastern Asia the coming chief centre

of world interest 131

Interests there of the Teutonic states not the same, yet

similar 133

Conditions of efficient mutual support 134

1. Participation in a common purpose, rather than

assumption of a literal obligation.

2. Candid recognition of respective interests and

spheres of responsibility.

3. Abstention from permanent formal obligations.

4. Retention of independence in individual state

action.

5. Results : co-operation, not alliance. Modifying effect of new conditions upon applications of

Monroe Doctrine .....135

Contents xxi

Chapter III. — May, iqoo — continued

^ Page

Only the United States directly interested in the Caribbean and its Isthmus 136

Increasing mutual comprehension between the English-speaking communities 139

Promises endurance, because resulting from permanent

conditions 139

Evidenced in our war with Spain and in the Transvaal

hostilities 140

Tendency of mankind to aggregate into groups greater

than existing nationalities 141

War a principal instrument in this process, historically.

Instances 141

Justification of war between United States and Spain,

and of Great Britain in South Africa 142

Security of the foundations for Anglo-American co-operation 144

Ethnic relation of Germany to the English-speaking

communities . 144

Relation of Italy to present world movements . . . 145

II. EFFECT OF ASIATIC CONDITIONS UPON WORLD POLICIES

From North American Review, November, 1900

Extraordinary events since the writing of preceding

papers 147

Common eifect upon European nations 147

The United States and Japan members of European

commonwealth 147

Japan's claims to be so considered 148

Parallel in Teutonic entrance into Roman civilization . 149 xxii Contents

II. Asiatic Conditions — cofitinued

Page

Difference between the conditions of the Roman world

then, and Christian civilization now 149

Japan the only Asiatic participant of European progress 150

Influence of insular environment 151

Recent events have not changed permanent conditions . 152 They do not indicate any change of Asiatic characteristics 152

Consequently, no permanent change in national policies 153 Momentary necessity for combined action of European

states 153

Obligation of states during such a passing moment . . 153

Permanent policy resumes sway afterwards . . . . 154 Europe's community, as well as divergence, of interest

in Asia 154

Recent declaration of policy by United States Government 155

Consistent with our past line of action 155

Course of governments controlled by public opinion . 156

Necessity for individual citizens to study the conditions 156

Imperfect knowledge the source of popular fickleness . 157

Summary of world conditions 157

General competition for world's commerce . . . . 158 Effort to compass end by appropriation of territory, or

by establishment of influence 159

Results in international antagonism, resting upon armed

force 159

Fixity of political tenure in Europe and America . . 159 Analogous condition in Africa and the islands of the

sea 159

Different political status of Asia 160

Necessary policy of the maritime powers 161

Particular conditions of the United States 162

Contents xxiii

II. Asiatic Conditions — continued

Page Commercial and political importance of the Yang-tse

valley 164

Present close contact of Eastern and Western civilizations 165

Interaction can no longer be avoided . . . . . . 166

Guidance all that can be attempted 166

Freedom of thought and speech requisite, as well as

freedom to trade 166

Principal objects in dealing with Chinese question . . 167

1. Prevention of preponderant control by any one

state.

2. Insistence upon the "open door" for speech,

as well as for commerce.

Baselessness of outcry against missionary effort . . . 168 Christianity an effective part of Western civilization . 168

Critical importance of present moment 169

Necessity for United States to prepare for her part in

the future 169

Preparation of purpose and preparation of power . . 169 Preparation of power implies also curtailment of needless efforts 170

Policy of the United States clearly defined by its government 170

Diverse in spirit from that of some other states . . . 171

The difference calls for watchfulness 171

The " open door " can be maintained only by readiness to enforce it 172 '

National influence depends upon evidence of purpose

and of power 172

Matters cannot safely be allowed to drift 173

Incapacity of China to develop unaided 174

Aim of recent reactionary movement 174 xxiv Contents

II. Asiatic Conditions — continued Ykgy.

"' Must be resisted 5 by force, if necessary 174

This will be done, even if the United States stands aside 1 74

The signs of the times 175

The Yang-tse valley the great field for commerce and

for sea power 176

Powers in competition upon the field 177

Power of independent action always limited . . . . 177

Consequent necessity for co-operation 178

Co-operation rests upon community of interests and

standards 178

Does not renounce individual responsibility . . . . 178

Implies also division of labor 179

Co-operation not only local in Asia 179

Distributed likewise between the ocean lines of communication 179

Two chief lines — from Europe and from America. . 179

Europe ^na Suez, America 'via Panama 179

Decisive points on each line 180

Under co-operation, the American line is the charge of

the United States, as well as her interest . . . . 180 Our claim to preponderant consideration in the Caribbean practically conceded 180

Not a barren triumph only, but a responsibility . . . 181 United States needs effective naval force in both Pacific

and Atlantic 181

Communications by canal liable to interruption . . . 182

i Military advantages of the " interior line " . . . . 182 ' Military use of canal depends mainly on the solidity of

our naval power in the Caribbean 183

Risk cannot be wholly eliminated from warfare . . . 183

Probable security, however, obtainable 184

First element of security an adequate fleet .... 1 84

Contents xxv

II. Asiatic Conditions — continued ^kcy.

Conditions of adequacy defined . . , 184

Great Britain formerly opposed to our preponderance in

the Caribbean 185

Reasons for her change of attitude in this respect . . 185

Her interest now that we be in naval predominance there 186

Probability of her moral support 186

Her attitude during the recent war with Spain . . . 187 Significanc of moral support, when based upon community of interests 187

Requires, however, evidence of due preparation of purpose and of power 189

Bitterness towards Great Britain shown by some American citizens 189

Exaggerated inferences as to action thence drawn . . 190 Sentiments, bitter or otherwise, permanent only when

based on actual interest ...190

The United States and Great Britain have common actual

interests and common standards 190

Bitterness therefore transient, not reflecting real interests 190

The appreciation of such factors by statesmen . . . 190 • Contrary effect upon them of backwardness in military

and naval preparation 191

Discussion of general conditions governing naval force

needed by United States . 191

Difference of level between Eastern and Western civilizations 191

Consequent danger when barriers disappear . . . . 192

Importance of the Anglo-Saxon type to the final result 192 Continuous vitality and power shown by it since known

to history 192

Duty of the United States to contribute to future racial

action 193 xxvi Contents

II. Asiatic Conditions — continued p ^

Prejudices to be sacrificed to this end 194

The Pacific and the East, the sphere for our external

exertion 194

Bearing of Great Britain's friendship upon the size of

our navy 195

Dependence of Great Britain upon her navy vital . . 197 The United States self-dependent for the necessaries of

existence 198

Considerations determining the size of the United States

navy 198

Superior importance of providing an adequate number of

trained seamen 199

This element of force generally overlooked . . . . 199 Retrenchment of external responsibilities by United

States 201

Application of Monroe Doctrine extended too far . . 201 The valley of the Amazon suggests a possible broad

dividing belt 202

III. MERITS OF THE TRANSVAAL DISPUTE

From the North American Review, March, 1900 Merits of the Transvaal dispute 203

T33T oooe-ooos " p:

THE

PROBLEM OF ASIA