INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY

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Preface

THIS treatise is called a TEXT-BOOK, because it has been purposely thrown into the form adapted to the class-room, rather than that adapted to general reading ; and to intimate, at the same time, that it is offered to the public, not so much as a new contribution to the matter of the science, as to its form. However, it will probably be found about as original as the other treatises on the subject, which have appeared since the principles of the science have been so fully developed.

To ignore what has been done by others, on a subject which has attracted the attention and engrossed the thoughts of the most gifted of our race for thousands of years, is simply proof of folly, not of originality. A book on such a subject as this, to be up with the times, must embrace the best views of previous investigators. Could I promise this with regard to the present treatise, I should deem it a much better commendation than any pretence to unusual originality. As it is, I can only say, that I have endeavored to make myself acquainted with the views of the best thinkers on the subject, and have not hesitated to adopt them

IV PREFACE.

when I could present no better of my own. I wish particularly to acknowledge my indebtedness to Sir W. Hamilton, to whom I am under obligations far beyond what is implied in the number of direct quotations from his works, and to whom I might have been under still greater obligations, had not this treatise been virtually completed before the publication of his excellent Lectures on Metaphysics.

What is here presented is confessedly but an outline ; and, as a text-book, it should be only such. Whether we consider the wants of the pupil or those of the teacher, a text-book should be brief; it should contain only the fundamental facts and principles of the science to which it is devoted. The field of science is so extended, that only the most commanding and essential features can **e surveyed in a general course of education. Where there is so much that is important, the mind of the pupil should not be encumbered with what is unessential. Something should be left to be supplied by the teacher, and something to be learned by after study. An outline is all that ought to be committed to memory by the pupil, and all that is required by the teacher, as a nucleus around which to gather supplementary and illustrative matter. If the present treatise shall be found adequate to such a purpose, it will fully meet the expectations of the author.

The brief abstract of the history of philosophy, subjoined in an appendix, it is hoped' will not be wholly

SEEPAGE.

devoid of use. It may at least stimulate the curiosity of the student to know something more of a subject so rich and varied. Both the philosophic aptitude and a correct view of philosophy are best acquired by viewing the subject on many sides, as it has presented itself to different speculators, in different ages and various parts of the world. The abstract contains, of course, but the merest hint of the views of the different philosophers and schools ; but I have studied to convey in these hints the leading idea and distinguishing character of each system. Aiming at a mere abstract of the history, I have not always felt bound to consult the original works of the authors, but for the most part have been content to follow such competent guides as Eitter, Tennemann, Stewart, Moirell, Schwegler, Chalybaus, Lewes, Archer Butter, and Hamilton. 1*

Appendix

Abstract of tho History of Philosophy, 185 iiNTjSLLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

MIND AND MATTER.

1. TJie body in one sense a part of self. That which each one calls himself embraces more or less in different cases. Considering man as a purely reflective being. self includes only the mind ; but considering him as a sensitive and active being, it includes the body as well as the mind, since sensation is manifested in the body and action transmitted through it. Though the body is but the special instrument and medium of the mind in communicating with exterior objects, yet, as a portion of matter specially organized and appropriated for that purpose, it becomes so animated and pervaded by the spirit, as to seem a part of self. It is not, however, the whole body of whose affections we are conscious, but only the nerves of sensation. But these are so largely distributed through the body, and especially over its surfaces, that nearly all the external acts and internal processes and functions of life affect them.

2. The body a part of the human personality. As, then, the body is animated by the spirit, the spirit being directly conscious of the affections of the body, while it has no direct consciousness of the affections of

12 INTRODUCTION.

any other form of matter, the body is properly considered, in the most comprehensive sense of the term, as a part of the human personality, though always to be discriminated in thought from the real interior, conscious personality, or self. Indeed, the mind first becomes conscious of itself through the various affections which the body suffers. It is first awakened to consciousness by the impressions made upon our bodily organs from without.

3. The body the special sphere of the mind. The body is thus the special sphere of the mind ; it is the microcosm of the human spirit, as the universe is the macrocosm t>f the Divine Spirit The mind does not, in any proper sense, leave the body in the present life. Even in the most discursive thought, it rather draws in, or mimics in its own chambers, what is without, than goes out to it But intimately associated as mind and matter are in the human being, they are broadly distinguished from each other by the qualities or modes under which they manifest themselves, and by which alone they are known to human intelligence.

4. Properties of matter and mind respectively. The body, like other forms of matter, is known to us only under the various qualities involved in the general notions of Extension and Eesistance. It is composed of the same elements as other material objects, only differently compounded and arranged, and presents no higher claim to the possession of intelligence, than the rocks and other earthy substances around us. , It is as impossible to conceive that the body thinks, as that these do. The mind, on the contrary, is known to us under an entirely different character. It is not regarded as possessing any of the properties of matter, and hence

INTEODUCTION. IS

is said to be immaterial It manifests itself wholly by its properties, or rather, energies, of knowing^ willing, and feeling.

5. How far the lower phenomena of life depend on mind. How far the lower elements of life in man, such as the involuntary motions, and the wonderful processes of circulation and appropriation ever going on in the human system processes utterly inexplicable by any known mechanical or chemical la^s are dependent on the presence and influence of the mind, is uncertain. But there can be no doubt that all the conscious phenomena are wholly dependent upon it For, although these phenomena disappear at death, this by no means proves that they are proper manifestations of the body itself. It proves nothing more than that the body, in order to be the sphere and instrument of the spirit, must retain a certain integrity of parts, and some approach to its normal state. When it relapses from this condition, as it always does at death,* it becomes an unfit instrument for the spirit, and is therefore abandoned.

6. The precise relation of body and spirit not known. The precise relation which the mind holds to the body, we have no means of determining. We know that the mind is somehow conscious of the affections of the body, but whether by simply being present as a loitness of them, or by itself actually participating in

* This is obviously so whore death ensues from a wasting disease. Bat it is no less so in cases of sudden death, which are usually occasioned, either by violence done to some of the central parts of the nervous system the special seat of the mind, or of the repairing system, without whose action the organization immediately degenerates from its normal condition.

14 INTRODUCTION.

them, may be doubtful : though the latter seems the more consistent and probable hypothesis. But whatever may be the precise process of obtaining knowledge through the organs of the body, it is evident that it is rendered slow, laborious, and defective by such an arrangement. The enclosing the soul in a material body seems an evidence of our low estate. God and other pure intelligences know things at once, by direct intuition.

7. Tlie antithesis of mind and matter. We thus, at the outset, find in our own persons the ever-recurring antithesis of Mind and Matter, and meet at the very threshold of our inquiry into our own nature, that mystery of mysteries, the connection of the Material with the Immaterial. It is from this connection that the chief difficulties in mental philosophy arise. The various psychological* systems all turn upon the view which is taken of this connection.

* " Psychological " has the same meaning as menfaZ,hut is capable of a wider application.

Section I. Different Designations Of The General Knowing Pbinoiple

1. Tlie mind, soul, intelligence. The general conscious principle in man, as an independent substance or existence, is variously denominated the Mind, the Soul, or the Spirit. Of this conscious principle, the most important function is that of intelligence, or knowledge. And hence, this general power of knowing, though really embracing several distinct processes, higher and lower, has itself received several distinct names, each intended to designate it as a whole with more or less exactness. These designations of the intelligent principle, all represent the mind as knowing, but with some variation of emphasis as to the particular processes involved.

2. The intellect. The term Intellect, in its ordinary acceptation, designates the general knowing principle of the mind more simply and unequivocally,, perhaps, than any other term. But even this refers more emphatically to the higher cognitive* powers, than to

* " Cognitive " means knowing, and " cognition/' knowledge; bnt the terms admit of a somewhat wider application, than their more familiar equivalents.

perception, memory, etc. By some philosophers, indeed, the intellect is regarded as the special faculty or repository of principles. But even in this sense, which is not a very common one, it underlies, if it does not wholly include, the general knowing powers of the mind. For these native principles, or original convictions of the mind, certify and warrant all knowledge. It is not without reason, therefore, that by general usage, treatises on the cognitive powers of man in general are called Intellectual Philosophies.

3. TJie understanding. Understanding is another term frequently used to designate the intelligent principle in general. It is so used by Locke. His " Essay on the Human Understanding," is a treatise on the cognitive powers in general. But recent usage, at least, does not warrant so wide an application of the term. " The term understanding" says Sir W. Hamilton,* "usually and properly denotes only a part the higher part of the cognitive faculties, and is then exclusive of sense, imagination, etc." In other places he calls the understanding " the faculty of relations and comparisons," which comes to the same thing. Understanding is comprehending, and implies comparison and a perception of relations. It is not the mind considered as receiving and retaining the materials communicated through the senses, but rather as analyzing, comparing, and elaborating these materials.

4. The reason. Reason, also, is sometimes made to denote the general intelligent principle of the mind. But by the more prevailing and better usage, it is made to refer more especially, if not wholly, to the very high-

*Note to Eeid's Works, p. 514.

OF MIND IN GENERAL. 17

est and most ideal form of our intelligence. As discursive, as capable of proceeding from step to step through a proof, it stands opposed to the mere receptivity of sense ; while,' as calmly and dispassionately judging of the conclusiveness of proofs, it is equally opposed to the blindness and excitability of feeling and passion. In this form it is the faculty of proofs, and hence the process of proof is called reasoning.

5. Reason intuitive. The reason, however, is not simply the faculty of reasoning. Reason, to adopt the distinction of Milton, is not only discursive, but intuitive, also, intuitive of first principles of truth. Its perception of many truths is instinctive, as being the immediate and. irresistible convictions of our rational nature. There must b'e a last reason in every case. Even the reason cannot give reasons 'for every thing. It must rest at last upon its own simple convictions. All that it can do, in such cases, is to show its convictions to be reasonable, that they involve no contradictions among themselves, and that in the nature of the case, there can be no further reason given ; that the convictions upon which it rests are necessarily final, and not susceptible of further analysis and reduction.

6. Reason transcendental. As to the transcendental sense in -which the term reason is used, it is of little consequence to the student of a sane philosophy, except as a matter of history. In the philosophy of Kant and his followers, reason is sharply distinguished from the understanding, as the faculty or repository of " ideas," in the Platonic sense. According to this view, while the understanding knows only the finite, the limited, the phenomenal, the reason is conversant about the

2*

18 INTELLECTTJAL PHILOSOPHY.

infinite, the absolute, the real. As the philosophy of the unconditioned is now generally abandoned by all sound minds, this meaning of reason may well be disregarded.

7. Consciousness. The term Consciousness, also, might be named as another designation of the knowing principle in general. Consciousness, however, does not denote knowledge (or the faculty of knowledge) simply and purely as such, but knowledge as noted and registered. It is knowledge known, and capable of being recalled. As the grand revealer and register of knowledge, consciousness will receive a fuller treatment in the next chapter.

8. Different forms and faculties of knowledge. But the general power of knowing, as it exhibits itself under several plainly distinguishable forms or processes, is usually distributed among several different faculties. According to the most approved distribution, the intuition, or direct apprehension,of external objects is called Perception,* and of internal states or operations of the mind, Self-Consciousness ; the recalling of perceptions or states of consciousness, is Memory ; the framing of

* Since the time of Reid, the term perception has heen appropriated almost exclusively to the apprehension of external objects. But it is sometimes convenient to use the term in a general way, as it was before his time, to denote any mental apprehension. In this sense, all mental apprehensions are either direct or indirect perceptions. Direct perceptions, whether by sense or reason, are called, also, intuitions ; while indirect perceptions embrace what are commonly called concepts, judgments, reasons, conclusions, etc. Apperception (a term now not much used) is the consciousness of any mental representation, as in memory, imagination, etc. ; and if the perception of external objects be held to be representative, it includes this also. Sensation is properly the objective or outward side of perception by the senses, though by Locke it is made to include the whole process of perception.

OP MIND IN GENEEAL. 19

individualized or concrete images, is Imagination ; and of generalized or abstract notions. Conception ; the connecting in thought of two concepts is Judgment ; while the connecting of pairs of judgments successively, so as to necessitate a third judgment in each case, is Eeasoning.

Section II. Intelligence Distinguished From Other Mental Phenomena

1. Different classes of mental phenomena. Besides knowing, we also feel and will. We are susceptible of the feelings of hunger, pain, weariness, hope, fear, joy? gratitude, and the various feelings which make up the sum of human happiness afad misery. We are capable, also, of deliberating, choosing, and resolving. These phenomena are evidently quite distinct in character from the phenomena of knowing, and yet they are all united in a common consciousness. They are the concomitants of knowledge its antecedents, conditions, effects, consequents, etc. but not knowledge itself. They are all states of consciousness, but not properly cognitions.

2. Different classes of feelings. Of our Feelings, some are so localized in different parts and organs of the body, that they may be called organic or corporeal feelings. Of this sort is the uneasy feeling in the stomach occasioned by the want of food ; also, the various aches and pains in the internal organs, or at the surface of the body, caused ^ by derangement, disorganization, or pressure. Another class of feelings, depending rather upon certain mental perceptions or thoughts, than upon local, physical causes, may be called intellectual or moral feelings, they are commonly denominated Sentiments. They are such as: love^ which is awakened by the perception or thought of an endeared object ; desire, which is awakened by the perception or thought of any thing which we suppose will gratify a want ; gratitude, awakened by favors received; the sense of beauty or deformity, awakened by the presence or thought of comely or uncomely objects or acts ; and the sense of right and ivrong, awakened by the perception or recollection of human conduct, as according to, or contrary to, right relations.

3. Pleasure and pain, good and evil. The feelings excited by physical causes, constitute physical pleasure and pain ; while those excited by our thoughts, constitute the more purely intellectual pleasures and pains. That which produces pleasure of either kind, is called good, and that which produces pain, evil, yet, good and evil of different orders, according to the character of the pleasure or pain produced.

4. Designations and character of the different feelings. The feelings, considered in their most general character, as modifications of our sentient nature, are called Affections ; * considered as mental excitements or movements, they are called Emotions ; when violent or excessive excitements, Passions ; and when considered as appetences towards different objects, or revulsions from them, they are called Propensities, or Desires and Aversions. But however denominated, and wherever conceived as having their seat, even if distinctly local-

* Not in the limited sense* of " kindly interest in some person or thing," in -which the term is sometimes nsed in treatises on morals ; but in the more generic sense of the word, as designating any simple impression or modification of our sentient nature.

OP MIND IN GENERAL. 21

ized in particular organs of the body, they are all, evidently, real mental affections, since they are as unlike any mere affections or qualities of matter, as are the phenomena of intelligence. And yet they are not knowledge, though often the conditions of knowledge, as is the case with the special feelings in sensation, which is the condition to perception. The organic feelings, also, as localized in different parts and organs of the body, disclose a knowledge of -their place, in the consciousness we have of the affection, we become conscious of its locality.

5. Tlie moral and asthetic feelings. The moral sentiments are only a peculiar class of feelings consequent upon moral perceptions. Thus, Bishop Butler * speaks of the moral faculty, as either " a perception of the understanding, or a sentiment of the heart, or what seems the truth, as including both." The moral sentiments are merely different forms and degrees of the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, in consequence of conduct or character which is perceived to be in accordance with, or contrary to, right relations. And the same may be said of the aesthetic feelings, or the emotions of Taste. The pleasures and disgusts of taste are mere emotions, immediately consequent upon the perception by the senses, or the thought of, objects of a certain character as to their proportions and parts, or their relations, surroundings, etc. There can be no aesthetic feelings, without a previous perception or thought of objects of an aesthetic character, or under aesthetic relations.

6. Tlie will The Will is the third grand phase of the mind revealed to us in consciousness. The volun-

* Dissertation on Virtue.

tary phenomena are equally distinct from the phenomena of feeling and the phenomena of knowing. Deliberation, indeed, is but an intellectual comparison of objects or thoughts ; but the preferring one to another, as more desirable, and, above all, the resolving to act thus and thus in consequence, are operations quite distinct from any mere acts of knowledge. As to the extent of the independent power of the will, whether it be self-determining, or determined, in its action, this question belongs rather to the more general science of mental philosophy, and need not be discussed here. I may merely say, in passing, that this is a subject upon which speculation has thrown, and seems destined to throw, but little light. Practically, we feel ourselves to be free, though we cannot, it may be, clearly make it out in thought. There is ground enough here for conviction, for faith, though we can never, perhaps, attain to positive knowledge on the subject.

7. Tlie mode of action of the will not to be considered. Neither-have I any thing to do with the question how the will carries out its determinations through the body, how the mind affects the body or its nervous system. This question, with the kindred one, how external objects affect the mind through the body, belongs to physiology, if to any science. Various conjectures or assumptions have been made, by those who have investigated the physical side of our mental manifestations, to account alike for each of these reverse processes ; from that of a flow of animal spirits through or along the nerves, to that of a development in the nervous system of some general nervous agent, as electricity, or magnetism, which is now, perhaps, the prevailing assumption among this class of philosophers.

OP MIND IN GENERAL. 23

But none of these hypotheses have been established, or even rendered probable, on scientific grounds.*

8. The will the deepest principle of the mind. These, then, are the three great classes of mental manifestations, the phenomena of Knowing* the phenomena of Feeling-, and the phenomena of Willing, of which the latter seem to proceed from the deepest and most central principle in our nature. The will, more than any thing else, seems to constitute the real self. If it be free (and unless it is, there can be no morality, and no necessity even for the assumption of a spiritual nature f in us and above us), then it controls the movements of the mind, and is the primal power in our nature. The will carries the whole mind with it, and all our powers wait to obey its behests.

# Whoever Irishes to follow out such speculations, which hare thus far, at least, proved rather curious than profitable, will find them ably and yet cautiously handled by Dr. Holland, in his CJtapters on Mental Physiology.

t See Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, p. 298.

CHAPTER IL

CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION I.

NATURE OP CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. Knowledge and consciousness virtually the same. We cannot properly be said to know any thing which we do not note, mark, observe, or attend to in some degree. And when we do thus note or attend to the objects before our minds, one thought becomes associated with another, so that they are known together^ and hence may be recalled one by the other. Hence, all real knowledge must be conscious knowledge ; i.e., knowledge standing in relation to other knowledge, and consequently capable of being recalled. Thus knowledge and consciousness, if not exactly the same, are yet equivalent, since the process of knowing (Le., noting) objects, leads to associated knowledge, or consciousness. Hence, knowing, and knowing that we know, are virtually the same. It is by and in noting objects, and only thus, that the mind becomes conscious of them.

2. Sidb-fcnowledg'e and sub-consciousness. But are there not also isolated thoughts? Can there be no sijch thing as a knowledge wholly fugitive and transitory ? In the nature of things, we should suppose 'that we might be aware of many things as they pass, without noting them sufficiently to render them objects of conscious knowledge. We infer the same also from many of our acts, which seem to imply an apprehension of things, of which yet we have no consciousness. But we never can know, except by inference, whether there be any such fugitive thoughts or not ; for, not being associated, they cannot be recalled. However, if there be such mental states of wakefulness to what is passing, as there seems to be every reason for believing there are, which never rise to conscious knowledge, they can be nothing else than momentary apprehensions, by the same general principle of intelligence which apprehends permanent knowledge. If they cannot be properly called states of consciousness, it is only because they are not properly knowledge. They seem to constitute a sort of sub-knowledge and sub-consciousness, producing the same results as knowledge, but never fully realized.

3. Instances of such knowledge. Such states of sub-consciousness seem to be implied especially in the performance of processes usually ascribed to the effects of habit ; such as reading or repeating a familiar piece of composition, singing or playing a familiar tune, taking a familiar walk, and the like. Such operations, when first performed, are merely a combination of external signs, representing the like combination of mental perceptions, of which we are conscious. But in time we come to perform them without any conscious succession of thoughts. Hamilton, following Leibnitz, regards such operations as the result of what he calls latent mental modifications; i.e., a blind action of the mind, not only not conscious, but not even intelligent. Others have regarded such processes as wholly automatic in their nature, as having, by repetition, 3 become &o connected in their several parts, that after the initial mental impulse is given, one movement follows another by virtue of the local nervous irritability of the system. There are some things, doubtless, which seem to favor this last hypothesis especially ; but it seems more rational to suppose, with Stewart and many others, that even the most familiar acts are the result of intelligent states of the mind, but states so naturally and rapidly succeeding each other, as not to be dwelt upon sufficiently to be capable of being recalled.

4. Tlie usual antecedents of knowledge do not always awaken any mental apprehension. There are doubtless many cases, where the usual antecedents of knowledge exist without awakening in us any mental apprehension of any kind, whether momentary or permanent It is often so, undoubtedly, in sleep, and probably also in our waking hours, when the mind is very much absorbed in other things. In such cases, sights and sounds, and other objects of sense, seem to malte no impression upon us. Yet, even here, we cannot, perhaps, be quite certain that no momentary impression is made upon the mind. Indeed, we sometimes recall, afterwards, an impression, as of the striking of a clock, which awakened no attention at the time. In such a case, of course, there must have been an impression received, and it must have been associated, too, at least with the thought through which it is recalled ; or else, the attention being relieved soon after the impression was made, and while it still continues in its effects, * it is now first recog-

* In the case of sight, we learn, as observed by Berkeley, that the impression remains so as to be distinctly cognizable for a time after the cause is removed, by the simple experiment of moving a burning coal or candle rapidly round in a circle, when an entire ring of light is seen. This, of nized. Still, it scarcely admits of a doubt, that there are many cases where the usual antecedents of knowledge exist without awakening in us any mental apprehension at all.

5. Consciousness not a distinct faculty. Consciousness, then, is not a distinct faculty, as represented by Reid and many other philosophers, engaged in witnessing the operations of the other faculties, but is the general knowing principle, contemplating and assured of its own acts. A machine works blindly, but the mind knows as it works. Knowing, willing, and feeling become distinct acts, only as they are consciously so. They are all alike realized, and can be realized, only in and through consciousness. Consciousness is knowing that we will and feel, as well as knowing that we know, and hence embraces all knowledge, at least, all distinct knowledge. It extends to external acts of perception, as well as to the internal acts of the mind : but in speaking of our knowledge of external objects, it is more proper to say that we perceive them, than that we are conscious of them, since perception denotes the outward side of this form of consciousness.

6. Consciousness embraces all the materials which the mind has to work with. As, therefore, consciousness embraces all the cognitive acts of the mind, the facts of perception, memory, imagination, etc., may all be taken together as the facts of consciousness. Indeed, as a general name for the cognitive principle on its subjective* side, and the general medium in which all

course, would not bo the case, did not the impression made by the light, at each point, remain after it had passed on to other points. So, also, we speak of a sound continuing to " ring in tho ear."