Front matter
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WORKING FORCES l^ PANESE POLITICS
'Account of Political Conflicts
Preface
This is an attempt to study Japanese political forces from the viewpoint of modern sociology; that is, to consider them as dynamic forces, not as static conditions. The writer has recognized from the outset that these forces are extremely complex, and that any attempt to separate them must be arbitrary. No systematic consideration of the Japanese state, whether the method be that of sociology or metaphysics or what not, can be free from the danger of artificiality.
The writer is fully aware of this natural shortcoming of his book. He feels, however, that a sociological study of the Japanese polity should be made on these lines. In attempting it he departs from the methods of other students of Japanese political institutions, who have been content merely to recite the facts of history or to discuss dialectically the Japanese constitution and its theory.
As a student of Japanese law in one of the Japanese universities the writer was taught to consider the institutions of his country only as they are described in the constitution and the statutes. He was not encouraged to examine the actual workings of those institutions. The scholars of that university never went beyond an abstract interpretation of the written codes. After the writer came to Columbia University and stU'lied The Responsible State,^ by Franklin H. Giddings, his con-
438250
6 PREFACE [5
ception of Japanese political institutions underv/ent a change. This small book of Professor Giddings gave him the hint for the present study.
Many books have been written on Japanese politics, and many of them are widely read in the West. Among the best are Dr. Uyehara's The Political Development of Japan, Dr. McLaren's A Political History of Japan, Dr. McGovern's Modern Japan, and Mr. Pooley's Japan at the Crossroads. Some of these books are historical, and some are analytical of laws only. None of them presents an entirely adequate analysis of actual political conditions, as they appear in a moving society.
The writer has no thought of deprecating these books. He wishes to supplement them. They are invaluable to anyone who wishes to gain a glimpse of Japanese politics, and no student of the subject should neglect them. Any differences which may appear between the conclusions of these authorities and of the present writer are due largely to a difference in viewpoint.
This small book is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise. Its purpose will be fulfilled if the reader gains from it a point of view and a suggestion for further study.
Special references to the authorities are infrequent in the following pages, but the accuracy of the historical statements made may be readily verified by the historical works listed in the bibliography.
The writer is particularly indebted to Professors Franklin H. Giddings and A. A. Tenney, of the Department of Sociology, Columbia University, for their instruction and guidance, which he will always remember with gratitude. Acknowledgment must be made to all members of the Department of Sociology, especially to
7] PREFACE J
Mr. F. A. Ross and Mr. H. N. Shenton, for their instruction, kindness and personal interest. To Mr. Manjiro Hasegavva, one of the most competent students of social conditions in Japan, the writer is indebted for invaluable suggestions concerning the method of handling his subject. He also wishes to thank his friends, Mr. Robert L. Stern and Mrs. Elizabeth M. C. Stern, who corrected his English and aided him with criticism and suggestions ; Mr. Go M. Fisher, Honorary National Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Japan, who read the manuscript, making valuable criticisms ; and Mr. and Mrs. Edward Thomas, who aided the writer with editorial suggestions.
UlCHI IWASAKI.
Columbia University, New Yoek City.
December, 1920.
CHAPTER I Introduction I
Superficial observers of political and social events in Japan often marvel at what they call the " extraordinary adaptability " of the Japanese. In a few decades, they say, Japan, on her own initiative, transformed herself from a feudal state into a modern nation. Westerners are fond of this interpretation of modern Japanese history, and many natives of Japan agree with them.
Although this view is in harmony with the superficial facts, it is, the writer believes, essentially misleading. To be sure, Japan now has a constitution which in her feudal days would have been impossible. Her intercourse with the western world has, moreover, greatly modified many of the customs and institutions of her people. But to interpret these facts as indicative of an essential and a complete revolution is to exaggerate greatly.
No nation could, over night, effect a change as complete as the Japanese are said to have effected. Least of all could the Japanese, who have shown themselves to be socially static. For three centuries they remained supine under the feudalism of the Tokugawa shogunate, with its rigid forms and iron-clad class distinctions. The early Tokugawas knew how to rule, and they established themselves firmly amid a network of laws and customs unbelievably intricate and intolerable, which impressed themselves II] II indelibly on the minds of the people. Above the shogun of course, was the Emperor, enshrined in the holy city and worshipped by all, but he was powerless, and in his name the shogun controlled the nation.
The time came, in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the power of the shogun was doomed to end. Japan opened her doors to foreigners, and it was impossible for her to continue the feudal system. As a result of this situation came the readjustment called the Meiji Restoration. It is this Meiji Restoration that has given to casual observers the impression that Japan has undergone a complete revolution, and has won for the Japanese a reputation for extraordinary adaptability.
As a matter of fact, long established customs cannot be changed in a day. A new society is not to be begotten by the word or act of a group of statesmen. It can be won only after long and painful experience. When circumstances demand a change in the life of a people, as in the Meiji period they demanded a change in the life of Japan, the people, following the line of least resistance, will alter their manners, but they will make the smallest alteration that the exigencies of the moment permit.
Thus, when the Japanese feudal system was destroyed in 1867 there was set up in its stead a bureaucracy that retained the spirit of the shogunate. It is not too much to say that the political and social institutions of the new Japan were only another expression of the Tokugawa system.
II
Let us consider the Meiji Restoration, with a view to discovering the nature and extent of the change that it has brought to Japan.
In feudal Japan the rulers were as follows: first the
13] INTRODUCTION I3
Emperor, his family and the court nobles, who lived secluded in Kyoto and took no active part in the affairs of the government; second, the shogun, or feudal overlord, who ruled the entire nation; third, the daimyo or feudal lords, who ruled absolutely over parts of the country which they held as fiefs of the shogun; and fourth, the samurai or knights, who formed the intellectual or fighting class and to whom the daimyo turned over most of the real administrative work. The heimin or common people had no power, and, of course, the capitalist class had not yet arisen. The stronger of the daimyd, who were at the head of powerful clans such as Choshu and Satsuma, were rivals of the shogun, and were ready to seize control of the state at the slightest sign of weakness in the rulers.
In the days of his strength the shogun was really terrible. But *' if there is spring, there must be fall," says a Japanese proverb, and in the middle of the nineteenth century it was plain that the spring of the Tokugawas was over. Perry and the American fleet came to Japan in 1853, and the nation was faced with the peril of foreign invasion. A western civilization from which they could not hold aloof was shown to the Japanese, and it was apparent to all that something had to be done. The clans, led by the daimyd of Chdshu and Satsuma, arose in rebellion, and the shogun failed in his^ttempt to subdue them. The result was the end of the Tokugawas.
On the face of it this was simply a struggle between the shogun and the daimyd, but behind the daimyo were the samurai, men of real ability, who took advantage of this opportunity to increase their own power and to bring them-» selves into prominence. An examination of the names of those who played the most important part in the Meiji Restoration and in the conduct of the government that followed will easily show how remarkably the samurai of
Chdshu, Satsuma, Hizen and Tosa, the mast powerful of the clans, succeeded in their purpose. The samurai knew the situation better than any others. They played the shogun against the lords, and themselves came out on top.
The heimin — farmers, artisans and the merchantstook no part in this. It was a game played by the ruling classes.
This struggle, at the time of threatened foreign invasion, placed the nation in a precarious position. The confusion was great, and it was feared that the consequences would be serious. Each of the struggling classes saw the danger, and cast about for a leader who could unify the nation. The shogun could not take the fore, because his power had been broken; no one of the lords would do, for his influence, however great, was merely local; and the samurai did not feel themselves strong enough openly to set themselves up as the ruling class. The obvious solution was — the Emperor.
In the history of Japan there is no record of revolt against the Imperial Dynasty which has ruled Japan since prehistoric times.^ Because of this loyalty, and because it has been the policy of the Dynasty to espouse the cause of the more progressive parties, it has been an unbroken custom to look to the Imperial family in time of great disturbance. To the Emperor, then, the leaders of the Meiji Restoration turned. Each of the struggling factions sought his support, but, true to the policy of his line, he threw the
1 This does not mean that there have been no revolts against ministers or shoguns of some Emperors, or even against certain Emperors themselves. But the revolutionists in no case have wished to overthrow the Imperial House. Many times one Emperor has been deposed and one of his relatives set up in his stead. For instance, in the early thirieenth century the Shogun Hojo Yoshitoki deposed the Emperor Chukio, and put upon the throne the Emperor's cousin, who then became known as Go-Horikawa-Tenn6. But no one not of the old Imperial blood has ever attempted to usurp the throne.
12] INTRODUCTION 1 5
weight of his tremendous prestige upon the side of the revolting daimyo. The samurai who were behind the daimyd took advantage of this to completely crush the sh5gun and establish themselves in power.
Thus, the Meiji Restoration was accomplished with the Emperor as its center and the samurai, as the greatest force behind it. It was, as the writer has said, a struggle of the ruling classes in which the common people took no part. The revolution was more political than social. It was a transference of power frcm one ruling group to another, and the groups which emerged triumphant had been in the upper strata of society in the pre-revolutionary days. The whole movement was a small wave in the great still ocean of Japanese life, which continued to retain the traditional spirit of feudalism. In point of form only was the revolution great.
Ill
Into the chaos which followed the overthrowing of the shogun came the influence of European political philosophies. The Japanese soon saw that in reforming their government they must adopt western ideas. There were presented to them the French idea, the heritage of Rousseau and his philosophy of the social contract; the English idea, based upon the theories of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith and the rest of the Utilitarians; and the American idea, based upon the Declaration of Independence, and involving the establishment of a democratic republic. The rulinof classes rejected all of these as too democratic. Seeking further for a philosophy that would counteract these influences, they found in Germany the idea best fitted to their purposes. Accordingly, they took advantage of the natural conservatism of the Japanese people and their intense national patriotism, and gave them a constitutional monl6 WORKING FORCES IN JAPANESE POLITICS [i5
archy on the German model, somewhat modified to suit the peculiar needs of Japan/
The Emperor resumed his ancient position as the head of the state. A bicameral legislature, consisting of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives, was created. A cabinet was established, but it was not made responsible to the legislature. An independent judiciary was formed. Closest to the throne under the new constitution was the privy council, which, like the judiciary, was independent of all other governmental agencies except the Emperor, who exercised only a nominal control. Most influential of all was an extra-constitutional body, the council of Genrd or Elder Statesmen, which dominated all.
In this there is little of democracy. The class lines which had been established and made rigid under the Tokugawas was largely retained, and each of the ruling classes took a place of influence in the new order. The daimyd or lords of the clans were created peers. These, by way of compensation for voluntarily restoring their fiefs to the crown, sat in the upper house of the legislature.
The samurai, under the new regime, may be divided into two classes: those who were successful in the scramble for power and those who were unsuccessful. The former, for the most part, were of the Choshu and Satsuma clans, and these took the important positions in the bureaucracy. Choshu controlled the army and Satsuma the navy, and the samurai of these two clans formed the majority in the Genro council. The samurai of the lesser clans found themselves left behind, and led by the men of Hizen and Tosa, formed political parties in opposition to the bureaucrats. Their stronghold was the lower house of the legislature.
5 See Mr. K. Kawakami's Political Ideas of Modern Japan, The University of Iowa.
17] INTRODUCTION I7
Thus was established the Meiji bureaucracy, a readjustment of the forces of feudalism under a constitution that was a compromise among the interests of the several ruling classes. The common people were left out. The Emperor, while theoretically at the head, in reality exercised his authority almost entirely according to the advice of the Genro and the prime minister. The Genr5, samurai in origin, carried on the traditions of feudalism. Exercising great authority and taking advantage of their extra-constitutional status, they were the true power behind the throne. The bureaucrats, their proteges, fought under their protection against the political parties, allying themselves with their friends in the House of Peers, with the Privy Council and with the army and navy. This bureaucratic combination maintained its supremacy for thirty years, and not until the close of the Meiji Era (1868- 191 2) was it forced to recognize the power of the political parties and to compromise with them.
At first the political parties were idealistic, seeking to defeat the bureaucrats, the Genro and the peers, and to establish a true parliamentary government on the Anglo- Saxon model. Later, in the bitterness of defeat at the hands of their rivals, they modified their demands and compromised. At the same time they gradually aligned themselves with the industrial capitalists who were becoming powerful in the meanwhile.
During the Meiji Era Japan was in a comparatively static condition. The ruling forces — Genro, aristocrats, bureaucrats, militarists and political parties — were in a state of equilibrium.
l8 WORKING FORCES IN JAPANESE POLITICS [ig
IV
The foregoing is, the writer thinks, a fair sketch of the conditions which followed the abolition of the shogunate. But in order faithfully to picture the Japan of to-day we must add another stroke to the drawing : a description of the rise of industrialism in what is caJlled the Taish5 Era.
The industrial revolution reached Japan at the close of the nineteenth century. In feudal days the chief occupation of the nation was agriculture; but in modern times a nation of small area with insufficient natural resources must turn to manufacturing if it is to keep its place in the economic world. So it was with Japan, as with England and Germany before her.
The ruling military classes observed the tendency towards industrialism. Doubtless they saw the danger, but at the same time they realized that if they were to compete on the field of battle with the nations of the West they must not be afraid of the modernization of their own country. Therefore, as a part of their program of preparedness for war, they encouraged industry, particularly shipbuilding and the manufacture of steel.
Just at this time China was being opened as a world market and a source of raw materials. The western nations saw their opportunity and scrambled for concessions, and Japan saw that if she would retain her natural advantages in this field she must develop her industry. As a result of all these influences many of the agricultural workers of Japan flocked to the cities and became factory hands, and the economic status of the nation was transformed.
Parallel with the industrial revolution came the spread of education. The ruling classes saw the value of education, and they adopted a scheme of compulsory schooling which reduced illiteracy to an amazingly low figure. The control of the schools was an enormous power in the hands
19] INTRODUCTION I9
of the bureaucrats, but they exercised that power in a way that left open a path for the growth of hberaHsm. On the one hand they emphasized the beauty of Japanese culture, with much flag waving and suggestions derogatory to all foreigners, and on the other they urged the necessity of embracing the material side of western civilization. The study of foreign languages, particularly English, was required, in order that the students might familiarize themselves with conditions in the rest of the world; but this redounded to the disadvantage of the ruling classes, for it enabled the educated people to read about western thought as well as western business, and many of them began to realize that Japanese culture was not the only one on the market. Since English was a required language in the secondary schools, British and American ideas permeated the nation, and encouraged the growth of liberalism. The presence in Japan of more than 1000 American and British missionaries and teachers had a powerful influence in the same direction.
At the same time came an improvement in the means of transportation and communication. The Japanese railway system, under the encouragement of the bureaucracy, has reached an extraordinarily high development. While it is not as extensive as that of England or the United States, yet it is further advanced than the railway systems of such European countries as Italy or Spain. From Toky5 a traveller can reach the remotest parts of Japan in a few days. At the same time the telephone, telegraph and postal systems have reached a high point of efficiency under a government monopoly. The bureaucracy encouraged this, impressed chiefly by the military advantage of good communications, and failing to observe the effect upon the growth of liberalism.
In this era newspapers began to appear in great numbers throughout the nation, until every town of a population of ten thousand or more had at least one sheet. The papers "wfere almost unanimous in their opposition to the bureaucracy.
As a climax came the World War, a greater revolutionary influence than any of these domestic developments. Participation in the struggle completed the opening of Japan which Perry had begun. Formerly the attention of the Japanese, after their isolation was broken, had been directed largely toward their oriental neighbors, China, Korea, Manchuria, Formosa, Siberia. Now this interest was definitely focussed upon Europe. The people could now make a comparison between the German and Anglo-Saxon civilizations, and the result of the war determined their decision on the relative merits of the two. Their tendency was to regard the war as a struggle between militarism and liberalism, in which liberalism came off victorious.^
The growth of radicalism in Europe after the war had its reflection in Japan. Labor unions arose and asserted their right to strike, and the socialist movement won a large measure of freedom from repression.
All this resulted in the rise of two new classes to join the aristocrats, the bureaucrats, the Elder Statesmen, the miltarists, and the parties in the struggle for political supremacy. One of them, the capitalist group, has climbed in a few years to a position of domination.
In feudal days, the merchant was despised. The daimyd and samurai often needed him to finance their undertakings, but the farmer and the artisan were considered more
1 The conduct of the Allied nations since the armistice, and the anti- American propaganda of the Japanese militarists weakened this conviction to some extent
2i] INTRODUCTION 21
essential to the life of the nation, and won far greater respect than the mere trader and money lender. In the Meiji era the common people, including the merchants, were formally released from serfdom and made theoretically free. The merchants in the cities then took advanr.^ge of the increase in trade to improve their situation.
The industrial revolution, in Japan as elsewhere, brought the heyday of merchants and manufacturers. The despised money lender became the captain of finance. The artisan and the trader became the manufacturer and merchant prince. Especially great became the influence of those who gained control of shipbuilding, the munitions trade, the merchant marine, mining and metal manufacturing. All the while the influence of the country landlord remained stationary.
In the Meiji Era the merchants sought to advance their ^ influence by hobnobbing with the bureaucrats and militarists. Later the political parties grew stronger and to them the industrialists turned their attention. They found this more favorable to their interests, because the politicians of a province were easier of access than a bureaucratic governor. Moreover, a party always needs campaign funds, and who is better able to supply these than a growing captain of industry? Thus there came about a tremendously powerful alliance between capital and the political parties, which triumphantly rose to power with the present Hara ministry. The existence of this alliance is proved by the very names of the members of Premier Hara's cabinet. They are among the leaders of Japanese business and finance.
To understand this is to gain an insight into the foreign policies of present-day Japan. While Hara is loud in his disclaimers of territorial ambition in Shantung and Siberia, he is much interested in economic concessions in outlying territories, which are valuable, of course, to his capitalist friends, and he has compromised with the militarists in order to capture these concessions.
VI
Coincident with the rise of capital came, naturally, the development of a laboring class, the second great group developed by the industrial revolution. In the feudal days the workers were serfs. The Meiji Restoration freed them theoretically but actually left their position almost unchanged. The only advantage they won was the right to an education. With the industrial revolution the ai:tisans came to the cities and began to develop into a class-conscious proletariat. With them came many of the farmers, driven into industry by the scarcity of land and the demand for industrial labor. These factory workers were open to the influence of propaganda, because most of them had now been taught to read. The newspapers they read did not increase their friendliness toward the government.
The laboring class was strengthened by the fact that the increasing cost of living forced into alliance with it those who would have preferred to remain petty bourgeois: namely, teachers, newspapermen, and small government officers, such as policemen, whose salaries were not advanced. These now joined with the factory workers, who had gained skill at their trades and whose prestige was increased by the demand for their labor. The workers shared to some extent the prosperity brought to Japan by the war. By their alliance with the lower middle class their group gained brains and learned ambition. Class consciousness had now arisen, and the Japanese proletariat of the present is considering whether it can best serve its interests by forming a political party and competing with the capitalists in the Diet, or by clinging to the trades-union principles of direct action, with frequent use of the strike and sabotage.
23] INTRODUCTION 23
This, then, is the situation in Japan today: The arista-^ crats and the bureaucrats still exercise their traditional power through the House of Peers, the army and navy, and the Genro. Against them struggle the political parties, now powerful, which control the House of Representatives and are backed by the capitalists. The power of the capitalists in the Diet is not easily to be shaken, for they are protected by the election laws restricting the franchise to those who own property and pay direct taxes. Against them, however, the new laboring class is slowly rising, demanding universal suffrage for both sexes, the recognition of labor unions and the right to strike, and political freedom for democratic and socialist parties. It should now be apparent to the reader that Japan is to be regarded as a whirlpool of conflicting forces. Japanese^/ politics can best be studied by scrutinizing these influences, these struggling classes. The future can best be judged by him who understands their positions and their relative strength. The forces to be considered in the subsequent chapters are eight:
The Genro, or the Elder Statesmen
The Political Parties
The Capitalists
The Workers
CHAPTER II The Emperor
Obscurity, born of a tradition as old as man, surrounds the relation between the Emperor of Japan and his people. Few westerners understand the true position of the Mikado in the actual world of politics. In this chapter the writer will attempt to expound it to them.
The writer does not agree with those Japanese patriots v/ho see fit to interpret the position of the Imperial Dynasty by a mixture of Japanese mythology and pseudo-science. He prefers to consider this subject in the impartial light of history. In doing this he is, to some extent, risking the ire of some Japanese bureaucrats. But he believes it t > be the duty of a scientific student to adhere to facts, not myths ; and further, a careful study of the true position of the Emperor of Japan can reflect nothing but the utmost credit and honor upon the Imperial Dynasty. He writes, not as a hostile critic of Japanese traditions, but as a sincere admirer of the Imperial Japanese Dynasty.
II
Students of Japanese law hold two conflicting theories of the constitutional position of the Emperor.^ The con-
1 The conservative school of interpretation of the constitution was
founded by Professor Yatsuka Hozumi, of the Imperial University of
Tokio. In his book, Kempd Teiyd {Outline of the Japanese Con-
stitution) his theories arc expounded. When he died the leadership
24 [24 servative group contends that the Emperor is an absolute ruler, wielding the powers of government without check, and considering nothing but his own Imperial will. The more progressive school declares that he rules not as an absolute monarch, but as the supreme representative of the nation, which is composed of the Emperor and the people. His power, they contend, is not absolute and personal, but constitutionally limited; and in exercising it he is bound to consider not his own Imperial will, but the needs of his nation. _"
Defendants of the conservative theory point out that the Emperor Meiji promulgated the constitution, in 1889, of his own free will, and not as concession to any popular demands. He made a set of rules for the guidance of his people and of his government as a schoolmaster makes rules for the control of his pupils; therefore it is not to be considered that the Emperor is restricted by a constitution of his own making.
The leading defender of this theory was Prince Ito, who had been sent abroad by the Emperor Meiji to study the political ideas of the West, and who, upon his return, was the chief draftsman of the constitution. His followers, including many professors of constitutional law in the Japanese universities, were passionate in their enthusiasm for the theory of Imperial absolutism, and some of them went so far as to denounce as traitors the scholars who agreed with the political parties in opposing this. Prince Ito, in his book A Commentary upon the Constitution of the
of this school fell to Professor Shinkichi Uyesugi, also of Tokio. The opposition is led by Professor Tatsukichi Minobe, of the same institution, who is the leader of the liberal school of interpretation. Professors Sasaki and Ichimura, of the Imperial University of Kyoto, are followers of Minobe. Space does not permit an elaborate statement of their positions here. They have all written textbooks, to which the interested reader is referred.
Empire of Japan, which has been translated into EngHsh, fully expressed his views on this subject.
The theory is based chiefly on Articles I and III of the constitution. Article I reads " The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." The substance of Article III is : " The Emperor is sacred and inviolable."
It is hardly scientific to interpret a document in the light of two or three articles only, and the writer is convinced that a consideration of the constitution in its entirety will refute Prince Ito and his followers. Let us examine the first chapter of the constitution, in which the powers of the Emperor are defined. To him is given legislative and executive authority in sanctioning and promulgating laws and ordinances, in convoking and dissolving the Imperial Diet, in determining the organization of the different branches of the administration and the salaries of civil and military officers, and in the appointment and dismissal of the officers ; supreme command of the army and navy; the right to declare war and conclude treaties of peace and to confer titles of nobility and other ranks of honor; and the ordering of amnesty, pardons, commutation or punishments, and rehabilitation.
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