The American theory of government considered with reference to the present crisis

Front matter

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Chapter I. • Value Of The Union

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§ 1. Devotion to the Union should be based on sound reasoning 7

2. The object of Government, and the right to institute it 8

3. The benefits of the Union in the past, a reasonable basis for esti-

mating its benefits in the future , 9

4. Difficulty of designating the dividing line between the sections. . . . 10

5. Frequent wars would be the consequence of permanent dissolution. 10

6. These wars would be carried on by regular soldiers 12

7. The evils of War 13

8. Effects of dissolution upon National Credit IT

9. Effects of dissolution upon the investment of capital 18

10. Dissolution fatal to supremacy at sea 19

11. Despotism the ultimate result of dissolution 19

13. A despotism inimical to a free press 25

14. Dissolution exposes us to foreign aggression 25

Chapter II. Causes Of The Crisis

§ 1. Causes of the Crisis stated 27

2. Circumstances under which the Constitution was framed and ratified 29

4. The radical vice of the confederation practically continued in the

Constitution 34

Yl CONTENTS.

7. Other effects of divided sovereignty 43

8. Character of the reserved powers 44

11. The general corruption of our public men 51

15. An elective Judiciary 62

CHAPTEE III.

§ 1. The ultimate remedy stated 68

2. There should be no State Sovereignty 71

3. The Executive Power. 73

4. The Legislative Power , 77

5. The Judiciary 80

6. Sala/ies 81

7. Slavery 82

8. Conclusion 82

THE

AMERICAN THEORY OF GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTEE I.

VALUE OF THE UNION.

"It is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national Union to your collective and individual happiness." — Washington.

§ 1. Devotion to the Union should be based on sound reasoning.

The acute Calhoun, in that memorable speech, (the last one of any importance delivered by him in the Senate,) in speaking of the former union between the parent country and her colonies, very justly said :

" Washington was born and grew up to manhood under that union. He acquired his early distinction in its service, and there is every reason to believe that he was devotedly attached to it. But his devotion was a rational one. He was attached to it not as an end, but as a means to an end."

It may with equal truth be said, that the devotion of " the illustrious Southerner, whose mortal remains repose on the banks of the Potomac," to the present Union, " was a rational one ; " for, unless the Union be intrinsically valuable " as a means to an end," it is unworthy of our love and respect, and should not and cannot be permanently sustained. And Mr. Calhoun was equally right, when he said in the same speech :

" It cannot, then, be saved by eulogies on the Union, however splendid and numerous. The cry of ' Union, Union — the glorious Union ! ' can no more prevent disunion, than the cry of ' health, health — glorious health ! ' on the part of the physician, can save a patient lying dangerously ill."

The time has been when no estimate of the value of the Union need to have been made. All was then internal peace and fraternal love. But that time has passed away ; and we are now in a great crisis — a severe trial — a conclusive test, and must meet it as best we may. If we should prove unequal to the task, and be unable to rise with the mighty occasion, the world will have ample reason to know that we are but a degenerate people, and false claimants of merits not our own. We should, then, under existing circumstances, calmly and justly estimate the true value of the Union, and the ultimate probable effects of a permanent dissolution when accomplished. "We shall then be prepared to make the greater efforts to prevent that overwhelming misfortune ; for the efforts of a people, like those of an individual, will be in proportion to the estimated magnitude of the end to be attained.

§ 2. The object of Government, and the right to institute it.

It may be proper, in this place, to remark, that the main blessings of government consist not so much in conferring affirmative good, as in preventing intolerable evils. The primary object of government is to protect individuals against each other, and the combined whole against foreign enemies. It is not expected that government should contribute to the support of individuals, but that they should contribute to the support of the government. Men, when they enter into political society, must give up a portion of their individual natural rights, and confer upon their governmental agents the power to afford them efficient individual and national protection in return for the rights thus surrendered, and the powers thus conferred. This protection is the greater good ; otherwise government would not exist.

It may also be proper to state in this connection, that, as a general rule, each distinct people have the political right to determine from time to time the form and powers of their own government. This right, however, is vested in the combined whole, speaking through the majority as its proper organs, and not in each separate part, acting alone for itself; otherwise a part would bo greater than the whole. But what constitutes a distinct people is often a very difficult question, which can only he determined by the circumstances of each particular case. No intelligible general rule can be laid down ; because nature herself has not, in most cases, distinctly marked the appropriate boundaries of empires.

§ 3. The benefits of the Union in the past, a rational basis for estimating its benefits in the future.

The benefits derived from the Union in the past have been too palpable to need proof. They are seen everywhere, on land and on sea, at home and abroad. Our progress, in all the elements of material greatness, has been unprecedented. It has surely been sufficiently rapid to satisfy reasonable minds. "We know from actual, and not merely speculative proof, what we have already accomplished. Could the same success have been attained without the Union ? If not, can we reasonably expect to prosper in the future by dissolution ? The proper answer to this question will depend upon a just estimate of the circumstances now existing, and those that will probably arise in the future.

As the geographical position, and the natural resources of our country, will be the same in the future as in the past, the argument drawn from this fact to show that we are, in the nature of the case, but one people, will always remain substantially the same. If it be true that our country has been so favored by nature, as to render one government for the whole, the most beneficial for each and every part, then no permanent severance of the Union can be justified by mere temporary causes. Permanent effects should flow from permanent causes. Time will cure temporary evils ; and it is wiser to endure them, trusting to the future justice of our country, than to war against the laws of nature. Our separation from Great Britain was justified, not so much by the alleged oppressions of the parent country, as by the fact that we could not be properly governed as one people. Our distance from the seat of government beyond seas, and the extent and varied capacity of our own country to sustain a distinct and powerful nation, were ample and permanent reasons for a permanent separation.

§ 4. Difficulty of designating the dividing line "between the

sections.

As a dissolution is possible, we will suppose it accomplished for the sake of the argument only ; and then estimate, as well as we can, the probable legitimate results that will flow from such a condition. In doing so, we pass over the difficulty of dividing the public property, this being a temporary evil that time could cure.

The geographical features of the country are such, that the difficulty of determining the line separating the sections would seem to be insuperable. If we suppose the line so drawn as to separate the free from the slave States, the two divisions would be separated by an arbitrary air line, easily crossed at all points, and run without the least regard to the natural features of the country. It would commence on the Atlantic shore and extend west, passing more than two thousand miles through a country generally fertile, of good surface for settlement, with sufficient timber and water, and capable of sustaining a dense population in immediate proximity to the line on both sides of it ; thus dividing our territory into two long narrow strips, lying with their sides to each other. There being between the two sections no impassable mountain ranges, or other serious natural obstructions, the only practicable mode of preventing smuggling would be to have no tariff. To fortify such a line, so as to make invasion difficult, would be impossible. Besides, this arbitrary line severs the great natural arteries of commerce, connecting every part of the rich and extensive valley of the Mississippi with the Gulf of Mexico. The position of this line would be determined, not by the natural features of the country, but upon the basis of a social institution, which, in the natural progress of population, will not probably endure to the end of the present century in many of the States where it now exists.

§ 5. Frequent wars would be the consequence of permanent

dissolution.

The people on both sides of this long line of division would be brought face to face ; and, as they speak the same language, the excitable masses would understand the insults of each other.

Our present national patriotic songs would no longer be sung, but would become obsolete and be forgotten. Other patriotic songs, celebrating alternate victories and defeats of both sections, would take their places. How could peace be preserved between dense masses of population thus situated?

The truth of this position is shown by the experience of other nations. The States of South America are generally divided from each other by air lines ; and, though the people are of the same mixed races, profess the same religion, speak the same language, and have substantially the same manners and customs, revolutions and desolating wars are very common among them. The main reason is their proximity to each other. Brazil and Chili form exceptions to this rule ; and, while the government of the first is a monarchy and that of the second a republic, they are both prosperous. Brazil is practically separated from other States by vast uninhabited tracts of country ; and her greater population, and preponderating power, give her additional security. Chili is separated from La Plata by the Andes on the east, and from Bolivia by a desert on the north.* Contiguous nations are always enemies. The history of the world shows this to be true. Before the union of Scotland and England, the two nations were nearly always at war. The effect, of the union has been to prevent these frequent wars ; and this is the main reason why it has proven of such immense benefit to both countries. The mutual advantages of the union all admit. (Iial-

* The population of Brazil is some 8,000,000. Navy in 1857 consisted of forty-two ships in active service. Total naval force in 1858, 4,600 men. Revenue in 1859, was 19| millions of dollars. Expenditures 18 millions. " The soundness of the general financial condition of the country was made evident during the commercial panic in the latter part of 1857, when Brazil stood firm, while almost all other countries were drawn into the vortex of the crisis." (New Am. Cy., art. Brazil.)

The population of Chili in 1857 was 1,558,453. " The Chilians are not a longlived people ; pulmonary diseases, affections of the heart and liver, and epidemic dysentery prove fatal to great numbers, and reduce the average duration of human life there to a lower point than in more variable climates." " The climate, though so delightful, seems to predispose the inhabitants to apathy and indolence, the dolce far niente of Italy." " A large part of the soil of Chili is unproductive." " The Chilenos are more enterprising than the inhabitants of most of the South American States, and the planters and merchants often accumulate large amounts of property." The mercantile marine in 1848 was 105 vessels, tonnage 12,628. In 1858, 269 vessels, tonnage 62,209. Increase in ten years 164 vessels, and 49,581 tons. " The improvement of the people in intelligence, wealth, and social progress, has been rapid within the last six years." (Id., art. Chili.)

lam's Constitutional History, 675.) England and France are neighboring nations and hereditary enemies.

Besides these causes of war, there would exist others not to be overlooked or forgotten. The people inhabiting the free States of the valley of the Mississippi, would never rest satisfied while the months of that river were in the possession of a foreign power. From the delicate and intricate nature of the interests involved, no treaty stipulations could possibly avoid difficulties. One party would feel insecure under the consciousness that the other was master of all access by water to the ocean. This jealousy and fear would inevitably produce collisions.

§ 6. These wars would he carried on by -regular soldiers.

Each section is threaded with railroads and telegraphic lines, and a large invading force could be concentrated at almost any point along the line, within three days' time. In the present advanced state of the world, no time is lost in sending orders, and very little in concentrating troops. Napoleon said war was the art of concentrating, the greatest number of men at a given point within a given time. The knowledge of the science and art of war is- so well diffused in this age, and the courage of disciplined troops of different nations is so nearly equal, that numbers generally prevail. The general history of battles within the present century will prove this to be true. Napoleon, in his first campaigns, was able to rout his enemies ; but long before the close of his career, he could only drive them from the field in good order. In most of the great battles fought by him, the hostile forces were about equal.

"When this Union shall have been permanently dissolved, each division will be compelled to keep a standing army as large as it can support. The weaker section would naturally seek compensation in superior discipline. This would lead to the permanent creation of a large standing army ; and what one does; the other, in self-defence, would be compelled to do. It would not be safe or wise to rely upon militia to repel a sudden invasion. Men engaged in the peaceful pursuits of life must have time for consideration, and some discipline, before they can have confidence in each other, and possess courage to meet a disciplined foe. The weakness of a peaceful and un-

VALUE OF THE UNION. io

armed community was fully shown by the raid of old John Brown.

The condition of things on the continent of Europe proves the correctness of these views. France has a standing army of some seven hundred thousand men. Prussia, Austria, and Kussia, the same ; while that of Great Britain does not exceed three hundred thousand, and only some sixty thousand of these are kept at home. Were it not for her vast colonial possessions, and her general interference with continental affairs, her standing army, in time of peace, need not to exceed a hundred thousand men. The reason is, that her territory cannot be invaded by land, and she has the control at sea. "We are, while united, in a better condition, because a wide ocean lies between us and all other powerful nations. An invasion of our country, while united, would be idle, if not impossible. But when we are once divided, the condition of things is entirely changed, and our enemies are at our very doors, always ready and able to attack us ; and we must, of necessity, be able at all times to meet them. A standing army of a reasonable size, is not an evil but a benefit ; but one as large as a people can possibly sustain, is a most grievous burden. It takes too much from the industrial force of the country, gives rise to exorbitant taxation, and becomes dangerous to liberty.

§ 7. The evils of war.

The evils of war are not properly estimated by the great mass of men, because they are prone to see only its glories. History shows that, in general, the masses are the first to clamor for war, and the first to ask for peace. By sad experience they find out the dire effects of this destructive custom.

Aside from the terrible destruction of human life,* the effects of frequent wars, in a business and financial point of view, may

* The effect of the frequent wars among a portion of the States of South America has been to produce a great disparity between the number of the sexes. Lt. Gibbon, in his account of the exploration of the valley of the Amazon, under the direction of the Department of the Navy, speaking of the town of Santa Cruz, in Bolivia, says :

" The women are very pretty, and affectionate to their husbands. He chooses her from among Jive, there being about that number of women to one man in the town." (Vol. h\, p. 161.)

I know not the author of the following article, nor have I examined authorities to be appreciated by considering the present condition of the different powers of Europe. The plan of carrying on war by means of national loans, is of modern origin. The beginning of the national debt of Great Britain was occasioned by the war with Holland in 1672, (Hallam's Con. His., 452, note.) It was further increased by the nine years' unsuccessful war, which terminated at the peace of Eyswick, and much augmented by

prove the correctness of the statistics given ; but they are substantially correct in so far as my own recollection of history has enabled me to judge :

Havoc to Life by War. — It is difficult to conceive what fearful havoc this custom has made of human life. It has at times entirely depopulated immense districts. In modern, as well as ancient times, large tracts have been left so utterly desolate that a traveller might pass from village to village, even from city to city, without finding a solitary inhabitant. The war of 1756, waged in the heart of Europe, left in one instance no less than twenty contiguous villages without a single man or beast. The Thirty Years' War, in the seventeenth century, reduced the population of Germany from 12,000,000 to 4,000,000— three-fourths ; and that of Wirtemberg from 500,000 to 48,000 — more than nine-tenths ! Thirty thousand villages were destroyed ; in many others the population entirely died out ; and in districts once studded with towns and cities, there sprang up immense forests.

Look at the havoc of sieges, in that of Londonderry 12,000 soldiers, besides a vast number of inhabitants; in that of Paris, in the 16th century, 30,000 victims of mere hunger ; in that of Malplaquet, 34,000 soldiers alone ; in that of Ismael, 40,000 ; of Vienna, 70,000; of Ostend, 120,000; of Mexico, 150,000; of Acre, 300,000; of Carthage, 700,000 ; of Jerusalem, 1,000,000.

Mark the slaughter of single battles — at Lepanto, 25,000 ; at Austerlitz, 30,000 ; at Eylau, 60,000 ; at Waterloo and Quatre Bras, one engagement, in fact, 70,000 ; at Borodino, 80,000 ; at Fontenoy, 100,000 ; at Arbela, 300,000 ; at Chalons, 300,000 of Attila's army alone ; 400,000 Usipetes slain by Julius Caesar in one battle, and 430,000 Germans in another.

Take only two cases more : The army of Xerxes, says Dr. Dick, must have amounted to 5,283,320 ; and, if the attendants were only one-third as great as is common at the present in Eastern countries, the sum total must have reached nearly six millions. Yet in one year this vast multitude was reduced, though not entirely by death, to 300,000 fighting men ; and of these only 3,000 escaped destruction. Jenghiz- Khan, the terrible ravager of Asia in the 13th century, shot 90,000 on the plains of Nessa, and massacred 200,000 at the storming of Kharasm. In the district of Herat, he butchered 1,600,000, and in two cities with their dependencies, ], 760,000. During the last twenty-seven years of his long reign, he is said to have massacred more than half a million every year ; and in the first fourteen years he is supposed, by Chinese historians, to have destroyed not less than eighteen millions — a sum total of 32,000,000 in forty-one years.

In any view, what a fell destroyer is war ! Napoleon's wars sacrificed full six millions, and all the wars consequent on the French Revolution some nine or ten millions. The Spaniards are said to have destroyed in forty-two years more than twelve millions of American Indians. Grecian wars sacrificed 15,000,000; Jewish wars, 25,000,000 ; the wars of the twelve Caesars, 30,000,000 in all ; the wars of the Roman Empire, of the Saracens and the Turks, 60,000,000 each ; those of the Tartars, 89,000,- 000 ; those of Africa, 100,000,000 ! " If we take into consideration," says the learned Dr. Dick, " the number not only of those who have perished through the natural consequences of war, it will not perhaps be overrating the destruction of human life, if we affirm that one-tenth of the human race has been destroyed by the ravages of war, and, according to this estimate, more than fourteen thousand millions of human beings have been slaughtered in war since the beginning of the world." Edmund Burke went still further, and reckoned the sum total of its ravages, from the first, at no less than thirtyfive thousand millions.

the war of the grand alliance, commenced in 1702, for tlic succession to the crown of Spain.*

The immediate relief to the nation has led to the practice, in modern times, of creating national debts to defray the extraordinary expenses of war. What the ultimate result of such a practice may be, time alone can determine. But the amount of the national debts of the different countries of Europe has become so great, that it would seem almost impossible to increase them to any considerable extent. There must, in the nature of things, be a point beyond which the national credit cannot go ; and when that point shall have been reached, the nation will not only have to pay the expenses of new wars without the aid of further loans, but also, at the same time, pay the interest upon former loans, or repudiate. A resort to the latter alternative would effectually destroy the credit of the government, and lead to a discontinuance of the practice of national loans.

This practice of creating great national debts is a selfish one,

* " A -war of nine years, generally unfortunate, unsatisfactory in its results, carried on at a cost unknown to former times, amid the decay of trade, the exhaustion of resources, the decline, as their sums give reason to believe, of population itself, was the festering wound that turned a people's gratitude into factiousness and treachery." (Hallam's Con. His., p. 565.) The historian, on page 564, gives a detailed description of the financial condition of England, showing that " public credit sank so low, that in 1696 it was hardly possible to pay the fleet and army from month to month, and a total bankruptcy seemed near at hand. . . . Certainly the vessel of our Commonwealth has never been so close to shipwreck as in this period."

The war of the Grand Alliance produced results about as exhaustive. " The kingdom had been impoverished by twenty years of uninterruptedly augmented taxation, the annual burdens being triple in amount to those paid before the Revolution. Yet amid these sacrifices, we had the mortification of finding a debt rapidly increasing, whereof the mere interest far exceeded the ancient revenues of the crown, to be bequeathed, like an hereditary curse, to unknown ages." (Id., 608.) Though England had not been invaded, such was the state of distress produced by war, that the " population was at best stationary." France had suffered more severely. (Id., 609 ) During " the hundred years' war" between England and France, (1337 to 1453,) the sufferings of both nations were great, but those of France much greater. Twice France was upon the eve of becoming a dependency of the English crown.

"The nation, exhausted by the long wars of William and Anne, recovered strength in thirty years of peace that ensued ; and in that period, especially under the prudent rule of Walpole, the seeds of our commercial greatness were gradually ripened. It was evidently the most prosperous season that England had ever experienced .... In the war of 1743, which, from the selfish practice of relying wholly on loans, did not much retard the immediate advance of the country, and still more after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, a striking increase of wealth became perceptible." — (Hallam's Con. His., 656.)

16 VALUE Or THE UNION.

and of very doubtful utility. Besides the sore burdens entailed upon posterity to pay the annual interest, the practice encourages war, and leads to extravagance in public expenditures. The debt of Great Britain, in 1857, was some eight hundred millions of pounds sterling, and the annual expenses thereon some twenty-eight millions. In 1817 it was eight hundred and forty-eight millions. The debt has been reduced a few millions by the government taking advantage of the decline in the rate of interest. The debt of France, in 1859, was some seventeen hundred millions of dollars, and the annual charges thereon some one hundred millions. In 1814, it was only two hundred and forty millions. The enormous cost of war may be appreciated by the fact, that in the war with France, from 1793 to 1815, Great Britain increased her national debt from two hundred and thirty-nine to eight hundred and forty-eight millions of pounds sterling, the increase being about equal to three thousand millions of dollars. The population of Great Britain is some twenty-eight millions, and that of the United States some thirty-one millions ; and yet the annual interest upon her national debt is nearly double the yearly expenses of the Federal Government in time of peace.*

"We have escaped the frequent wars that have so much desolated Europe. This impunity has arisen from the advantages of our position. Although our fathers suffered many privations in the Revolution, they did not endure the extreme exhaustion

* " What are the chief sources of expense in every government ? What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the European nations are oppressed ? The answer plainly is, wars and rebellions ; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses of those institutions which relate to the more domestic police of a State, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with their different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures, (which will comprehend almost all the objects of State expenditure,) are insignificant in comparison with those that relate to the national defence. In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above one-fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned, the other fourteen-fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies." —(Hamilton, Federalist, No. 34, p. 160.)

It will be observed that these remarks were made by Hamilton before the enormous increase of the debt of England, arising from the twenty-one years' war with France, had occurred. They are, therefore, more just at this time than when they were made.

felt on the continent of Europe, particularly in France. Our country was new, rich in soil, and too extensive to be thoroughly overrun ; and there was, consequently, little or no starvation. France contributed one-twentieth of her entire population during the times of Napoleon, and lost one million seven hundred thousand men upon the field of battle. One-twentieth of our entire population during the Eevolution, would have given us an army of about one hundred and seventy-five thousand men, a greater number than we lost during that memorable period. In the late war with England our sufferings were comparatively slight. "We lost but few men in comparison to our population, and expended but a small amount of treasure, creating a national debt so small that the country, without exorbitant taxation, was enabled to pay it off in some sixteen years after the close of the war in 1815. But before the termination of the present unhappy contest, our people may know, perhaps, the real miseries of war, and be capable of estimating, with tolerable accuracy, the legitimate results of a permanent dissolution of the Union. This will be but one of many wars that must result in the future from such a misfortune.

§ 8. Effects of dissolution upon national credit.

"With a divided Union, each section being invadeable by land, the credit of each would be bad, and high interest upon national loans the necessary result. Great Britain can borrow money at three per cent., while France, and other powers on the continent, are compelled to pay from five to six. In the course of a few centuries, this disadvantage is severely felt. All the countries of Europe, invadeable by land, have been invaded within the present century ; and several of them more than once. Each successful invasion costs the country invaded about the labor of a generation, and destroys, for the time at least, the ability to pay the interest upon its bonds. People who invest their funds in government loans, are generally persons who seek repose in retirement from business, and who desire a safe and certain income. If they obtain only a low rate of interest, they can manage to live within their income, when the interest is punctually paid. Security, not profit, is their primary object.