A view of the philosophical principles of phrenology

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Preface

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~ Wuorver wishes for truth is a philosopher; and of philosophers there are as many varieties as there are departments of knowledge as well physical as metaphysical. The title, however, is more particularly given to him who looks for exact notions and positive knowledge founded on principles dependant on the relations between cause and effect.

It is unfortunate for humanity, that those who assume distinctive titles do not act up to them. From this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall into discredit. Pretended patriots have sometimes been more dangerous than declared enemies ; pretended Christians worse than heathens. Who would not be styled philosopher, or friend, or lover, of wisdom? Yet is this name often applied to decry individuals and their manner of thinking. Let us only observe that all who call themselves philosophers deserve not the title any more than do all their’s who are called noble.

The ancient philosophers were, in general, metaphysicians, that is, they examined objects, without the reach of observation ; for'instance, the primitive © v1 PREFACE.

cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, &c. 1 incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out what the mind is in itself. Phrenologists are observers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestations of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place. In my work, entitled ‘“ Phrenology,” a great mass of incontestable facts is collected. This volume will contain philosophical reflections, and inferences’ only. It will be divided into seven sections. Inthe first I shall examine the modes of action of the fundamental powers of the mind, and the necessity of rectifying by Phrenology all the systems of philosophy which have ever been given to the world; in the second, give a new nomenclature of the fundamental powers of the mind, state their aim, the disorders which may result from them, and the consequences of their inactivity ; in the third, discuss their origin ; in the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations ; in the fifth, the moral nature of man; in the sixth, make some practical reflections ; and, in the seventh, explain several philosophical expressions, according to the fundamental powers of the mind.

The contents of this volume made a part of the two first editions of the Physiognomical System. The subjects, however, are here treated more in detail ; new expositions are added, and the arrangement of the whole is undoubtedly improved.

“CONTENTS.

Section I

On the fundamental powers of the mind. General view

Opinions of Idealogists —- - - - = - Attention - - - eS - r * Perception - - - ta 5 i - Memory - : 2 i = = a .

Reminiscence - - - - = < 4 &.

Imagination - ie - - = - 4 Judgment . a. ~ : tye re 2 Association - - = 3 = ” Z * Opinions of Moralists - - - xa J Will - - - 7 - - > a : Affections - - - - = = ‘i Passions - - A . ’ - ‘i e On religion in general - - - s - £

Section II

Fundamental powers of the mind, and their classification Affective faculties common to man and animals - Affective faculties proper to man ee a Pe ee Intellectual faculties m0 - - - - -

Section III

Origin of the fundamental faculties. - - -~ - All is innate in Man sin i~ eye Side rs é A few general faculties produce the particular dispositions

= Man’s faculties are the result of education 4 .

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Vili CONTENTS.

Of the external senses as the cause of the mental powers Of accidental circumstances as the cause of the mental powers - - - - - - - - - Society - - “# a - « 4 4 + 2 Misery PEP eta ets ee a EN wy Cie 5 Climate - - - - - . = A - : Of prepared circumstances as the cause of our faculties Innateness of the mental faculties ~ * hj 5 u.

Section V

The moral character of man ~ = = as w 2 Materialism - - = : = eS = 2 Fatalism - - - ~ - A “ . i Liberty - - ~ - - A *s 2 Moral Liberty - - ~ = Mec S i Morality - a la a mM ok te Origin ofevil - - = PD Fe ed al Ss i Comparison between natural religion and morality and the Christian morality = - e p a d 5 SECTION VI.

Practical considerations « - a % é és a Modifications of the affective and intellectual faculties 4 Difficulty of judging others - a ee 3 2 5 Sympathy and Antipathy * = a z 3 : Happiness of man - : Z e J 2 x ~ Bettering the lot of man : ‘ . ‘ S yp Personal liberty - - - - = ihaee :

Section VII

Explanation of Philosophical expressions - - . Recapitulation and conclusion ~ - - . " "

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155 164 171 174 181 184

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES.

OF

PHREN OLOGY.

SECTION I. Of the Fundamental Powers of the Mind

Generant VIEW.

In order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental functions, a capital error must be avoided,—an error which prevails in the systems of all philosophers ; it consists in their having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, like naturalists, having admitted three sorts of notions: general, common, and special. This distinction is essential to the classification of beings into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In knowing the general qualities of inanimate objects, such as extension, configuration, consistency, colour,—even in knowing the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids; we are not yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c., it is indispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if varieties exist, to state even their distinctive characters.

B ris)

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are particular; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c. ; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness.

Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each particularly, but they consider their animal life, in a manner, quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is explained by means of the word instimet. Animals eat and drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the field-mouse makes provisions for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c., and ali by instinct. ‘This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. ‘The knowledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct ? Is it a personified being, an entity, . a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ygnorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification 5 thus the word ¢nstinct denotes every inclination to act arising from. within.

Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating

FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES. : a that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined, The term instinct may be compared with that of motion. Planets turn round the sun; the moon round the earth; the magnetic needle towards the north ; rivers fall into the ocean; animals walk, run, or fly; the blood circulates ; and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of animals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the ‘various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, and must, therefore, be looked for and specified.

Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by instinct. It is true that seme of their doings, such as the labours of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, but many animals modify their actions according to external circumstances, they even select one among different motives, and. often resist their internal impulsions or instincts, A dog may be hungry, but with the opportunity he will not eat, because he remembers the blows which he has received for having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following’ his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he overtakes his master.

This shews that some animals act with understanding. On the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if men of great genius manifest talents without knowing that such faculties exis if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any

BZ tuition, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind.

The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas entertained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its faculties. Many of them reduce all the mind’s operations to sensation, and all its faculties to sensibility; others call this general faculty understanding, or intellect.

Here we must make reflections on understanding similar to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist independent of each other. ~ icone painters cannot always become great musicians; profound mathematicians may be without any talent for poetry; and excellent generals may be miserable legislators. Hence, in the study of man, it is necessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sensation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sensation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary to specify the kinds of sensation, since sensations of hunger, friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of forms, colours, localities, &c., cannot be of one and the same sort, any more than the senses of feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessary to specify the various internal, as well as the external senses.

Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not al-

FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES. 5 ways act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and peculiar sounds which accompany the rather energetic expression of the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say that he always acts with understanding? We too often choose the worse even in knowing the better.

The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers : un~ derstanding and will. They, however, merit the same reproach as the zoologists who consider the actions of animals as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understanding alone. ‘They attach themselves to generalities, and neglect, particulars; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will as well as those of understanding. For it cannot be the same faculty which makes us love ourselves and our neighbours, which is fond of destroying and of preserving, which feels self-esteem or seeks others’ approbation. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one time in a good, at another in a bad acceptation, must be laid | open. Every special faculty of the mind, therefore, is to be determined individually.

Though many philosophers have considered understanding and’ will as the fundamental powers of the mind, they have conceived particular modes of action in each of them. Understanding mayact as perception, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and as attention,—one of the most important of these modified operations, The will may produce

6 - FUNDAMENTAL FACULTIES.

sensuality, selfishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlightened and external circumstances modified.

From this it appears that philosophical considerations on the mind have hitherto been general; and whilst the study of the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, another has devoted itself to that of the will, principally as embracing the doctrine of our duties. Yet neither of them has determined any special faculty. ‘They have always taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also overlooked one of the most important conditions to the exhibition of affective and intellectual powers, viz., the organization of the brain. oe

The first of these classes of philosophers is styled Jdealogians, the second Moralists. This separation, and the consequent destruction of that harmony which ought to reign between the two, are to be lamented. Idealogians and moralists differ not only in their pursuits, but each criminates the other, and endeavours to confine it within certain limits. Idealogians deride the studies of Moralists, and these often decry Idealogians as the greatest enemies of mankind.

Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several opinions. As, however, it is easier to look for truth alone than to detect it when rapt up in error, I shall make only a few summary remarks ; first, on the notions of Idealogians and then on the doctrines of Moralists, and endeavour to put

Phrenology in harmony with both branches of philosophy.

CHAPTER L

On the Opimons of Idealogians ; or, on the Modes of Aciton of the Intellectual Faculties.

THE mind considered as the power which knows was the object treated of in all the ancient, as it is still in all the modern, philosophical systems. The Greek philosophers paid great attention to this subject. ‘The Romans made no improvement in it; they only learned from the Greeks.—The earliest philosophers made no distinction between considerations or thoughts, and objects considered or thought of ; they particularly studied cosmogony, God, and the soul. Later philosophers began to distinguish the considerations of the mind from the objects which are considered. ‘Two classes of philosophers, therefore, arose. Some admitted the senses as particular means of acquiring knowledge; others regarded their testimony as illusive, and confided in the understanding alone. Democritus admitted both kinds of knowledge, but considered: that obtained by the senses as changeable and not to be depended on; and therefore gave the preference to knowledge obtained by the understanding. In their philosophical examinations, both classes of philosophers, generally, considered external objects much more than the nature of man.

Socrates gave a particular direction to philosophical investigation. He thought it more reasonable to examine things in relation to man, and the principles of his moral conduct, than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of the human mind, and consequently do not relate to it. The philosophy of Socrates was in general practical.

Plato also distinguished the knowledge obtained by the senses from that obtained from within ; and observed that the former is individual and simple, while the latter is general. He admitted, moreover, certain considerations, in regard to the mind, though destitute of all experience, as necessary and positive.

After the restoration of the sciences, Bacon, Descartes, and Leibnitz, were eminent in philosophy, in different ways. Bacon established his philosophy upon the basis of observation and induction... The essentials of Descartes’ philosophy were thought and the knowledge obtained by thought. Like Plato, Leibnitz never arranged his philosophy methodically, but it admits two kinds of perceptions, one without and the other with consciousness; it considers the knowledge procured by the senses as individual, accidental, and changeable; but that obtained by thinking and reasoning, as general, necessary, and positive. According to this system, the reasoning power is endowed with principles, and all phenomena are intellectual. .

Locke maintained that all knowledge springs from experience, and that all conceptions are founded on sensations,. but that our mind never acquires any knowledge of objects themselves. Condillac, and the French philosophers, agree with Locke about the origin of our knowledge, and never examine things in themselves, but only judge of their relations to each other. Hume not only confines all. knowledge to mere experience, but denies the necessity of causality.

Rerkeley, so far from examining objects in themselves, even:

denies the possibility of proving the existence of external objects.

The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the philosophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical. philosophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), and another founded on belief (Krittk der practischen Vernunft). He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual relations only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject he conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object ; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism; upon the union of the subject and object ; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and conceived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds—to quantity, quality, relation, and. modality ; of these the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other, and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions independent »of experience, as conceptions of space, time, cause, and others; and considers these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject: they exist @ priori, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, and of immortality, are not experimental, but belong to the practical understanding, and originate @ priori. Liberty is a postulatum.

Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcendental idealism, according to which all certainty and reality is confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, arrives at intellectual intuition.

The philosophy of nature rejects subject and object, makes no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual intuition, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. It does not consider the objects as existing but as originating; it constructs them speculatively &@ priort. Absolute liberty and existence without qualities, are the basis of this system. |

My mind can never rise to similar conceptions: it is con4 fined to analysis. Following the principle of Bacon, I wish to collect as many facts as possible, to compare them, and to draw conclusions, or form inductions.

As the system of Locke is the basis of the greater number of philosophic opinions in England and France, I shall compare its principles with my philosophy, and shew how far I agree with him, and wherein our opinions differ. Like Locke, I think that truth is to be placed above all other considerations ;

with him, too, I think we cannot.examine the nature of the

MODES OF ACTION OF THE FACULTIES. 1l mind, but only observe its faculties; Dr. Gall and I, therefore, study the organs by means of which these are manifested. With Locke, I admit innate capacities, but not innate ideas or innate principles, He, however, denies the innateness of ideas and principles on a ground different from mine, v22., because certain children and adults, and even nations, are without them, or possess them variously modified.: Granting the fact is so, Locke’s position is not proved thereby, because inactivity of the faculties is explained by insufficient development of their appropriate organs ; and modifications of ideas and principles result from different and dissimilar combinations of the faculties; a subject which I shall treat particularly by-and-by.

Locke admits only one primitive source of the activity of the mind—external impressions on the senses; whilst, if I speak of the mind generally, I still admit a second, which is internal, According to Locke, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its perception, contemplation, retention, comparison, and its faculties of composing and abstracting, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition : the feelings also, in his system, primitively result from external. impressions, and mediately from the understanding. I, on the contrary, separate the propensities and sentiments of the mind from its understanding ; independently of which they exist, and to which they bear no proportion ; they are internal faculties, which, it is true, may be excited by external impressions, but which are often active by their own inherent. power alone. ‘They are innate as particular faculties, and are inseparable from the nature of man, though their determinate actions be not so. According to Locke, moral principles must.

be proved ; but T think they must be felt: reasoning does not produce them any more than it produces the perception of colours, or of musical tones.

In regard to the understanding, Locke thinks that it is by means of the five senses and their impressions alone, that it conceives the existence of external objects, their separable or sensible and their inseparable or original qualities, such as extent, figure, and mobility. I am of opinion that the mind conceives very few ideas by the senses alone, and that peculiar parts of the brain are commonly necessary. In my physiological work entitled Phrenology, I treat of the immediate and mediate functions of the five senses ; to the latter of which belong our conceptions of the existence of bodies, of their form, size, weight, colour, order, and number. ‘The understanding as a reflective power acts, in my opinion, not only upon the sensations and conceptions of external objects, but also upon the propensities and sentiments, the sources of which are internal; these, as well as external sensations and perceptions, it knows, compares, considers in different ways, and determines in their various relations. Moreover, I do not only admit an internal activity of mind independent of external experience as the propensities and sentiments are concerned, but also with Kant, as understanding and experimental knowledge, even-as the reflective powers are implicated. The conception of dimension, that the whole for stance 1s greater than the half, does not result from experience, but from an internal faculty. The conception that there is nothing without a cause, is also internal. These general conceptions are the attributes of the internal faculties of the understanding, just as the particular feelings are of the

— propensities and sentiments. ‘The general conceptions of experimental knowledge which arise from within, and the primitive feelings, are calculated for the external world; and the general conceptions of the reflective powers of the mind are calculated for experimental and sentimental knowledge. ‘This second knowledge, then, is as positive as the first; for we know our feelings as well as we do our sensations and perceptions by the five senses, Every determinate action of any faculty whatever depends on two conditions, the faculty and its object. The activity of every feeling and the general conceptions of the perceptive faculties are merely applied to the external world; whilst the general conceptions of the reflective faculties are applied to experimental knowledge and to the feelings. In a perfect state of mind, all conditions must agree and harmonize with each other. If, for instance, external impressions do not agree with the ordinary state of man, and with the respective internal faculties, they are illusive; and if internal faculties suppose in external objects something which experience does not confirm, they also err: each condition must correspond. with another, and all be conformable to the conceptions of reflection ; and these again apply to the actions of the particular faculties.

Thus, in a perfect system of the knowledge of man, every particular faculty must be pointed out and considered in its concordance with every other. I recognise internal powers and external faculties, by whose intermedium the mind and the external world are brought into communication, and made mutually influencient. The internal faculties differ essentially in their nature, and may either act by their own power, or be excited by appropriate impressions from without, Some of them make man act, while others modify, assist, and direct his actions. Some procure a relative knowledge of external objects, and others bring all the faculties into harmony, in order to constitute unity. If such a system be practical, it requires first a knowledge of particulars, and if these be capable of useful application, they must be reduced to generals, and even to unity. All modern idealogians admit several mental operations, which they ascribe to various faculties, or to particular laws or categories, according to which the mind acts. Their opinions differ only in as far as the number of faculties, or the modes in which the mind acts, are concerned. Nevertheless, it is certain that they have considered general operations and modes of action or effects only, and have discovered. none of the fundamental faculties of the mind. « Let us examine the particulars.

1. Aitention.

Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive power of the mind, active throughout all its varied operations, and the basis on which observation and reflection repose. < It is attention,” says Helvetius*, “‘ more or less active, which fixes objects more or less in the memory.” According to Vicg d’ Azyr, apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have no attention. Dr. Reid +- makes a distinction between attention and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second

_ ‘ Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 60.

MODES. OF ACTION OF TIE FACULTIES. 15 an involuntary act; while other philosophers, with Locke, confound these two mental operations. _ To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the mind, I reply, that atteniton, in none of its acceptations, is a single faculty ; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular. sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it happen that an individual animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another? Sheep never attend to philosophy or theology ; and while the squirrel and ring-dove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, individuals are influenced in their attention to different objects, even by sex and age: little girls prefer dolls, ribands, c., as play things ; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty conversation; one with the recital of events which touch the heart, and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on. The word attention denotes no more than the active state of any Intellectual faculty; or, im other terms, attention is the effect of the intellectual faculties, acting either from their proper force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one or several affective faculties. Hence there are as many species of attention as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of colouring, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, and also why it is impossible to succeed in any pursuit or undertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect success in an art or science, when the individual power on which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The. affective faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the faculty of artificial language; boys who are fond of applause will be apt to study with more attention and perseverance than those who are without such a motive.

ii. Consciousness or Perception.

Speculative philosophers have incessantly spoken of the singleness of consciousness, and of there being nothing but consciousness or sensation in animal life. Now, though it be true, in a general way, that all operations of the mind are accompanied with consciousness, it by no means follows that perception, or consciousness of the impressions, is one of its fundamental faculties. Consciousness, in fact, is a general term, and is an effect of the activity of one or several of the intellectual faculties. ‘There are, further, various kinds of perception or consciousness, one of which, and not another, may be possessed, and which, reciprocally, are in no proportion to each other. It is, therefore, incumbent on philosophers to specify each individual kind of perception, or consciousness. These are, in fact, as numerous as the fundamental powers of the mind.