A treatise on language: or, The relation which words bear to things, in four parts

II Ehh1

I OO'

V O

TREATISE ON LANGUAGE

RELATION WHICH WORDS BEAR TO THINGS

IN FOUR PARTS.

BY A. B. JOHNSON.

NEW YORK.

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS.

1*

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, by Harper & Brothers, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New- York.

£7?^

HENRY W. REES, STEREOTYPE*., 45 GOLD STREET, NEW-YORK.

U)

Preface

In 1828 the following work was first published, It was entitled " The Philosophy of Human Knowledge, or, A Treatise on Language ;" and was the first part of a series of experimental investigations which were to include language, physical actions, thoughts, and feelings. The publication of 1828 was limited to the investigation of language ; and as the present publication possesses the same limitation, and the other topicks, though in progress, may never be completed, the first half of the original title is omitted, and the present publication is designated A Treatise on Language.

Except many gratifying letters received by me from strangers in various states of our Union, and one extensive review, the preceding edition of this work excited no attention. The edition has, however, been long since absorbed spontaneously by the publick, and I have received repeated applications for further copies.

The form of lectures to which the preceding work was subjected, has been retained as a means of lessening the natural wearisomeness of instruction. In other respects, the work -has been newly arranged and simplified. The present edition contains also much that is not in the former ; yet the lectures are still little more than heads of discourses. They are sufficient to indicate my views of language ; while persons who shall accord with me in these views, will readily discover new illustrations of the rules which I have given, and new rules for

IV PREFACE.

verbal positions to which I have not adverted. Indeed, all that the book contains is the elucidation of but one precept : namely, to interpret language by nature. We reverse the rule and interpret nature by language. The precept itself which I have sought to illustrate, I profoundly respect ; but whether I have demonstrated its importance, the publick must determine. Amid active and extensive employments, and with no external stimulus to literary pursuits, I shall be satisfied if the succeeding discourses shall commend the doctrine to the efforts of men whose understandings are more comprehensive than mine, and whose labours the world is accustomed to respect. As, however, the following sheets are the painful elaboration of many years, when my language or positions shall, in a casual perusal, seem absurd, (and such cases may be frequent,) I request the reader to seek some more creditable interpretation. The best which he can conceive should be assumed to be my intention : as on an escutcheon, when a figure resembles both an eagle and a buzzard, heraldry decides that the bird which is most creditable to the bearer, shall be deemed to be the one intended by the blazon.

THE AUTHOR.

V

Contents

LECTURE I.— Introductory 33

Section 1. — To know the extent of our powers will save us from, impracticable pursuits . . . .... .33

Section 2. — We are in little danger from the pursuit of physical impracticabilities . . . . . . . . .33

Section 7. — Significant verbal inquisition is not unlimited . . 35

Section 8. — Language may be formed into propositions whose results, though incontrovertible by logick, are irreconcileable with our senses ... 33

Section 9. — The verbal defects which these discourses will discuss, are inseparable from language, and differ from any defects that you may anticipate 37

Section 12. — These discourses concern not the relative meaning which words bear to each other, but the relation which words bear to created existences 38

Section 13. — We translate sensible existences into words, instead of interpreting words by the information of our senses . . 38

Section 14. — We must make our senses the expositors of words, instead of making words the expositors of what our senses reveal 38

Section 15. — To understand these discourses, a slight perusal of detached parts, or of the whole, will be insufficient ... 39

VI CONTENTS,

Part First, Of Language With Reference To Existences Which Are External Of Man

LECTURE II. — External sensible existences are susceptible

OP A CLASSIFICATION WHICH SHALL REFER EACH EXISTENCE TO THE SENSE THROUGH WHOSE AGENCY WE ACQUIRE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE . 43

Section 4. — To understand the relation which words bear to created existences, we must contemplate creation apart from words 43

Section 5. — The external universe may be divided into sights, sounds, tastes, feels, and smells 44

Section 6. — Sights, feels, &c, are presented to us by nature in certain groups 44

Section 7. — Sights and feels are the most frequently associated 44

Section 8. — Sights, feels, tastes, and smells, are frequently associated 45

Section 10. — Sights, sounds, tastes, feels, and smells, nature sometimes presents singly to us 45

Section 11. — We must discriminate between the extent and variety of creation and the paucity of language . . . .45

Section 13. — Tastes, smells, sounds, and feels, are seldom designated specifically by names 46

Section 14. — We create names when we deem them useful . 46

Action 15. — The associations of nature are sometimes separable 47

Section 16.— Feels can also be separated from the sights with which they are naturally associated 47

Section 17. — Painting, slight of hand, natural magick, &c, consist in the separation, either artificially or spontaneously, of the sensible existences which nature usually associates . . .47

Section 18. — When we see a sight, experience alone induces us to expect that it is associated with a feel . . . . .48

Section 19. — When we perceive a feel, experience alone induces us to expect that it is associated with a sight . . . .49

Section 20. — Language refers to the groups which nature presents to us, and not to the individual phenomena of any group . . 49

Section 21. — Words are confounded with things . . . .50

Section 22. — We should endeavour to regard words as merely the names of things 50

LECTURE III. — Language implies a oneness to which nature

CONFORMS NOT IN ALL CASES 52

Section 1. — The existence which we name a shadow, possesses more natural oneness than the existence which we name gold 52

CONTENTS. Vll

Section 2. — The oneness of natural existences must not be interpreted by their names, but by our senses 52

Section 3. — We must subordinate language to what we discover in nature 53

Section 4. — Verbally, the oneness of every existence is equally simple, but the natural oneness varies in different existences . 53

Section 5. — In all our speculations, we estimate created existences by the oneness of their name 54

Section 6.— Because nature exhibits not the oneness which we find in language, we impute the discrepancy to a fallacy of nature, instead of knowing that it is simply a provision of language . 54

Section 7. — Instead of employing our experience to teach us that the oneness of language is fallacious, we employ it to show that the duality of nature is fallacious 55

Section 8. — We make language the expositor of nature, instead of making nature the expositor of language . . . .55

Section 9.— -We invent theories to reconcile the duality of nature to the oneness of language . . . . . . .55

Section 10. — To assert that distance is invisible, is only an enigmatical mode of relating the simple fact, that seeing cannot reveal to us a feel 57

Section 11. — Whether seeing can or not inform us of an external universe, depends on the meaning which we attach to the word external. The question relates to language, and not to nature 57

Section 12. — Estimating nature by the oneness of language is a fallacy \* hich enters deeply into every system of philosophy . 58

LECTURE IV. — The oneness implied by language affects not

ONLY METAPHYSICAL DISQUISITIONS, BUT PHYSICAL SPECULATIONS . 59

Section 1. — When a word names the phenomena of two or more senses, the oneness of the name is peculiarly embarrassing 59

Section 3. — We seek in nature for a unit which exists in language only 59

Section 4. — Groups of natural existences and relations may be deemed units, but we must estimate their oneness by our sensible experience, and not by the implication of language ; nature being no party to our language . . . . . . • 60

Section 5. — The oneness of nature is different in different cases, but the oneness which language implies is always complete . 60

Section 7. — The particulars which we can discover in nature, are all which truly pertain to nature 61

Section 9. — Medical science is probably embarrassed by our imputing to diseases and their incidents, the oneness which pertains to their names only 62

Section 11. — Our moral speculations also are embarrassed by imputing to nature the oneness which exists in language only 63

Vlll CONTENTS.

Section 16. — Some units are a sensible aggregation, and some 3 verbal aggregation . . . . . . . . .84

Section 17. — We invent theories to supply the unit which we suppose must exist, but which we fail from finding in nature . 64

LECTURE V. — Language implies identities to which nature

CONFORMS NOT ... 66

Section 2. — Language is a collection of general terms, but creation is a congregation of individual existences . . . .66

Section 3. — We interpret the identity of existences by the identity of their name 66

Section 4. — The identity which language implies has embarrassed medicine ... 67

Section 5.— Individuality is characteristick of nature . . .67

Section 7. — The identity which language implies is always complete, but nature approximates in various degrees only to a perfect identity 68

Section 10. — We should not confound the verbal identity with the realities of nature 68

Section 11. — Failing to discover in nature the identity which language implies, but believing that it mus>t, exist somewhere in nature, we mistake it for a mysterious property of creation . 68

Section 12. — We transfer to nature the generalization which belongs to language . • . 69

Section 13. — The diversity which we discover among natural objects, &c, that possess the same name, should teach us to correct the identity implied by their name ; but we employ the verbal identity to excite wonder at the natural diversity . . 69

Section 16. — Language, in its ability to designate individual existences, is like colours in their ability to depict the variety of nature . 70

Section 19. — Verbal disquisitions will be erroneous till we cease from imputing to nature the identities which belong to language 71

Section 20. — The meaning of the word identity varies with the object to which it is applied 71

Section 21. — We subordinate nature to language, instead of subordinating language to nature 72

Section 22. — No two existences are as identical in nature as in name 72

Section 23.— The identity which language implies is the expedient by which a finite language comprehends an infinitely diverse creation .72

Section 24. — Imputing to nature the identity which exists in language, causes much fallacious speculation ~ ■ . . . .73 Section 33. — Estimating nature by the identities of language misleads us in natural history, geography, &c. . . . .75

CONTENTS. IX

Section 35. — Two men, who assent to the same general proposition, may possess very diverse meanings 76

Section 36. — Our expressions are often identical, when our meanings are diverse . . . -'' 76

Section 37. — Estimating thoughts by the identity which their name implies, has prevented us from noting the natural diversity which thoughts exhibit 76

Section 38. — Thoughts are divisible into six different classes . 77

Section 39. — One class of thoughts are words . . . .77

Section 41. — In the production of verbal thoughts, an agency of the organs of speech is discoverable . . . .77

Section 42. — Verbal thoughts are limited, like audible words, to a consecutive formation . . . . ' . . . .78

Section 43. — The identity which exists between verbal thoughts and mere words, is closer than the generality of identities . 78

Section 44. — One class of thoughts is characteristically sights . 78

Section 45. — The remaining four classes of thoughts are characteristically sounds, tastes, feels, and smells . . . .79

Section 46. — The thoughts which I class as smells, possess the limitation that pertains to the perception of odours . . .79

Section 47. — Tastes possess in thought the singleness which attends the reception of tastes . . 79

Section 48. — The recollection of sounds differs from the recollection of articulations 79

Section 49. — We construe nature by the forms of language, instead of construing language by the revelations of nature . 80

Section 50. — Dumb mutes possess neither verbal thoughts nor auricular thoughts 80

Section 51. — To acquire a written language will not give the dumb verbal thoughts . 80

Section 52. — Infants possess no verbal thoughts . . . .81

Section 53. — A paralysis of the tongue impedes verbal thinking 81

Section 54. — Practically, we are well aware of the difference which exists in the nature of our thoughts . . . .81

LECTURE VI. — Words can be divested of signification, and still formed into propositions which will not be obviously futile 83

Section 1. — Words can be divested of their sensible signification 84

Section 7. — We are vigilant in detecting verbal contradictions, but we never detect the sensible contradiction which exists in affirming the presence of sensible existences, where none are discoverable by the senses . 85

Section 8.— Words, divested of signification^ may still be employed in all the processes of logick 85

Section 13. — Words divested of signification may still be employed in the problems and demonstrations of mathematicks . 87

X CONTENTS.

Section 16. — The fallacy enters largely into the speculations of every department of philosophy 88

Section 20. — Theoretical causes are frequently nothing but words divested of their sensible signification .... 90

Section 22. — When we subtract from a word its sensible signification, the word returns, (so far as relates to the external universe,) to the pristine insignificance which the word possessed, before it was applied to the purposes of language ... 90

Section 24. — The law of nature, which makes the word scarlet insignificant to the blind, makes all words insignificant when they attempt to name external existences which our senses cannot discover 91

Section 26. — We can no more subtract from an external existence its sensible qualities, and leave a subsisting reality, than we can subtract all sensible qualities from an orange, and leave a fruit . 91

Section 27. — When the word cause is used significantly, it refers to a sensible existence 92

Section 29. — An ignorance of the limitation which nature has formed to the signification of language, is in no instance so productive of erroneous speculation, as in its application to the word cause 92

Section 36. — Theories are useful, but we need not confound them with the sensible realities of creation .... 94

Section 38. — The principles of this lecture are correct, though some of my illustrations may be deemed incorrect . . 95

LECTURE VII. — The meaning of a word varies with its application 96

Section 1. — Words may be compared to a mirror. It is naturally void, and varies its representations as you vary the object which is placed before it ....:... 96

Section 2. — Words signify the objects to which they are applied 97

Section 3. — Every word is a general term, and applies to a multitude of diverse existences 97

Section 4.— We attribute to nature the generality which belongs to language 98

Section 5. — Instead of qualifying the meaning of a word by the existence to which we apply the word, we estimate the existence by the word 98

Section 7. — We must resort to our senses for the sensible meaning of a word, and not to a dictionary 100

Section 8. — We must discriminate between the question which relates to the appropriateness of a word, and its signification 100

Section 9. — Interpreting nature by language enables us to communicate an artificial interest to scientifick experiments . 101

CONTENTS. XI

Section 10.— -The language in which every experiment is announced must be interpreted by the experiment. We must not interpret the experiment by the language . » ■. .101

Section 15. — Interpreting nature by language enables us to very insidiously excite admiration . .* . . . . 102

Section 17. — Interpreting nature by language enables us to both artificially exalt and degrade sensible information . . . 103

Section 20. — The sensible realities to which words refer, and which alone give words a sensible signification, are not affected by our phraseology 105

Section 21. — Philosophy often expends itself in a contest about phraseology, from not knowing that the meaning of words is controlled by the sensible existences to which the words refer 105

LECTURE VIIL— Every general proposition possesses as many

SIGNIFICATIONS AS IT POSSESSES REFERENCE TO DIFFERENT PAR- TICULARS . . 107

Section 2. — Every proposition signifies some particular that the speaker refers to ; but the proposition is interpreted by some^- thing that the hearer refers to . * . . . . 107

Section 3. — One particular may constitute the meaning of numerous propositions 108

Section 4. — General propositions produce often an apparent conflict of opinion where no disagreement exists . . .108

Section 8. — Universal gravitation signifies the particulars only to which it refers 109

Section 9. — The sphericity and motions, &c, of the earth, signify the phenomena only to which the propositions refer . 110

Section 10.— "Till we know the particulars to which a proposition refers, its meaning is unknown to us . . . .111

Section 11. — Ignorance of the true method of interpreting propositions causes controversy * HI

Section 12. — Medical science has suffered by a misconstruction

. of general propositions » , . .112

Section 13. — The illustrations of a general proposition constitute often all its meaning . . .',-.'■. . . .112

Section 14. — Conflicting general propositions often harmonize when we know the particulars to which they refer . .112

Section 16. — No general proposition is significant of more than certain particulars .113

Section 18. — We should never contest general propositions, but the particulars to which the propositions refer. Men cannot be forced to adopt but one phraseology 114

XII CONTENTS.

Section 20. — Nearly every proposition is true when interpreted as the speaker interprets it. This results from the nature of language, and not from conventional agreement . . .114

Section 22. — General propositions are unintelligible till resolved into some known particulars 115

Section 25. — Some writers commit a species of tautology, by involving in general propositions the facts which they subsequently particularize . .116

Section 31. — General propositions bring often unmerited honour on their authors 118

Section 34. — We must interpret every general proposition by the particulars to which it refers ; and not interpret the particulars by the general proposition 118

Section 36. — Some sensible particulars imply others, by virtue of our experience 119

LECTURE IX. — When the negation of a proposition refers

TO NO PARTICULAR, THE NEGATION IS INSIGNIFICANT ; AND THE PRO- POSITION POSSESSES AN UNLIMITED AFFIRMATION, WHICH MAKES THE PROPOSITION SEEM TO SIGNIFY MORE THAN A LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTICULARS .......... 121

Section 1. — That the sensible signification of a general proposition is limited to the sensible particulars to which the proposition refers, proceeds from nature and not from convention . 121

Section 2. — Affirmative propositions possess a universal application, when the negation of their universality refers to no sensible particular ......... 121

Section 3. — Uninterrupted experience excites a feeling of expectation which enters into the meaning of some propositions that allude to futurity 122

Section 4. — A universal proposition that speaks of futurity, cannot be invalidated by a negation that refers to no sensible particular * 122

Section 5. — If a negation refers to no sensible particular, the negation is insignificant 122

Section 6. — All affirmations and all negations refer for signification to our experience 123

Section 7.— Propositions are neither significant nor insignificant, but as they refer to our sensible experience .... 123

Section 8. — Though the absence of a sensible negative will make an affirmative proposition universal in its meaning, yet the affirmative proposition will signify the sensible particulars only to which it refers 123

Section 9. — The universality of a proposition relates to the absence of a sensible negative particular, and not the number of the affirmative particulars . . . . . . 124

CONTENTS. Xill

Section 10. — Many scientific!?: propositions owe their propriety to the absence of a sensible negative 124

Section 12. — A doubt or salvo which refers to nothing sensible, is verbal only and sensibly insignificant 125

LECTURE X.— Language can effect no more than refer us to

THE INFORMATION OF OUR SENSES ...... 126

Section 1.— Words can supply the place of no sense. They can simply refer us to what our senses have disclosed . . 127

Section 2. — No sight which I have not seen, can be revealed to me by words 127

Section 5. — Pictures can reveal no sight but themselves . . 128

Section 6. — No taste which I have not experienced, can be made known to me 129

Section 7. — No sound which I have not heard, can be made known to me 129

Section 8. — Brilliancy of imagination and acuteness of intellect cannot perform the office of any of our senses . . . 129

Section 9. — No feel which I have not felt, can be known to me 130

Section 10. — No muscular effort which I have not experienced, can be made known to me by language 130

Section 11. — Nearly every word possesses a verbal meaning as well as a sensible meaning 130

Section 12. — The sensible signification of a word nothing can reveal but our senses; — the verbal signification can be disclosed by words . 131

Section 13. — We rarely discriminate between the verbal signification of a word and its sensible signification . . .131

Section 14. — Words and definitions can disclose only the verbal meaning of words 132

Section 18. — A knowledge of the two-fold character of words useful in the instruction of deaf mutes . . . . .133

XIV CONTENTS,

Part Second. Of Language With Reference To Phenomena Internal Of

MAN.

LECTURE XL — To make all language refer to sensible information, FORCES US TO ESTIMATE, AS SENSIBLE INFORMATION, SOME INTERNAL PHENOMENA "WHICH ENTER LARGELY INTO THE SIG- NIFICATION OF WORDS, AND ARE NOT USUALLY INCLUDED AMONG SENSIBLE INFORMATION. WORDS ALSO ENTER LARGELY INTO THE SIGNIFICATION OF OTHER WORDS . . . . . . .137

Section 1. — Language refers to our internal feelings . . . 137

Section 2. — Language would lose a large portion of its meaning, to a person destitute of internal feelings . . . 137

Section 3. — Internal feelings enter largely into the signification of words that relate to religion 138

Section 5. — Religious feelings seem a part of the human constitution, like hope, fear, &c ....... 138

Section 6. — Religion, from its connexion with our internal feelings, is but little affected by adverse logick . . . .139

Section 7. — Internal feelings enter largely into words that are not religious 139

Section 8. — The whole universe can be nominally analyzed into sights, sounds, tastes, feels, smells, internal feelings, thoughts, and words 139

Section 9. — Our analysis is artificial ; the universe can be correctly expounded by itself alone ...... 140

Section 10. — Words that refer to our internal feelings are subject to all the rules of interpretation which are enumerated in the preceding lectures 140

Section 11.— The identity of love is as fallacious as its oneness 141

Section 12. — We subject our internal feelings to fewer verbal distinctions than our sensible information .... 141

Section 13.— Language is significant of what our senses inform us of, what we are conscious of experiencing within ourselves, and of words . . . . . . . . . . 142

Section 14. — Words are significant of other words . . . 142

Section 15. — A word which at one time signifies a word, may, at another time, signify a sight, &c. ..... 143

Section 16. — Some words never signify any thing but other words 143

Section 17. — Some words of the above class, when connected with an internal feeling, are of the most sacred character . 143

CONTENTS. XV

Section 19. — The present lecture is only introductory to succeeding ones, which will show that speculative writers fail to discriminate between the verbal signification of a word, — its sensible signification, — and its signification with reference to our internal feelings. They deem the variety of meaning a duplicity of nature, instead of a property of language . . 144

LECTURE XII. — Much errour occurs in our speculations

WHEN WE OMIT TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THE VERBAL MEANING OF A WORD, ITS SENSIBLE MEANING, AND ITS MEANING THAT REFERS TO OUR INTERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS 145

Section 1. — We should discriminate between the verbal signification of a word, and the sensible signification . . . 145

Section 3. — Words can yield us nothing but the verbal signification of words : 146

Section 4. — We strangely confound the verbal signification of a word with the sensible signification 146

Section 5. — The sensible signification of a sentence is the sensible existence to which the sentence refers . . . .147

Section 6. — Phraseology is controlled by custom, but the sensible signification of phrases is controlled by nature . . 147

Section 8. — We cannot transmute sights, feels, &c, into words 148

Section 10. — Logick relates to the verbal meaning of words, and its conclusions must not be confounded with sensible existences 148

Section 14. — We cannot enlarge our sensible knowledge by words 150

Section 15. — Sensible existences will not conform to our phraseology, but our phrases will signify the sensible existences to which the phrases refer 150

Section 16. — We must refer to the revelation of our senses for the meaning of words, and not refer to words for the meaning of what our senses reveal 151

Section 17. — All that my senses disclose, and all that I am conscious of experiencing within myself, constitute the realities of nature. The rest of my knowledge is verbal . . . 151

Section 18. — As bank notes are the artificial representatives of specie, so words are the artificial representatives of natural phenomena 152

Section 19. — When words attempt more than a reference to the revelation of our senses, the words may possess a verbal meaning, but not a sensible meaning 152

Section 20. — The sensible signification of a theory is the sensible phenomena to which the theory refers . . . .153

XVI CONTENTS.

Section 21. — We confound theories with the realities of nature 154

Section 22. — Every theory possesses a verbal meaning- as well as a sensible 154

Section 23. — We cannot transmute sights, feels, &c, into words, though we strive after the transmutation with an entire unconsciousness that we are transmuting one sentence only into another . . . . 155

Section 25.— Words are sometimes the ultimate meaning of words 156

Section 26. — In all discussions, we should discriminate whether we are attempting to define a word, or to designate an existence 156

Section 28. — We mistake for sensible investigations, what are only verbal deductions from artificial definitions . . . 157

Section 31. — We mistake words for things . . . .159

CONTENTS. XV11

Part Third

OF LANGUAGE WITH REFERENCE TO THE RELATION WHICH WORDS BEAR TO EACH OTHER.

LECTURE XIII. — Language commands our assent to propositions WHEN WE DISCOVER THAT THEIR PREMISES AFFIRM THEIR

conclusions 163

Section 1. — Reasoning can effect no more than to show us that the conclusion is admitted by the premises .... 164

Section 14. — When our conclusions are not obviously admitted by our premises, we explain the premises so as to show that they embrace the conclusion. The explanation is sometimes in the form of proofs, and sometimes a definition . . . 166

Section 23. — Propositions are sophistical when the conclusion is only seemingly (not actually) included in the premises . 169

Section 24. — Sometimes the premises are made to admit very covertly the conclusion 169

Section 25. — Similar principles with the foregoing govern our assent to mathematical propositions 170

Section 29. — Are the foregoing principles of language conventional, or a dictate of our sensible experience with physical bodies? 171

LECTURE XIV. — Our assent to any proposition is founded on our sensible experience . 172

Section 1. — The incongruity and congruity of any two assertions are the result of our experience 173

Section 3. — The congruity and incongruity of any two assertions are not the results of the conventional meaning of words 173

Section 4. — The axioms of geometry are no otherwise authoritative than as they refer to our sensible experience . . 174

Section 5. — A contrivance implies a contriver, because the* implication refers to our sensible experience .... 174

Section 6. — Existence implies a beginning, because the implication refers to our experience .175

Section 7. — Time which is not present, must be either past or future, because the position is verified by our experience . 175

Section 8. — That ice cannot be hot is an experimental incongruity 176

Section 9. — All the implications of language, all its congruities and incongruities, must be interpreted by our sensible experience. They signify nothing more . . 176