Principles of psychology

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Preface

It has been a reproach to philosophy, generally and persistently put forward, that it makes no progress, that it lacks established elements, that it is a field of extravagant and contradictory theories. We do not accept these assert; ons in the unqualified way in which they are thrown out. So made, they are the result of ignorance and ungrounded contempt on the part of those who so easily utter them. So far, however, as these statements are true, they are a common reproach and misfortune, to be removed only by more patient, more protracted, more guarded inquiry. To scorn and reject philosophy as presented under its own, its metaphysical form, subject to its own conditions, is simply to deepen the difficulty, and postpone indefinitely an answer to the most fundamental and central inquiries. If more than the usual number of mistakes have been made in this department, it is because more than the usual obstacles lie in the path of progress. These are not to be removed by discouragement, or by opening ways in other directions. All success to the students of physical science : but each of its fields may have its triumphs, and the secrets of mind remain as unapproachable as hitherto. With philosophy and

IV PREFACE.

not without it, under its own laws and not under the laws of a lower realm, must be found those clues of success, those principles of investigation, which can alone place this highest form of knowledg-e in its true position. The following treatise is at least a patient effort to make a contribution to this, amid all failures, chief department of thought. If asked why I hoped this volume might reward the perusal, I should answer, Not because the system presented is new, but because the statement it here receives is at once succinct and elaborate, is incidentally strengthened by new points, by a consistent maintenance of all that belongs to it, and by the rejection of that which, essentially alien to its principles, only embarrasses it. I trust the Intuitive Philosophy will be found hereby to have gained somewhat of that proof which springs from completeness and proportion of parts.

I have acknowledged my obligations to others in cases in which they have been direct. I here especially express my indebtedness, in the general tone of the philosophy presented, to the eminent explorer and instructor in this field, Dr. Hickok.

Holding my work amenable to thorough criticism, I shall yet expect but little profit from the facile application of previous opinions to detached points ; or from any discussion of the principles involved, less penetrative and systematic than that here presented. I believe this treatise to have the integrity of a system, and to call, therefore, for a joint and complete judgment. To such handling I hopefully commend it.

PREFACE. V

In the present edition secondary points are more fullypresented than before, and the work is better fitted for the purposes of instruction in higher education. We have been diffident in claiming for the philosophy here offered the independence, coherence, and strength which we believe belong to it. As, however, we are zealous for the system, and have found critics easily overlooking points not forced upon their notice, we now invite attention to the clear definition given to the doctrine of the intuitions ; to the care with which they are enumerated, with which their relations to each other are pointed out, and their constructive office in thought is assigned them. Herein is secured a certainty of conviction, a strength of defense, and a clearness of explanation, not otherwise attainable. The system lies in direct continuation of the intuitive ^ philosophy, but is put upon advanced ground, in a form more self-sufficient and defensible than hitherto.

Introduction

PAGH

1. Value of Philosophy i

2. Determines the rank of Man 2

3. Itself half the field of knowledge.. . , 4

4. Its connection with moral and religious truth 6

5. Disparagement of metaphysics 8

6. Postulates of Philosophy 13

BOOK I.— The IniellecL CHAPTER I. THE FIELD OF MENTAL SCIENCE AND ITS DIVISIONS

§ I. Field of Philosophy, Consciousness 16

§ 2. Difficulties of Philosophy 18

§ 3. Aids to inquiry — Language — History — Physical organs.. . 23

§ 4. Division of faculties 26

§ 5. Volition and choice, not separable 27

§ 6. The relation of consciousness to our faculties 29

§ 7. Mental phenomena below consciousness 30

§ 8. A sub-conscious region allied to materialism 41

§ 9. Is the mind always consciously active ? 43

§ 10. Dependence of the Mind on the Brain 49

§ II. Somnambulism — Hypnotism 64

Chapter II. The Intellect — Its Divisions — Perception

§ I. Divisions 67

§ 2. The Senses — Divisions of them 68

Vlll CONTENTS.

PAGE

§ 3. What do we see ? 70

§ 4. Idealism in reference to perception 79

§ 5. The doctrine of perception 80

^ 6. No denial of consciousness 82

§7. The action of each sense 86

§ 8. Importance of perception — History 92

§ 9. Primary and secondary qualities — Criteria of. 100

§ 10. Consciousness as a source of knowledge 108

Chapter III. The Understanding

§ I. What the understanding includes — Memory log

§ 2. Theories of memory — Hamilton's theory 113

§ 3. Association as connected with memory — Plabit — Growth. 117

§ 4. Qualities of memoiy — Kinds of memory 120

§ 5. Imagination 129

§ 6. Theories of imagination — Bain — Hamilton 130

§ 7. Influence of imagination on passions — On judgment 134

§ 8. How cultivated — The word conception 136

§ 9. The judgment — Importance of 138

§ TO. Erroneous views of judgment — Sir Wm. Hamilton 142

§ II. Judgments, classes of. 148

§ 12. A second use of the word conceive. 152

Chapter IV. The Reason

§ I. Disagreement as to existence of this faculty 154

§2. Existence — Bain 157

§ 3, Number 160

§ 4. Space — Spencer's view given — Sustained by Bain 162

§ 5. Time — Spencer's view stated and examined 174

§6. Resemblance 179

§ 7. Cause and effect 182

§ 8. Relation of these six ideas 192

§ 9. Beauty 194

§ II. Iviberty — What it implies — Not conscious of it.. 213

§ 12. The notion of the infinite 215

§ 13. Criteria of intuitive ideas — Necessity — Universality 226

CONTENTS. IX

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§ 14. Are these ideas merely forms of thought ? 227

§ 15. Grouping of these ideas — Relation to instinct 23 1

Chapter V. The Dynamics Of The Intellect

§ I. Indebtedness of philosophy to the Materialistic School. . . 238

§ 2. Acquisition of knowledge — Resemblance 246

§ 3. Steps of progress — Sensation — Judgment — Reasoning. . . . 251

§ 4. The control of the mind over its thoughts 258

§ 5. Difference of endowment in man and in the animal 263

BOOK IL—The Feelings,

§ I. Distinction between feelings and thoughts 273

§ 2. Division of the feelings — Use of words 276

Chapter I. Physical Feelings

§ I, Division of the physical feelings 278

§ 2. Special senses — Sensations and perceptions — Touch 279

§ 3. Indefinite senses — Sense of pressure — Of heat 282

§ 4. Appetites — Purposes subserved — Irritability 284

CPIAPTER II.

THE INTELLECTUAL FEELINGS.

§ I. Division^Desires — Not primitive — Division of 288

§ 2. Feelings dependent on desires 293 ig

§ 3. Feelings which accompany failure 296

§ 4. Admiration — Contempt — Good will — Compassion 298

§ 5. General conditions affecting intellectual feelings 300

Chapter III. The Spiritual Feelings

§ I. What these are — Their divisions 302

§. 2. -^sthetical feelings 307

X CONTENTS.

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§ 3. Moral sentiments — Effect on other emotions 312

§ 4. Affections — Religious sentiments 315

*' § 5. Classification of the feelings 317

Chapter IV. Dynamics Of The Feelings

§ I. Offices of the several classes of feeling 319

§ 2. Order of development in the three classes successive 322

§ 3. Communities take up the law of growth 323

» § 4. Expenditure of vital force in emotion 325

§ 5. Animal life in its feelings — Utilitarianism 326

Chapter III. Primary Volition, Or Choice

§ I. Divisions of volition. . . •. 346

§ 2. Choice 347

§ 3. Motives must be unlike in kind — A moral element 349

§ 4. The will governed by the strongest motive 350

§5. Effect on liberty and responsibility of this view 353

§ 6. Whence the idea of weaker and stronger motives 353

CONTENTS. XI

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§ 7. Objected to liberty that it admits no control 355

§ 8. Proof of liberty — Not found in consciousness 357

§ 9. Proof of liberty — Spontaneity 362

Chapter IV. Dynamics Of The Will And Of The Mind

§ I. The will strengthened by use 367

§ 2. Order of activities — Reflex relation. 368

§ 3. Control exercised by the will 370

§ 4. The feelings central — Their relations to pleasure 371

§ 5. Automatic and voluntary life 374

" CHAPTER V.

THE RELATIONS OF THE SYSTEMS HERE OFFERED TO PREVALENT FORMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

§ I. Value of general convictions 380

§ 2. Materialism — Its a priori character 386

§ 3. Hamilton — Direct perception 393

§ 4. Idealism — Excellences — Defects 395

§ 5. The philosophy now presented — Its relations 398

INTRODUCTION.

§ I. Though a knowledge of the value of a subject is not necessary to its successful pursuit, yet it imparts to our inquiries peculiar zest and pleasure. We shall never fully understand the advantages connected with any science, till we have mastered it ; and it is thus natural that each should praise his own favorite pursuit, experiencing daily the enjoyment and power it confers. Nor is this commendation usually, in itself considered, excessive ; it is chiefly at fault as it disparages other investigations, in themselves possessed of rival claims. As the fashion of thought in out time is to underrate philosophy, a brief space bestowed to urging its importance will not be misemployed.

We shall not enlarge on the pre-eminent mental discipline it gives, the acuteness of analysis, the steadiness of attention, the breadth of principles. All study imparts more or less of this training, and some are willing to believe that metaphysics bestow an unprofitable subtility of intellect, a gymnastic dexterity of thought ; more fit for show than service, more likely to mislead than guide their possessors. There are certain peculiar and pre-eminent considerations on which we would chiefly rest our estimate of philosophy.

The facts which it furnishes are most intimate to our own actions, to the mastery and ordering of our own thoughts, and to the influence we are to exert over others. It is indeed possible, that there should be healthy and successful intellectual action, a wise play of the emotions and of the moral nature, without understanding them. So may there be physical health without hygiene ; yet who will deny an influence of the knowledge of the laws of life in the government of life ? To pick up a few facts so personal, so of our very selves, as those which pertain to mind, cannot but be of the highest moment in ordering our action. Indeed, every man who has any claims to general knowledge is a philosopher, however much he may deny it, and however false and limited his conclusions may be. It is not a question whether there shall be philosophy among men; this there must be, if men are to think and act at all; but whether this philosophy shall be a true or false one. Yet we do not wish to dwell on the value even of the facts which mental science gives, their direct practical worth in affording rules for intellectual training, and for influence over others ; but rather to point out certain broader relations of philosophy, which make its acquisition yet more imperative.

§ 2. In the first place, no true notion of the dignity of man will be attained without it. If we consider man exclusively in his external relations, in his physical organization, and the ministration of nature to him, though we shall certainly assign him, if we reflect wisely, a pre-eminent position, we shall by no means measure his true worth. The forces and lives of the world grade up to him, and grade down from him ; and while he is the highest and latest of living things, he is nevertheless of them, ruling by a superiority, not by a complete separation, of nature. The body of man is very perfect ; but those other organisms are also in kind marvelous. The brain of man is very large ; but those other brains are large also, and apparently thoughtful. Having traveled in classification all the way up from infusoria, the last strides of progress, great as they are, do not impress us as throwing man out of the general range and fortunes of the life of which he makes a part.

As a matter of fact, those whose attention has been most external in its objects, who have studied nature, and man in nature, have held comparatively disparaging views of the rank of the human race. They have often put it in the direct line of development with the life below it ; they have thought it to share its intellectual and moral endowments with the higher animals ; and they have subjected it, in common with all life, to the fatalistic lock of physical forces. Approaching man from below, we interpret him from the types of power we find in nature, we limit his liberty or rob him of it, we expound his moral nature by the law of utility, so obtrusive in the acquisition of physical good ; while we seem to find the germ and outline of his intellectual constitution in brute instincts, perceptions, associations. We are thus as those who contemplate in a statue more the pedestal on which it rests, the marble of which it is made, the measurements to which it conforms, than the living, spiritual power it expresses.

There is no adequate defence against this tendency, no reasoning man out of this grasp of scientific classification, from the position of bimana among quadrumana, from his rank as co-ordinate in structure with the gibbering monkey, the grinning chimpanzee, the brute-headed gorilla, except through philosophy — ^without reversing the process, beginning at the top and moving downward — without considering that which is internal, and overshadowing with it, transient, external conditions. Suppose, for instance, as the result of such direct, independent inquiry, it is found that liberty belongs to man, a power altogether unique, with no prediction or type in nature ; that the moral intuition, the necessary accompaniment of freedom, transforming it into self-poised, responsible life, is equally independent and primary ; do we not in these two pillars of personality discover supports which lift the spiritual life into an entirely new region, which cannot be broken by all the blind giants of simple, physical induction that may' bow themselves against them ? If also it shall appear that the intellectual action of man is throughout different in kind from that of the animal ; that we have no proof that the truly rational elements, the regulative ideas of thought, ever enter the lower field of life, ever transform associations into comprehension, then shall we again see, that we have reached a new plane ; not the completion of that which is below, but the commencement of that which is above ; not to be explained from the earth upwards, but from the heavens downwards.

To estimate man outwardly, physically, is to judge a temple from the exterior, is to decide upon it by the order of its architecture, the bevel of its stones, the greatness of its workmanship, without entering its shrine, seeing its worship, or studying its ritual. So to judge man is as if we should pronounce on the supernatural claims of Christ by an inquiry into his human features and Jewish characteristics, in perfect oversight of the subject matter of the question. Man is to rank according to his spiritual constitution, and that it is the office of philosophy, and philosophy alone, to inquire into. We must go within the mind, see its structure and appliances, before we can know the dignity of the race. If this is denied us, if these portals are locked against us, we can only remain mute till the key shall be brought us.

§ 3. The second great office of philosophy is to furnish a counterpoise, a complement and corrective to the methods of natural science. It is not because we overlook the legitimacy and practical value of these methods, nor because we disparage induction, a chief builder in the temple of knowledge, one that has commenced and is carrying briskly onward some of its most showy and serviceable portions, that we urge the rank of philosophy; but for this end, that the two may be seen to be truly supplemental each to each, that the arrogance of science and its supercilious denials may be felt to diminish the worth of its own services, and so to cut down the scope of human faculties and hopes as to make knowledge itself comparatively trivial and nugatory. It is the nature of the mind that knows, that gives significancy to knowing, and if this term, the one most intimate to ourselves, in which alone we are deeply concerned, is to be excluded from knowledge ; if the disembodied spirit, the mind itself, is to be left wandering in the limbo of things forever uncertain and unknowable, then, indeed, is it a most minute and unsatisfactory gain, that our unexplored and unfathomed powers lay hold for a little of the things about them ; a small matter that the stream, rushing on, we know not whither, yields a troubled reflection of the shrubs on its banks.

We claim, that the knowledge that centres directly in mind, in its moral and intellectual powers, and in the social, civil, and religious actions that arise immediately from them, is a full half of all knowledge ; and that the methods of reasoning employed in these departments, while very different from the naked inductions of science, constitute the nobler moiety of intellectual life. We urge attention to philosophy, because the sphere of thought cannot be complete without it, cannot be rounded into a well-balanced and stable orb.

If there has been one devolopment more preposterous than all others in the growth of knowledge, that development is Positive Philosophy — a scheme that scouts metaphysics, and yet can do it on no other than metaphysical grounds ; that determines what may be known and what may not be known, and puts among the things to be discarded the knowing faculties ; that uses philosophy to blow up philosophy, and on the ground thus cleared builds up a cobble-house of facts, every one of whose connections must yet be as purely intellectual as those of mental science itself This is as if the eye, failing to look backward as well as forward, inward as well as outward, should deny the existence of anything in that direction, and affirm the objects before itself to be ultimate, the only resolution of facts into ideas. To save us from such pitiful philosophizing, we need philosophy.

We are, then, in peculiar want of this branch of knowledge, since it is a hemisphere of itself, holding in equipoise the world of truth ; since in it are found new regulative ideas, new laws, new lines of order, and also the tests of the validity of knowledge, and the rational grounds on which the limits of inquiry are established. Patches of truth may be given here and there by science, but landmarks, a synthetic rendering of the whole, can only be secured by the aid of philosophy.

§ 4. A last reason we shall urge for these lines of investigation is, that intelligent, moral action and religious faith must rest upon them. Fortunately, considering the premises from which they start, men are so illogical, that they find no difficulty in believing much which in consistency they ought not to believe, no difficulty in doing that for which their own philosophy can render them no adequate reasons. But in spite of the fact that there is often an interior coherence in action, in the unconscious woik-- ings of our constitution, which does not appear in our reasonings, a false, deficient philosophy will, from time to time, come to the surface in unbelief, irreligion, immorality ; the ground will soften under long trodden paths of faith ; and many blind pilgrims, plunged into an u^iexpected quagmire, will fail to reach the farther shore. All the ideas on which morality and religion rest are established and defined in the realm of metaphysics, and to deny us this branch of knowledge, or to treat it slightly, is to put us, in the conflict with unbelief, at such disadvantage that we can never maintain our ground. We may, indeed, shut our eyes, and stand fast ; we may stop our ears, and run from the questionings and claims of scepticism; but we cannot maintain our position in quiet and serene conviction, without searching for those foundations of truth found in the discarded field of philosophy.

The nature of right and its obligations, of liberty and its responsibilities, of the infinite in its application to God, as well as the positive and negative knowledge we have of his existence and attributes, are to be established by an inquiry into the phenomena of mind, the truths present to it, their source and authority. To hope, therefore, for morality and religion, and yet to sink out of sight those abutments on which they are to rest, is infatuation. Those, do not so hope who wittingly do this work of denial and overthrow, — quite the contrary. Veiy many of them well ?oiderstand that their mines run beneath the sacred edifices of religion, the spiritual labors and history of the race, and that, if they can be fully and successfully fired, these will sink, a mass of ruins, into a black, sulphureous chasm. We say, therefore, the intellectual battle between belief and unbelief, religion and irreligion, must be fought, in large part, in the fields of philosophy. The truths of revelation must be vindicated or overthrown by their relation to man's constitution, his powers of knowledge and obedience, and the rational stretch of his hopes.

Simple, then, are the reasons for philosophy, if philosophy be possible. We must abandon ourselves later than all things else, consent to darkness everywhere, if we can

S PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

only strike a cheerful light at this fireside of our home. Unfortunate, indeed, would it be to lose the reins of power wherewith we guide the forces of nature, but far more unfortunate to miss the right handling of ourselves, and that, serene strength which wins the rewards of life.

§ 5. But is philosophy possible ? Is there not rather foundation for those many taunts and denials, asserting the endless, hopeless round of conflicting theories, the entire want of progress, the inevitable uncertainty attaching to every conclusion, and all conclusions, in metaphysics ? If philosophy be not possible, if there is ground for the scorn and incredulity with which labor in this department is often regarded, so much the worse for us all. Nothing can take the place of philosophy. If we are doomed to ignorance here, our ignorance is hopeless and pitiable. We fail to understand the satisfaction with which some snuff out this light, when they have nothing wherewith to replace it — nothing better to propose than the desertion of this whole region, and a surrender of it to confusion and chaos. The injunction, ''Know thyself," the revered precept of all time hitherto, thus becomes impossible, and to modern thinkers, ridiculous. Outside of ourselves, we move with patient inquiry ; we may feed our senses, and through them the mind ; but we harvest home this knowledge, we know not for what ends. We gather facts, ignorant of their ulterior, spiritual uses, as the ox grazes, letting digestion and nutrition care for themselves. We see no grounds for congratulation in such a result. If it must be accepted, it yet remains a painful and sad alternative, turning the key in a door which above all others we would fain open, hiding from us things which most reveal the invisible world. It is as if some one, moiling long and patiently and profitably in the bowels of the earth, knowing how to pick, and blast, and shovel, and sure of the productiveness of those processes, should, hearing of the miscarriages, accidents, and embarrassments of the upper world, begin to deny this region to himself and to others, and to make it the dogma of his life, that there was but one form of sure, safe and remunerative labor, but one unmistakable and positive good, and that was mining. We console ourselves, in view of such conclusions, with their entire falsity, and the utter impossibility of their general acceptance.

Other departments, moreover, besides philosophy, are to suffer from this rejection of the philosophical spirit. The positive sciences themselves require for their successful cultivation something beyond an observation of facts — a classification of resemblances. There is ever kept hovering before the mind some idea of the causes, the concealed grounds and reasons, of phenomena ; audit is this supers ensual notion which guides inquiry, directs the eye, and teaches it what to observe. Without this, the classifications of science would come to litde more than the child's art in grouping its bits of crockery by size or color or the conceits of fancy. It has been, for illustration, some notion of the nature of light, either as a material emanation, or a movement in a generally diffused ether, that has directed inquiry, instituted experiments, and interpreted facts. Yet there is nothing in philosophy itself more subtile, more impossible of conception, more evasive and evanescent than either of these supersensual conceptions, which have presided over this department, and resulted- in most brilliant discoveries. Deny a search into intangible and inconceivable causes, causes that in their inception are -purely theoretical, and we lose at once the clew of our labyrinth, and henceforth wander at chance, with no forecast of thought, through its endless passages. Another illustration is furnished by the correlation of forces. Some notion of a hidden equivalence oetween very diverse phenomena haunts the mind, of a concealed agreement where no apparent agreement exists. This it is which sets the inquirer at work, quickens his thoughts, and leads him to new observations and experiments.

But how vain is it to demand positive, direct knowledge through the senses of this notion itself, so serviceable and indispensable ? If we are to banish, as the ghosts of past superstitions, all the disembodied ideas the mind furnishes to positive science, we shall shortly be left without guidance, deserted of these good angels of thought, in whose absence eyes and ears are of no avail. We are in science, no less than in philosophy, constantly reaching and handling supersensual notions, purely mental phenomena ; we are ever making them most fruitful sources of farther acquisitions, though certainly with no more full, definite and positive knowledge of their very nature than that we possess of mental phenomena from consciousness. Indeed, the moment we penetrate a very little below the surface, Positive Philosophy is of the same nature with that which it discards, is dealing with causes, forces and reasons which are wholly the offspring of the mind, and the limits of whose legitimate use must be determined on purely intellectual grounds.

Nor is philosophy itself without its fixed, settled facts as generally admitted, and as incontrovertible as those of any science whatever. The laws of association, recollection, attention, judgment, imagination, of the emotions, of responsibility, constitute a large department of knowledge, of accepted conclusions. The principles and precepts therein involved are running hourly through our processes of reasoning, our persuasion, our judicial action, our social opinions. Indeed, no single science, unless, perhaps, we except mathematics, is furnishing so many, so constant, so undoubted guides, both to those who maintain, and to those who deny, its theoretical value, as philosophy, with its adjuncts of logic, aesthetics and ethics. Totally untrue then is the representation, that metaphysics is a helpless medley of contradictory and unverified theories. An appearance of truth is given to this assertion by directing attention from established facts to those skirting and partially explored fields of ontological inquiry, of the sources of our mental furniture, and of the authority of our faculties. We might thus discredit the established facts of electricity on the ground of conflicting opinions concerning the nature of the activities or physical states which constitute it.

Now it is evident, from the nature of the case, that more of these ultimate questions, more of these points at which direct, sensible knowledge ends, must belong to philosophy than to any other branch. The postulates and definitions of knowledge are conditioned on the faculties of mind, on its necessary action, and to state these in their safe, ultimate, fixed form; to settle where knowing, in all its phases, begins, and to give the reasons and grounds of these statements, is a late and difficult task, and one which should not, by its slow, laborious and partial results, prejudice a department which is highest in rank, as it is most recondite and ultimate in its conclusions.

What act more indolent and unscientific than to jump to the conclusion, that these deepest questions are unsearchable and fruitless — than to turn our back on a region that does not at once yield its secrets ? Nor are we without progress in these most obscure directions of philosophical inquiiy. In some cases, the true conditions of the problem are better seen — what is to be hoped for and what not ; in others, the grounds of attack and defence are shifted. Many arguments and presentations have been exploded, and, tliough others have taken their place, there has been progress, progress toward an ultimate decision. The battle surges and rolls onward, and is not endless. The doctrine of human liberty is an example of the first sort. A more consistent statement of what it involves can to-day be made than ever before. It can be better distinguished from every form of necessity, and set apart with proper limits, and more defensible boundaries than hitherto. To be sure we cannot explain freedom in the ordinary meaning of the word, but we can see why such explanations are not, and ought not to be applicable. As an illustration of the second form of progress, we instance the discussions as to the sources of knowledge ; whether among these are intuitive ideas. The doctrine, that experience is the ground of all knowledge, is a very different one in the hands of Spencer and Bain from what it was as expounded by Locke. The later champions pronounce the earlier proofs and defences insufficient. Confessedly then this school has been driven in part from its line of argument. Herein is movement, looking to an ultimate solution of the problem. Though inner lines succeed one another, the city cannot be besieged forever. The grounds of conflict and the balance of strength are suffering daily changes, and though the conclusion may be yet far off, we see that it is slowly prepared for by what transpires about us. This discussion is not simply the dogged reiteration of affirmation and denial ; the striking of shadowy forms with immaterial weapons, the wounds of to-day closing against the battle of to-morrow. Quite the reverse ; old points are yielded, new points are made ; light in turn is thrown upon them, and we move forward toward a conclusion — move slowly it may be, but as certainly as when the discussion pertains to the natuie of heat or light. Reid dogmatically asserted as a tenet of common sense what philosophy ever since has been defending, limiting, settling on rational grounds.