An outline of philosophy : with notes, historical and critical

Front matter

WORKS BY PROFESSOR WATSON.

Crown 8vo. Fourth Edition. Js. 6d.

The Philosophy of Kant as contained in Extracts from his own Writings. Selected and translated by John Watson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston.

Preface To The Second Edition

The call for a second edition of this little work — which now bears the more appropriate title, An Outline of Philosophy — has led me to attempt to make it somewhat more worthy of the favour with which it has been received. Knowing well how incomplete is the treatment of the various problems with which it deals, my first impulse was to re-write and extend the whole ; but I soon found that to do so would be to construct a complete system of philosophy, a task for which I do not yet feel competent. Besides, a work of that character would not fulfil the function of a manual, which cannot do more than awaken an interest in philosophical problems, and indicate the lines on which in the opinion of the writer they may be solved. I have therefore, with some reluctance, retained the original Outline, contenting myself with making a few changes, especially in Chapters vi. and x., which, as I hope, may help to make the meaning clearer, especially if they are read in connexion with the corresponding Notes vin. and xn. The Notes Historical and Critical of the present edition are intended to give a fuller view of topics discussed in the body of the work, and to show their historical affiliation. They may also serve to indicate the difficulty and complexity of some of the problems which the original plan of the book

v vi

Preface

compelled me to treat in a somewhat summary way. These Notes, on the whole, follow in logical as well as historical sequence, and therefore admit of being read by themselves, though they should also be considered in relation to the main argument. In preparing them, my difficulty has been to decide what to exclude. At first I thought of making frequent references to the masters in philosophy, as well as to contemporary writers; but it became evident as I proceeded that this method would increase the size of the book so much that a separate volume would be required, and this I was anxious to avoid. I have therefore introduced only such Notes as seemed best fitted to throw additional light upon the principal questions discussed in the text, avoiding the discussion of points in which I am compelled to differ from the views advocated in such important works as Mr. Bradley's Appearance and Reality, Mr. M'Taggart's Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic^ and Mr. Hobhouse's Theory of Knowledge.1

The following extracts from the former Preface will sufficiently explain the general scope of the book.

"The philosophical creed which commends itself to my mind is what in the text I have called Speculative Idealism, by which I mean the doctrine that we are capable of knowing Reality as it actually is, and that Reality when so known is absolutely rational. Such a doctrine seems to many to be presumptuous, contrary to the sober spirit of inductive inquiry, and based on an untenable theory of knowledge and

1 The views discussed in the Notes are (in historical order) those of Plato (i. A), Aristotle (i. B, ii.), Descartes (ix. A), Locke (iv. A), Berkeley (iv. B), Hume (iv. C), Kant (ix. B, xii.), Hegel (vi. B), Lotze (x.), J. S. Mill (v.); and, of recent or contemporary writers, Green (xii.), Mr. Bradley (xi.), and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick (iii.).

PREFACE.

vii conduct. My aim has been to show that these objections rest upon a misunderstanding of the idealistic position, at least as held by such writers as the late Professor T. H. Green and the present Master of Balliol. The general proof of Idealism must consist in showing that, while the determination of Reality by such categories as coexistence, succession, and causality, is capable of vindication so long as it is not regarded as ultimate, it becomes false when affirmed to be final, and that we are compelled at last to characterize existence as purposive and rational. There are various ways of enforcing this view. The method which I have followed here is to attempt to show that the ideas which lie at the basis of Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Psychology and Ethics, Religion and Art, are related to each other as developing forms or phases of one idea — the idea of self-conscious Reason.

"No apology seems needed for the publication at the present time of an Outline of Philosophy. There is no lack of Introductions to Psychology and Ethics, but, so far as I know, there is not in English any book which seeks to give in moderate compass a statement of Philosophy as a whole. I am well aware that there is danger in generalities, but there seems to be just now an even greater danger that Philosophy, in the large sense in which it was understood by Plato and Aristotle, should be lost in artificial divisions and in a mass of empirical detail. There is no doubt a vast body of material — biological, psychological, and historical — which will have to be reduced to system some day; but in the meantime there is a certain justification in a work like this, which tries to fix the main outlines of a complete system of philosophy.

b viii

PREFACE.

"A teacher naturally prefers his own way of putting things, even when he agrees in general with another, but perhaps the following pages, which contain the substance of lectures delivered by the author to his own students, may be of some use to students and even to teachers in other Universities. Should any of my fellow-teachers think of using this Outline in the class-room, I may mention that in my own practice lecturing is only a part, and perhaps the least important part of the work actually done. So far as practicable, it is my habit to insist upon a first-hand study by the class of the authors I criticize. Every year's experience confirms me in the conviction which I ventured to express some years ago in the Preface to my Selections from Kant, that lectures upon authors who have not been read have very poor educational results.

"In preparing this Outline I have been most indebted to Green's Prolegomena to Ethics and the criticism of Mill contained in his Philosophical Works ; to Mr Caird's Comte and Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant\ and, in a lesser degree, to the late Professor Stanley Jevons' articles on Mill's Logic in the Contemporary Review."

The Index of Topics and Index of Authors at the end of the volume will, I hope, be useful. The latter will enable the reader, if he so desires, to consider the views of a particular thinker as a whole, so far as I have had occasion to deal with them.

For a fuller statement of the philosophy of Aristotle than that contained in Notes i., il, and vi., I may refer to four articles of mine, the first of which appeared in the Philosophical Review for Jan,, 1898, Vol. vn., No. 1. I have to thank the editors of that Review for permission

PREFACE.

to reprint what is here called Note n. My thanks are also due to Dr. Vaihinger for his courtesy in allowing me to reproduce as Note ix. what originally appeared as an article on The Cartesian Cogito ergo Sum and Kanfs Criticism of Rational Psychology in the Kantstudien,

JOHN WATSON.

Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, 2yd August, 1898.

Chapter I. The Problem Of Philosophy

The Aristotelian and Platonic definitions of philosophy — Why it is better not to define Philosophy as a "science" — Philosophy and the sciences — Mathematics from the point of view of Riemann, Helmholtz, Clifford, and Sylvester— Mathematics as J. S. Mill views it — Explanation of Mill's view of mathematics — (i) Mathematics not an exact science — It rests upon definitions — Which rest upon experience — No real lines, circles, etc. — Discrepancy between geometrical definitions and sensible things — (2) Mathematics not a necessary science — It rests upon induction — No accumulation of instances can warrant a must — Imagination cannot re-present what has not been presented — Experience can never warrant a conclusion wider than itself — Nothing impossible in straight lines enclosing a space, or in 2 + 3 = 6 — Apparent necessity of mathematical propositions therefore explicable on the principle of " inseparable association"— Summary: "Mathematics is not an exact or necessary science, but states what we have found to hold good within our limited experience, its apparent necessity being due to confusion between a necessity in the nature of things and the subjective necessity of inseparable association" — (1) The mathematician has no theory of knowledge — Two questions : {a) What do we know about the number and magnitude of things ? (b) What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? — (2) The absolute opposition of knowledge and the object of knowledge cannot be maintained — Mill's "round square" means that there is no absolute fixity in the quantitative relations of things — Hence we are forced to inquire into the possibility of knowing existence in its ultimate nature — If xi xn

CONTENTS.

real existence cannot be known, real knowledge is impossible — (3) How methematics originated — It is not a collection of detached propositions, but an organized system — Summary : (1) Mathematics directs its attention to the objects of knowledge, philosophy to the nature of knowledge : (2) Mathematics assumes that those objects are absolutely real, while philosophy inquires into the truth or falsehood of that assumption : (3) Philosophy admits the internal consistency of mathematics, but refuses to admit without criticism that any of its conclusions are true of things as they are in their ultimate nature — The physical sciences assume that no change ever takes place which is not due to some cause — Illustration : " A body is found to assume a crystalline form : what is the cause of the change?" — Hume thought it impossible to show that there is any necessary connection in nature — Explanation of Hume's view of Causation — (1) Hume's sceptical doctrine rests upon his theory of knowledge — (2) We cannot tell what is the nature of knowledge without determining the nature of real existence — (3) Philosophy has to examine the principles assumed by such sciences as physics and chemistry — It admits that, in whatever sense any one of the propositions which the sciences contain is true, all the rest are true — It may be divided into (1) Philosophy of Nature, (2) Philosophy of Mind, (3) Philosophy of the Absolute, - • - - I

Chapter II. Philosophy Of Auguste Comte

Explanation of Comte's view of the philosophical doctrine known as the Relativity of Knoiv ledge — His "subjective" and "objective" synthesis : ' ' Man must be content to gain such a limited knowledge of the world and of human life as will enable him to make use of nature for the perfecting of society " — Comte's own intellectual development is partly explained by his relation to Rousseau and the French Revolution — Sum of Rousseau's teaching : " All the evils of man are due to society, and he can reach perfection only by being freed from all restraint and allowed to follow his natural instincts" — Even in the economic region this form of individualism was not justified — What Comte learned from St. Simon — Comte's three stages, theological, metaphysical, positive — Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism — Metaphysic — Physical science — Extract from Cours de Philosophic Positive — Comte's social

CONTENTS.

xiii philosophy the most valuable part of his system — Is Agnosticism consistent with itself? — Ambiguity in the doctrine as expressed by Comte — (i) It sometimes means for him that the only true knowledge is of laws not of causes — In his main contention Comte is right ; it is no explanation of a pestilence to say that an offended God sent it in His wrath, or that it is produced by a " poisonous principle " — But Comte does not see that this does not banish religion or philosophy — (2) Comte also assumes that the human mind is necessarily limited to the knowledge of phenomena, and is conscious of its own limitation — Has man a knowledge only of things as to his finite mind they seem to be ? — Comte's limitation of knowledge to phenomena implies two mutually exclusive realms — Kant's remark about dogmatism and scepticism — (a) Are there two spheres of existence! — Plato's do^a helps to illustrate Comte — (b) Comte's doctrine implies that there are two distinct kinds of intelligence — This at once affirms and denies the consciousness of limitation, which is self-contradictory — Comte's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge plausible because knowledge is only in its infancy — But knowledge cannot consist in adding particular to particular — Is any knowledge the apprehension of particulars? — A knowledge of mere particulars is a contradiction in terms — We cannot perceive, or even imagine, space as a whole, but we can think it as one — Besides the particular aspect of an object there is always implied a certain universal aspect — Bearing of this truth on the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge — Illustration from the law of gravitation, - - - - - - - 21

Chapter III. Philosophy Of Nature

GEOMETRY.

Mathematical knowledge is the science of magnitude — It is usually supposed to deal with Space and Motion, though we might add Time — In that case we should have three sciences : Geometry, Kinematics, and Chronometry — Our object therefore to inquire whether geometry is a real science of nature — We assume space to be of three dimensions only — (1) Examination of Mill's view of geometry — Mill takes it for granted that we have a knowledge of the actual properties of real things : he is not contrasting a reality unknown to us with reality as we suppose it to be — The mathexiv

CONTENTS.

matician, while aware that points, lines, etc., are not sensible objects, does not suppose that he is dealing with mere fictions of abstraction — What are 4 'real things"? — Mill's answer — Objections to it — Our perception of the position and figure of a sensible object is not derived from sensation — Yet Mill must hold that the geometrical properties of bodies are somehow given us in sensation — Perhaps a number of sensations may be so associated as to appear extended — Hume thought so — Illustration of Hume's view — Conclusion : No geometrical property of a sensible object can be derived from any number or variety of sensations, nor from any association of sensations — No "ultimate inexplicability " — What is an "object"? — We shall be helped to an answer by considering how we come to have a perception of the position of a particle of matter — If space were a sphere with a definite boundary we might locate the particle, but space has no boundary that we can perceive — Are there any purely individual particles ? — In the perception of objects as in space, their mutual externality is implied — Hence space involves a peculiar intellectual form of consciousness — (2) Mill's denial that the propositions of geometry are universal and necessary — Examination of this view — Conclusion : The nature of our consciousness is such that any experience of the enclosure of a space by two straight lines is an impossible experience, 43

CHAPTER IV. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE {Continued)

ARITHMETIC AND ALGEBRA.

Statement of Mill's Theory of Numbers — He has two main objects in view : (a) To show that arithmetic and algebra rest upon induction from sensible observations ; (5) to prove that their supposed accuracy and precision arises from their hypothetical character — (1) Mill does not criticise the a priori view — The view of the "nominalists" — Mill objects that Nominalism virtually denies the theory of numbers to be based upon induction — What has led the nominalist to suppose that there are no general propositions in regard to numbers? — The reason is that in arithmetical and algebraic operations we deal with symbols of sensible objects — "Ten" represents an actual fact of sensible observation — Arithmetic differs in this respect from geometry — (2) Examination of Mill's Theory of Numbers, 76

CONTENTS.

XV

CHAPTER V. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Continued)

THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES.

Mill seeks to distinguish the processes by which generalizations of science are reached from various logical processes confounded with them — (i) Induction not the mere registration in language of a given number of individual observations — (2) Certain mathematical processes not inductive — (3) Description of a set of observed phenomena not induction — Mill's definition of an induction — Examination of Mill's definition — Causation — Three kinds of laws of nature — The ground of induction is the law of causation — Definitions of a " cause" — Examination of Mill's definition of a cause as an "invariable" and "unconditional" antecedent — A cause is an unchangeable fact — Distinction drawn by Mill between permanent and changeable causes irrelevant and misleading, - 86

CHAPTER VI. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Continued)

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

Third problem of philosophy of nature — We commonly distinguish between organic and inorganic beings — The distinction is denied by two sets of thinkers : (a) those who "level down" ; (b) those who " level up" — Is there a biological knowledge of nature? — Spencer defines life as "the power of continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations" — Revised definition: life is "the principle by which a being maintains its individuality by a continuous adaptation to external conditions " — The individuality of a living being is dependent upon the organization of its parts — Where there is little differentiation of organs, it is hard to say whether there is one being or several — Living beings also produce other individuals of the same general type as themselves — Apparently, therefore, we must apply to them a different conception, viz., final cause — Some, however, hold that the theory of development is incompatible with a teleological explanation of the world — Darwin himself assumes a line of demarcation between organic and inorganic beings — Darwin's view is that species are not imxviii

CONTENTS.

to have a knowledge, or an apparent knowledge, of the object? — His derivation of " relations of sequence and relations of coexistence " {i.e., of time and space)— Parallelism of "feelings" and nervous changes — Apparently simple feeling really complex — The subject thus reducible to units of feeling, the object to units of force — Objection : How can the subject apprehend the object? — Spencer answers that we do not know reality in its absolute nature — Hence we can think of matter only in terms of mind, and of mind only in terms of matter — Spencer's five propositions — All five untenable — Examination of the absolute opposition of subject and object — It involves a confusion between (a) the separation and (b) the logical distinction of subject and object — A subject conscious only of its own states would never become conscious of an external object — Why the separation of subject and object seems indubitable— (i) The objective world is not dependent upon anybody's knowledge — (2) It existed prior to the subject — Similarly, the subject has different properties from the object — The answer of Speculative Idealism — (a) The supposed ' ' separation " of the object rests upon an untenable dualism — Inorganic things are not independent of one another — Nor are organic beings — Nor can we find Mind existing independently — The objective world is therefore self-conscious — (b) Scientific evolutionists deny the identity of subject and object, because the objective world existed before the subject — But (1) this assumes that "subject" must mean this or that individual subject — (2) It really abolishes the subject — The category of "cause" falsely applied to the relation between existence as a whole and its modes — Summary of the idealistic view — Comparison of Scientific Evolutionism and Speculative Idealism — Self-determination in knowledge — Self-determination in action — Criticism of Spencer's second proposition, that the object is for us a complex of feelings, the subject a complex of movements, - 150

CHAPTER IX.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

IDEA OF DUTY.

(1) "Duty" implies the opposition of an ideal world and the actual world — (2) It also implies the opposition between a law of reason and a law of inclination — Why the opposition seems absolute —

CONTENTS.

XIX

Analysis of desire — The contrast of the ideal and actual self not absolute — Carlyle's " shoe-black " — The Stoical conception of " reason " — How far it is true — The abstract idea of duty, and particular duties — No " natural law" in the "spiritual world" — " Renunciation " not the last word of morality — No real opposition between appetite and reason — "Duty" may be defined as "the identification of the actual self with the ideal self, by a particular determination of it" — Kant holds that "Duty" implies (i) an absolute law — (2) self-determination by this law — His reasons for maintaining that action done from desire is contrary to duty — Objections to the form of Kant's doctrine — His analysis of the " categorical imperative " — Distinguishes between (1) duties of imperfect obligation, and (2) duties of perfect obligation — His three formulae — Desire for pleasure involves (1) a particular object or end, (2) conceived as desirable for me, (3) which is distinguished both from the object and the subject — Kant is therefore wrong in assuming that desire for an object is desire for pleasure — Problem of morality is : What is the distinguishing characteristic of the object we ought to desire? — The solution consists in each individual conceiving of himself as a member in a social organism — Historical proof of this — Strength and weakness of Kant's ethical theory, 195

CHAPTER X.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Continued).

IDEA OF FREEDOM.

The problem of freedom has the same root as the problem of duty — The solution turns upon our view of " motives " — " Determinism" confuses desire with impulse, and mechanical movements with volition — What a " motive " really is — Meaningless to say that "the strongest motive" leads to action — There is no "liberty of indifference " — Kant's view of freedom — He holds that in willing the law of reason man is free — This would make man irresponsible for doing wrong — How the contrast of freedom and necessity arises.

THE SUMMUM BONUM.

Hedonist view of the summum bonum — Kant distinguishes between (a) the chief good and (b) the complete good — Statement of his

XX

CONTENTS, doctrine — His- " postulate " of immortality — His moral proof of the being of God — Objections to his argument for immortality — His proof of the being of God must be revised, - - - 235

CHAPTER XL MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Continued).

PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS.

Self-realization as exhibited in the sphere of individual rights — Kantian distinction of the sphere of rights from the sphere of morals — Rights (1) belong to persons, not to things, (2) are held against all other persons, (3) are reciprocal — Rights distinguished by Kant as (a) rights of property, (b) rights of contract, (c) personal rights — The State based upon an "original contract" — Ultimate form of the State a Republic — All class legislation wrong — Kant's view of penal justice — Basis of International law — Articles for an everlasting peace — Kant's doctrine of rights repeats his opposition of desire and reason in a new form — (1) His theory of society not self-consistent — It virtually admits that society is the basis of rights — Imperfection of his view of the family and the State — (2) Kant's opposition of law and morality untenable — (3) His view of punishment inadequate — Kant's system of moral virtues — Two ends which we ought to realize : (1) our own perfection, (2) the happiness of others — Distinction of " obligations of right " and " obligations of virtue" — The three characteristics of duty — Duties to ourselves — Duties to others — 'Kant wrong in opposing them, - 257

CHAPTER XII.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

RELIGION.

Kant separates Morality from Religion — His interpretation of " Original Sin " — How he treats the Pauline doctrine of Redemption — Kant's conception of evil in advance of the doctrine of the Stoics — But his doctrine must be reinterpreted — He has not got rid of Individualism — No opposition of outer and inner law — Morality not independent of Religion.

CONTENTS.

xxi

ART.

Art an objective presentation of the ideal — Kant distinguishes between the beautiful and the sublime — An aesthetic judgment rests upon a disinterested contemplation of beauty — The sublime due to the disharmony of the object as perceived and as conceived — Two forms of the sublime : mathematical or that which is too great in magnitude to be pictured by the imagination ; and dynamical\ or the feeling which arises in presence of the forces of nature— Beauty excludes the idea of definite purpose — The products of art a symbol of moral ideas — Value of Kant's conception of beauty — Examination of Kant's affirmations (i) that beauty rests upon feeling ; (2) that it involves thought, - 282

Index of Topics, 484

Index of Authors, - _ a 487

NOTES HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

Page of Outline.

I I. The Platonic and Aristotelian Criticism of Sensationalism—

A. Plato's Criticism, 303

B. Aristotle's Criticism, - - - - 315 2 II. Aristotle's Definition of Philosophy, - 320

21 III. Agnosticism and Scepticism, 329

43 IV. Mathematical Knowledge —

A. Locke's Theory, 336

B. Berkeley's Theory, 342

C. Hume's Theory, - - - - 351 51 V. The Association of Ideas, ----- 363 92 VI. The Principle of Identity or Non-contradiction —

A. Aristotle's Doctrine, 375

B. Hegel's Doctrine, ----- 378 xxii CONTENTS.

Page of Outline.

ioo VII. Causality and the System of Experience, - - - 385

107 VIII. Natural Evolution, 390

138 IX. Descartes and Kant —

A. The Cartesian Cogito ergo sum, - - - 391

B. Kant's Criticism of Rational Psychology, - 400 190 X. Lotze's Theory of Knowledge, - - - - 431 194 XI. The Feeling Soul, ------- 449

235 XII. The Problem of Human Freedom : Kant and Green, 460

AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY.

Chapter I. The Problem Of Philosophy

" The feeling of wonder," says Plato in his dialogue the Theaetetus^ " is the genuine mark of the philosopher; for philosophy has its origin in wonder; and he was no bad genealogist who said that Iris is the child of Wonder." Those who are destitute of this feeling he calls the " uninitiated," who " will not admit that there is any reality but that which they can take hold of with their hands." Philosophy, in other words, at first exists as an immediate feeling or conviction, that things in their real or ultimate nature are not what at first they seem to be. It looks beyond the shows of things to a reality that is felt to be implied, although it is not yet grasped by the mind as a definite object, the nature of which can be expressed in precise and definite language. We can say, negatively, that reality, as it is behind the veil of sense, is not that which we see with our eyes and grasp with our hands ; but at first we cannot apply to it any definite

1 Theaeteius, 155 CD.

A

AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY.

predicates. Wonder may therefore be said to be a self-contradictory feeling. It denies that what we know is real, and yet it cannot tell us what reality is. We are conscious of our ignorance, and yet we claim to know that we have no knowledge. The man of hard common-sense, the " uninitiated " as Plato would call him, can therefore make out a very good case for his rejection of philosophy as a useless quest for what can never be known. Like Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust, he prides himself on taking things as they are, and refusing to follow the lead of mere ideas. Plato, on the other hand, finds in the vision of the ideal the true reality. Those who are content with the first or unreflective view of things he likens to men confined within a dark underground cave, with a narrow opening towards the light, who see only the shadows of things thrown on the wall as they are carried past the mouth of the cave. In this conviction of the reality of the invisible and intangible, Plato is at one with those who believe that in art and religion there is revealed something truer than all that we can directly perceive with our senses. Poetry and religion, as well as philosophy, claim that there is a contradiction between what seems and what is, and that true reality can be revealed only to the higher vision. He who is satisfied with the first or unreflective view of things need never hope to know reality as it truly is. There is a divine unrest which compels us to search for the hidden truth of things. As Aristotle says, it is in the effort to be rid of ignorance that men have been led to construct philosophies. The object of philosophy is therefore to search for the first principles of things ; to discover, if that be possible, what is as distinguished from what seems