The principles of psychology

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Preface

It has been a reproach to philosophy, generally and persistently put forward, that it makes no progress, that it lacks established elements, that it is a field of extravagant and contradictory theories. We do not accept these assertions in the unqualified way in which they are thrown out So made, they are the result of ignorance and ungrounded contempt on the part of those who so easily utter them. So fer, however, as these statements are true, they are a common reproach and misfortune, to be removed only by more patient, more protracted, more guarded inquiry. To scorn and reject philosophy as presented under its own, its metaphysical form, subject to its own conditions, is simply to deepen the difficulty, and postpone indefinitely an answer to the most fiindamental and central inquiries. If more than the usual number of mistakes have been made in this department, it is because more than the usual obstacles lie in the path of progress. These are not to be removed by discouragement, or by opening ways in other directions. All success to the students of physical science : but each of its fields may have its triumphs, and the secrets of mind remain as unapproachable as h\\.\iet\.o. '^\^^^Jk^^^^'^$«^ '^'s^

IV PREFACE.

not without it, under its own laws and not under the laws of a lower realm, must be found those clues of success, those principles of investigation, which can alone place this highest form of knowledge in its true position. The following treatise is at least a patient effort to make a contribution to this, amid all failures, chief department of thought If asked why I hoped this volume might reward the perusal, I should answer, Not because the system presented is new, but because the statement it here receives is at once succinct and elaborate, is incidentally strengthened by new points, by a consistent maintenance of all that belongs to it, and by the rejection of that which, essentially alien to its principles, only embarrasses it I trust the Intuitive Philosophy will be found hereby to have gained somewhat of that proof which springs from completeness and proportion of parts.

I have acknowledged my obligations to others in cases in which they have been direct I here especially express my indebtedness, in the general tone of the philosophy presented, to the eminent explorer and instructor in this field. Dr. Hickok.

Holding my work amenable to thorough criticism, I shall yet expect but little profit from the facile application of previous opinions to detached points ; or from any discussion of the principles involved, less penetrative and systematic than that here presented. I believe this treatise to have the integrity of a system, and to call, therefore, for a joint and complete judgment To such handling I hopefu]]y commend it

Introduction

WAmm

^1. Value of PhiloBophy. '..... 1

§ 2. Determines the rank of Man. 8

§3. Itself half the field of knowledge 4

§ 4. Its connection with moral and religions truth. 6

§ 5. Satifi&ction taken in disparaging metaphTsics— other

departments sofier therefirom — Assertion of entire want of

established principles not true— Proofs of progress giren. 8-

§6. Postulates of Philosophy 18

BOOK L— The IrUeOed.

CHAPTER L

THE FIELD OF MENTAL BOIBNOB Ain> ITS DIYXBIOHB.

§ 1. Field of Philosophy, Consdousness — ^Distrust of Con-

sdousness 16

§ 2. Difficulties of Philosophy — Methods of observation — Nature of the phenomenal-Language-— Analogies— Unwillingness to accept finalities 18

§ 3. Aids to inquiry — Language — History — ^Physical life and

organs — Phrenology 28

§ 4. Division of faculties — ^Desires belong with the feelings.. . 26

§ 5. Volition and choice, not separable 27

§ 6. The relation of consciousness to the three classes of facnlties. '^

Vi CONTENTS.

{ 7. Are tliere any mental phenomena below consciousness? Hamilton — His arguments considered — Memory — Acquired skill — Association of ideas 80

§ 8. A sub-conscious region allied to materialism — Unknowable. 41

§ 9. Is the mind always consciously active ? Reasons for — Antecedent improbability — Dreams — Sonmambulism — Certain other fiwts 48

CHAPTER n.

§ 1. Divisions. 49

§ 2. The Senses — Divisions of them 50

§ 3. What do we see ? — ^Eye deals only with colors — ^These intermediate between it and things — Sight full of judgments — ^The same true of hearing — Idealism — ^Hamilton's doctrine of perception — ^What relation the eye bears to the mind

in perception 63

§ 4. Idealism in reference to perception 61

§ 5. The doctrine of perception. 63

§ 6. No denial of consciousness — The real point of conflict with common belief — ^What this involves — Confirmatory

considerations 64

§ 7. Primary and secondary qualities — Criteria of — The application of these in the qualities of solidity and extension— The distinction breaks down — ^Incidental proofs furnished

tointuition. 68

§ 8. Consciousness as a source of knowledge 76

CHAPTER IIL

THE XTNDEBSTANDINCI.

§ 1. What the imderstanding includes— Memory — ^What — physical connections.. 77

§ 2. Theories of memory— Hamilton's theory — ^Its defects — Such theories a priori 81

§ 8. Association as connected with memory — ^Habit— »€bowth of mind— DivlsionB of memory 86

CONTENTS. Vii

§4. Qoalities of memory — ^E^inds of memory — ^AaK)eiAtion dependent on meYnory — ^Memory, how cultivated — Advantages and dangers of a strong memory 88

§ 5. Imagination 93

§ 6. Theories of imagination — Bain — Hamilton 94

§ 7. Influence of imagination on paasiona — On judgment —

On action— On character. 98.

§ 8. How cultivated — The word conception. 100

§ 9. The judgment — ^Importance of 102

§ 10. Erroneous views of judgment— Sir Wm. Hamilton— Bain— The doctrine that all judgments involve resemblance — Simplest judgment — ^Presence of a regulative idea. 104 § 11. Judgments which unite two objects — Involve an intuitive idea — A. third class of judgments 110

§ 12. A second use of the word conceive— Relations of the understanding — ^Relation of included powers 114

CHAFl'EB IV.

THB BEA80N.

§ 1. Disagreement as to existence of this faucvlty — Importance of the discussion — What understood by the reason —

The several intuitive ideas 116

§ 2. Existence— Bain 119

§3. Number 122

§ 4. Space — Spencer's view given— Sustained by Bain— Con^

troverted — ^Included intuitions. 124

§ 5. Time — Spencer's view stated and examined 186

§6. Besemblance — ^The manner in which this notion has

been used 141

§ 7. Cause and effect— What— In this form rejected by the Empirical School— Proof that this is the actual working idea in the human mind — ^Language — Science — ^Philosophy — Sir William Hamilton— His view controverted — ^Three reasons against it— Intuitive doctrine damaged by its advocates — ^Things involved in cause and effect.. ; 144

§ 8. Belation of these six ideas — Consciousness a regulative

idea — ^Not so presented by others ^^

§ 9. Beauty— This quality generally acoepted— B«&acwd. ^ via CONTENTS.

Utility— To Unitj — To association — Of intuitive origin 166

^ 10. Right — General phenomena accepted — ^Right referred to utility — ^How far the utilitarian right — Utility fails to account for the sense of oUigation — Things which obscure in this connection the truth — Sense of obligation not found in public opinion— Striking moral phenomena unexplained — The useful, as such, imposes no sense of duty — Experience does not conform to the theory — ^But two theories plausible — ^An e£K>rt to combine them^Blessedness — Bentham. 159

§ 11. liberty — ^What it implies — ^Not conscious of it 175

§ 12. I'he notion of the infinite— How it arises — Space- Time — God — The law of the conditioned — ^The infinite a positive idea — Spencer — ^Practical use of the idea 177

§ 13. Criteria of intuitive ideas — ^Necessity — Universality — How applied 188

§ 14. Are these ideas merely forms of thought? — Of inde- . pendent, external application 189

§ 15. Grouping of these ideas 193

CHAPTER V.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTEUjEOT.

§ 1. Indebtedness of philosophy to the Materialistic Schools- Development of faculties — Sensation — ^Bjiowledge gained of the body — The objective character of experience — ^Regulative ideas present, how 194

§ 2. Acquisition of knowledge — Resemblance — Why a knowledge of resemblances is sought — Knowledge of the mind — Dangers of the transition — Knowledge of God — Deduction and induction 203

5 8. Steps of progress— Sensation — Judgment— Reasoning — Deduction— Induction — Hamilton — Mill — What is reasoning ? — True character of deduction and induction 207

) 4. The control of the mind over its thoughts — How many objects can be attended to at once — How far does the mind control the order of its ideas — Association — ^wrong view of"— Dependence on memory — Control of the mind eomplete, if long periods are contemplated 214

CONTBNTS.

§ 5. Difforenoe of endowment in man and in the animal— Too high estimate of the powers of animals — Pioi Whitnej quoted — How tricks are acquired bj snimsis — ^Methods of truning — ^Difficulties attendant on supposing that brutes think — Gases of marked knowledge— Consequences of the view giyen. 819

'P

BOOK n.— The Fedings.

§ 1. Distinction between feelings and thooghts— The iint, single; the second, double— Thought more immediatelj subject to tlie will — ^Less directlj inflnenoes the will

^ 2. Division of the feelings — Use of words.

CHAFTEBL

PHZHZOili IKKLOIGS*

§ 1. Division of the physical feeUngs. 284

§ 2. Special senses — Sensations and perceptions — ^Touch- Relation of sensation to pleasure 286

§ 3. Indefinite senses — Sense of pressure— Of heat — Feelings which indicate a physical condition — Effect on action 288

§ i. Appetites — ^Purposes subserved — Iiritabilitj — Natural Affections. 240

CHAPTER n.

THE ZNTELLEGTUAL TEELINOS.

§ 1. Division— Desires— Not primitive— Division of— Different degrees of strength 244

§ 2. Feelings dependent on desires — Hope— Joj — Feelings occasioned bj the relation of others to our success — Feel- ^ ings drawn forth hy our own connection withsucoesB^Vanity— Pride 249

§ 3. Feelings which accompany fiEdlure— Fear — Discouragement — Disappointment— Envy — Jealousy — Dislike— Malevolent Feelings 203

X CONTENTS.

§ 5. General conditionis affecting intellectnal feelings — ^Novelty — ^Harmony — Sympathy — ^Association — ^Imagination. . . 266

CHAPTER HL

THE SPIEITUAL FEELINGS.

§ 1. What these are — ^Their divisions — ^Feeling elicited by truth 258

§ 2. .^thetical feelings — ^why spiritual feelings obscnre — Conditions of a perception of beauty — ^Effects on action — Relation of aesthetics and ethics 263

§ 3. Moral sentiments — ^Effect on other emotions — Obligation — Certainty of moral feelings 268

§ 4. Affections — ^Religious sentiments 271

CHAPTER IV.

DYNAMICS OF THE FEEUNGS.

^ 1. Generalization by Hamilton — Offices of the several classes of feeling — ^Relation to health, to choice of means, to choice of ends 273

§ 2. Order of development in the three classes successive 276

§ 8. Communities take up the law of growth — Strength of a ruling feeling 277

§ 4. Expenditure of vital force in emotion — ^Duration of — Labor and play — Success affords relief to labor 279

§ 6. Animal life in its feelings — Utilitarianism 280

BOOK III— The Wm

^ 1. Relations of the will — Subdivisions 283

Chapter I. Vital Action Anticipatory Of Volition

% 1. Life — The nervous system — Its constitution an4 office. 284 § 2. Nervoos action as involuntary — The seat of involuntary Mctioa^-^f voluntary action 290

CONTENTS. XI

§ 8. Bcflex actloQ — ^The blending of volantAry and Involuitazyaetkn 298

CHAPTER II. EZECCTIYB YOUnON

§ 2. Action of animali — Skill, bow &cqaircd-~Subconaeioa« region— Mingling of Tolontaiy and in voluntary activity — The paMage of one into the other 290

Chapter III

^ 1. DiviflionB of volition that pertain to their practical bearings 800

§ 2. Choice — Distinguished — Must be an alternative to action as a condition of liberty 801

§.8. Motives must bo unlike in kind — A moral element must be present as a condition of choice — The connection of motives and choice 808

§ i. The theory that the will is govomod by the strongest motive — Its philosophical difficulties — Inductive difficulties. 804

§ 5. Eflfect on liberty and responsibility of this view — Such a will a superfluity 807

§ 6. Whence the idea of weaker and stronger motives —

- Does not contemplate the moral nature — Whence springs a sense of guilt 807

§ 7. Objected to liberty that it admits no control — That it is i^onymous with chance 809

§ 8. Proof of liberty — Not found in consciousness — Inferred from law, from moral nature— Bain — ^Mond phenomena subverted by him 811

§ 9. Proof of liberty found in the fact that we universally attribute it under given conditions 816

Chapter IV. Dynamics Of The Will And Of The Mind

§ 1. The will strengthened by use—Activities differently called forth in different peiwiiB—'Y«m^T«saKoX% ^^

Zll CONTENTS.

§ 3. Order of aetiyities— Beflex relation 818

§ 3. Control exercised by the will 820

§ 4. The feelings central — Their relations to pleasure — The rational emotions 821

CHAPraRV.

THE BXLJLTIONS OF THE SYSTEMS HEBE OSTEBED TO PBETALEKT

FOBMB OF PHIIiOSOPHT.

§ 1. Valae of general convictions — Postolate what^How the material world established — Connection between matter and mind 824

§ 2. Materialism — ^Its ^priori character — Correlation offerees — Its weakness most give way to ideiJism — ^Mills's system « 880

§ 8. Hamilton — Direct perception .';;-* 8^

§ 4. Idealism — ^Excellences — ^Defects^Tme philosopher inquires how much, not how little he may assume 889

§ 4. The philosophy now presented recognizes all the forms of knowing — ^Independent validity of the notions of causation and of liberty — Relations of the two — Causation connected with space— Liberty with consciousness — ^Liberty Ues back of causation. 842

INTRODUCTION.

{ I. Though a knowledge of the value of a subject is not necessary to its successful pursuit, yet it imparts to our inquiries peculiar zest and pleasure. We shall never fully understand the advantages connected with any science, till we have mastered it ; and it is thus natural that each should praise his own ^vorite pursuit, experiencing daily the enjo3anent and power it confers. Nor is this commendation usually, in itself considered, excessive ; it is chiefly at fault as it disparages other investigations, in themselves possessed of rival claims. As the fashion of thought in our time is to underrate philosophy, a brief space bestowed to urging its importance will not be misemployed.

We shall not enlarge on the pre-eminent mental discipline it gives, the acuteness of analysis, the steadiness of attention, the breadth of principles. All study imparts more or less of this training, and some are willing to believe that metaphysics bestow an unprofitable subtility of intellect, a gymnastic dexterity of thought ; more fit for show than service, more likely to mislead than guide their possessors. There are certain peculiar and pre-eminent considerations on which we would chiefly rest our estimate of philosophy.

The fects which it furnishes 2Jt telosX mXAxca^ft. \si ^\ix own actions, to the mastery and ordering of our own thoughts, and to the influence we are to exert over others. It is indeed possible, that there should be healthy and successful intellectual action, a wise play of the emotions and of the moral nature, without understanding them. So may there be physical health without hygiene ; yet who will deny an influence of the knowledge of the laws of life in the government of life ? To pick up a few facts so personal, so of our very selves, as those which pertain to mind, cannot but be of the highest moment in ordering our action. Indeed, every man who has any claims to general knowledge is a philosopher, however much he may deny it, and however felse and limited his conclusions may be. It is not a question whether there shall be philosophy among men; this there must be, if men are, to think and act at all; but whether this philosophy shall be a true or false one. Yet we do not wish to dwell on the value even of the facts which mental science gives, their direct practical worth in affording rules for intellectual training, and for influence over others ; but rather to point out certain broader relations of philosophy, which make its acquisition yet more imperative.

§ 2. In the first place, no true notion of the dignity of man will be attained without it If we consider man exclusively in his external relations, in his physical organization, and the ministration of nature to him, though we shall certainly assign him, if we reflect wisely, a pre-eminent position, we shall by no means measure his true worth. The forces and lives of the world grade up to him, and grade down from him ; and while he is the highest and latest of living things, he is nevertheless of them, ruling by a superiority, not by a complete separation of nature. The body of man is very perfect ; but those other oj^gunisms are also in kind marvelous. The brain of man is

ISTRODLCTIOX. 3

veiy laige ; but those ot!icr brains arc lar^c also, and apparently thoughtful. Having tnivclcd in clxssification all the way up fxx)m infusoria, the last striilcs of progress, great as they arc, do not impress us as throwing man out of the general range and fortunes of the life of which he makes a part

As a matter of fact, those whose attention has l>cen most external in its objects, who have studied nature, and man in nature, have held comparatively disjaraging views of the rank of the human race. They have often put it in the direct line of development with the life l)clow it ; they have thought it to share its intellectual and moral endowments with the higher animals ; and they have subjected it, in common with all life, to the fatalistic lock of physical forces. Approaching man from below, we interpret him from the types of jx^wer we find in nature, wc limit his liberty or rob him of it, we expound his nionil nature by the law of utility, so obtrusive in the acijuisilion of physical good ; while we seem to find the germ and outline of his intellectual constitution in brute instincts, perceptions, associations. We are thus as those who contemplate in a statue more the pedestal on which it rests, the marble of which it is made, the measurements to which it conforms, than the living, spiritual power it expresses.

There is no adequate defence against this tendency, no reasoning man out of this grasp of scientific classification, from the position of bimana among quadrumana, from his rank as co-ordinate in structure with the gibbering monkey, the grinning chimpanzee, the brute-headed gorilla, . except through philosophy — without reversing the process, beginning at the top and moving downward — without considering that which is internal, and overshadowing with it, transient, external conditions. Suppose, for instance, as the result of such direct, independent \i\<\M\r^^ \t. \& fovMA^VaJ.

liberty belongs to man, a power altogether unique, with no prediction or type in nature ; that the moral intuition, the necessary accompaniment of freedom, transforming it into self-poised, responsible life, is equally independent and primary ; do we not in these two pillars of personality discover supports which lift the spiritual life into an entirely new region, which cannot be broken by all the blind' giants of simple, physical induction that may bow themselves against them ? If also it shall appear that the intellectual action of man is throughout different in kind from that of the animal ; that we have no proof that the truly rational elements, the regulative ideas of thought, ever enter the lower field of life, ever transform associations into comprehension, then shall we again see, that we have reached a new plane ; not the completion of that which is below, but the commencement of that which is above ; not to be explained from the earth upwards, but from the heavens downwards.

To estimate man outwardly, physically, is to judge a temple from the exterior, is to decide upon it by the order of its architecture, the bevel of its stones, the greatness of its workmanship, without entering its shrine, seeing its worship, or studying its ritual. So to judge man is as if we should pronounce on the supernatural claims of Christ by an inquiry into his human features and Jewish characteristics, in perfect oversight of the subject matter of the question. Man is to rank according to his spiritual constitution, and that it is the ofl&ce of philosophy, and philosophy alone, to inquire into. We must go within the mind, see its structure and appliances, before we can know the dignity of the race.. If this is denied us, if these portals are locked against us, we can only remain mute till the key shall be brought us.

S S' The second great office of philosophy is to furnish -s counterpoise, a complement and corrective to the meijrntoDi'cnoN. 5

thods of natural science. It is not because we overlook the legitimacy and practical \*aluc of these mcthoiis, nor because we disparage induction, a chief builder in tlic temple of knowledge, one that has cx>mmenccd and is carrying briskly onward some of its most showy and scr\'iceablc portions, thatwc urge the rank of philosophy; but for this end, that the two may be seen to be truly supplemental each to each, that the arrogance of science and itssu{)crcilious denials may be felt to diminish the worth of its own services, and so to cut down th^ scope of human faculties and hopes as to make knowledge itself comparatively trivial and nugatoiy. It is the nature of the mind tliat knows, that gives significancy to knowinp;^, and if this term, the one most intimate to ourselves, in which alone we are deeply concerned, is to be excluded from knowledge; if the disembodied spirit is to be left wandering on the further shore in the limbo of things forever uncertain and unknowable, then, indeed, is it a mo>t minute and unsatisfactory gain, that our unexplored and un fathomed powers lay hold for a little of the things about them ; a small mauer that the stream, rushing on, we know not whither, yields a troubled reflection of the shrubs on its banks.

We claim, that the knowledge that centres directly in mind, in its moral and intellectual powers, and in the social, civil, and religious actions that arise immediately from them, is a full half of all knowledge ; and that the methods of reasoning employed in these departments, while very different from the naked inductions of science, constitute the nobler moiety of intellectual life. We urge attention to philosophy, because the sphere of thought cannot be complete without it, cannot be rounded into a well-balanced and stable orb.

If there has been one development more preposterous than all others in the growth of knowledge, that development is Positive Philosophy — a sc\vem^ NJwaS. ^o^^a. \sNj^Nar physics, and yet can do it on no other than metaphysical grounds ; that determines what may be known and what may not be known, and puts among . the things to be discarded the knowing faculties; that uses philosophy to blow up philosophy, and on the ground thus cleared builds up a cobble-house of facts, every one of whose connections must yet be as purely intellectual as those of mental science itself. This is as if the eye, failing to look backward as well as forward, inward as ^ell as outward, should deny the existence of anything in that direction, and affirm the objects before itself to be ultimate, the only resolution of facts into ideas. To save us from such pitiful philosophizing, we need philosophy.

We are, then, in peculiar want of this branch of knowledge, since it is a hemisphere of itself, holding in equipoise the world of truth ; since in it are found new regulative ideas, new laws, new lines of order, and also the tests of the validity of knowledge, and the rational grounds on which the limits of inquiry are established. Patches of truth may be given here and there by science, but landmarks, a synthetic rendering of the whole, can only be secured by the aid of philosophy.

§ 4. A last reason we shall urge for these lines of investigation is, that intelligent, moral action and religious feith must rest upon them. Fortunately, considering the premises from which they start, men are so illogical, that they find no difficulty in believing much which in consistency they ought not to believe, no difficulty in doing that for which their own philosophy can render them no adequate reasons. But in spite of the fact that there is often an interior coherence in action, in the unconscious workings of our constitution, which does not appear in our reasonings, a false, deficient philosophy will, from time to time^ come to the surface in unbelief, irreligion, immorality ; the ground will soften under long trodden paths of iMTRODucnoir. 7

fiuth ; and many blind pilgrims, plunged into an unexpected quagmire, will fail to reach the farther shore. All the ideas on which morality and religion rest are established and defined in the realm of metaphysics, and to deny us this branch of knowledge, or to treat it slightly, is to put us, in the conflict with unbelief, at such disad\'antage that we can never maintain our- ground. We may, indeed, * shut our eyes, and stand fast ; we may stop our ears, and ran from the questionings and claims of scepticism ; but we cannot maintain our position in quiet and serene conviction, without searching for those foundations of truth found in the discarded field of pliilosopliy.

The nature of riglit and its obligations, of lil>Grty and its responsibilities, of tiic infmitc in its a[)plicAtion to God, as well as the positive and negative knowledge we have of his existence and attributes, are to be established bv an inquiry into the piienomena of mind, the truths present to it, their source and authority. To hofxi, tiierefore, for morality and religion, and yet to sink out of sight those abutments on which thev are to rest, is infatuation. Those do not so hope who wittingly do this work of ilenial and overthrow, — quite the contrarj*. Very many of them well understand that their mines run beneath the sacred edifices of religion, the spiritual labors and histor)- of the race, and that, if they can be fully and successfully fired, these will sink, a mass of ruins, into a black, sulphureous chasm. We say, therefore, the intellectual battle between belief and unbelief, religion and irreligion, must be fought, in large part, in the fields of philosophy. The truths of revelation must be ^^ndicated or overthrown by their relation to man's constitution, his powers of knowledge and obedience, and the rational stretch of his hopes.

Simple, then, are the reasons for philosophy, if philosophy be possible. We must abandon ourselves later than all things else, consent to daiVrv^^ ^n^ty^V^'^^/^Jl ^^ ^^a^w

8 PRINCIPLES OF FSYCHaLOGY.

only strike a cheerful light at this fireside of our home. Unfortunate, indeed, would it be to lose the reins of power wherewith we guide the forces of nature, but far more unfortunate to miss the right handling of ourselves, and that serene strength which wins the rewards of life.

§ 5. But is philosophy possible ? Is there not rather foundation for those many taunts and denials, asserting the endless, hopeless round of conflicting theories, the entire want of progress, the inevitable uncertainty attaching to every conclusion, and all conclusions, in metaphysics? If. philosophy be not possible, if there is ground for the scorn and incredulity with which labor in this department is often regarded, so much the worse for us all Nothing can take the place of philosophy. If we are doomed to ignorance here, our ignorance is hopeless and pitiable. We fail to understand the satisfaction with which some snuff out this light, when they have nothing wherewith to replace it — ^nothing better to propose than the desertion of this whole region, and a surrender of it to confusion and chaos. The injunction, **know thyself," the revered precept of all time hitherto, thus becomes impossible, and to modem thinkers, ridiculous. Outside of ourselveJj, we move with patient inquiry ; we may feed our senses, and through them the mind ; but we harvest home this knowledge, we know not for what ends. We gather facts, ignorant of their ulterior, spiritual uses, as the ox grazes, letting digestion and nutrition care for themselves. We see no grounds for congratulation in such a result If it must be accepted, it yet remains a painful and sad alternative, turning the key in a door which above all others we would fain open, hiding fi-om us things which most reveal the invisible world. It is as if some one, moiling long and patiently and profitably in the bowels of the earth, knowing how to pick . and blast, and shovel, and sure of the productiveness of those processes, should, bearing of the miscarriages, accidents.