Text-book of intellectual philosophy, for schools and colleges : containing an outline of the science, with an abstract of its history

Appendix

Abstract of the History of Philosophy, 187

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS.

1. Definition of person. — The human person embraces both the internal knowing principle, and the external material organism, the powers of knowing, feeling, willing, and acting, — the body as well as the soul, the mind as well as the matter which encloses it. When one says my body, my soul, my reason, my hand, and the like, he claims each of these as belonging to himself, and equally as constituting but a part of himself. To be present in person, is not merely to be present in thought, but to be present bodily.

1. An individual object is one which exists by itself, separate from other objects ; or, at least, one which is capable of being separated from other objects in thought. A human person is a conscious individual ; not only existing apart from other objects, a rounded whole by himself, but aware of his different parts, and recognizing them as his own. What is called personal identity, or the sameness of the individual at different times, includes the body only as a typal form, like the new grain of wheat which springs from that which is sown (" We are sown a natural body, we are raised a spiritual body ") ; but the internal knowing principle seems ever the same.

2. Definition of mind. — The mind, however (from the Latin mens, Greek psvog, strength*), is recognized as the most important part of the human person, — as that which gives him his power, life, and motion. The body and its organs are made up of the same substances as the trees, rocks, and other material objects around us, only differently arranged and compounded. And as we never think of ascribing life and intelligence to these material objects, so we cannot believe that the phenomena of life and intelligence manifest in the human person belong to the body. Hence we must ascribe them to an altogether different principle ; which is variously denominated the mind, the soul, or the spirit. As the manifestations of this principle are entirely different from the phenomena of matter, we call it immaterial.

3. Definition of knowing, feeling, and willing. — The distinctive phenomena of the mind are those of knowing, feeling, and willing. In its most general sense, knowledge is the being aware of any thing, the realization of what is going on within a certain sphere. It includes thus the consciousness of the various affections or changes which take place in the different organs or parts of the body, as well as the apprehension of external objects ; the direct information which we receive through the senses, and recall by the memory, as well as the inductions and deductions which we make from the materials thus furnished us. In short, knowing is seeing, tasting, hearing, touching, remembering, un-

2. The term " soul " designates the mind more specifically as embracing the principle of life in the being; and the term "spirit" represents it as capable of being either embodied or disembodied. — " Phenomena M means appearances, or manifestations.

derstanding, reasoning, &c. As to feeling and willing, they are intimately connected with knowing, though

different from it. The sensations in the organ connected with seeing, hearing, touching, &c, as well as the painful or pleasurable emotions which arise from the information derived from the exercise of these powers, or from memory, reasoning, and the like, are different forms of feeling ; while willing is the determi-

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nation and the final impulse given to act according to the suggestions of our thoughts and feelings. Thus, we may see a beautiful landscape, and may experience certain pleasurable feelings in consequence of the sight, and may determine or will to visit it again at some future time. Mental philosophy, therefore, embraces an account of the principles which pertain to all three of these classes of phenomena, while intellectual philosophy properly takes cognizance of those only which pertain to the intelligence, or knowledge. © 7 ©

4. Definition of intellect. — The term intellect, then, designates merely the intelligent or knowing principle of the mind, and even this more emphatically in its higher capacities and operations. By the intellect of man we understand more specifically his powers of comparing, judging, and reasoning; less definitely, his powrers of perceiving, remembering, and imagining. Still, as intelligence is the primary, and by far the most important, function of the mind, the intellect is often used,

3. As the mind acts through the body, its manifestations are dependent upon the condition of the body, and cease when that becomes an unfit instrument for its use. The operations of the mind, too, affect the body, and not unfrequently strain and impair its condition, — somewhat, we may suppose, as the steam strains and impairs the engine in which it works. — Another term for mental philosophy is psychology , " the doctrine of the soul."

in a general way, to denote the mind as a whole, as an independent nature.

5. Definition of understanding and reason. — The terms understanding and reason, also, are used in a similar sense. Locke's " Treatise on the Human Understanding " is intended to embrace an account of all the operations of the mind, from sensation and perception upwards; though more properly the term represents the mind as comparing, comprehending, and elaborating ideas, rather than as simply receiving and retaining them. So, too, the reason is often put for the mind as a whole, though strictly the term designates only the very highest processes of the mind. The reason is the faculty of reasoning, and judging of the validity of proofs ; and hence stands equally opposed to the receptivity of sense and the excitability of passion. Indeed, reason is the grand distinguishing faculty of man, who is called a rational animal, in distinction from all others.

6. Definition of consciousness. — There is another term which is used to designate the different operations of the mind as a whole, — consciousness. Or, rather, consciousness is the knowledge which we have of all our mental acts, and of every affection within our organism that reaches the mind. Every distinct act of the mind, whether it be of knowing, feeling, or willing, is a conscious act. Consciousness is internal knowledge. Denoting, according to its derivation (u knowing together "), associated knowledge, it is not commonly regarded as including fugitive thoughts, which flit by unnoticed, and hence unconnected with other thoughts. And, being internal knowledge, we cannot properly be

5. For a fuller account of the applications of the terms intellect, understanding, and reason, see Wight's Hamilton, pp. 79, and following.

said to be conscious of external objects, though we are conscious of the operations of the mind by which we gain a knowledge of these objects, as well as of all other operations of the mind. Indeed, it is of the very nature of mental action, as distinguished from mechanical or chemical action, that it is conscious. Consciousness, then, is the essential characteristic of mental action, and inseparable from it.

7. The different faculties of knowledge. — But the mind, though one, in obtaining knowledge acts through special forms, or by special faculties : such as perception by the senses, by which we obtain a knowledge of external objects ; memory, by which we recall past experiences; imagination, by which we figure to ourselves objects like what we have perceived by the senses ; conception, judgment, and reasoning, by which we generalize and combine our primary ideas, and enlarge our knowledge. These faculties are all regarded as capacities for doing something, and hence are often called powers, or energies.

8. Definition of speculation. — In addition to the above-named special faculties, we have the power of speculation, or of scrutinizing the materials of knowledge obtained by these faculties, and detecting their subtle relations, and the general ideas or notions which they imply, and which underlie them as their conditions or foundation. We find, upon reflection, that all the objects of our knowledge imply the existence of space and time, and necessarily arrange themselves in our

6. Consciousness is not to be regarded as a special faculty taking cognizance of the operations of the other faculties ; but the realization rather of those operatious themselves, or the sum of those operations as realized by us. The mind acts consciously, if at all : its action is necessarily conscious action.

mind under the relations of substance and attribute, cause and effect, means and end, and the like. The detection and establishment of these and the like fundamental principles assumed in all thinking constitute what is called speculative philosophy, or metaphysics.

9. Office of feeling and willing. — It only remains to point out more definitely the particular office of our capacities of feeling and willing. These, as the immediate antecedents and prompters to action, constitute the special basis of ethics, or moral philosophy. Intelligence, to be sure, is the guide, or should be the guide, to action ; but feeling and will are the immediate impulse to it, without which it is impossible for it to exist. Right action is the right application and carrying out in practice of our best thoughts and feelings and volitions : it is thus the proper and fitting result of the exercise of all our conscious capacities and powers.

9. A capacity is a capability, first of becoming something, and then of doing something. Feeling, therefore, is but a passive capacity ; but the will, even if it be necessarily determined by the strongest motive, as being capable of appreciating motives, should be regarded rather as a power. — Perhaps it will be thought that instinct should be named as an additional faculty of knowledge. But instinct belongs almost wholly to the lower animals; and, besides, is merely an internal impulse, resulting from the organization of the animal, and not properly a faculty of knowledge : indeed, it operates quite independently of knowledge, and is not at all improved by knowledge. The first acts of the young of all animals, and even of human infants, are instinctive. But while man governs, or is capable of governing, his later acts by intelligence, the acts of the lower animals remain chiefly instinctive, being but slightly controlled by the results of experience. Young quails and rabbits run through bushes, avoiding all obstacles, and young ducks swim, as well at first as in later life. And although the feats of instinct have often been exaggerated, yet the principle is sufficient for the wants of the animal. Man alone, by his wonderful powers of progress, seems destined for a future life.

10. Divisions of the subject. — From this account of the different operations of the mind, we see at once the natural divisions of the subject. Following the order and distinguishing the nature of the several processes and their results, we have, 1st, Simple or concrete knowledge, embracing consciousness, perception by the senses, memory, and imagination ; 2d, Generalized or abstract knowledge, embracing conception, judgment, and reasoning; 3d, Speculative knowledge, or metaphysics ; and 4th, Ethics, or knowledge carried out in practice through the impulse of the feelings and of the will. A complete treatise, therefore, on mental philosophy, would embrace these four divisions, or parts. In concrete knowledge, the mind deals with individual objects or things ; in abstract knowledge it deals with combinations or classes of things; in speculative knowledge it searches after underlying principles and relations ; while, in the applications of knowledge to practice, it deals with the principles of right and wrong in action. As to Lome, which treats of the right use of the concept and the judgment in reasoning, it naturally falls under the second of the above divisions.

11. Philosophy and science. — Philosophy and science, though dealing with the same general materials, are not entirely coincident. The philosophy of any thing is a rational account of it, or a general explanation of phenomena by referring them to certain causes or fundamental principles ; while science is a detailed and systematic proof and establishment of the causes of such phenomena. Philosophy, being strictly the result of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, properly investigates only such matters as naturally arrest the attention, and hence is confined to the general underlying principles of things. Science, on the contrary, aims at an exhaustive exhibition and verification of the truth on any subject. Hence the operations of the mind, as naturally arresting the attention of every one, and as fundamental to every thing else, are the proper and special subject of philosophy.

Section I. Nature Op Consciousness

1. Consciousness defined. — Consciousness has been described as knowing that we know. It is also knowing that we feel and will and act. It is primarily a knowledge of any affection of our nervous system, or any impression made upon it through either of the five senses of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling. We are thus conscious of all sensations and sense-perceptions ; and we are equally conscious of these sensations and perceptions when they recur to us in memory or imagination. So too, when we combine these perceptions and reason upon them, or form plans of action and exert our wills or our muscles to carry them out, we are equally conscious of what we are doing. Consciousness accompanies every intelligent act, whether external or internal : it is, indeed, those acts realized ; it is the mind acting in them.

2. Impressions upon the senses and internal action of which we are not conscious. — But may there not be external or internal action in the organs or limbs which does not reach the mind, and hence is unaccompanied by consciousness ? The senses undoubtedly may be so closed in sleep that the usual causes of sensation and perception do not reach the mind, or awaken any mental apprehension. The attention, too, may be so absorbed in some matter, even during our waking hours, that we are not conscious of ordinary impressions upon the senses. The senses, being at rest in sleep, are in a torpid condition, and do not receive and transmit impressions as they do when awake ; and in the other case, the mind, being wholly absorbed in one thing, pays no attention to any other. So, too, the processes of circulation, appropriation, secretion, and the other internal functions of life, are generally unaccompanied by consciousness. These changes being necessary for the preservation of the system, are intrusted to the superintendence of the vital principle, leaving the mind free to perforin its own work.

3. Effect of habit in obscuring consciousness. — There

2. We call a sound sleep a " deep sleep," as though the soul had withdrawn far from the surface. Sometimes, on our attention being relieved from its absorption, we recall an impression, as the striking of a clock, which we did not seem to notice at the time ; or else we now first become conscious of it from the impression on the organ still remaining, the sound, as we say, still " ringing in the ear." So the eye retains the impression a longer or shorter time after the cause is removed, as is proved by the ring of light which is seen when a torch is whirled rapidly around. Vital action, i.e. the action necessary to preserve the system from decay and death, is always involuntary, but not necessarily unconscious. We are conscious of all our external involuntary motions, such as sneezing, winking, starting at a sudden noise, and the like ; and of some of the internal involuntary changes, as of respirations, the beating of the heart, &c. Thus the vital principle is not wholly an unconscious principle : and it is also a plastic or formative principle ; since, under its influence, animal bodies are formed by organs and limbs, after a fixed type. It is evidently no mere mechanical or chemical principle, but should be regarded as the lowest form or beginnings of mind.

is another class of actions apparently unaccompanied by consciousness, and which many regard as really so, — those that have been often repeated and are performed from habit ; such as taking a familiar walk, repeating a familiar piece of composition, or playing a familiar tune. Each of these and the like processes consists of a series of external acts or motions, which at first are performed with the greatest attention and care, but which, by frequent repetition, have become so familiar that they require but little or no attention, and seem almost involuntary. And yet they do not appear to be wholly unconscious acts; for the performer of the most familiar piece on the piano will notice a misplaced note in the music before him, and the drowsy fiddler, whose arm appears to move automatically, will stop the moment the dancing ceases. Habit, as we say, is a second nature ; and as we have seen that nature relieves the mind by devolving certain constant and laborious operations upon the vital principle, so habit seems to effect something ot the same result. When processes have become familiar, they seem to be remitted very much to the unconscious reflex action of our nervous system.

4. Consciousness is co-extensive with knowledge. — Consciousness meaning "knowing together," or, as some interpret it, " knowing again " (knowing that we know), it may be inquired whether any of our thoughts are wholly unconnected with other thoughts, and thus escape consciousness. There would seem to be nothing improba-

3. Hamilton, following Leibnitz, refers such acts as are here described to the operation of latent mental modifications, through which the mind is supposed to act unconsciously in directing the external movements. Stewart, on the contrary, regards such acts as strictly intelligent acts, but so slightly attended to as scarcely to be realized.

ble in the supposition that there may be thoughts passing so rapidly, and so little attended to, as to bring with them no other thoughts, and hence to be wholly isolated and fugitive. But, whether there actually are such thoughts or not, we can never be certain, since, not being connected with any other thought, they can never be recalled. They are at most but momentary thoughts, serving a temporary purpose, and then passing into oblivion. To know any thing distinctly, we must note or attend to it with some care ; and, when we do thus attend to any thing, other things are usually observed with it, or other thoughts come into the mind, and are associated with it. Hence all real knowledge must be conscious knowledge. Fugitive knowledge is but subknowledge, and is, therefore, but partially conscious : the consciousness however, at the moment, is just as clear and distinct as the knowledge is.

5. Is the mind continually conscious? — As we have seen that consciousness accompanies, or rather is involved in, all real mental action , the question arises, whether the mind is always active, and hence continuouslv conscious. If not, what evidence have we of the continuous existence of the mind ? Consciousness being the special property under which the mind becomes knowrn, if it lose this, it is said, it loses its identity, just as matter would lose its identity if it ceased to be extended. It is true that the mind manifests itself through consciousness ; but these manifestations in turn are made through the body, and must depend, therefore, upon the condition of the body as a medium for spiritual manifestations. On the death of the body, these manifestations wholly cease within their accustomed sphere ; and so they may during certain torpid states of the body, without implying the non-existence of the soul. Indeed, it is not certain that there is not, or rather it is highly probable that there is, during all these torpid states of the body, an internal current of consciousness constantly in existence. We all know that one may train himself so as to keep a correct account of the passage of time in sleep, and awake at a definite" hour ; and, even in the deepest sleep, the subject, by ejaculations and other signs, often indicates the existence of consciousness. The same thing is shown by the phenomena of dreams. As certain vivid dreams arouse us sufficiently to become connected with our ordinary waking current of thought, and hence are remembered, we may well suppose that there is constantly going on in sleep a less vivid but continuous dream-life which is not remembered.

6. Consciousness not precisely the same as knowledge. — Thouo'h consciousness is involved in all knowledge, yet it is not precisely the same as knowledge. Knowledge resolves itself into perception, memory, imagina-

5. The dream- life seems to be directed wholly by the ideas present to the mind, without the control of the will. This is seen especially in that kind of dreaming called somnambulism, or wralking and performing various external acts in sleep. The dreamer is wholly absorbed in a certain current of thoughts, and pays no attention to any thing else while the spell lasts. And for the same reason, if the bystander can get his attention, he can direct his acts to almost any thing which he suggests ; and he will go through the performance, whatever it be. But, when the subject comes out of this state, he has no remembrance of what he has been doing; and yet, when he relapses into a similar state, the former ideas and acts may be resumed. The two different states of life, having nothing in common, do not suggest each other, but are each pursued independently of the other. Mesmeric phenomena are probably due to a similar state of the system induced by the manipulations or suggestions of the operator in highly-nervous persons. See Marshall's Physiology, p. 317.

tion, conception, judgment, and reasoning. These are all regarded as processes leading to certain results which constitute knowledge. Now, we are conscious of every step taken in each of these processes, and also of the result as an internal fact, but not of the thing embraced in the result. As we are conscious of all that transpires within us in the process of perceiving a tree, and of our conviction that it exists, but not of the tree itself; so we are conscious of all the steps taken in the process of proving that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and also of our conviction of the truth of the proposition, and yet are not properly conscious of the truth itself. This last is knowledge, or a conclusion to which we have come for reasons which seemed to us satisfactory.

7. Consciousness is no authority for abstract truths or the reality of things. — Hence we see that consciousness cannot be appealed to for the truth of abstract propositions or the reality of independent existences. It deals only with internal facts. It cannot be mistaken in regard to the phenomena which transpire within : but it does not profess to interpret these phenomena ; this it leaves to our various faculties of knowledge. In the various illusions of vision, as in mirage, consciousness reports correctly what is presented in the organ ; but we come to interpret them rightly only by the knowledge which we acquire through investigation and experience : and, as all apparent facts must be interpreted by our rational powers, so must all general truths be tested by these powers. Consciousness, then, is no authority for the reality of the external world, nor for the truth of general propositions. And, in like manner, it is no direct authority for the existence of a separate spiritual nature in man. It is an evidence of the existence of such a nature in us, as all our powers are ; but it reports nothing in regard to such a nature, except certain acts and states which seem to imply its existence, and from which we infer it.

8. Confirmation of the above view. — The view expressed in the last paragraph is quite different from that very generally held, and formerly entertained, by myself. But, on further reflection, I do not see how the doctrine of an immediate consciousness of external objects, or of general truths, or of our own spiritual nature, can be maintained. Can we be said to be conscious of a tree ? to be conscious that the whole of any thing is greater than a part of it? or to be conscious of the nature of the soul, or of its existence distinct from the body? Even Hamilton, who held the first two of these doctrines, if not the third, usually avoids such expressions, as evidently incongruous and incorrect. " In the act of sensible perception," his language is, " I am conscious of myself as a perceiving subject, and of an external reality ', in relation with my sense, as the object perceived" Yes, in the act of perception, or through perception, one becomes thus conscious : the process of perception brings him this knowledge of which he is conscious. Perception is a process and a conclusion as to what is implied in it ; and we are conscious of the process and the conclusion, but not of the things implied. So we cannot properly be said to be conscious that the whole of a thing is greater than any of its parts ; but our judgment or reason decides that it is so, and we are conscious of the decision. Consciousness reports the experience and the conclusions of the mind ; nothing more. In like manner, we infer the existence of a spiritual nature within us on account of certain phenomena of intelligence which seem to us plainly to imply it, not because we are directly conscious of that nature.

It is obvious that consciousness is not a special power of any kind, whether of knowing, feeling, or willing. We neither know nor feel nor will by consciousness ; though we are conscious alike of all these operations. It is, then, merely a quality of mental action, the distinguishing characteristic of it. But, the mind being a conscious principle, it is often convenient to use the term " consciousness" for the mind as a whole ; as where we speak of the concentration of consciousness, instead of the concentration of the powers of the mind itself.

Section II. Concentration Of Consciousness (attention And Reflection.)

1. What attention is. — Attention is a special concentration of consciousness upon some particular object, process, phenomenon, or passing event. When we give ourselves up to the influence of what is passing around us, without endeavoring to control our thoughts or feelings, there is no special exercise of attention. In such cases, there is barely the ordinary wakefulness of the mental powers, such as is secured to each object in turn, by the varying interest which they excite in the mind in its different moods. But the moment we make an effort to apply ourselves to any particular business or study, our consciousness is more or less concentrated on that, to the exclusion of other things ;

and in the highest concentration of consciousness, every thing is excluded from the mind except the matter immediately under consideration.

2. Attention carries the whole mind with it. — As the acts of the mind are only conscious acts, and as, indeed, we know the mind only in its conscious acts, when the consciousness is specially concentrated upon any object, the whole mind is virtually concentrated upon it. Hence, when attention to any thing is complete, we are wholly absorbed in it, and are as incapable, while the concentration lasts, of any other intelligent process, be it perceiving, remembering, or reasoning, as though we had no mind. By attention, then, the whole mind is turned to some object, with the faculty, or faculties, required in the case, in the highest degree of wakefulness, and in readiness to exert themselves.

3. How far the attention is under the control of the will, — The special concentration of consciousness, called attention, is effected by the will, and hence the attention is said to be under the control of the will. This it undoubtedly is to a certain extent, but not absolutely. We can at any time, by an act of the will, concentrate our attention upon an object, but we cannot always, by an act of the will, keep it so concentrated, against the intrusion of wandering thoughts and the diverting influences of passing events. Hence the attention, after it has been concentrated on any object, is liable at any moment to be diverted. The will, doubtless, may resist these influences to a certain extent, but not to all extents, — they may become so powerful as to be irresistible. Here, then, are indicated the chief points to which we should direct our efforts in attempting to increase our control over the attention.

4. To control the attention we should always act with a will. — In the first place, then, we should cultivate resoluteness of purpose and persistence of will in controlling the attention. We should form a settled purpose of acquiring as complete control over our attention, and hence over our faculties generally, as possible. When we turn our attention to any thing, we should do so with the determination of holding it there to the end, if possible, against all distracting influences. We should make it a point to resist to the utmost all such influences. We shquld be resolute and in earnest in all that we do, working in all cases under a strong tension of the will. Such a course will greatly increase the power of the will over the attention amid distracting influences.

5. We should cultivate orderly habits of thought^ etc. — Besides, these disturbing influences themselves may be very much diminished and controlled by proper internal habits and external arrangements. Wandering and intrusive thoughts come chiefly of desultory habits of thinking. Our minds are formed for regular and coherent thought. In the natural order, one thought leads to another by a regular succession. In memory, reasoning, and all the fundamental processes of thought, one step almost necessarily follows another in a given order, in a well-regulated mind. To exclude wandering thoughts, then, we have only to follow, and confirm in our practice, the order of nature as to the connection of our thoughts. We should persistently discipline ourselves to think in a connected order, and thus curb the erratic and capricious action of the imagination. So, too, we may protect ourselves very much against the disturbing influences of external objects by proper external arrangements. When we engage in anything requiring close attention, we should not leave ourselves at the mercy of any one often thousand influences, by undertaking it in the midst of the distractions of business, of society, or even of the family circle. All the more difficult and protracted mental efforts require retirement. Thus, and thus only, can the attention be preserved long enough to carry them through.