Hedonistic theories from Aristippus to Spencer

Front matter

THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROUNA AT CHAPEL HILL

ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES

10001917730

Preface

In the following pages an attempt is made to give, in familiar and untechnical language, a critical account of Hedonistic Theories in their historical succession. I hope that even those who cannot accept my criticisms may find my expositions fairly satisfactory. For my own part I am convinced, as the result of this and other investigations, that no Hedonistic theory can plausibly explain morality without assuming ideas inconsistent with its asserted principle. What is here presented to the public has been in manuscript for several years, and I have been induced to publish it now as a needful supplement to the ethical part of my Outline of Philosophy. At the same time each work is complete in itself.

To obviate the necessity of continual foot-notes, I have relegated all references to authors to the end of the volume.

Aprils 1895.

/ ^ '^-1

Chapter 1. Influence Of The Sophists On Greek Thought

The question, Is life worth living? shows that we live in an age of philosophical doubt — Pessimistic answer — Carlyle's attitude unsatisfactory— Spencer's ** short and easy" methoci with those who deny Hedonism fallacious — The Greek Sophists implicit Hedonists — Differences between Greek and modern State — The Sophists, by creating doubt of customary morality, helped to destroy the Greek State — They were (i) casuists, (2) rhetoricians — Protagoras denied natural morality — Hippias denied customary morality — Gorgias held morality to be the interest of the people — Thrasymachus made morality the interest of the ruler — The rhetoric of the Sophists led to disregard of truth, pages 1-18

CHAPTER 11.

ARISTIPPUS THE CYRENAIC.

The scepticism of the Sophists a condition of progress — Law of progress (i) construction, (2) destruction, (3) reconstruction — The Cyrenaics beyond the Sophists, in having a precise doctrine — Aristippus ( i ) held that there is a single end of life, viz., pleasure ; (2) reduced all knowledge to feeling; (3) maintained that the end is the pleasure viii of the moment — This is Hedonism in its naive form — Criticism : (i) Valuable as bringing out the logical result of the individualism of the Sophists — (2) Aristippus' theory of knowledge is a theory of ignorance — (3) As a matter of fact men do not seek pleasure — (4) Aristippus' ethical theory is {a) self-contradictory, because it tells us to seek pleasure by not seeking it ; {jb) false to the real nature of man, ....... pages 19-46

Chapter III. Epicurus

JEpicurus says that pleasure is the end, but it can be obtained only by foresight — He is a ** practical" philosopher — His problem was: How shall I find the highest satisfaction in a world foreign to me ? — Historical reasons for this— (i) Epicurus adopts the atomic theory to get rid of superstition — Modifies it to make room for freedom — (2) The soul material and mortal — (3) The ^'wise man" will keep clear of politics — Epicurean ideal of life, plain living and refined fellowship — (4) Pleasures do not differ in kind — (5) 'Arapa^ta the ideal — (6) Cardinal virtues are [a) self-restraint, {b) courage or cheerful endurance of pain, (<;) justice or enlightened self-interest, friendship — Criticism : (i) Epicurus' theory of nature a veiled scepticism — (2) His ethical theory involves two discrepant ends: {^a) pleasure, {b) permanent satisfaction — (3) 'Arapa^La not the highest good, because {a) only attained by a few, {b) an organized selfishness, and therefore self-destructive, - . pages 47-72

CHAPTER IV. :::::: r - HOBBES.

Hobbes shows the influence of Christianity in his Hedonism — Relation to his time— Man by nature selfish — The primary desires— Right

CONTENTS ix and wrong the creation of th€ State— Which is based upon contract — Hobbes prefers an absolute monarchy — Criticism", (l) The theory of Hobbes is unhistorical — {a) There never was a '* state of nature " — [b) Society, therefore, did not originate in a contract — (2) The theory is unphilosophical— (^z) The State not an "automaton" but an organism — [b) The State could not be made by a contract — (3) Society a self-conscious organism — (4) Man is not by nature selfish any more than unselfish — (5) The natural desires not selfish — (6) Society not an instrument for securing selfish pleasure, but the embodiment of reason, . . . . . . pages 73-94

Locke, the philosopher of compromise — Seeks to determine the limits of knowledge — Contract not the basis of society, but for the protection of existing rights — Toleration based upon the uncertainty of theological knowledge — No innate ideas" — Locke's inconsistency in holding that we know the primary" qualities of bodies— His ethical theory inconsistent — (i) The man is free, but not the will — ;(2) The motive to action the "most pressing uneasiness"— (3) We have the power to "suspend the satisfaction of our

' ' desires " — (4); Distinction of present and future pleasure — (5) Moral obligation arises from law— Which is divided into {a) divine> (^) civil, (^r) social— Shaftesbury holds that we desire the pleasure of others as well as of ourselves^ — But after all we are seeking our own pleasure in the pleasure of others— Hutcheson distinguishes

; ' between " blind ^' and **calm" affections — The altruistic "

: tendencies need reinforcement from the ** moral sense" — Criticism : (i) Locke's "freedom" is merely "spontaneity": he is in reality a " determinist "— (2) He cannot consistently admit any power to "suspend" the desires— (3) His theory of moral obligation inconsistent with his account of desire, . . c . » pages 95-115

X

CHAPTER VL

■ HUME.

Hume's watchword is ''Thorough" — No "substance" or "causal nexus " — The Self a " bundle " of feelings — Hume's ethics : (i) The will is not free, for all actions proceed from motives — (2) Reason the " slave of the passions " — It has no power to initiate or prevent action — (3) The "passions" divided into (at) direct, {b) indirect, {c) instinctive— (4) Why do we call an action virtuous Sympathy with the pleasure of others explains the moral approbation accompanying benevolent actions — {b) Sympathy with their tendency to produce the greatest pleasure on the whole explains our moral approbation of just acts — Justice an "artificial" virtue — Its origin — (5) The motive to virtue never moral obligation, but desire for pleasure — Criticism : Consciousness not a series of feelings— Desire and will not related as antecedent and consequent — Will not the result of a struggle between impulses — Man's conscious life a process — Freedom, self-determination by an ideal — Morality conformity to a rational ideal, . . . pages 116-136

CHAPTER VIL BENTHAM.

Bentham's aim practical — (i) Rejects Asceticism and Intuitionism — (2) Pleasures must be estimated quantitatively — Wherein their quantity consists — They are divided into "self-regarding" and "extra-regarding" — (3) Distinction between {a) intention, [b) motive, {c) disposition — (4) Contrast of "private ethics" and the "art of legislation" — Criticism*, (i) The balancing of pleasures really a rational judgment — (2) The end is not pleasure, but self-realization — (3) Bentham's account of the relations of intention, motive, and disposition imperfect — («) An intention is good or bad, because the means to a conceived end — (<^) A motive good if consonant with reason — {c) The disposition not good for Bentham, because the "sum of the intentions" — (4) Bentham can only consistently hold "self-regarding" motives — (5) To make "common good " the end is to abandon Hedonism, . . pages 137-15^

CONTENTS xi

CHAPTER VIII.

JOHN STUART MILL.

Mill's ** Utilitarianism " exhibits Hedonism expanding into a truer doctrine — (i) Pleasures differ in quality as well as quantity — (2) Morality depends upon intention^ not upon motive — (3) Sanctions are either external or internal — (4) Proof of Utilitarianism — (5) Mill's account of Justice — {a) The "idea" implies something "which some individual person can claim as his moral right" — [jb) The '* sentiment" derives its energy from the instinct of retaliation, its moral character from enlarged sympathy and enlightened self-interest — [c) The ** sanction" of Justice is its tendency to promote the public good — Criticism : (i) To value pleasures by their quality is to abandon Hedonism — (2) Common good could not result from every one acting according to excess of imagined pleasure — (3) Mill's "proof" of Utilitarianism fallacious — (4) His V account of Justice plausible, because it implies that law expresses an ideal of reason, pages 159-179

CHAPTER IX.

HERBERT SPENCER.

Spencer connects Hedonism with Evolution — Previous moralists "unscientific " — Spencer's conception of Evolution wider than Darwin's — His general formula — Its application to ethics — (i) To understand moral conduct we must consider conduct in general — {a) Purposeless actions excluded — {h) Purposive actions show increasing complexity — The result is to increase the breadth as well as the length of life — And that in the species as well as the individual — Perfectly evolved human conduct implies permanently peaceful societies — (2) Data furnished by the various sciences — {a) Physically^ conduct consists of bodily movements ; Moral conduct shows greater cohereitce^ dejiniteness^ variety^ and harmony — (b) Biologixii cally^ moral conduct consists in the due discharge of the functions — {c) Psychologically, moral conduct consists in the complexity of the motive and of the thought through which the motive is shaped — Moral restraints concern the intrinsic "' effects of actions — (^Z) Sociologically y ethics is "an account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state"- — (3) A scientific" ethics seeks

> to lay down the rules that "formulate normal conduct in an ideal society "—(^z) One class deals with actions in their relation to the

^ individual — {b) Another class deals with the effects of one's conduct on others — (a) Rules of Justice — ( jS) Rules of Beneficence, negative " and positive, . ... . . . pages 180-199

HERBERT SPENCER (Continued).

Limits of the Darwinian theory of evolution — Extension of the problem by Spencer— Examination of his "formula" — It tacitly denies any fundamental distinction between different orders of existence — I. Spencer cannot legitimately distinguish between conduct and action in general, and between moral and non-moral conduct —

(1) When human conduct is viewed as movement it is not viewed as conduct: hence thQ "formula" must be further specified —

(2) This is done when acts which do not secure an end are excluded ■■iv\ •■ — ^^(3) Spencer, however, virtually obliterates this distinction — (4)

J The ".formula" must be finally specified so as to exclude all . r actions except those intended to secure an end — But this shows C that we caLnnot apply the same formula to all orders of being — * 2. Spencer's "Absolute Ethics " rests upon an abstraction— Its main 'J ' value lie- in reminding us that society is still in process towards an ideal goal— ^3. Spencer's view of motives imperfect, because it i: 'SUf^oses one feeling to control another—Natural that he should regard the feeling of moral obligation as temporary-*-In reality, the Cprisciousness of ' moral obligation can orily disappear with the •V, disappearance of self-consciousness, • . . pages 200-225

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER XL

HERBERT SPENCER (Concluded).

How Spencer connects Evolutionism with Hedonism — (i) Even the pessimist assumes pleasure to be the end — (2) This end can be obtained only by aiming at completeness of life — *'Good" means in ordinary language what secures an end — This agrees with the results reached by the study of conduct in its evolution — The course of evolution tends at once towards the most perfect life and the greatest happiness — Proof of the correspondence of greatest pleasure and completeness of life — All previous ethical systems neglect the idea of causation — Even the utilitarian moralist does not ask what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness" — Illustration of the difference between the empirical" and the "scientific" method — An action good according as it ministers to the preservation of self, offspring, and society in general — Life-preserving and pleasure-giving acts ultimately identical — Their occasional divorce arises in the transition from one stage of social development to another — (3) The pleasure of the agent and of society must coincide in a perfect state — But general happiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of one's own happiness — Criticism : (i) The ordinary judgments as to '*good " do not support Spencer's view — {a) No action is called morally good unless it is intended, and is directed to a good end — Spencer's account of motives does not recognize this — [h] Completeness of life" is not a means to pleasure, but pleasure is an element in it — (2) To say that life-preserving are also pleasure-giving acts is to confuse the desirable with the pleasurable — (3) Spencer does not prove pleasure to be the end, but simply assumes it — Hence he cannot show that conduct subserving the universal good is binding upon us, pages 226-243

HEDONISTIC THEORIES FROM ARISTIPPUS TO SPENCER

Chapter I Influence Of The Sophists On Greek Thought

The author of that clever but somewhat flippant satire, The New Republic, has made us familiar with the question, Is life worth living ? That such a question should be put at all is a fact of great significance. The first tendency of man is to expend the pent-up energy with which he is endowed, in building up for himself an ordered world of customs, institutions, and laws. And what is true of the race is also true of the individual. A man throws himself into some active pursuit: the accumulation of a fortune for himself and his family, the ascent to political or social power, the achievement of fame as a man of science, an artist, or a thinker; but he assumes in all of these cases that ? what he seeks is worth striving for, and the life he lives worth living. When, therefore, we find an age or an individual " sitting down in a calm

A moment to think," and when the thought takes the form of the question, What is the end of life ? we may be sure that the energy and enthusiasm of youth is spent, and has been succeeded by the sober reflection of maturer years. But when the problem has assumed the sceptical form, Is there any worthy end of life at all ? we cannot doubt that the age of faith is gone for ever.

Now, Mr. Mallock's question is of this sceptical character. When we ask, Is life worth living ? we condense in one set of words two connected questions — (i) Is there an end of life? (2) If so, is it worth seeking ? Will it bring satisfaction supposing it to be attained ? To these questions some men, in point of fact, have answered. Happiness is doubtless the end which all men seek, but it is an end which no man ever has attained, or ever can attain. This despondent view of life is thus expressed by Shelley in his Queen Mab—

" The flower that smiles to-day To-morrow dies ; All that we wish to stay

Tempts, and then flies : What is this world's delight ?

Byron puts the same thought into still more hopeless words —

" Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen, Count o^er thy days from anguish free, And know, whatever thou hast been, ^Tis something better not to be."

Nor is this view of life a plant of purely modern growth, for the chorus in the Oedipus Coloneus of Sophocles says that it is —

" Happiest beyond compare Never to taste of life ; Happiest in order next, Being born, with quickest speed Thither again to turn From whence we came,"

while the saying of Menander, Whom the gods love die young," has all the familiarity of a proverb. The view of life embodied in these sayings of the poets has received careful philosophical expression at the hands of such thinkers as Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann. Human life," says the former, " oscillates between pain and ennui"; our conscious life, according to the latter, is one long disease, " in pain it is born, with pain it consumes itself, through pain it raises itself to a higher level ; and what compensation does it offer for all this pain but a vain reflection of itself?"

It is not my intention to make a special examination into the basis of pessimism, and although I think it will be found, as the result of our inquiry, that it rests upon a fundamental mistake, I have brought forward these sayings rather to show the necessity of a reasoned basis for the faith in absolute rules of conduct which we all tacitly assume. No doubt it is natural to regard such reflections upon human life as those which I have quoted as a proof of the futility of all speculation on the ultimate nature of things, and to draw from them the lesson that we must fall back upon simple and child-like faith. In his Past and Pj^esent, Carlyle passionately commends the ages of faith in comparison with the eager^ questioning, critical age in which we ourselves live. But one answer to Carlyle's advice not to philosophize on the basis of conduct is that it is that most useless of all kinds of advice, that which cannot be followed. By refusing to inquire into the foundation of things we do not get rid of a theory of life, but may adopt a crude and uncritical one. It is no more possible to go back to the simple faith of an earlier age than to return to the spontaneous and abounding energy of earlier years, or, like Alice in Wonderland, to make and unmake one's stature at will. I will go further, and say, that not only can one not retain the simplicity of an earlier and less reflective age, but that it would not be good for us even if we could. Just as the innocence of the child must develop into the self-control of the man, so criticism, the testing and founding of conduct on a reasoned basis, is essential to our full intellectual and moral stature. That faith is the most robust which

" buildeth in the cedar's tops, And dallies with the wind, and scorns the sun."

My aim shall therefore be, in the following pages, to take nothing for granted, to try all things, and, while stating as clearly and impartially as I can the views of those thinkers in ancient and modern times who have said that pleasure is the end of life, to " hold fast that which is good " in their doctrine, and to reject that which is false.

I have decided to consider hedonism in its historical development, rather than to discuss its abstract basis, because as a rule the earlier form of hedonism is also the simplest, and because nothing so well enables us to grasp a truth as to see it from the most various points of view. It has been suggested that some of the prejudices of Englishmen are due to the fact that they live on an island ; and at least we may say that in the realm of thought as of practical life, Homekeeping youth have ever homely wits." Such a critical account of hedonism would seem to be an impertinence were Mr. Herbert Spencer right in saying that all theories of human conduct, wittingly or unwittingly, must from the nature of the case assume pleasure to be the end of life. Even the pessimist, when he says that life is not worth living, bases his proof, according to Mr. Spencer, on the assumption that the end is a surplus of agreeable feeling." He condemns life because it results in more pain than pleasure. The optimist defends life in the belief that it brings more pleasure than pain. The implication common to their antagonistic views is, that conduct should conduce to preservation of the individual, of the family, and of the society, only supposing that life brings more happiness than misery. This " short and easy method " with the opponents of hedonism is not so convincing as Mr. Spencer seems to think. For the pessimist may hold that as a matter of fact life brings more pain than pleasure, while maintaining that not pleasure but something infinitely higher is the end of life. You will of course understand that I do not intend these remarks to be taken as a disproof of the hedonistic end, but only as a disproof of Mr. Spencer's attempt to snatch a hasty verdict in favour of hedonism, by an unwarrantable interpretation of theories which differ from his own.

Having thus cleared the way, we may now go on to consider the hedonistic theories of Ancient Greece. The first set of thinkers who can be called hedonistic, in tendency at least, is that remarkable group of men called the Sophists. It is true that in them hedonism was implicit rather than explicit, but yet they were so instrumental in preparing the way for the Cyrenaics, who expressly formulated hedonism, that no consideration of this type of thought as it existed in Greece would be complete that failed to take note of their extraordinary influence in the development of philosophical reflection. To estimate that influence aright we must know something of the form of 'society and the modes of thought and feeling characteristic of Ancient Greece.

In the fifth century before the Christian era, the Greeks had developed from their early condition into a number of city commonwealths, all of which were, at least in idea, absolutely independent. When we speak of the Greek people we must never forget that the bond uniting them was mainly that of a common religion and a common tongue. Politically each city, with its immediately surrounding territory, formed an independent State. The idea of a vast region united by the bond of a common polity was quite foreign to the mind of the Greek. His country was not a region but a city. Hence freedom to the Greek meant something different from what it means to us. To be a freeman was to have the rights and privileges of a citizen. For as the State was small it was possible for the whole body of citizens to assemble for political purposes in one place. In Attica the whole number of citizens does not seem ever to have exceeded 30,000. Such a thing as representative government was undreamt of by the Greek : his idea of citizenship was to take part personally in the high matters discussed in the assembly of the people, to fill the offices of state, to take his place as one of the judges in the courts of law, or to offer up public sacrifices. Hence the franchise was jealously guarded and limited. A freeman, a foreigner, or a dependent ally was in no case admitted to citizenship unless by a special decree of the assembly of the people. Each Greek State was thus like a number of mutually repellent atoms. There was no means of compressing a number of cities into one body. Either a city must be absolutely free or it must be dependent upon another. No doubt, at a very early period, Eleusis, Marathon, and the other small towns of Attica were independent before they were absorbed by Athens, but the whole of Attica was comparatively small in extent. Sparta, with a larger territory, held the Laconian towns in complete subjection, and Boeotia was regarded by her so-called Attica as a tyrant.

What we find then in Greece is a crowd of little city commonwealths, each independent and sovereign, and each united by the common ties of blood, language, manners, and religion. It will be readily understood that direct participation in public affairs afforded the citizens of a State like Athens the highest political education. An ordinary citizen in democratic Athens had more power than an ordinary English member of parliament ; he had not only the right to speak in the assembly, but he was called upon to vote ^ven upon such important matters as declaring war or making peace. And not only was the Greek State a city, not a nation ; not only were the people at once parliament and government, but there was no distinction as with us between Church and State : the form of religion was under the control of the people, and its acceptance or rejection was regarded as a part of their political function. Hence we find Aristophanes saying that the Athenians had converted Athens into Egypt by their facility in admitting strange gods, while Anaxagoras and Protagoras were banished, the former for saying that the sun was a red-hot ball about the size of the Peloponnesus, the latter, because he had said " Whether there are gods I cannot tell : life is too short for such obscure problems " ; and Socrates, one of the most pious as well as the most thoughtful of men, was condemned to death on a charge of corrupting the lO minds of the youth and denying the gods of his country. The result of this active participation in affairs of state was an intense and yet narrow patriotism. The walls, temples, and theatre of Athens were regarded by each citizen as his own ; and it is not wonderful that in its best days a man was glad to die for the great name of Athens.

But this intensity of life had its weak side. For one thing, those who were not allowed to take part in war or politics were thrust into the background, and hence the family life of the Greek was largely sacrificed to the public good. Further, as a small city cannot be continually recruited by new blood, it gradually loses its vigour, especially in times of prosperity, and exhibits symptoms of senility and decay. Moreover, to the intensity of patriotism corresponds an intensity of hatred of other States, and hence we find that war was carried on with a fierceness and a cruelty to which we are happily unaccustomed in modern times. The very smallness of the arena led to intense bitterness of party warfare, and to the perpetual expulsion of the leaders of defeated factions. But the source of the greatest weakness of the ancient State was the fact that it rested upon slavery. The greatest work of Greece was done during the two centuries that ended with the close of the Peloponnesian war. Seeing the great results that were achieved by means of it, such humane philosophers as Plato and Aristotle accepted the institution of slavery and only sought to ameliorate the condition of the slave. In Attica there were over 400,000 slaves and aliens and only some 30,000 citizens. Raised on the shoulders of this immense servile population, who were engaged chiefly in menial tasks, a small body of citizens was left free to devote their energies to war and politics, or, in later times, to literature and art. For a time the rate of progress was wonderful, but after the repulse of the barbarian hosts of Persia, moral and political corruption set in, the fire of intellect gradually burnt itself out, and when St. Paul came to Athens he found its people a set ! of refined gossips, with no origing.lity, no faith/ and no enthusiasm. What has just been said may help to explain the influence of the Sophists. They acted as a solvent of Greek thought by destroying men's faith in what had been accepted as a sort of divine revelation of what was right and just. The main idea common to them all was that customary morality was not absolute, but was a fair subject of discussion and criticism. The very simplicity of Greek thought made it peculiarly liable to scepticism the moment the sanction of a supposed divine authority was withdrawn from it.

To a man, in our own day, who thinks and who insists upon having a connected view of things, it is apparent that individual, social, and political morality are one and inseparable, and that law and morality as a whole ultimately rest upon and are explained by religion. But the complexity of modern life is so great, and the various forms of organization so many and distinct, that often a man will act in different spheres in ways quite inconsistent with one another. The man who in private life is considerate and unselfish may in his public life display all the rancour and bitterness of faction; he may practically deny that the nation should be guided by the same principles of morality as are binding on the individual ; or he may separate morality from religion or religion from morality, not seeing that these are two sisters

" That doat upon each other, friends to man, Living together under the same roof, And never can be sunder'd without tears."

The danger to the Greek mind was of an opposite character. As the State was all in all, and gathered up in itself the various functions now separately discharged by the club, the university, the church, the municipality, and the state, to touch traditional beliefs at one point was to touch them in all. An attack on the sanctity of public law sent a shock through the whole body politic. To say that a time-honoured custom had no support but convention seemed to the Greek as impious as to sneer at the gods of his country. The Greek mind referred the institutions and customs of the State to divine appointment. .Noble families believed that they could trace their descent from a god or god-like hero. Herodotus, in telling the thrilling story of how the three hundred Spartans kept the pass of Thermopylae against overwhelming odds, pauses to trace the genealogy of Leonidas back to Hercules. Thus the popular mind could even less than now distinguish between the form and the substance of religion or grasp the idea that, from its very nature as dealing with the Infinite, religion cannot without degradation be identified with the rites and ceremonies of a particular people. The mythological stories of the gods and heroes seemed to have the same sacredness as the laws and customs of the State ; to cast doubt on the popular creed was to destroy the State itself, for the Greek State could only survive so long as its citizens had implicit faith in their own as the only perfect form of constitution.