The physical and metaphysical works of Lord Bacon including the Advancement of learning and Novum Organum

Preface

Loud Bacon can only be said to have carried the three first parts of his Insiaurcdio Magna to any degree of perfection. Of these the Sylva Sylvarum is but a dry catalogue of natural phenomena, the collection of which, however necessary it might be, Bacon viewed as a sort of mechanical l.;boi r, and would never have stooped to the task, had not the field been abandoned by the generality of philosophers, as unworthy of them. The two other portions of the iiistauratio Magna, which this volume contains, unfold the design of his philosophy, and exhibit all the peculiarities of his extraordinary mind, enshrined in the finest passages of his writings.

Of the De Augmentis, though one of the greatest books of modern times, only three translations have appeared, and each of these strikiniiiy imperfect. That of Wats, issued while Bacon was living, is singularly disfigured with solecisms, and called forth the just censures of Bacon and hia friends. The version of Eustace Gary is no less unfortunate, owing to its poverty of diction, and antiquated l)hraseology. Under the public sense of these failures, another translation was j^roduced about sixty years ago by Dr. Shaw, which might have merited approbation, had not the learned physician been impressed with the idea that he could improve Bacon by relieving his work of some of its choicest passages, and entirely altering the arrangement. In the present version, our task has been piincipally to rectify Shaw's mistakes, by restoring the author's own

PREFACE.

arrangement, and supplying the omitted portions. Sucli of Shaw's notes as were deemed of value have been retained, and others added where the text seemed to re* quire illustration. Due care also has been taken to point out the sources whence Bacon drew his extraordinary stores of learning, by furnishing authorities for the quotations and allusions in the text, so that the reader may view at a glance the principal authors whom Bacon loved to consult, and whose agency contributed to the formation of his colosrul powers.

The version of the Novum Organum contained in this volume is that by Wood, which is the best extant. The present edition of this immortal work has been enriched with an ample commentary, in which the remarks of the two Playfairs, Sir John Herschel, and the German and French editors, have been diligently considted, that nothing may be wanting to render it as perfect as possible.

J. D.

It

Contents

THE GllEAT INSTAURATION

Author's Announcemeut. Preface, and Account of the Work . . ^. ... ^. ^. .. . . Pages 1-20

I. THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, IN Nine Bock 3.

Book II.— On the Interpretation of Nature or the B£iaN OF Mas ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ii8

FRANCIS OP VEUULAM'S

GEEAT INSTAUEATION.

Announcement of the Author.

/RANCIS OP VERULAM THOUGHT THUS, AND SUCH IS THE METHOD WHICH HE DETERMINED WITHIN HIMSELF, AND WHICH HE THOUGHT IT CONCERNED THE LIVING AND POSTERITY TO KNOW.

Being convinced, by a careful observation, that the human understanding perplexes itself, or makes not a sober and advantage(5us\ise 7)T the real helps within its reach, whence manifold ignorance and inconveniences arise, he was determined to employ his utmost endeavours towards restoring or cultivating a just and legitimate familiarity betwixt the mind and things.

But as the mind, hastily and without choice, imbibes and treasures up the first notices of things, from whence all the rest proceed, errors must for ever prevail, and remain uncorrected, either by the natural powers of the understanding or the assistance of logic ; for the original notions being vitiated, confused, and inconsiderately taken from things, jind the secondary ones formed no less rashly, human knowledge itself, the thing employed in all our researches, is not , well put together nor justly formed, but resembles a magni-y licent structure that has no foundation. \

And whilst men agree to admire and magnify the false powers of the mind, and neglect or destroy those that might be rendered true, there is no other course left but with better assistance to begin the work anew, and raise or rebuild the sciences, arts, and all human knowledge from a firm and solid basis.

This may at first seem an infinite scheme, unequal to human abilities, yet it will be found more sound and judi* « II g THE GFvEAt INSTAUnATION.

cious than the course hitlierto pursued, as tending to some . issue; whereas all liitherto done with regard to the sciencesi is vertiginous, or in the way of perpetual rotation.

Nor is he ignorant that he stands alone in an experiment almost too bold and astonishing to obtain credit, yet he thought it not right to desert either the cause or himself,, but to boldly enter on the way and explore the only path which is pervious to the human mind. For it is wiser tc engage in an undertaking that admits of some termination, than to involve oneself in perpetual exertion and anxiety about what is interminable. The ways of contemplation, indeed, nearly correspond to two roads in nature, one of which, steep and rugged at the commencement, terminates in a plain ; the other, at first view smooth and easy, leads only to huge rocks and precipices. Uncertain, however, whether these reflections would occur to another, and observing that he had never met any person disposed to ajiply his mind to similar thoughts, he determined to publish whatsoever he found time to perfect. Nor is this the haste of ambition, but anxiety, that if he should die there might remain behind him some outline and determination of the matter his mind had embraced, as well as some mark of his sincere and earnest affection to promote the happiness of mankind.

ATITHOIl'S PREFACE.

Of the state of learning — That it is neither prosperous nof greatly advanced, and that a way must be opened to the human nnderstandmg entirely distinct from that known to our predecessors, and ditfierer.t aids procured, that the mind may exercise her power ovef the nature of things.

It appears to me that men know neither their acquirements nor their powers, bat fancy their possessions greater and their faculties less than they are; whence, either valuing the received arts above measure, they look out no farther ; or else despising themselves too much, they exercise their talents upon lio;hter matters, without attempting the capital

PREFAC35. 3

kliings of all. And hence the sciences seem to have their Hercules' Pillars, which bound the desires and hopes ot'>( mankind.

But as a false imagination of plenty is among the principal causes of want, and as too great a confidence in things present leads to a neglect of the future, it is necessary we should here admonish mankind that they do not too highly value or extol either the number or usefulness of the things hitherto discovered ; for, by closely inspecting the multiplicity of books upon arts and sciences, we find them to contain numberless repetitions of the same things in point of invention, but differing indeed as to the manner of treatment ; so that the real discoveries, though at the first view they may appear numerous, prove upon examination but few. And as to the point of usefulness, the philosophy we principally received from the Greeks must be acknowledged puerile, or rather ^tolkatiye^th an generative — as being fruitful in controversies, but barren of effects.

The fable of Scylla seems a civil representation of the present condition of knowledge; for she exhibited the countenance and expression of a virgin, whilst barking monsters encircled her womb. Even thus the sciences have their specious and plausible generalities; but when we descend to particulars, which, like the organs of generation, should i)roiuce fruits and effects, then spring up loud altercations and controversies, which terminate in barren sterility.^ And had this not been a lifeless kind of philosophy, it 1 were scarce possible it should have made so little progress jl in so many ages, insomuch, that not only positions now frequently remain positions still, but questions remain ques tions, rather riveted and cherished than determined by disputes ; philosophy thus coming down to us in the persons of master and scholar, instead of inventor and improver. In the mechanic arts tlie case is otherwise — these commonly advancing towards perfection in a course of daily improvement, from ^ rough unpolished state, sometimes prejudicial to the first inventors, whilst philosophy and the intellectual sciences are, like statues, celebrated and adored, but never adva.nced ; nay, they sometimes appear most perfect in the original author, and afterwards degenerate. For since men have gone over in crowds to the opinion of their

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# THE GREAT INSTAURATIOH.

, leader, like those silent senators of Rome,* they add nothing \ to the extent of learning themselves, but perform the servile duty of waiting upon particular authors, and repeating their doctrines.

It is a fatal mistake to suppose that the sciences have gradually arrived at a state of perfection, and then been recorded by some one writer or other ; and that as nothing better can afterwards be invented, men need but cultivate and set off what is thus d:lscovered and completed ; whereas, in reality, this registering of the sciences proceeds only from the assurance of a few and the sloth and ignorance of many. For after the sciences might thus perhaps in several parts be carefully cultivated; a man of an enterprising genius rising up, who, by the conciseness of his method, renders himself acceptable and famous, he in appearance erects an art, but in reality corrupts the labours of his predecessors. This, however, is usually well received by posterity, as readily gratifying their curiosity, and indulging their indolence. But he that rests upon established consent as the judgment approved by time, trusts to a very fallacious and weak foundation ; for we have but an imperfect knowledge of the discoveries in arts and sciences, made public in different ages and countries, and still less of what has been done by particular persons, and transacted in private ; so that neither the births nor miscarriages of time are to be found in our records.

Nor is consent, or the continuance thereof, a thing of any account ; for however governments may vary, there is but one state of the sciences, and that will for ever be democratical or popular. But the doctrines in greatest vogue among the people, are either the contentious and quarrelsome, or the showy and empty ; that is, such as may either entrap the assent, or lull the mind to rest : whence, of course, the greatest geniuses in all ages have suffered violence ; whilst out of regard to their own character, they submitted to the judgment of the times, and the populace. And tlus when any more sublime speculations happened to appear, they were »A>mraonly tossed and extinguished by the breath of popular opinion. Hence time, like a river, ha.s brought down to xa

• Peclarii scnatorcs.

PREFACE. G

what is light and tumid, but sunk what wafj ponderous and Bolid. As to those who have set up for teachers of the sciences, when they drop their character, and at intervals speak their sentiments, they complain of the subtilty of nature, the concealment of truth, the obscurity of things, the entanglement of causes, and the imperfections of the human understanding ; thus rather choosing to accuse the common state of men and things, than make confession of themselves. It is also frequent with them to adjudge that impossible in an art, which they find that art does not affect ; by which means they screen indolence and ignorance from the reproach they merit. Tlie knowledge delivered down to us is barren in effects, i! fruitful in questions, slow and languid in improvement, ex- J/ hibiting in its generalities the counterfeits of perfection, but /> meagre in its details, popular in its aim, but suspected by il<R/ very promoters, and therefore defended and propagated by\ > artifice and chicanery. And even those who by experience ' propose to enlarge the bounds of the sciences, _scarce_ever entirely quit the received opinions, and go to the fountain^ head, but think it enough to add somewhat of their own ; as prudentially considering, that at the time they show their modesty in assenting, they may have a liberty of adding. But whilst this regard is shown to opinions and moral considerations, the sciences are greatly hurt by such a languid procedure ; for it is scarce possible at once to admire and excel an author : as water rises no higher than the reservoir it falls from. Such men, therefore, though they improve some things, yet advance the sciences but little, or ratherY amend than enlarge them.

There have been also bolder spirits, and greater geniuses, who thought themselves at liberty to overturn and destroy the ancient doctrine, and make way for themselves and their opinions ; but without any great advantage from the disturbance ; as they did not effectively enlarge pliilosoj)hy and arts by i)ractical works, but only endeavoured to substitute new dogmas, and to transfer the empire of opinion to themselves, with but small advantage; for opposite errors proceed mostly from common causes.

As for those who, neither wedded to their own nor others' opinions, but continuing friends to liberty, made use o. assistance in their inquiries, the success they met with did

6 THE GREAT INSTAURATIOK.

-lot answer expectation, the attempt, though laudable, bekig but feeble ; for pursuing only the probable reasons of things, they were earned about in a circle of arguments, and taking a promiscuous liberty, preserved not the rigour of true inquirers; whilst none of them* duly conversed with

^ experience and things themselves. Others again, who commit themselves to mechanical experience, yet make their experiments at random, without any method of inquiry. And the greatest part of these have no considerable views, but esteem it a great matter if they can make a single discovery ; which is both a trifling and unskilful procedure, as no one can justly or successfully discover the nature of any one thing in that thing itself, or without numerous experiments which lead to farther inquiries. And we must not omit to observe, that all the industry displayed in experiment has been directed by too indiscreet a zeal at some prejudged

■ effect, seeking those which produced fruit rather than know-

I ledge, in opposition to the Divine method, which on the first day created time alone, delaying its material creations

[ until the sun had illumined space.

' Lastly, those who recommend logic as the best and surest instrument for improving the sciences, very justly observe, that the understanding, left to itself, ought always to be suspected. But here the remedy is neither equal to the disease, nor approved ; for though the logic in use may be properly applied in civil affairs, and the arts that are founded in discourse and opinion, yet it by no means reaches the subtilty of nature ; and by catching at what it cannot hold, rather serves to establish errors, and fix them deeper, than open the way of truth.^

Upon the whole, men do not hi therto appear to be happily inclined and fitted for the sciences, either by their own industry, or the authority of authors, especially as there is little dependence to be had upon the common demonstrations and experiments ; wliilst the structure of the u<iiverse renders it a labyrinth to the understanding ; where the paths are not only everywhere doubtful, but the appearances of things and their signs deceitful ; and the wreaths and knots of nature

'' For exemplifications of these opinions, the reader may consult Morhof's "Polyhistor.," and the other writers upon polymathy and literary history. Shaw.

intricately turned and twisted:*' through all which we are only to be conducted by the uncertain light of the senses, that sometimes shines^ and sometimes hides its head ; and by collections of experiments and particular facts, in which no guides can be trusted, as wanting direction themselves, and adding to the errors of the rest. In this melancholy state of things, one might be apt to despair both of the understanding left to itself, and of all fortuitous helps ; as of a state irremediable by the utmost efforts of the human genius, or the often-repeated chance of trial. The only cluo \ > ^ and method is to^begin^all anew, and direct our steps in a | f^ certain order, from the very first perceptions of the senses, j Yet I must not be understood to say that nothing has been I done in former ages, for the ancients have shown themselves worthy of admiration in everything which concerned either wit or abstract reflection ; but, as in former ages, when men at sea, directing their course solely by the observation of the stars, might coast along the shores of the continent, but could not trust themselves to the wide ocean, or discover new worlds, until the use of the compass was knoAvn: even so the present discoveries referring to matters immediately under the jurisdiction of the senses, are such as might easily result from experience and discussion ; but before we can enter the remote and hidden parts of nature, it is requisite that a better and more perfect application of the human mind should be introduced. This, however, is not to be understood as if nothing had been effected by the immense labours of so many past ages; as the ancients have performed surprisingly in subjects that required abstract meditation, and force of genius. But as navigation was imperfect before the use of the compass, so will many secrets of nature and art remain undiscovered, without a more perfect knowledge of the understanding, its uses, and Avays of working.

For our own part, from an earnest desire of truth, we have committed ourselves to doubtful, difficult, and solitary ways ; and relying on the Divine assistance, have supported Qur niinds against the vehemence of opinions, our own internal doubts and scruples, and the darkness and fantastic

« By wreaths and knots, is understood the apparent comphcation of causes, and the superaddition of properties not essential to things ; aa light to heat, yellowness to gold, pellucidity to glass, &c. Shaw.

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images of the mind ; that at length we might make moi-« sure and certain discoveries for the benefit of posterity. And if we shall have effected anything to the purpose, what led us to it was a true and genuine humiliation of mind. Those who before us applied themselves to the discovery of arts, having just glanced upon things, examples, and experiments; immediately, as if invention was but a kind of contemplation, raised up their own spirits to deliver oracles : whereas our method is continually to dwell among things soberly, without abstracting or setting the understanding farther from them than makes their images meet ; which leaves but little work for genius and mental abilities. And the same humility that we practise in learning, the same we also observe in teaching, without endeavouring to stamp a dignity on any of our inventions, by the triumphs of confutation, the citations of antiquity, the producing of authorities, or the mask of obscurity ; as any one might do, who had rather give lustre to his OAvn name, than light to the minds of others. We offer no violence, and spread no nets for the judgments of men, but lead them on tojbhings themselves, and their relations ; that they may view their own stores, what they have to reason about, and what they may add, or procure, for the common good. And if at any time ourselves have erred, mistook, or broke off too soon, yet as we only propose to exhibit things naked, and open, as they are, our errors may be the readier observed, and separated, before they considerably infect the riiass of knowledge ; and our labours be the more easily continued. And thus we hope to establish for ever a true and legitimate union between the experimental and rational faculty, whose fallen and inauspicious divorces and repudiations have disturbed everything in the family of mankind.

But as these great things are not at our disposal, we here, at the entrance of our work, with the utmost humility and fervency, put forth our prayers to God, that remembering the miseries of mankind, and the pilgrimage of this life, where we pass but few days and sorrowful, he would vouchsafe, through our hands,, and the hands of others, to whom he has given the like mind, to relieve the human race by a new act of his bounty. We likewise humbly beseech him, that what , is hunwu may not clash with what is divine; and that when

PREFACE. y

the ways of the senses are opened, and a greaternatnral light set up in the mind, nothing of incredulity and blindness towards divine mysteries may arise; but rather that the understanding, now cleared up, and purged of all vanity and superstition, may remain entirely subject to the divine^^ oracles, and yield to faith, the things that are faith's : and, lastly, that expelling the poisonous knowledge infused by/ the serpent, which puifs up and swells the human mind, we may neither be wise above measure, nor go beyond the bounds of sobriety, but pursue the truth in charity.

We now turn ourselves to men, with a few wholesome admonitions and just requests. And first, we admonish them to continue in a sense of their duty, as to divine matters ; for the senses are like the sun, which displays the face of the earth, but shuts up that of the heavens : and again, that they run not into the contrary extreme, which they certainly will do, if they think an inquiry into nature any way forbid them by religion. It was not that pure and imspotted natural knowledge whereby Adam gave names to things, agreeable to their natures, which caused his fall ; but an ambitious and authoritative desire of moral knowledge, to judge of good and evil, which makes men revolt from God, and obey no laws but those of their own will. But for the sciences, which contemplate nature, the sacred philosopher declares, " It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the glory of a king to find it out."'^ As if the Divine Being thus indulgently condescended to exercise the human mind by philosophical inquiries.

In the next place, we ad v^ise all mankind to think of the true ends of knowledge, and that they endeavour not after it for curiosity, contention, or the sake of despising others, nor yet for profit, reputation, power, or any such inferior con- ^ sideration, but solely for the occasions and uses of life ; all J along conducting and perfecting it in the spil^oFlbenevolence. Our request* are, — 1. That men do not conceive wo liere deliver an opinion, but a work ; and assure themselves we attempt not to found any sect or particular doctrine, but >^ to fix an extensive basis for the service^jjf h^man nnturA ji 2. That, for their own sakes, they lay aside the zeal and

* Frov. XXV. 2.

10 THE GREAT IKSTAURATION.

prejudices of opinions, and endeavour tjie common good ; and that being, by our assistance, freed an3~^ept clear from the errors and hinderances of the way, they would themselves also take part of the task. 3. That they do not despair, as imagining our project for a grand restoration, or advancement of all kinds of knowledge, infinitely beyond the power of mortals to execute ; whilst in reality, it is the genuine stop . and prevention of infinite error. Indeed, as our state is /niortal, and human, a full accomplishment cannot be expected I in a single age, and must therefore be commended to I posterity. Nor could we hope to succeed, if we arrogantly searched for the sciences in the narrow cells of the human understanding, and not submissively in the wider world. 4. In the last place, to prevent ill effects from contention, we desire mankind to consider how far they have a right to judge our performance, upon the foundations here laid down : for we reject all that knowledge which is too " hastily abstracted from things, as vague, disorderly, and illformed ; and we cannot be expected to abide by a judgment which is itself called in question.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK.

IN SIX PAETS.

1. Survey and Extension of the Sciences; or, the Advancement of

Learning.

2. Novum Organum ; or, Precepts for the Interpretation of Nature.

3. Phenomena of the Universe ; or, Natural and Experimental History,

on which to found Philosophy.

4. Ladder of the Understanding.

5. Precursors, or Anticipators, of the Second Philosophy. 3. Second Philosophy ; or, Active Science.

We divide the whole of the work into six parts : the fii-st whereof gives the substance, or general description of the knowledge which mankind at present possess ; choosing to dwell a little upon things already received, that we may the easier perfect the old, and lead on to new ; being equally inclined to cultivate the discoveries of antiquity, as to strike out fresh paths of scieuce. In classing the sciences, we com

DISTRIBUTION OP THE WORK, 11

prehend not only the things already invented and known, but also those omitted and wanted ; for the intellectual globe, as well as the terrestrial, has both its frosts and deserts. It is therefore no wonder if we sometimes depart from the common divisions. For an addition, whilst it altera the whole, must necessarily alter the parts, and their sections ; whereas the received divisions are only fitted to the received sum of the sciences, as it now stands. With regard to the things we shall note as defective; it will be our method to give more than the bare titles, or short heads of what wc desire to have done ; with particular care, where the dignity or difficulty of the subject requires it, either to lay down the rules for effecting the work, or make an attempt of our' own, by way of example, or pattern, of the whole. For it concerns our own character, no less than the advantage of others, to know that a mere capricious idea has not presented the subject to our mind, and that all we desire and aim at is a wish. For our designs are within the power ot all to compass, and we ourselves have certain and evident demonstrations of their utility. We come not hither, as augurs, to measure out regions in our mind by divination, but like generals, to invade them for conquest. And this is the first part of the work.

When we have gone through the ancient arts, we shall prepare the human understanding for pressing on beyond them. The second object of the work embraces the doctrine of a more perfect use of reason, and the true helps of the intellectual faculties, so as to raise and enlarge the powers of the mind; and, as far as the condition of humanity allows, to fit it to conquer the difficulties and obscurities of nature. The thing we mean, is a kind of logic, by us called The Art of interpreting Nature ; as differing widely from the common logic, which, however, pretends to assist and direct the understanding, and in that they agree : but the difference betwixt them consists in three things, viz., the end, the order of demonstrating, and the grounds of inquiry.

The end of our new logic is to find, not arguments, but arts ; not what agrees with principles, but principles themselves : not probable reasons, but plans and designs of works — - a different intention producing a different effect. In one the adversary ia conquered by dispute, and in the other uatui*e

12 THE GRR/lT INSTAURATION.

by works. The nature and order of the demonstrationa agree with this object. Tor in common logic, almost our whole labour is spent upon the syllogism. Logicians hitherto appear scarcely to have noticed induction, passing it over with some slight comment. But we reject the syllogistic method as being too confused, and allowing nature to escape out of our hands. For though nobody can doubt that those things which agree with the middle term agree with each other, nevertheless, there is this source of error, that a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are but the token and signs of things. Now, if the first notions, which are, as it were, the soul of words, and the basis of every philosophical fabric, are hastily abstracted from things, and vague and not clearly defined and limited, the whole structure falls to the ground. We therefore reject the syllogism, and that not only as regards first principles, to which logicians do not apply them, but also with respect to intermediate propositions, which the syllogism contrives to manage in such a way as to render barren in effect, unfit for practice, and clearly unsuited to the active branch of the sciences. Nevertheless, we would leave to the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular and speculative acts; while, in everything relating to the nature of things, we make use of induction for both our major and minor propositions; for we consider induction as that form of demonstration which closes in upon nature and presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with action. Whence the common order of demonstrating is absolutely inverted ; for instead of flying immediately from the senses, and particulars, to generals, as to certain fixed poles, about which disputes always turn, and deriving others from these by intermediates, in a short, indeed, but precipitate manner, fit for controversy, but unfit to close with nature ; we continually raise up propositions by degrees, and in the last place, come to the most general axioms, which are not notional, but well defined, and what nature allows of, as entering into the very essence of things.®