Faith and its psychology

Front matter

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FAITH AND ITS

Preface

THE main objects of this volume are threefold. Firstly, to vindicate for religious Faith its true dignity as a normal and healthy part of human nature. Next, to insist that Faith demands the actual reality of its objects, and can never be content with a God who is only an ideal. Lastly, to show in detail how most of the errors and defects in religious belief have been due to a tendency to arrest the development of Faith prematurely, by annexing it to some one faculty to the exclusion of others, or by resting on given authority. The true goal is an unified experience which will make authority no longer external. This scheme has compelled me to state, far too briefly and dogmatically, my grounds of disagreement with certain religious opinions which are widely held, such as the infallibility of ‘ the living voice of the Church,’ and the finality of the appeal to Holy Scripture, and also with those religious philosophies which make religion exclusively an affair of the will, or the intellect, or the esthetic sense. My criticisms of these various theories are all intended to show the errors which result from a premature synthesis. Faith claims the whole man, and all that God’s grace can make of him. If any part of ourselves is left outside our religion, our theory of Faith is sure to be partly vitiated by the omission; and conversely, an inadequate theory of Faith is likely to be reflected in one-sided or distorted practice.

When we try to analyse the contents of Faith, after claiming for it this very comprehensive range, we must

Vv vi FAITH be prepared for the criticism that we have given only bare outlines, or else that we have left rival constructions side by side in the form of patent inconsistencies. For we cannot hope to understand and co-ordinate all the highest experiences of the human spirit. And our own generation, it seems to me, is not called upon even to attempt any ambitious construction. We must be content to clear the site for anew building, and to get the materials ready. The wise master-builder is not yet among us. ‘ Revivals’ are only a stop-gap; they create nothing. They recover for us parts of our spiritual heritage which were in danger of being lost, and having achieved this, they have done their work. The words Catholic and Protestant are much like the words Whig and Tory in politics. They are the names of obsolescent distinctions, survivals of old-world struggles. When the next constructive period comes, it will be seen that the spiritual Latin empire and the Teutonic revolt against it belong to past history. Already the crucial question is, not whether Europe shall be Catholic or Protestant, but whether Christianity can come to terms with the awakening self-consciousness of modern civilisation, equipped with a vast mass of new scientific knowledge, and animated for the first time by ideals which are not borrowed from classical and Hebrew antiquity.

The great danger in our path, I venture to think, comes from the democratisation of thought, which has affected religion, ethics, philosophy, and sociology—in fact, almost every department of mental activity except natural science. We see its results in hysterical sentimentalism, which is the great obstacle in the way of using organised effort for social amelioration. We see them in the frank adoption of materialistic standards, such as the pleasure and pain calculus, as soon as we leave the region of abstract speculation. And in philosophy it is impossible to miss the connection between the new empiricism, with its

PREFACE vil blatant contempt for idealism, whether of the ancient or modern type, and the democratic claim to decide all things in heaven and earth by popular vote. It is possible to sympathise thoroughly with the spread of education, and yet to be aware of the enormous dangers to civilisation which the false theory of natural equality brings with it. It has bred a dislike of intellectual superiority, and a reluctance to allow reason and knowledge to arbitrate on burning questions. Everywhere we find the praises of feeling or instinct sung, and the dangers of intellectualism exposed. Now instinct is the tendency in humanity to persistence, reason is the tendency to variation. Most variations, we are reminded, fail to establish themselves ; instinct is therefore the safer guide. But the tendency to variation is just what has raised man above the lower animals; it is the condition of progress. And in civilised man reason has largely displaced instinct, which is no longer so trustworthy as in the brutes. Since this process is certain to go further, distrust of reason is suicidal, and to exclude it from matters of Faith must be disastrous. I believe that the Kantian antithesis between the speculative and practical reason is wholly fallacious, a residuum of the dualism which Kant found dominant in philosophy and failed to overcome. If this dualism is abandoned, the contrast between Faith and knowledge falls with it. And yet the temptation to ‘heal slightly’ the wounds of religion by reverting to this separation of Faith from fact has proved irresistible to very many, and I believe that it is a main source of the notorious inefficacy of our apologetics. The intellectual difficulties raised by science are not popular, and we are tempted to override them because the masses are still ignorant and superstitious; but I believe that here is still our great problem, and that we shall do well to agree with our adversary quickly, while we are in the way with him.

This is not the kind of intellectualism which paralyses vill FAITH action. To escape this, it is only necessary to remember that, in the life of man, thought and action are equally important. The normal course of all experience is expansion followed by concentration. Ideals are painted by imaginative thought, but realised only in action. Character is consolidated thought. Action and contemplation must act and react upon each other; otherwise our actions will have no soul, and our thoughts no body. This is the great truth which the higher religions express in their sacraments. A sacrament is more than a symbol. The perception of symbols leads us from the many to the one, from the transitory to the permanent, but not from appearance to reality. This belongs to the sacramental experience, which is symbolism retranslating itself into concrete action, returning to the outer world and to mundane interests; but in how different a manner from our earlier superficial experience! The formula ‘ From symbol to sacrament’ completes and Christianises the Platonic (or Plotinian) scheme, and gives the mystic a tule of life. ‘Are we not here to make the transitory permanent?’ asks Goethe. ‘This we can only do if we know how to value both.’ There are two essential movements in the spiritual life: one which finds God in the world, mainly through thought and feeling; the other which re-finds the world in God, mainly through moral action. The former reaches permanence through change, the latter change through permanence. So the spiral goes on, in ever-diminishing circles (gyrans gyrando vadit Spiritus), till in heaven, we may be sure, the disharmony between thought and action is finally attuned.

Notr.—This book is an expansion of ten lectures which were delivered in London on the Jowett Foundation, in the early months of this year. For this reason, the form of lectures has been adhered to throughout.

Contents

PAGE CHAPTER I

‘FAITH Nm AS A RELIGIOUS TERM, ‘ : : . ° 1 CHAPTER II

FAITH AS A RELIGIOUS TERM—continued, . : ° - 24 CHAPTER III

CHAPTER I ‘FAITH’ AS A RELIGIOUS TERM (a) In the Bible

I PROPOSE to consider the first of the theological virtues, in order to determine, if possible, in what it consists. I will not begin by attempting a definition of *‘ Faith’; but a brief indication of the sense in which the word will be used in the course of the discussion seems desirable. Broadly speaking, when we use the word Faith, without _special reference to religion, we mean, either the holding for true of something which is not already verified by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion,! or confidence in the wisdom and integrity of a person. In the former sense, the corresponding verb is ‘ believe,’ in the latter it is ‘trust.’ In the former sense, the conception of Faith is independent of the character or quality of the © thing believed. I may believe in a God or in a devil; in the habitability of Mars or in the man in the moon; or I may believe that if I make one of a party of thirteen at dinner it will be a good speculation to insure my life. The erossest superstition might be called Faith in this sense. But in religious language, to which the word more properly belongs, Faith has a more limited and a more dignified meaning. ‘It is the general expression for subjective ~ religion.’ ? It is used for conviction as to certain ultimate

1 Cf, Fechner, Die drei Motive und Griinde des Giaubens, p. 1. 2 Dorner,

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’ facts relating to the order of the universe and our place in it. And we shall see in the sequel that this conviction is not the result of a purely intellectual judgment, but has a more vital origin. It involves an eager and loyal choice, a resolution to abide by the hypothesis that the nature of things is good, and on the side of goodness. ‘That is to say, Faith, in the religious sense, is not simply belief; it is inseparable from the sister virtues of hope and love.*

After this preliminary statement about the meaning of the word, I will proceed to sketch the historical growth of ‘Faith’ as a theological concept. For it is a complex idea and has a history.

Let us take first the history of the Greek words zioris and muoteverv. Ilécrvs means the trust which we place in any person or thing, and the conviction, or persuasion, which we hold about any subject. Less frequently, it means fidelity, and so the pledge of fidelity, acquiring the meaning of promise, security. Auschylus (Frag. 276) hag ov« dvdpds épkot miotis, aAN Opkwov avnp; and miotis became a common technical term for ‘proof.’* The word first occurs in Hesiod—vioreis yap rot duos Kal dmurtiat OAecav avdpas, 4.e. ‘in money matters be neither confiding nor suspicious’; while Theognis has learned by experience that it is safest to trust nobody: rictes ypypar’ ddeooa, arurtin § éexdwoa, In the first-mentioned sense it is opposed to knowledge, and is thus almost a synonym of d6€a, though wioris could never (like 6déa) be contrasted with ad7Gea, or voynors, but only with érucrjpy, or yvaors. Very instructive is Plato (Rep. 10. 601): rod atrod dpa oKevous 6 pev ToinTis Tiotiw opOnv Fer wept KaAAOVS TE Kal movnpias, Evvav TO ciddte kal dvayKxa(dpevos akovew Tapa TOU

1 On the connection between Faith and Hope, cf. Newman, Lectures on Justification, p. 256 m. ‘Luther and Calvin both virtually grant that faith — and hope are inseparable, or parts of one thing, though Luther (and perhaps — Calvin) denies this of faith and love.’ Cf. p. 15. ne

2 Cremer, Biblico-Theological Lexicon, p. 495. 8 Lightfoot, Galatians, p. 156.

elddTos, 6 € ypwpevos ériotypnv (‘ though the implement is the same, the maker will have only a correct belief about the beauty or badness of it . . . whereas the user will have knowledge’). Iliorss is not necessarily weak conviction, but it is unverified conviction. As, however, all conviction should seek to verify itself, it may be called encomplete science. Plato (Rep. 6. 511; 7. 533) gives us two divisions of the mind, intelligence (véyc1s) and opinion (5d€a), each having two subdivisions. The four divisions thus produced are science (émio77}17), understanding (S:avoie), belief (or faith or persuasion—zioris), and the perception of images («ixacia). And he says that as being is to becoming, so is intelligence to opinion; and as intelligence is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of images. Faith, for Plato, is a mental condition which still takes the visible and opinable for true ; though it possesses a higher degree of clearness than <ixacia, It is a stepping-stone to true knowledge. ¥ IIécrcs is used in classical Greek of belief in the gods ; generally (e.g. Eur. Med. 414) of confidence in them rather than of belief in their existence ; but examples of the other sense are not wanting. By the time of Plutarch, Greek thought was already familiar with the idea of ‘ Faith’ as that which guards a traditional deposit of divine truth. Cf. Mor. 756 B.: dpkei 1) ratpios Kai wadawd riortis, is ovK EOTLY ELTELY OVS avEvpety TeKUHpLoV Evapyéertepov. ‘The ancient ancestral Faith is sufficient, than which it is impossible to mention, or to discover, anything clearer. If [he continues] this common foundation for the pious life is disturbed and shaken at any point, the whole becomes insecure and suspected.’ _ The verb wioreverv, when used in relation to persons, seems to have expressed a somewhat stronger emotion than the substantive zior1s, and accordingly it was not much used in classical Greek of mere belief in the existence of gods. For this belief vouigev was tho regular word,

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indicating acceptance of statutory beliefs rather than any warmer sentiment. At the beginning of the Memorabilia, Socrates is accused of not ‘ believing in’ (vopégewv) the gods whom the city worships, and Xenophon replies that since he certainly trusted in the gods, how can it be true that he did not believe in them? So a distinction is recognised which is of great importance in the history of Faith. |

In the later Platonists, we have a doctrine of Faith which closely resembles that which I shall advocate in these lectures. The nature of God, says Plotinus, is difficult to conceive and perhaps impossible to define. But we are sure of His existence, because we experience, in our inmost being, expressible and definable impressions when we come near to Him, or rather when He comes near to ‘us. The ardent desire with which we turn towards Him is accompanied by a pain caused by the consciousness of ‘something lacking in ourselves; we feel that there is something wanting to our being. It must be by His _ presence in our souls that God reveals Himself to us, for _we have no means of knowing things except by something -analogous to contact. The light of God’s presence is brighter than the light of science or reason. But none can see it who is not made like to God, and whose being is not, like that of God, brought to an inner unity. Elsewhere, Plotinus explains Faith as a kind of spiritual perception, as opposed to demonstration (drddeé.s), which is the result of reasoning.!

In Hebrew, the verb ‘ trust’ or ‘ believe’ is connected with words meaning ‘support’ and ‘nourish’; and the fundamental idea is stability, trustworthiness. ‘ Whatever holds, is steady, or can be depended upon, whether a wall which securely holds a nail (Isa. xxii. 23, 25), or a brook which does not fail (Jer. xvi. 18), or a kingdom which is firmly established (2 Sam. vii. 16), or an assertion which has

1.] ‘FAITH’ AS A RELIGIOUS TERM i 5 been verified (Gen. xlii. 20), or a covenant which endures for ever (Ps. Ixxxix. 28), or a heart found faithful (Neh. ix. 8), or a man who can be trusted (Neh. xiii. 13), or God Himself who keeps covenant (Deut. vii. 9), is ‘ faithful.’ 1 The difference between ‘believing in’ (placing trust in) and simple credence is marked in the Old Testament by different prepositions following the verb. Jt cannot be said that the verb is very common in the Old Testament in a religious sense; and there is in Biblical Hebrew no substantive properly meaning ‘ Faith’ in the active sense. Accordingly, the Revised Version only admits the substantive Faith in two places (Deut. xxxii. 20, and Hab. ii. 4). These are not translations of the same Hebrew word. In Deut. xxxii. 20, the words are: ‘they are a very froward generation, children in whom is no Faith.’ Here one may doubt whether the meaning is not simply, ‘ they cannot be trusted.’ In Habakkuk, however, the active sense is apparently intended: ‘the just shall live by his faith’ ; but even here the sense is disputed, and the margin of the Revised Version has ‘in his faithfulness.’ I think, however, that the marginal rendering, though more in accordance with the usage of the word, gives a less satisfactory sense, because the context shows that a contrast is being drawn between the arrogant self-sufficiency of the Chaldean and the humble trust in God of the ‘ just.2 We may perhaps, then, hold that in this one passage of the Old Testament we have the word Faith used in something like its full Christian or Evangelical meaning, as an enduring attitude of the mind and heart towards God. |

The notion of Faith, or rather, faithfulness, in the Old Testament is largely determined by the idea of a covenant between God and His people. Faith, trust, or faithfulness - belongs to the parties to a covenant; it has no meaning outside that relation. The covenant was made between God and His people collectively ; individuals were parties

1 Warfield in Hastings’s Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. Faith.

to it as members of the favoured nation. Faith, or faith- | fulness, is the observance of a right attitude towards the | covenant with God—it is the conscientious observance of | the human side of the covenant, the divine side of which ° is grace and mercy. We may trace a development in the Jewish ideas about this covenant. With the decay of the national fortunes Faith became more spiritual and more individualistic. It became finally the mental attitude of those who ‘ waited for the consolation of Israel,’ trusting in promises which seemed every year further from their fulfilment.

The Septuagint was not able to preserve the distinction, above referred to, between ‘ to trust to’ and ‘ to trust in.’ It usually renders both by wiorevery with the dative. Nor can the Greek reproduce all the meaning of the Hebrew words. It wavers in translating the Hebrew word for ‘ trustworthiness,’ the nearest equivalent to Faith, and the corresponding adjective, rendering them sometimes by dA7jGeva, aAnOivds, and sometimes by ziorvs and kindred adjectives. In Isa. vii. 9, there is a kind of play on words. ‘If ye be not firm’ (in Faith), ‘ ye shall surely not be made firm ’ (in fact) ; or, ‘If ye hold not fast, ye shall not stand fast.’ This is lost in translation. In the important verse, Hab. i. 4, the Septuagint manifestly misunderstands the original, translating 6 Sikatos ex mictews pov (poetar=‘ the just shall live through my faithfulness (to my covenant).’ Still, the word micreveww is satisfactory, as it has the right association with moral trust, as well as with what may be called the earlier Greek associations of ziorts, as opposed to érirtipy.

Philo’s notion of Faith is characteristic of his position as a mediator between Jewish and Greek thought. Asa Jew, he emphasises trust as determining Faith; but his philosophy leads him to single out the unchangeableness of God almost exclusively as the ground and object of Faith.

3 A. B. Davidson, The Theology of the Old Testament, p. 280.

There is not a great deal about Faith in his writings: what there is, is chiefly with reference to the standard case of Abraham’s Faith. ‘Abraham,’ he says, ‘saw into the unfixedness and unsetiledness of material being, when he recognised the unfaltering stability which attends true being, and to which he is said to have completely trusted.’ ‘He anchored himself firmly and unchangeably on true being alone.’ ‘The only thing stable is Faith toward God, or toward true being.’! Philo’s ‘ Faith’ is thus a steady reliance on the eternal and unchangeable ideas of 1, truth and righteousness, which lie behind the fleeting shows of phenomenal existence. The active sense has fairly established itself, but Faith for Philo differs rather widely from the Christian virtue in that it is the prize * and not the starting-point of the race, standing at the end, not at the beginning, of the religious life.

Sanday and Headlam ® have a valuable note on the use of the word Faith in the apocryphal literature. In the Psalms of Solomon it is attributed to the Messiah Himself ; in the other books it is characteristic of his subjects. Thus 4 Esdras vi. 28, ‘ florebit fides et vincetur corruptela’ ; vii. 34, ‘veritas stabit et fides convalescet.’ In the Apocalypse of Baruch we have, ‘incredulis tormentum ignis reservatum.’ In other places we have ‘ Faith and works’ in combination, indicating that the discussion of their relative merits did not originate in the Christian Church.

We now come to the New Testament. I think that for our purposes it will be most convenient to take the Synoptic Gospels first, as a record of our Lord’s actual teaching about, and attitude towards, Faith; the Pauline conception of Faith next; the Epistle to the Hebrews third ;

1 Cf, KE, A. Abbott, Johannine Vocabulary.

3 On Romans i. 17.

and the Johannine interpretation of our Lord’s teaching last. This order is not intended to imply any disparagement of the Fourth Gospel as a historical document; but St. John certainly wrote for his own generation, and it is possible to speak of a Johannine doctrine of Faith, which must not be taken out of its chronological place. |

The Triple Tradition does not agree in any saying of Christ containing the verb mioreverv ; and in the use of the substantive zic71s the only verbatim agreement is ‘ thy faith hath saved thee,’ of the woman with the issue of blood. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that our Lord spoke of ‘ Faith ’ and ‘ believing ’ in the technical religious sense which is characteristic of the New Testament as a whole. There seems to be no objection on linguistic grounds. Not only did the Hebrew word acquire an active meaning in Rabbinical literature, but in the Aramaic dialect (according to Lightfoot on Galatians, p. 154), an active form had been developed. How far this language was original with Him, it is difficult to say. It is extremely probable that the words were often on the lips of the simple folk in Palestine who ‘ waited for the kingdom of God.’ We have seen that all was ready for the richer doctrine of Faith which was part of Christ’s message. The devout country people among whom He was brought up had not much to learn about confidence in God, about conviction of the reality of the unseen, or about patient waiting for the consolation of Israel. . In the Synoptic Gospels, Faith generally means cons “fidence in Christ’s power to perform some particular thing. It would be superfluous to enumerate the cases in which Faith is mentioned as the condition of miracles of healing. In these instances, Faith is simply the psychological state which alone makes the patient susceptible to cures of this kind.

There are, however, many passages, especially if we add the uses of the verb mioreverv to those of the substantive, in which the wider sense of trustful self-surrender to Christ, or to God, is clearly indicated. There is only one place in the Synoptics, I think (Matt. xxiii. 23), in which rioris means ‘ integrity’; and so strong have its theological associations already become, that it is never used of man’s faith in man. When it has an object, that object is in the genitive, as St. Mark xi. 22, ‘ have faith in God’; not with a preposition (év, «is, mpds, ex’) as in the Epistles. But in the large majority of cases, it is used absolutely. When ‘ Faith’ is primarily expectation of a _Iiracle, a deeper thought is sometimes present. In the case of the paralytic, remission of sins precedes the physical cure (Matt. ix. 1-8): and in Luke vii. 50 the characteristic words, ‘ thy Faith hath saved thee,’ are used of forgiveness _ only, when there has been no miracle. Our Lord must have spoken much of the moral force of Faith, of what is now sometimes called the dynamic of religion. In the figurative and even hyperbolical language which He often used in popular teaching, He said that Faith, though no larger than a grain of mustard-seed, can remove mountains (Matt. xvii. 20), a phrase which became familiar to Christians (1 Cor. xiii. 2) at a very early date. Cf. also Mark ix. 23: ‘If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.’ That this Faith ought to be but is not always an abiding state is shown by the words to Peter (Luke xxii. 32), ‘I have prayed for thee, that thy Faith fail not.’ There are some who ‘ for a while believe, but in time of temptation fall away’ (Matt. xiii. 20). In Matt. xvi. 17, ‘ These signs shall follow them that believe,’ we have an approximation to the use of the participle as a designation of the Christian society, ‘ the believers,’ which we find in the Acts.!

One passage in the Synoptists seems to me to stand quite alone—Luke xviii. 8, ‘ When the Son of Man cometh, shall

1 It is worth while also to call attention to Matt. xxiii. 23. ‘justice, mercy _ and faith.’ Cf, Micah vi. 8 of which these words may be a reminiscence, ‘The third virtue, Faith, is added by Christ.

He find Faith’ (or, the Faith) ‘on the earth ?” Iam unable to understand these words except in the sense that though God will avenge his saints ‘ speedily ’ (see the preceding verse), yet the time will appear so long before the second coming that the love of many will have waxed cold. ‘Faith,’ or ‘ the Faith,’ will hardly be found on the earth. 1 must confess that the words sound more like an expression of the discouragement which we know to have been felt by the second and third generations of Christians, when ‘hope deferred’ ot the zapovoia was ‘making the heart sick,’ than what we should have expected to have from the lips of our Lord. If the words are authentic, we must take ‘ Faith’ (with the best orthodox commentators) in the less natural sense of ‘the necessary Faith,’ or ‘ the Faith that perseveres in prayer.’

To sum up: ‘ Faith,’ and ‘ to believe,’ in the Synoptic Gospels, means a spirit of simple receptiveness towards the Messiah and His message, a state of mind which, unlike the righteousness of the Pharisees, requires no previous course of discipline in meritorious actions. ‘Faith’ is the primary motion of the human spirit when brought into contact with Divine truth and goodness. Its fruits are loyal self-devotion, even unto death, complete renunciation of all earthly ties, in so far as these could come between the disciple and his Master, untiring energy in service, and an enthusiastic temper, full of love, joy, and peace. This is really the whole content of Faith, as preached by Jesus to the simple folk whom He gathered round Him in Galilee.

We next turn to St. Paul’s Epistles. I do not wish to discuss the more technical theological problems connected with the Pauline doctrine of Faith, but only to determine what the word means for him. One of the most significant passages is Gal. ili, 23, rpd rot éAdciv tiv riot, ‘ before the coming of [the] Faith.’ This expression proves that the Christians felt their ‘ Faith’ to be something new in the world ; as new as their ‘ Love,’ for which they required

1. ‘FAITH’ AS A RELIGIOUS TERM ll an almost new word in the Greek language, their ‘ Hope,’ ’ which the pagans conspicuously lacked (Eph. ii. 12), and their ‘Joy,’ which no man could take from them. The coming of Christ was the coming of [the] Faith. The “Acts of the Apostles shows that the disciples soon began to call themselves ‘ Believers’; it was one of the earliest names of the Christian society. Whether, as Lightfoot suggests,” the name indicates ‘ The Trusty ’ as wel] as ‘ The Trustful,’ is uncertain; the active meaning certainly predominates. The name was familiar to friends and foes in the time of Minucius Felix, who shows that it had been Latinised— ‘pistorum precipuus et postremus philosophus ’ 3—since ‘credulus’ was impossible. The pagans in the time of Celsus employed it as an opprobrious term for their opponents. In other places St. Paul uses ‘ the Faith ’ almost as equivalent to the ene body of Christian doctrine and practice (Gal. i. vi. 10, rods oiketous HS TicTews= the Church ; Rae milk 13 6; Eph. iv. 13.)

The coming of Christ was ‘the beginning of the dispensation of Faith, and the new virtue had found a name both in Greek and Aramaic. For the Jews, a bridge was found in the text about ‘ faithful Abraham,’ which, as we have seen, was made to support a heavy superstructure of doctrine even by Philo, and was discussed with equal eagerness in the Rabbinical schools.* The meaning of Faith was being defined by controversy, and the concept was as yet so fluid that St. Paul and St. James can flatly contradict each other in words without differing much in meaning.

St. Paul’s theology, we are now beginning to see, must be interpreted by what we know of his personal religious experiences, which he naturally expounds by the help of current theological ideas and conceptions. Put very