The psychology of public speaking

Front matter

Bios we

Division PN ‘StS

Section |

Contents

Ii. Mental Imagery in Public Speaking ................... 31 I1I. Médern Theories of the Emotions ........ ............ 49 IV. Emotions and Their Expressional Control ......:.... 63 VY. Emotions and Their Proper Expressional Methods ..... 77 VI. Darwin and Wundt’s Principles of Emotional Expressions 89 VII. The Fluctuation of Attention .................. Paral 105 RNR CITE 05) oh ec hE PAM BRON LR RIN ah ia i Oi diar pie Macluvol ae 121 Rhythm in Written and Oral Discourse ............... 135 TEAS e765 sR RRR SORT aR a NO AGEN RED yee ALARA 149 XI. Rederiis an Audience Suggestible ................... 161

>. NF Psychology of the Crowd and of the Audience ........ 173

| MTR TRLOT VNC. 85) bia WON AN Ua hhavalhenata ttrati ay MVCN GEMM Que, 187 | XIV. Practical Applications of the Psychology of Memory ... 203

CHAPTER I. Mental Imagery

PERCEPTION AND MENTAL IMAGERY COMPARED.

Before me as I write is a poster, advertising the Chicago Horse Show. Turning my eyes to it, I perceive it in all its details. The horses, carriages, people and decorations are all equally clear and distinct to my gaze.

I close my eyes and try to imagine the poster, and it stands out before me much as it did when I was looking at it. The bold patches of color which represent trees and shrubbery, the lines of black and white that represent the fence, the black, red and yellow tallyhoes, and the brillant costumes are all present in my reproduction of the poster as I sit with closed eyes and try to imagine just how it looks. My visual image of the poster is quite similar to my percept of it.

There are children playing on a neighboring lawn. They are playing that they are fire-engines and are trying to reproduce all the sounds connected with this most interesting object. I can hear them tramp heavily up the sidewalk, screeching in imitation of the bell and calling excitedly just as they had heard the firemen do in a recent fire. Kivery sound is perceived by me as I stop to listen to them.

As the clatter in the adjoining lawn is for a moment silent, I try to live over again an experience of a former hour spent in ascending a precipitous cliff in which loose rock was moved from its resting place and went roaring to the bottom of the canyon. I hear in imagination the rock as it plunges from one ledge to another. With each bound the roar becomes more and more terrifying, the echoes re-enforce one another till the whole valley is filled with a deafening roar. As the rock strikes the bottom, there is a terrific crash, followed by a gradual dying out of the echoes, only to be followed by a death-like stillness. My auditory imagery of these sounds is so vivid that I feel once more that I am making the difficult ascent and hearing the noises of the canyon. Indeed, the shouts of the children which reach my ear are hardly more real to me than the roar of the canyon which I hear again in imagination.

I press my hand against my table and push it. The table, _ being heavy, requires a great force to start it. I observe the feeling in my muscles and joints as I push to see how it feels. I thus get a perception of muscular effort. I observe the feeling of strain in my muscles and joints as well as the rushing of blood to my head and the strain across my chest.

I call up a former experience in which I was playing football and in which the scrimmage was unusually trying. My muscles were weakened by long, continuous effort, and no time for rest was to be thought of. I feel in imagination ~ the straining of the muscles as I attempted to push against the line. I imagine the terrible struggle, the twisting, straining and writhing of every muscle, tendon and joint. As I imagine it I find the state is re-established and I am unconsciously leaning towards the goal as if the experience

Mental Imagery. Ly were a present one. My motor imagery of the foot-ball game is almost as distinct as the motor perception of moving the table.

I feel my collar pressing against my neck—I have a perception of it. In my imagination I feel a fly slowly crawling up the bridge of my nose—I have a tactual image of it—and the image is so strong that I have to stop to rub my nose.

I ate a peach for breakfast this morning and enjoyed the taste of it—my perception of the taste was pleasing. It is now almost noon, and, as I think of how it tasted, my mouth waters—I have a vivid gustatory image of the peach.

As I hold the rose to my nose I get a perception of it. As I think of how the gas factory smelt yesterday when 1 passed it, I have an olfactory wmage of the gas.

As IJ press the point of a pencil sharply against my hand I perceive the pain. As J think how it felt when I stepped on a rusty nail I have a mental image of the pain.

It is the function of our imagination to supply us with mental images, and from all that has been said, it is quite evident that we may have mental images of those things which we have previously perceived.

IMAGINATION, PRODUCTIVE AND REPRODUCTIVE.

Such mental images are the results of what is known as either productive or as reproductive imagination. The illustrations cited above are all of the reproductive type. The living over again or the reproducing of an entire former experience in imagination is known as reproductive imagination. All imagination is in a sense reproductive, for no one is able to imagine anything all the parts of which have not been present to his senses. It is a common belief that » the imagination is free and untrammeled in its flights, yet it is one of the most dependent of our faculties. All the | elements of the most bizarre fancy have been experienced | before by the imaginer.

It is quite possible for us to work over and reunite in different proportions and settings the elements of our former experiences and such a process is known as producdive imagination. In a sense all imagination is productive, for, no matter how scruplously exact I may be, when I live over again in imagination a former experience I am sure to change it in some details. One detail is left out and another is exaggerated; so that in a sense the experience is _ unique and might be called productive imagination. Hence we see that the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination is not a fixed thing. When the mental image is largely a reproduction of former experiences in their entirety and in the order in which they originally occurred, then we call the act reproductive imagination. If there is union of parts of different experiences so that the mental image is quite different from any former experience in its entirety or its connection, then we call it productive imagination. a ,

The Greeks exercised their productive imagination when they united the head and trunk of a man to the body of a horse and so created a Centaur. The medieval Satan is an example of productive imagination, as the horns of a goat, the hoofs and tail of an ox, and the wings of a bat are all added to the form of a man. The productive imagination is also manifest in the construction of an angel by uniting the wings of a bird to the body of a beautiful maiden. Newton joined the fall of an apple to the movement of the spheres and so arrived at the idea of universal gravitation. The work of the productive imagination is usually more subtle than these examples would indicate. Such figures of speech as similes are the result of productive imagination in which elements of one object are extracted and united with the elements of other objects or experiences. In the following quotation pleasures are thought of as transient, and this element is extracted and made use of to join pleasures with poppies and with snow flakes:

“For pleasures are like poppies spread— We see the bloom, the flower has fled; Or like the snow-flake on the river— One moment white, then gone forever.”

THE FUNCTION OF THE IMAGINATION.

Mental states are changed by everything that invades our experience and we are thus rendered capable of living in imagination all former experiences or any of the parts of these experiences and in any and all connections. The imagination is never richer than our experiences, yet none of us has put the things which we have experienced in all their possible new combinations because none of us has sufficient productive imagination. Nothing can be present in our imagination which was not first present in our perception; but the richness of life depends not on the number of things that we have perceived, but in the use that our imagination has made of what we have perceived. It is not so much our environment as our imagination that makes us condemn the world as cold and dreary. There is many a traveler who finds that new lands and peoples add but little to his enjoyment. All the peoples and all lands are equally stale and unprofitable to him. Luther and Milton found that prison walls, and even blindness, were no barriers to rich and productive life.

There is an impression shared by many that our senses alone give us reality and that our imaginations deal with the unreal. Such a view is based on an error. Objects are present to our senses but for a brief moment, but they may be present in imagination for days and years. Our best thinking concerning objects of sense may even be conducted after their disappearance. Our imagination is the instrument of reality. By means of it we are brought face to face with the past and by means of it we prophesy the future. In imagination the blind Beethoven hears his divine symphony, and then proceeds to put it on paper. In imagination Newton sees the universe controlled by the laws of gravitation, and then proceeds to demonstrate the fact. In imagination the sculptor sees his statue and then begins the task of carving it from the marble. The imagination is not confined to the work of the artist and the genius, but is employed in our every-day activities. I see in imagination the result of a certain line of conduct, and am led to abandon it. I construct in imagination an ideal of life and seek to attain it. I feel in imagination the suffering of the unfortunate and am induced to espouse their cause. I cannot imagine a line of conduct without feeling impelled towards it. If I try to imagine the pronunciation of the letter “q” I find that there is a movement in my tongue preparatory to its pronunciation.

SIR FRANCIS GALTON’S INVESTIGATION.

Until about 1880 it was assumed that any normal person could form an image of anything which had ever been present to his senses. It was not known that there were great personal differences, and it was not discovered that some persons could with ease see in imagination things which had been presented to their eyes but could form no mental image of sounds, while others could form distinct images of sounds but not of sights. In 1880 Sir Francis Galton instituted an investigation which revealed the fact of astounding personal differences in ability to form images of different sorts. He also found that the number of persons who could form distinct visual images was far in excess of those who could form distinct auditory images or tactual images.

The results of this investigator have been verified by many persons, and no peculiarity in his results seems to be unique. For over ten years records have been kept of the quality of the mental imagery of every student studying psychology at Northwestern University. These papers prove conclusively that the personal differences in normal intelligent persons are so great and the consequences of such a fact are so important that any one who has to do with the minds of people (as every reader of this treatise

has) should give careful consideration to the question of personal differences in mental imagery.

For each of the ten years all students have been saa to try to imagine their breakfast table of the preceding morning, to get it before them as vividly as possible, and then give a full and vivid description of all the details. (Tt is recommended that at this place every reader of this chapter pause and try to hold in imagination his breakfast table of the preceding morning and then examine the image as carefully as possible.) Each student was also asked to describe his mental image of a railroad train and a football game.

The following papers are all rather exceptional, used to illustrate the extremes, but any one of them can be duplieated many times from the hundreds of papers presented by the students.

The first paper was presented by a student of rather unusual oratorical ability, and his description indicates pronounced visual imagery:

THE EXTREMES OF VISUAL IMAGERY ILLUSTRATED.

“The various dishes appear just as perfectly before me as if they were arranged about me as I write. The colors are distinct, the mats, the bread, the potatoes, and the coffee, are all in their proper light. I see such details as the fat on one side of the meat and the lean on the other. The image of my friend who sat opposite me is very distinct.”

In contrast with this the following paper seems incredible: )

“The word ‘ breakfast table’ calls to my mind no visual image, and yet I know perfectly what is meant.”

The next paper is so convincing that it makes us pity the poor man who can see objects only when they are actually before him.

“My effort to imagine my breakfast table results as follows: When I first close my eyes I seem to see the table before me dimly; but as soon asI turn my attention to it and undertake to examine it more clearly, it vanishes, and there is total darkness in my mind. I am unable to see any colors. It seems to make no difference whether I have my eyes open or closed. If I suddenly close my eyes after haying them open for a while, I get a misty, ghost-like vision, which immediately vanishes. The whole vision is as if I were sitting at the table and there were a very dim light admitted to the room for a moment, and then total darkness came on again, this light being sufficient to enable me to see only the vague outlines of the table.”

It should be borne in mind that this is an honest report of a college senior, and that his report of his breakfast table would be duplicated by a report of his image of any other object or event.

THE EXTREMES OF AUDITORY IMAGERY ILLUSTRATED.

The following paper is the report of a student who was possessed of very good auditory, but poor visual imagery: “ When I think of the breakfast table I do not seem to have a clear visual image of it. I can see the length of it, —the three chairs, though I can’t tell the color or shape of these; the white cloth and something on it, but I can’t see the pattern of the cloth or any of the food. I can very plainly hear the rattle of the dishes and of the silver and above this hear the conversation, also the other noises, such as a train which passes every morning while we are at breakfast. Again in a foot-ball game I distinctly hear the noises, but do not clearly see anything or anybody. I hear the stillness when everyone is silent and then the loud cheering. Here I notice the difference of pitch and tone.”

The next report is that of a student with poor auditory imagery:

“Tam not able to state whether I hear the train or not. I am inclined to think that it is a noiseless one. It is hard for me to conceive of the sound of a bell, for instance. I can see the bell move to and fro, and for an instant seem to hear the ding dong, but it is gone before I can identify it. When I try to conceive of shouts I am like one groping in the dark. JI cannot possibly retain the conception of a sound for any length of time.”

IMAGERY OF MOVEMENT.

Although the visual and auditory images are the most vivid with most persons, there are those whose prevailing imagery is of movement—the so-called motor imagery. The following from the report of a student who thinks in ‘terms of movement will make this point clear:

“ When the word ‘ railroad train’ was pronounced, I saw the train very plainly just stopping in front of the depot. I saw the people getting on the train; these people were very indistinct. It is their motions rather than the people themselves which I see. I can feel myself getting on the train, finding a seat and sitting down. I cannot hear the noise of the train, but can hear rather indistinctly the conductor calling the stations. I believe my mental imagery is more motile (of movements) than anything else. Although I can see some things quite plainly, I seem to feel the movements most distinctly.”

Persons whose mental imagery differs from our own seem to do some things very queerly. The following is an extract of a report from a student who thought largely in terms of movement, and some of his methods of learning things, and the parts of his childhood experiences which he remembered, etc., impress most of us as odd:

“My mental imagery seems to be of the motile type, strongly characterized by a sense of position and direction. My visual images are poor. I can only obtain the visual image of a familiar face by successively giving my attention to the separate features; the whole face does not appear to my mind. A word is indelibly fixed in my mind if I trace its characters on the palm of my left hand with the forefinger of my right. The mention of an author or a book brings up the position which that work occupies on the shelves with which I am familiar, but does not call up the looks of the surroundings. The idea of the cardinal points of the compass never leaves me, though it is frequently a mistaken one. In the city of Chicago my only guide is this sense of direction, which seldom leads me astray. I doubt my ability to locate by streets or by adjacent structures the buildings with which I am most familiar. Words representing things that I have seen always give me a sense of their direction and position. Other words are invariably associated with the feeling of articulating them. In the act of writing each letter is mentally pronounced. Among my early memories is one of firing a revolver. I remember pulling the trigger, but not the report that followed.”

Many of the students found themselves unable to imagine movement in any form. As they call to mind the feet of a trotting horse in a race, the feet appear as they do in a photograph and the idea of thinking of the feet in motion seems an impossibility. As they try to think how a sprinter appears in a race they are able to think of him only in one position and as having one foot in the air ready to come down, but the foot will not fall.

DIVERSIFIED FORMS OF MENTAL IMAGERY.

Many can form distinct images of touch and of pain, while many others cannot. ‘The following extract is from a report of a student who possesses poor visual imagery, but most excellent imagery of sound, pain and touch. In recalling a fire which I witnessed I can hear the church bells ringing out the alarm, and can plainly distinguish between the deep tones of one and the higher pitch of the other. All the confusion of sound now comes to me—the shouting from different quarters of the town, the sound of _ footsteps on the board sidewalks, even the sound of my own breathing and puffing and of those running by my side. I have no really distinct vision of the fire itself, but can hear the cracking of breaking glass, the peculiar roar of a huge blaze, and the excited voices of the crowd. The picture is one of confusion, and noise predominates. I can easily see in imagination the faces of my acquaintances, but it is easier to hear their voices. In playing accompaniments to mandolin pieces upon a guitar, I derive almost the same amount of pleasure whether the other instruments are present or not. My imagination supplies all the absent parts. I can accompany and hear an air which is too difficult for me to render on a piano or by whistling; in my imagination every note is vivid. As for images of touch, they are most vivid to me when I hear or listen to accounts of surgical operations. If such accounts refer to a broken leg, there is a painful sensation in that part of my own anatomy, and I fear to step with that leg lest I hurt it. If I see a fly crawling on anyone, I have an intense desire to brush it off, and feel relieved if [ rub my face vigorously in the corresponding part.”

Many men find that they are unable to imagine the odor of an absent flower or at best cannot hold the image for more than an instant of time. There seem to be very many persons who are unable to imagine the taste of foods or of drinks; others seem to be well endowed with such ability.

Conclusion

Ordinarily we have no means for knowing the forms in which our companions do their thinking. We know the results of their mental processes, and it is only the results that we are usually interested in. We hardly take the trouble to identify the forms in which we do our own thinking, and we have assumed that our form of thinking is the same as that of all other persons, and so have given no attention to the subject. Of all these students none supposed that his form of thinking was different from that of his neighbor. ‘Tio one the world presents itself as a great panorama; to another it is a series of sounds; to another it is primarily an organism of movements. Some are impressed by one aspect of the environment and others by other aspects. That which appeals to one may have no meaning to the other. That which thrills one will be devoid of emotion for another. Every public speaker is naturally inclined to appeal to that form of imagery which impresses him most, and yet it may be a form which is without meaning to many of his hearers. Some of our great orators appeal primarily to one special form of imagery, while others appeal to several different forms. Since the orator is so dependent upon his special form of imagery for the presentation of his address, and since his appeal is so largely to the imagination of his hearers, it is self-evident that the study of mental imagery will have a valuable message for all public speakers, and in another chapter we shall consider the subject of mental imagery in its relation to the orator and to oratory, and incidentally to other agents and forms of artistic representation.

Mental Imagery in Public Speaking.

CHAPTER II. Mental Jmagery in Public Speaking

ORATORY AND THE IMAGINATION.

Oratory, poetry and philosophy are frequently thought of as having nothing in common. The imagination is supposed to have nothing to do with philosophy and to add only the embellishments to poetry and oratory. Such a conception is untrue and altogether misleading. Philosophy is similar to poetry and oratory in that the function of each is to reveal reality and as a means to accomplish this end all three rely upon the imagination. The philosopher sees in imagination the reign of universal laws and strives to proclaim them. ‘The poet sees in imagination the beauty of a scene and seeks to impart his vision. The orator sees in imagination the reality of a great truth; he feels its importance to humanity, and is impelled to reveal to others that which has already appeared to him. The imagination does not supply merely the veneer and the polish, for this is the least important of its functions. The great function of the imagination is to reveal to us the innumera- a ble forms of reality.

THE PLACE OF THE IMAGINATION IN THINKING.

Modern psychology has shown us that what we call seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., is more than half the work of the imagination. As I turn my eyes upon a piece of polished marble, I seem to see the smoothness, although in reulity smoothness is not visible, but subject only to the sense of touch. And when I seem to perceive smoothness by means of my eyes I am in fact adding it by means of my imagination. As I sit in my room and hear a noise in the street. I seem to hear a carriage passing, when in reality all I perceive is sound, and my imagination adds the interpretation.

The part which the imagination takes in perception is not greater than its function in judgments. When I pronounce the Matterhorn as more beautiful than Pike’s Peak, I see in imagination each of these mountains and compare the two mental images. When I judge beef steak to be more palatable than fat pork I form a mental image of the steak and of the pork, and the image of one is more pleasing than the other.

Reasoning is often thought of as the highest function of the human mind and it is supposed by many that such a process is far removed from imagination, and yet such is not the case. No act of pure reason is independent of imagination. A friend asks a scientist how to remove the cap from a fountain pen when it is too tight to be removed by hand. The mental process which the scientist goes through is something like this: He holds in mind a distinct image of the pen and the sticking cap. He then tries to think of the pen in various situations. If this does not avail, he tries to think of the different qualities of the metal (or rubber) cap, and at last thinks of the quality of “ expansion by heat.” He then sees in imagination the cap immersed in hot water, as expanding, and coming off with but little strain. Much of this process of pure reason is the work of the imagination.

Kiven in the profoundest works of reason the work of the imagination performs a leading part. Immanuel Kant saw his famous categories not with his physical eye, but only in imagination. In all realms of thought and activity the imagination is the great revealer of reality, and as such its place cannot well be overestimated in oratory. It is by means of the imagination that we grasp reality for ourselves, and it is by this means that we reveal it to others. The orator is one who surpasses his fellows in his power of imagining reality and in revealing it to others. While his fellows may know reality in its abstract expression, he sees it in such concrete form that it can be revealed effectively to others. He uses his imagination not to make the unreal seem real, but to present the real in such concreted form that it will appeal to all as the reality. The imagination is not for the purpose of deception, but for the more worthy end of revelation.

THE PLACE OF THE IMAGINATION IN THE EMOTIONS.

The place of the imagination in pure thinking (perception, judgments, and reason) is not greater than its place in the emotions. Every public speaker attempts to awaken the emotions of his hearers but such attempts are frequently futile. The methods used by different speakers to arouse the emotions are diverse and often are the products of imitation or of chance. Certain speakers are effective in the production of one class of emotions and fail with the other classes, although they are unable to explain either their successes or failures. A study of the awakening of emotions in general may be of benefit in helping to understand the methods which are available by the public speaker.

The first thing that we observe in such a study is that

,/ our emotions are awakened by concrete situations presented to the mind. Abstractions and generalities never awaken emotions in the normal mind even though they are conveyed to us with the height of intensity and with great demonstrations. We find that in newspaper accounts we are more affected by a vivid description of the suffering of a single unfortunate than by the abstract statement of fact that thousands were killed by the overflow or in the battle. I am frightened when alone at night in the woods and suddenly hear the howling of hungry wolves. The statement that hungry wolves are dangerous does not impress me at all. Descriptions of the Iroquois Theater diaster were made strong by the fact that the reporters gave vivid descriptions of the sufferings of individuals, and then the statement that there were hundreds of such cases added its cumulative effect. If there had been no descriptions of the individual cases, but all the descriptions had been of a general nature, the readers might have remarked that it was a terrible thing, but their statements would be of a logical rather than of an emotional nature. The preachers of a past generation were able to awaken an awe-inspiring dread not by telling of the general nature of a future punishment. ‘Their descriptions were not abstract and general