Defects, civil and military, of the Indian government

Front matter

->MN;i\s

THE LIBRARY

OF

Chapter I

Sir C. Napier appointed Indian Commander-in-Chief. Hostile feeling of Directors. Interview with the Duke of Wellington. With Lord John Russell. Refuses to go out, if not of the Supreme Council. Lieutenant Wood. Hostility. Sir Charles assumes command in India. Lord Dalhousie's first speech.

CHAPTER IL

Mutinous spirit among the Sepoys. Reduction of their pay. Soldiers not Automatons. Mutiny the greatest danger in the East. Mutiny at Rawul Pindee, Passive mutiny analyzed. Hostile population. European troops scattered. Dost Mohamed. Sikh soldiers. Vellore Mutiny. Instructions to Sir Colin Campbell. Unusual correspondence of Sepoys. Lord Dalhousie goes to sea. View of the Crisis. Instructions to Sir W. Gilbert. Mutinous spirit abates at Rawul Pindee. Clearness of Sir C. Napier's instructions. Insubordination at Delhi. Goorkas. Brahmins. Caste prejudices. Goorkas starving. Are promised line Pfiy-

Chapter III

Journey of Inspection. Memoir on Defence of India begun. Mutinous spirit reappears. Delhi. Public Works. Camp Equipage. British power not dependant on canvass palaces. Eulogiuni of Mr. Thomason and Mr. Edwards. The 41st Native Infentry insubordinate. Sepoy furloughs withheld. The 41st submissive. Meemt.

h

CONTENTS.

Military prisons. Evils of transxiortation. Mngnzines, ofiimls, anil niilitiiry prisons, lliinhvar, Ganges Canal. Laliore. Memoir completed. Beasous for transmitting it to Lord Dalliousie, wlio takes ofTeuce. Not entitled to do so. Not on Eastern despot.

Chapter IV

Peshawur frontier disturbed. Letter on Lahore defences. Extravagant plan of Governing Board. Wall pulled down by Government. Eastern fortifications not despicable. Herbert Edwardes at Mooltan. English tliree years at Lahore witliout i)olicc. Scinde police organised in a month. Lord Ellenborougb's administration. Govindghur. Umritzer. Sealkote. Wuzzeerabad. Engineer Maxwell. Military Board. Parlian)eut involved. Lord Dalhousie's ignorance of soldiers.

Chapter V

Afutiny at Wuzzeerabad. Sepoys sentenced to transportation. Sentence revised. Condenmed capitally. Sentence commuted. Reasons for treating each case as isolated. Lord Dalhousie's absurd reasoning and false conclusion. Sikh Punehayets. Murder of Sikh Rulers. First Punjaub war caused by Punehayets. Sepoys likely to adopt them. Brahmin's regard for oaths. Sepoys' connections with Sikh soldiers. Jhelum. Rawul Piudee. Attok. Peshawur. Lord Dalhousie's false reasoning. Site of Alexander's battle with Poms. Poet Moore.

Chapter VI

Rawul Pindee. Mutiny smouldering. Sepoys correspondence. Sir C. Napier refuses to open their letters. Boundary of India. Fourteen soldiers assassinated by AflFreedees. Affreedee Chief's statement. Leaders of the Assassuis demanded. Friendly tribes made enemies by civil misgovemment. Same man should have civil and military authority. Affreedee war unjust and impolitic. Probable result Sir C. Napier's government compared with Lord Dalhousie's. Measures which should have been adopted. Lord Dalhousie's wars. Attempts to suppress Sir C. Napier's dispatch. Notes and letter on the Government of Scinde.

Chapter VII

Reasons for going to Kohat. Review of Irregular regiments. Punjaub Board of Administration, its dangerous folly. Sunnnary of grounds for the expedition.

CUNTliNTS. Vll

Chapter VIII

Kolmt expedition. Baggage. Interview witli Afl'reedce Chiefs. Skirmish. Villages buniciL Sir C. Napier's indignation. Coke's Irregulars. Pass forced. Works not executed because Sir C. Napier was designer. Punjaub Board of acbuinistration. Mrs. George Lawrence. Death of young Sitwell. Feint to deceive Affreedees. Return through the Pass. Skirmish. Grand attitude and death of an Affreedee Chief. Jezails and Muskets. British bayonet charge. Futtch Mahomet. His exploits and honours. Lesson in skirmishing. Pass twice forced. Runject Sing lost 1000 men attempting some operation. General order. Extracts from Journal. False military notions. Lord DaUiousie's bad policy. Affreedees will be avenged. Lord Ellenborough and Lord Dalliousie. Difference of the Scinde and Punjaub frontier wars. Political agents. Letter from Lieut.-Col. Lawrence, and observations. Coke's and Daly's Irregulars.

Chapter IX

Kohat expedition offspring of a bad system. Governor-General heedless of ad\-ice. Letter to him. Regular troops tax-gatherers. War with tribes provoked. Two combats. Enemies uicrease. Men of Swat; doubtful if invaders or invaded. Bradshaw's operations. Governor- General should say where to stop. War does not brook delay. Calcutta remote for reference. Eusofzye country, danger of warring there. Phamuches. Akbar lost two Ai-mies in the mountains ; British one. Tribes not conquered. Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Dalhousic's war not termuiated. Sir C. Napier falsely accused of burning villages. Outrages perpetrated in Colonel Bradshaw's expedition by politicals. That officer's vindication. Done by politicals. Burning villages cruel and foolish, approved by Lord Dalliousie. Dispatch and several letters on the Kohat expedition. Affreedees should be paid not warred uijon. Lord Dalliousie ignores Sir C. Najjier's services. Comments. Letter from Sir Colin Campbell. Sir C. Napier urges the danger and expense, of frontier warfare. Expedition to destroy the Affreedees' crops useless and exasperating. Plans for retention of Kohat Pass. f!(Ith regiment mutinies. Colonel Bradford. Captain McDonald, (idlh disbanded. Goorka battalion substituted. Bradford. McDonald. Troup. European and Native officers. Lord Dalhousic's neglect of promise to Goorkas. Summary of facts.

Chapter X

Commander-in-Chief's office not to be retained with honour. Suspension of pay-regulation at Wuzzecrabad. Censured by Supreme Council.

VUl CONTENTS.

Anulysiis of tluit censure. Corri'siwiuleiico. Pesliawiir Boi'iticks. Irregiilai' 001^)8. Kuliiit furt. Seulkote. Meeiiu Meer. Kuropenus crowded lit Liibore. Kepriiniuul from Govcnior-Geuenil. Observations tbereou. Sir C. Nniner resigns. Oflieiul instructions witli observations. Lord Dolhousie's political ignorance. To proclaim sovereignty is not to conquci'. Instructions to General Campbell. Frontier not defined. Ollicial letter to Lord Dalbousic. Private ditto. False position of Comnuindcr-in-Cbief. Sir U. Napier vindicates bis conduct. Analyses. Lord Dalliousie's tirst minute. Brief Keview of Lord Dalbousie's conduct.

CHAPTEli XI.

Gimt and camel. Lieutenant Herbert Edwordes — Lis oamel — Lord Dalhuasie swallows it. Sir C. Napier — his gnat — Lord Dalhousio chokes upon it ; Scale for measuring Lord Dalhousie. Correspondence.

CONTEXTS. IX

TAET 11.

Chapter I

Subject. Lord Dalhousie's jealousy. Personally to be desplsetl. Effect on public welfare. Kurrachee and Hyderabad barracks. Bombay barracks. Aden barracks. Waste of human life. 6cindo barracks. Lord Ellenborough and Lord Dalhousie. Men die of red tape. Lahore barracks. Sir C. Napier's pliui of construction. Military Board plan. Sufferings of '2nd Bengal Europeans. Of Queen's 29th, 22nd, and GOth regiments. Sabathoo, Kassowlie, and Dugshai rendered healthy. Allahabad, Lahore, Sealkote. At Peshawur officers' barracks refused by the Directors. Bad results. Barracks there make no progress. Mortality. Military Board's interference. 50th regiment crushed by fall of barracks. MDitary Board and Directors responsible. Engineer system shall be changed. Feeling of British soldiers in India. Punkas. Parsimony of Directors. Hyderabad barracks. Sir C. Napier's efforts to preserve soldiers' health frustrated by Government. Kurrachee, its coming importance.

CHAPTER IL

Commissariat.

To be placed under one Chief. Parties concerned in soldiers' supplies. Soldiers rarely complaui of their food. Courts of inquii-y. Commanding olficers. CJuarler-masters. Commissaries, their ways unknown. Contractors study Solomon's proverb. Jotee Persaud. System of military Board. Injurious to public service and private character. Delay of Audits. Commissary-General. Contractors driven to fraud by military Board.

Chapter III

Civil interference with inilitary matters. Commanders-in-Chief at Inuiie and in India. Iwiur wars uncxpcetcilly announced by massacres and lialllos. I'lceariouh position of Commanders in Chief in India. I'olilicals. Phar-

X CONTENTS.

iiuclies. McNaug}itcn. Sir F. Currie, Example of civil interference with military atliiirs. Never keep a dog and bark yourself. Sir C. Napier's dangerous position in India. Civil duties executed by soldiers injurious. Lord Dalhousie usiu^js military patronage. Offers responsibility. Lieut. Norman. Ensign Murray. Lord Dalliousie's shameful usage of Murray. Letter on civil duties. Sisyphus could not be zealous. Dispersion of Bengal Army. Cantonments. Civil magistrates. Natives hate English. Unfair duties imposed on Sepoys. Concentration of troops. Chupprasses and Birkendauses. Police battalions suppressed. Bombay and Bengal Armies compared. Sepoys good soldiers. Heavy duties. Treasure guards, Kaifir patrols. Libellous pamphlet signed a Bombay officer. Promotion by seniority. Lord Ilardinge's opinions. Geneml order. Officers should speak the language of their men. Cadets should do duty with Queen's regiments in England. Camps of instruction. Augmentation of Company's Euorpean troops opposed. Goorkas. Soldiers overburthened with unnecessaries.

Chapter IV

Want of regimental senior officers. Guards. False system. Bad customs. Old officers respected. Young officers not so. Project for a new Staff. Europeans repel natives in Society. Eiu-opean officers. Sir Thomas Munro's opinion. European officers at Meeanee. Munro and others condemn the repulsion of natives. Furloughs. Munro's scale for Eiu-opean officers invalidated by modem changes. New military nomenclature censured. Fittest regiments. 45th stocking weavers. Flank companies. Insulting conduct to soldiers. Natives treated with immerited contumely. Eastern genius great. Native officers daring, able, ambitious and amiable. Native associations. People of India bullied by some civil servants. Such conduct condemned by Munro, Shore and others. Abolishing native officers likely to produce mutiny. Equality for natives. Danger best opposed by justice. Three measures of safety. Danger not avoided by concealment. Native Aides-de-Camps of Sir C. Napier's deprived of pay on his departure. Appointments without reference to military merit.

Chapter V

Company's Artillery. Horse ArtUlery too numerous. Many officers too young for command. Connnander-in-Chief bound by red tape. Emulation of the three regiments in India. Different systems. Details. Folly of Military Board. Well horaed field batteries fast enough for warfare. Leather breeches. Directors' job. Indian Artillery (iliould form one body. Corrcbpoiideucc on removal of Bengal .iVitillery Head Quarters.

CONTENTS.

Chapter VI

Cavttlrj-. Value of diflereut horses. Sir W. Gilbert. Eutii-e horse unfit for war. Sad fate of a Sergeant. Opinions. Stud horses in Imlia worst. Carry Sir Private Patronage. Sir W. Gilbert's report Cape, Arab, Australian, and North-west country horses all superior to stud horses. Eurojiean trooper and Eastern horseman. Superiority of tiie latter not inherent. Light and Heavy Dragoons. English and Hungarian Hussai's. Valise. Militarj- dress shoidd be regulated by clmiate. Indian Cavalry should choose their own swords. Pistols. Carbines. Straight sword better than sabre. Marshal Saxe's opuiion. Steel and wooden scabbards. Eastern Cavalry. Captain Unett's fight. Native saddles.

Chapter VII

Infantry. Present and former dress of Sepoys. Musket too heavy. Rifles should be abolished. MLnie rifle not advantageous. Muskets reduced in weight. Drill diflicult hi Bengal. Goose step. Duke of York. Dundas. Sir John Moore's camp of instruction. His death and genius.

Chapter VIII

Scinde baggage corps. Disbanded from personal enmity. Fighting Camel Corps. Design and organisation. Good services. Bombay Government's attempt to abolisli it bafilecL

Chapter IX

Bombay Briberies. Lord Campbell's law. Lord Denman's opinion tliereon. Plain honest John Campbell on the hustings. On the Bench. Civil and military authorities at Bombay propose to aid a private company at the public expense; rejected by Lord Mehdlle. Messrs. Willougliby, Reid, Campbell, and Holland, involved in this baffled job. Questions on the subject. Persecution of Moonshee Ali Akbar.

Chapter X

Origin and progress of prize monej-. Queen gi-ants prize money for Scinde. Directors attempt to defraud the troops. Not the first baseness. Offered Lord Wellesley .£.100,000 to connive at defrauding the Seringnpatam Army. Royal Government protects Scinde troops. Directors made tmsteea in place of Lord Ellenborough. Cheat the troops. Lord Campbell niles that the General of an Army is neither a soldier nor an officer of that Anny. Directors attempt to deprive Sir C. Napier of his

Xll CONTENTS.

fair sharo of booty. Appeal t« the Treasury. Directors quote false precedents. Foreed to produce true precedents, Mr. Pliilliniore's inenioriul. Decision against Directors.

Chapter XI

Sir II. Willock's letter to Mr. Turner. False claims of tlie Directors. Leadenhall documents and assertions not to be believed. Memoir exposing the Directors' misconduct. Sir C. Napier's commercial measures. Creek communication. Bombay Government, a sink of iniquity. Suppresses Sir C. Napier's institutions and strives to destroy trade. Propagates falsehoods with success for five years. Directors now forced to acknowledge the great value of Scinde. Mr. Frere's good government owing to the Bombay Council being purged of Reid, WUloughby, and Crawfurd — their vilcness. Public works required in Scinde. Sir Henry Willock's ignorance. Knows notliing of Russian and Chinese trafBo by Ladak. Oxus versus Indus. Russian goods cheaper at Peshawur than English goods. Czar wiser than Directors. Kiurrachee versus Calcutta. Soonomeeanee. Horse fair abolished by Directors. Sir C. Napier's vindication of his services and ajipeal to history.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

BY THE EDITOB.

Letters from Lord EUenborough, Sergeant Casey, Rev. Edward Coleridge — Sir Robert Peel's opinion, and proceedings. Sir C. Napier's name glorious without a title. Memoir on the general defence of India. Lord Dalhousie's comments thereon, with replication. Extract of letter from Lieutenant Wood. Extract of letter from Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes. Brigadier Hearsey on civil interference. Extract from Parliamentary statistic papers on the profit from opium.

PART I.

' PRELIMINARY NOTICE.

As this work, though designed to expose prominent evils affecting the stability of our Eastern Empire, contains a vindication of my personal conduct in resigning the chief military command — which cannot be consecutively made in the narrative— a previous brief view of that matter is here given, leaving the proofs for events as they arise.

In 1849 a mutinous spirit pervaded some thirty Sepoy battalions, in march for, or actually in the Punjaub. Lord Dalhousie was then going to sea in search of health, and the Commander-in-Chief remained the man of highest power and responsibility in India; if danger arose, external or internal, he was to deal with it and answer for the public safety. Great danger did arise. The smouldering mutiny began to show itself openly at several places, notably with the Sepoys at AVuzzeerabad under Brigadier Ilearsey, and the Commander-in- Chief w^as to take care the public weal received no detriment.

At this crisis, — Lord Dalhousie being on the B .

Indian Ocean, a Government Order, — only locally applicable, — came accidentally into operation at AViizzcerabad ; it cancelled a former order of a like nature, touching the allowances to the Sepoys, and was disparaging to those soldiers. Brigadier Hearsey, thinking it would increase the discontent existing, wrote to his immediate superior. Sir AValter Gilbert, expressing fear of the result. Sir Walter, taking the same view, forwarded the letter to Colonel Grant, Adjutant-General, who laid the matter before me, urging the impropriety of the order originally, — and he was, eoc officio, intimately connected with and versed in the details of the Indian Army and all Government Orders affecting it. I concurred in his opinion and that of the other two distinguished officers of the Company's Service. The matter was critical ; the Governor-General was on the ocean ; the Supreme Council at Calcutta, fifteen hundred miles distant ; the Commander-in-Chief was on the spot, a member of the Supreme Council and especially responsible for military order, — an isolated authority indeed, yet competent to deal with a great danger calling for immediate and decisive action.

My first step was a reference to the instructions of the Duke of Wellington, where I found these words : — " On a station so distant, and of such " magnitude and j^olitical importance, you must " necessarilij act in a great measure from your own " discretion.'' Tliis was plain sense. Instruction which every commander of an army must have received since armies were first raised, and on Avhich every general must act whether so instructed or not.

Now let my position be considered.

Mutiny with the Sepoys is the most formidable danger menacing our Indian empire. Mutiny had appeared, the Governor-General had disappeared. The matter was urgent, the Supreme Council was fifteen hundred miles off, and no answer could be received from it under a month. The General of Brigade, the General of Division, and the Adjutant-General of the Company's Army were the three orthodox officers for the Commander-in- Chief to consult on details of their own service. They were distinguished men, experienced, and intimately acquainted with the Sepoys, amongst whom they had passed their lives ; their opinions, all in agreement, were before me, and concurred with my own. Wherefore, " acting on inj/ own " discretion,'' I suspended the Government Order. Mark ! it is of consequence : suspetided it as a dangerous measure, brought by accident partially into operation at a moment of great peril. But only until the Supreme Government should decide on the course to be pursued ; for the order of suspension was dated the 20tli of January 1850, and on the same day went my report stating facts and expressing confidence of Government support. What could 1 have done more ? How could I have done otherwise X

To say this discretion was injudiciously exercised will not affect the question. That which T, and the three able officers spoken of, judged most fitting was done. We believed it to be within the competence of the Commander-in-Chief or the Adjutant-General would not have so advised, and had but the one object of preventing a spread of mutiny without the calamity of using force. Hence, the emergency being imminent, the discretion exercised was one of right in my position, and moreover actually enjoined by the Duke of Wclliniiton's instructions. To have shrunk from it would have been to show myself unworthy of command.

For thus acting, in a mode imposed on me not only by the nature of the crisis and positive instructions from home, but by Lord Dalhousie himself before he went to sea, — as shall be shown further on, — I was, by the same Lord Dalhousie, three months after the event, reprimcuulcd in the most offensive manner. I repeat, in the most offensive manner ; because a man, really designing to give support, would have written with his omii hand, or by his private secretary, not as he did, through the medium of officers under my command !

On receiving this insulting reprimand, which also forbade me to use my discretion on such matters " under any circumstances," in India, where the safety of the empire and the honour of the Army might call for instant decision, I decided to give up a command, which, from that moment, would have combined impotence with responsibility, and, so degraded, could only be held for the sake of lucre. Through the Duke of Wellington Her Majesty was graciously pleased to accede to my resignation and I returned to England.

This is a succinct account of my sudden retirement, and those who only desire that explanation may shut the book ; but those who, taking an interest in the affairs of India and the public welfare, read on, will find proof that I acted with prudence and success; that Lord Dalhousie's conduct was unjustifiable ; that remote causes inflaenced him, and rendered my stay in India, while he was Governor-General, useless to the Army and dangerous to myself. With power to serve the public my office would have been retained ; but that no such power was mine, a narrative of events during the two years my command lasted will prove ; that is to say, two years' service, with great responsibility but no authority — furnishing a peg for the Governor- General to hang his own blunders upon. Sixteen thousand a year was my pay as a scape-goat, but reputation was dearer to me.

Why I went to India a second time, notwithstanding much ill treatment before sustained in that country, and why I returned so suddenly will be found in detail further on. But here it may be noted, that to resign before the expiration of the regular term was not peculiar to me. Lord Dalhousie's own father is said to have so done on the same ground ; and of thirteen Commanders-in-Chief within this century, five only have retained their posts the full term of five years. — one being Lord Hastings, who united the office with that of Governor-General.

Chapter I

Appointed to the command of the Indian Armies against my own wish and my conviction of its inutility, I went expecting to find war. I found peace, and soon discovered that the absence of danger would excite and foster intrigues and secret hostility against one unfavourably regarded by the Court of Directors and the AYliig Government. Amongst those governing bodies might be some who placed confidence in me, but party feelings and private enmity were active before my departure. No cause for this hostility, especially on the part of the Directors, was known to me, save my previous zealous obedience to Lord Ellenborough when he was Governor-General; for it would appear the Directors, and possibly the Whig Government, wished me, a Major-General, to disobey and thwart that nobleman. A person in office at the time, wrote to me with friendly warning, to forbear any public expression of admiration for Lord Ellenborough, as likely to be injurious to my own interests !

His Lordship was then to me unknown even by sight, but finding him just and wise, the warning received did not deter me from praising what appeared great and honourable in his conduct. Obedience was my duty, yet against a zealous performance of it I was warned as injurious to my oivti interests ! Always, however, a consideration for my own interest has led me to act honestly, and abide consequences. This obedience is the only traceable cause for the great hostility constantly evinced towards me — hostility which has not, however, damaged me in public opinion ; on the contrary, it damaged my enemies, and my honest conduct caused me to be sent out in despite of them as Commander-in-Chief, when those who basely vihfied Lord Ellenborough were, and are still, held in contempt both by the Queen's and Company's Armies in India.

I have said the appointment was against my wish. When the Duke of Wellington first told me of it, I objected that my many enemies in India would mar its usefulness ; he laughed at that, pressed the matter home, and concluded thus : " //" t/ou don't ffo, I must.'' Still reluctant, from a firm conviction of the justice of my own view, I asked twenty-four hours for reflection. That was conceded, and finally a grateful sense of the public will prevailed. But scarcely was this arranged, when proof on proof arose that, with exception of Her Majesty, the Duke, the people of England, and the Armies of India, I was to expect from all other quarters that secret base hostility which is proverbially difficult for honourable men to repel.

Amongst the indications leading to this conclusion was the following. Lord John Russell, at an interview, gave me to understand that doubts had arisen as to appointing me one of the Supreme Council, as all my predecessors had been. Ho intimated that the Directors were seeking for a precedent, and would probably find one for denying it to me. Lord John was explicitly and perempcHAr. I.] 8

torily told on the instant, that I also would seek, and if I did not Jind would make a precedent, for to India I would not go unless as one of the Council. Six years I had served in the East with success as a military commander, and as a civil governor ; I had received the approbation of my Sovereign and the thanks of Parliament for victories which the public voice had applauded ; and I had been again called to command in the same country by that Sovereign and that public, and the expectation of my submitting to such an insult from the Directors was preposterous.

That a degraded command should have been offered or even discussed, showed that my measure of the Directors' temper was more exact than that taken by them of mine, when they thought I would ffo shorn of honour which others had received ; but another indication of hostility was soon furnished.

Tlie strength of public feeling relative to the Indian command at this time must be remembered ; the victory of Goojerat was unknown, all persons connected with India were cast down in spirit, and a protracted warfare in the Punjaub was expected. That province is traversed by many rivers, five of which are large and dangerous for troops ; to pass them is difficult, especially in face of an enemy, and my business was to prepare in time for such operations; wherefore, having heard from Lord Ellenborough that Lieutenant Wood of the Indian Navy, an officer well acquainted with those waters, was in London, I sought him out. He was a very intelligent man in the prime of life, knowing the rivers and speaking the languages of the tribes on their banks, and most anxious to go if he could be of service to the Company. My design was to enlist a body of English sailors at Calcutta, and so form a powerful bridge train, but I could get no definitive answer from the Directors. After I left London the Duke of Wellington, at my instance, also endeavoured to get Lieutenant Wood appointed, and was refused !

This was strong evidence of an inimical spirit working to the injury of the public at a critical moment, and where it was difficult to imagine the Court could have hesitated. Why were the services of Lieutenant Wood refused ! Was my application a job 1 That officer was to me unknown, save by Lord Ellenborough's recommendation and his own book ; he made no application to be employed ; he was sought out as a man who could do good service, and was ready to devote himself to the public. Here, then, at the outset, was not only a denial of just support, but opposition to evident public good, — opposition calculated to shake the confidence of any commander. Of what importance could it be to the Directors to prevent a Lieutenant of their Navy going to India, when his particular quahfication made his presence there of vast importance in the opinion of the Indian Commander, and that of the Duke of Wellington \ My having asked for him ought alone to have been sufficient. It was so with the Duke, who applied for him and was earnest to assist me, yet could not succeed !

Pressed by the Government to hasten my departure, I left England in the night of the 24th March, the anniversary of the victory at Hydrabad, reached Alexandria in fourteen days, embarked at Suez on the 11th of April, arrived at Calcutta the 6th May, and assumed the command of the vVrmies in India forty-three days after quitting London.

Chap. I.] 10

At Simla, my first interview with Lord Dalhousie tended to confirm my suspicions that secret hostility was also at work in India. In ten minutes he told me in substance, nay, the words were, " that in " letters from England he had been warned against " my endeavouring to encroach upon his power, " and had answered, he would take damned good " care I should not." This was said in a half laughing manner, but the impression made by the letters was evident, although a little reflection might have convinced him that no Commander-in-Chief could desire to increase his own labour by usurping the powers of the Governor-General. Being resolved however, that nothing on my part should give strength to the erroneous ideas which had been so mischievously created in Lord Dalhousie's mind by others, I answered that he was quite right in his determination, but might believe there was no wish to infringe on his authority. It will appear in the sequel that this silly phantom of my ambition haunted him to the last ; yet our conversation was, on the whole satisfactory, and we went on well together at Simla. Since my resignation, it has been told me that certain persons about him tried, secretly, to excite his jealousy; this may or may not be, it was unkno'vvn to me at the time and I have never inquired who those gentlemen were.

Chapter II

Less than a month after my arrival at Simla, a mutinous spirit arose among some of the Native regiments of the Bengal Army ; a matter which shall be here fully exposed, for on that question my command was resigned.

Lord Dalhousie told me the Native regiments, while in the Punjaub, had received an additional pay from Government, because, after passing the frontier they were considered as on foreign service ; but when the Punjaub was annexed the Sepoys there had no more right to higher pay than the rest of the Army, and he had ordered their allowances to be reduced. This was just ; but it was reducing the pay of mercenaries, which is always a delicate affair and should be done with great caution through the Military Chiefs. It was not so done ; yet, in justice to Lord Dalhousie, it must be said that it was a matter of detail with which he was not acquainted, nor , aware of the danger it might create. It was the fault of those about him, he only acted in the ordinary undiscriminating official routine ; but the measure was executed in the same spirit, that is to say, without looking into cause and effect; for some men imagine they can deal with soldiers as so many automatons without the feeUngs or aspirations of other human beings.

Chap. Ii.] 12

Official men often think that, to issue an order secures its execution. Lord Dalhousie, judging a reduction of the Sepoys' pay a proper measure, ordered it, and thought that sufficient to ensure quiet execution, lie was mistaken, and his error caused great danger to the State and ruin to many brave Sepoys ! He indeed, treated this mutiny amongst the native troops very lightly, after it had been supiyressed ; but he, and those who, like him have done so, know little of Indian interests. The ablest and most experienced civil and military servants of the East India Company consider mutiny as one of the greatest, if not the greatest danger threatening India, — a danger also that may come unexpectedly, and, if the first symptoms be not carefully treated, with a power to shake Leadenhall. Whether the mutiny in question was so treated will be seen in the following pages, in which its origin, progress and suppression, together with the conduct of Lord Dalhousie are exposed.

Many military men, and others belonging to the Indian Civil Service, who remember what bloodshedding there was in former mutinies of far less formidable character, still survive, and will admit that this one was successfully dealt with ; for without sacrifice of life on the scaffold, or otherwise, Lord Dalhousie and India were extricated from a great peril, provoked by his inexperience in government and incapacity for dealing with armed men. That my duty was successfully done shall be maintained, yet without disputing the right of the Governor-General to reprimand the Commander-in-Chief: nevertheless, it is the ri(jht of the Commander-in-Chief to resign if the Governor- General, acting unjustly in addition to rebuke, deprives him of the power to execute the duties of